Search

This paper examines how the dismantling of coercive institutions associated with the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 affected the distribution of rents from natural resource exports. It identifies the interplay between coercive institutions and natural resource rents as an important driver of local development. Using data from the 1996 census, the paper documents large income gaps between communities located just-inside and just-outside the former self-governing territories set aside for black inhabitants. Examining relative changes between 1996 and 2011, the paper finds that spatial income convergence was considerably stronger among marginalized communities with higher initial exposure to resource rents. These results accord with standard bargaining theory in which the dismantling of coercive institutions improves the negotiating position of unionized workers in the mining industry.

Endogenous order of moves in quantity choice is analyzed in a mixed oligopoly with one public firm, n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms. We consider the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in the context of a quantity setting mixed oligopoly where firms first choose the timing of choosing their quantities before quantity choice and find subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). The main results are that the public firm chooses to be a follower of all domestic private firms and not to be a leader of all foreign private firms, and that the number of SPNE depends on the number of domestic private firms and that of foreign private firms.

Now that import-substitution policies have failed and been discredited, there has been a shift in favor of interventions on behalf of export interests. The author argues that close scrutiny reveals these arguments to be as flawed as the old arguments for import substitution. Among other things, the author concludes that: 1) Under perfect competition, a country trying to retaliate against a trading partners export subsidies by instituting its own export subsidies, will only hurt itself. 2) The argument that export subsidies may be useful for neutralizing import tariffs, is spurious. In most practical situations, this is not possible. Removal of tariffs is a far superior policy. 3) In principle, a case can be made for protecting infant export industries in the presence of externalities. But the empirical relevance of externalities remains as illusory for export industries as it was for import-substituting industries. 4) Adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to the thinning of the market for credit insurance, but that is not a case for government intervention. 5) India's experience shows export subsidies to have little impact on exports. Brazil and Mexico's experience shows export subsidies to be a costly instrument of export diversification. 6) Those who argue that pro-export interventions were important in East Asia have not provided convincing evidence of a casual relationship between the interventions and growth.

Financial development has a major role in the sustainable economic growth of Central and Eastern European emerging countries, particularly after their political and structural changes. These changes required a reform of financial sectors of these countries, such as capital market development, banking privatisations and trade openness (TO). Moreover, emerging countries have opened too quickly to foreign competitors. Importantly, TO without financial openness is unlikely to contribute financial development. Therefore, this paper deals with banking sector analysis of the CEE emerging countries, which are still more bank based. Empirical results will show as which macroeconomic variables affect banking sector development in CEE countries. Different indicators of banking sector development will be used. Panel technique will be used to analyse panel data from 16 CEE countries during the period 1994–2007. Parameters of the panel data model will be estimated using GMM method.