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Background and Hypothesis Recovering from a first psychosis is a highly individual process and requires the person to make sense of their experiences. Clinicians, in turn, need to comprehend these first-person perspectives, creating a mutual sense-making dynamic. Antipsychotic medication is a substantial part of psychosis treatment. Providing insight in the lived experience of recovery with antipsychotics could improve the mutual understanding and help bridge the gap between the perspective of the clinician and that of the person recovering from psychosis. Study Design 14 persons in recovery from a first psychosis with the use of antipsychotics were interviewed. Their narratives were analyzed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Study Results Five overarching themes were found, representing important and meaningful experiences in recovering with antipsychotic medication. Theme 1: antipsychotics as external dampening (4 subthemes); Theme 2: shifting of realities ; Theme 3: pace of recovery ; Theme 4: antipsychotics' influence on identity ; and Theme 5: is it truly the antipsychotics? Conclusions Our findings show that recovery from psychosis with antipsychotics is an all-encompassing, multi-faceted, and ambivalent experience. The themes found in this research could inspire clinicians to discuss less obvious aspects of the experience of recovering with antipsychotics. Even more so, paying attention to the first-person perspective could lead to a more thorough understanding and benefit therapeutic relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This descriptive study presents a critical reflexive account of my research journey within a large-scale and long-lasting participatory project aimed at siting, developing and building a repository for low and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) in Belgium. While at the start of my employment I fostered ambitions to address several democratic deficits that our research team had identified in the participatory process and which had been brought to the fore by my predecessors over the years, this optimistic aim soon collided with the reality of top-down-oriented public participation in an institutionalised context. I draw on personal notes to elaborate on my evolution as a researcher with participatory, democratising and transformative aspirations. Several grounding principles of the ‘action research family’ provided me with a reflexive lens to engage in, analyse and comprehend the participatory process within the cAt-project, as well as to grasp the broader context of the project and to reflect on my own research practice. More importantly, in this article, the first-person perspective offers a critical lens through which to reflect on the democratising aspirations of action research and on the challenges researchers face in putting these aspirations into practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bodily illusions have been used to investigate one's sense of self and body ownership. This study explored the effect of the height of the first-person perspective (1PP) on out-of-body experience (OBE) illusion in which participants see their backs through a head-mounted display, receive visuotactile stimulation, and gradually feel as if they are sitting behind themselves, experiencing a sensation similar to an OBE. We hypothesized that increasing or decreasing the height of the 1PP would induce the OBE illusion at all heights and that participants' perceived own heights would adjust according to the 1PP height. We also predicted that the size and distance of external objects would vary according to the perceived height of one's own body. The results revealed that the OBE illusion occurred at all 1PP heights and was stronger when the 1PP height was lower or higher than usual. Meanwhile, the participants' perceived own heights, the sizes and distances of external objects did not change. These results suggest that manipulating the 1PP may affect the magnitude of the OBE illusion, but not the perception of the dimensions of the self or external objects. The height of 1PP may be one of the important factors in the bodily illusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Ketamine treatment has shown promising effects for different mental disorders. Yet, little is known on how people who receive ketamine for a psychiatric problem subjectively experience undergoing this intervention. We conducted a systematic literature search to identify relevant qualitative research on the first‐person experience of undergoing ketamine treatment in a psychiatric context. 24 eligible studies were identified and analysed using a thematic meta‐synthesis approach. Three main themes were identified. First, ‘The Ketamine treatment experience can be understood as a three‐stage journey with unique clinical features at each stage’. Second, ‘The subjective experience of acute ketamine treatment is multifaceted and complex’. Third, ‘Ketamine treatment can have different positive effects—but what happens if it does not work?’. In summary, the subjective experience of receiving ketamine treatment for a psychiatric problem can be understood as a journey whereby patients move towards, then undergo, and eventually depart from ketamine. Before treatment, the experiential focus lies on expectations, hopes, and feelings towards the drug. During treatment, the drug's multifaceted psychotropic effects and how they are emotionally appraised become central to experience. Once treatment is finished, the focus is on the presence or absence of clinically relevant effects. The conceptual framework we propose can guide further qualitative research on this topic and aid mental health professionals to better understand the experience of patients who undergo ketamine treatment for a psychiatric problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflection on the relationship between free will and consciousness has mainly revolved around Libet-style experiments, for example by criticizing the claim that conscious intentions never cause what we do. Less attention has been paid to whether this response captures the sense in which consciousness is relevant for free will, however. In this paper I argue that scholars seem to accept two assumptions they should reject: (1) that the relationship between free will and consciousness is best characterized in terms of conscious states and/or processes being part of the causal chain leading up to the action, and (2) that the third-person perspective is a suitable means to capturing the relationship between free will and consciousness. I provide an alternative proposal of how free will and consciousness may be related, in which an agent's self-understanding of what she is doing and why, while acting, takes center stage. In order to capture the relationship between the two, I argue, the first-person perspective should be investigated instead of explained away. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Linguistic discrimination is a complex phenomenon. How should it be investigated? Evidential pool is of key importance. In this paper, we present specific conceptual and methodological challenges in the study of linguistic discrimination, with a focus on linguistic discrimination resulting from implicit attitudes and the steadily growing research on biases and structural approaches to social injustice. We conclude by proposing that a productive and comprehensive way to investigate linguistic discrimination rooted in implicit attitudes should seek to incorporate first-person perspectives and testimonies from the linguistically harmed individuals, and discuss some arguments in support of this view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cinematic virtual reality (CVR) offers filmmakers a wide range of possibilities to explore new techniques regarding movie scripting, shooting and editing. Despite the many experiments performed so far both with both live action and computer-generated movies, just a few studies focused on analyzing how the various techniques actually affect the viewers' experience. Like in traditional cinema, a key step for CVR screenwriters and directors is to choose from which perspective the viewers will see the scene, the so-called point of view (POV). The aim of this paper is to understand to what extent watching an immersive movie from a specific POV could impact the narrative engagement (NE), i.e., the viewers' sensation of being immersed in the movie environment and being connected with its characters and story. Two POVs that are typically used in CVR, i.e., first-person perspective (1-PP) and external perspective (EP), are investigated through a user study in which both objective and subjective metrics were collected. The user study was carried out by leveraging two live action 360° short films with distinct scripts. The results suggest that the 1-PP experience could be more pleasant than the EP one in terms of overall NE and narrative presence, or even for all the NE dimensions if the potential of that POV is specifically exploited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article concludes the special section on vulnerability. By reflecting on the arguments in and the convergences between the contributions to the preceding trialogue, it outlines three key challenges in vulnerability research. Across disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological boundaries, the contributions agree in their criticism of negative, individualistic, and/or essentialist conceptualizations of vulnerability; instead, they call for a non-dualist, pluralist, and participative approach to vulnerability that takes the lived-through experience of individuals as its starting point. Based on this decision, the challenges arise of (1) how to conceptualize and identify the structures of lived-through experiences of vulnerability and of (2) how the experiences of individuals and groups in different social positions can be collected, understood, and interpreted. The trialogue texts, we argue, provide important impulses for the development of a multi-perspective methodology, which permits to analyze vulnerability in a way that is theoretically, ethically, and methodologically appropriate. Finally, by taking lived-through experience as a starting point, the articles in this special section (3) contribute to a better understanding of the contentious polysemy of the term vulnerability. By analyzing the constitutive ambivalence and ambiguity of experiences of vulnerability as well as the difficulties of intersubjective communicability, the contributions help to understand why articulations of vulnerability are often vague and why vulnerability can be politically instrumentalized. In this way, the comprehensive understanding of vulnerability (e.g., as positive and negative, enabling and inhibiting), promoted in the trialogue, also becomes a means of moral and political criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision accuracy is a crucial factor in the evaluation of refereeing performance. In sports research, officials' decision-making is frequently assessed outside real games through video-based decision experiments, where they evaluate recorded game situations from a third-person perspective. This study examines whether the inclusion of the first-person perspective influences decision accuracy and certainty. Twenty-four professional officials from the first and second German basketball leagues participated in the study. The officials assessed 50 game situations from both first-person and third-person perspectives, indicating their decisions and certainty levels. The statistical analysis utilises signal detection theory to evaluate the efficacy of the first-person perspective compared to the third-person perspective in identifying rule violations and no-calls in video recordings. The findings indicate that the first-person perspective does not yield superior accuracy in identifying foul calls. However, scenes from the first-person perspective exhibit a significant 9% increase in correctly identifying no-calls. Furthermore, officials report significantly higher levels of decision certainty and comfort when using the first-person perspective. The study suggests that sports officials may benefit from incorporating additional scenes from the first-person perspective into video-based decision training. Future studies should explore whether this additional perspective improves the training effect and translates into enhanced in-game performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature and Moral Feeling argued that ethics is best understood as a constraint on egocentric self-interest. That constraint is specified variously by groups or individuals who set parameters differently within common ethical principles, and who use a range of emotion-guided narrative genres to imagine and evaluate possible actions. Though it covers many ethical concerns (collectively termed "morality"), this account leaves out fairness (alternatively, justice). The following essay seeks to make up for that deficit. Framing its analysis by reference to a well-known problem in Milton's Paradise Lost, it distinguishes two systems of ethical response organized around first- and third-person perspectives. Like the first-person concerns of morality, third person concerns of justice are specified by setting parameters within common principles. In treating these principles and parameters, the essay articulates cognitive and affective components of third-person ethical evaluation. These, then, help to resolve the problem with Milton's poem. That resolution, in turn, suggests further complications in the account of ethical evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two basic aspects of attentional control. The ability to direct attention toward different objects is typically experienced as a fundamental indicator of attentional freedom. One can control what one attends to and directing attention is a relatively simple task. In contrast, sustaining attention on a chosen object proves to be difficult as mind-wandering seems to be inevitable. Does the problem of sustaining attention, mean that we are fundamentally unfree? We discuss this issue in light of an introspective study of directing and sustaining attention, looking specifically into the question of whether it is possible to experience the source of attention, i.e., the subject enacting freedom through attention. The study involved six persons performing different attention tasks over the course of about a month. Common experiences and contrasting reports are presented. This forms the basis for a discussion of the method of introspection and in particular of how to approach conflicting reports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distinction between the first-person perspective (1PP) and the third-person perspective (3PP) has been widely regarded as fundamental and rigid, and many researchers hold that genuine bodily illusions can only be experienced from the 1PP. We applied VR technology to investigate whether this mainstream view is correct. In our experiments, the participants were immersed in a VR environment in which they saw a life-sized virtual body either from the 1PP or from the 3PP. They either passively received tactile stimulations and/or actively interacted with a virtual soccer ball. Our VR system created novel visuo-motor-tactile correlations between the real and the virtual world: when the participant interacted with a real plastic soccer ball, he/she would feel corresponding tactile sensations and see the avatar performing the exact same movements. We found that a clear sense of ownership over the avatar was induced not only in the 1PP condition but also in the Passive-3PP and the Active-3PP conditions. We also observed evidence suggesting that it is possible to experience one's body-location, 1PP-location, as well as self-location, both from the 1PP and from the 3PP. Together, we demonstrate that there is in fact no fundamental gap between embodied 1PP and embodied 3PP in the virtual world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: As one of the most common psychological problems, social anxiety disorder (SAD) has lots of negative effects on the physical and mental development of individuals, such as decreasing the quality of interpersonal relationships, and even causing depression, suicidal ideation, etc., as well as leads individuals to generate mental illness stigma. The mental illness stigma that individuals perceive affects not only how they perceive themselves (first-person perspective) but also how they perceive others' appraisals of them (third-person perspective), which further exacerbates their anxiety symptoms. Objective: The study aims to explore the self-processing characteristics of individuals with social anxiety disorder from the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective. Methods: This study adopted the self-referential paradigm to conduct the recognition memory test on individuals with social anxiety disorder (30 participants in experiment 1) and individuals without social anxiety disorder (31 participants in experiment 2) in the two experiments. Results: In experiment 1, the recognition rate of individuals with social anxiety disorder under the self-appraisals condition was significantly higher than that under the condition of appraisals on mothers; in the three conditions of self-appraisals, appraisals on mothers and mothers' reflected appraisals, the recognition rate of negative trait adjectives was significantly higher than that of positive trait adjectives. In experiment 2, there was no significant difference in recognition rate of individuals without social anxiety disorder under the three conditions, and the recognition rate of positive trait adjectives was significantly higher than that of negative trait adjectives under the three conditions. Conclusion: Individuals with social anxiety disorder have a negative bias in selfprocessing and are more likely to focus on self-information, which is different from the self-positive bias of individuals without social anxiety disorder. This study can be beneficial to know the self-cognitive characteristics of individuals with social anxiety disorder, help them get rid of negative cognitive patterns, and remove the mental illness stigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two basic aspects of attentional control. The ability to direct attention toward different objects is typically experienced as a fundamental indicator of attentional freedom. One can control what one attends to and directing attention is a relatively simple task. In contrast, sustaining attention on a chosen object proves to be difficult as mind-wandering seems to be inevitable. Does the problem of sustaining attention, mean that we are fundamentally unfree? We discuss this issue in light of an introspective study of directing and sustaining attention, looking specifically into the question of whether it is possible to experience the source of attention, i.e., the subject enacting freedom through attention. The study involved six persons performing different attention tasks over the course of about a month. Common experiences and contrasting reports are presented. This forms the basis for a discussion of the method of introspection and in particular of how to approach conflicting reports.

Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective.

To design an online real-time transmission tool of irst-person perspective information. This information transmission tool is designed to help medical staff monitor the patient's condition changes and respond quickly, ensuring the patient's life safety. (本研究设计一种第一视角信息在线实时传输工具, 旨在方便医务人员第一时间监测到患者的病情变化趋势并迅速做出反应, 保障患者的生命安全。)

Persons are natural beings, but they probably do not constitute a natural kind. So how should a philosophical naturalist conceive of them? This article begins by critiquing different views on the nature of persons put forward by animalist, Eric T. Olson, medical ethicist, Mary Anne Warren, and common-sense metaphysician, Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker's views are of primary interest, as she initially offered a naturalist-friendly account of persons which later morphed into an anti-naturalist position. A naturalist account is proposed based on organisms having the properties of consciousness and intentionality that borrows from and modifies all three earlier views. The proposed account identifies three different kinds of persons. Kinds of persons are differentiated from each other by their serious capacity for one of three different forms of intentionality. The three different forms of intentionality identified are basic intentionality, enriched (or social) intentionality, and the intentionality required for a fully developed first-person perspective. Limitations of the proposal are explained, criticisms of the proposal are addressed and advantages of the proposal are enumerated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unprecedented advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) have given rise to ethical questions about how to recognize and respect autonomy and a sense of agency of the personhood when those capacities are themselves disordered, as they typically are in patients with DoC. At the intersection of these questions rests the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Indeed, evaluations of consciousness levels and capacity for recovery have a significant impact on decisions regarding whether to discontinue or prolong life-sustaining therapy for DoC patients. However, in the unconsciousness domain, there is the confusing array of terms that are regularly used interchangeably, making it quite challenging to comprehend what unconsciousness is and how it might be empirically grounded. In this opinion paper, we will provide a brief overview of the state of the field of unconsciousness and show how a rapidly evolving electroencephalogram (EEG) neuroimaging technique may offer empirical, theoretical, and practical tools to approach unconsciousness and to improve our ability to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness and also nonconsciousness with greater precision, particularly in cases that are borderline (as is typical in patients with DoC). Furthermore, we will provide a clear description of three distant notions of (un)consciousness (unconsciousness, nonconsciousness, and subconsciousness) and discuss how they relate to the experiential selfhood which is essential for comprehending the moral significance of what makes life worth living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Autism Voices study draws on novel inclusive methods to obtain the first-person experiences of autistic youth with a range of cognitive and verbal abilities. Thirty-one autistic youth were interviewed with a strength-based protocol, enabling them to provide responses in the modality of their choice. Dynamics between youth and their environments such as home, school, and community were explored. Youth were questioned about their interests, plans for the future, experiences with various emotions, and experience of autism. Based on a thematic analysis, six themes emerged: (1) autistic identities, (2) thinking about the future, (3) seeking social connection on their own terms, (4) seeking autonomy, (5) school as both a stressor and social facilitator, and (6) experiences of stress and anxiety. The experiences described by autistic youth parallel many of the aspirations and challenges of typically developing adolescents, while being uniquely shaped by their autism. We discuss how these insights shared by autistic youth can facilitate active involvement in their communities, promote well-being, and promote optimal transition into adulthood. Autism Voices demonstrates that partnering with multiple stakeholders and the use of inclusive methodologies are pivotal steps toward capturing the voices of all autistic youth. Currently, our understanding of the adolescent period for autistic youth has relied on the expertise of researchers, clinicians, parents, and teachers, yet rarely involves their unique first-person experiences. Our study attempted to understand the experiences and perspectives of autistic adolescents in their home, school, and community environments using the Autism Voices protocol, a semi-structured interview specifically designed and tailored to engage with autistic youth with various language and intellectual levels. The analysis of the 31 interviews conducted with autistic adolescents aged 11–18 years highlighted six themes: (1) autistic identities, (2) thinking about the future, (3) seeking social connection on their own terms, (4) seeking autonomy, (5) school as both a stressor and social facilitator, and (6) experiences of stress and anxiety. These results highlight similarities and differences in the adolescent experiences of autistic youth compared to their typically developing peers. Our findings suggest that by removing assumptions about the experiences of autistic individuals and investing in inclusive interview methods, we can faithfully capture the experiences of autistic youth regardless of their communication and cognitive abilities. Being able to capture and amplify these diverse voices will facilitate the active involvement of autistic communities in research and clinical and policy decisions that impact them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their recent book Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction, Pérez and Gomila present a novel way of understanding our ability to attribute mental states to others based on what they call second-person interactions. This article problematizes the conceptualization and the explanatory role this type of interactions might play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As Virtual Reality (VR) technology has improved in hardware, accessibility of development and availability of applications, its interest has increased. However, the problem of Cybersickness (CS) still remains, causing uncomfortable symptoms in users. Therefore, this research seeks to identify and understand new CS mitigation strategies that can contribute to developer guidelines. Three hypotheses for strategies were devised and tested in an experiment. This involved a physical travel interface for flying through a Virtual Environment (VE) as a Control (CT) condition. On top of this, three manipulation conditions referred to as Gaze-tracking Vignette (GV), First-person Perspective with members representation (FP) and Fans and Vibration (FV) were applied. The experiment was between subjects, with 37 participants randomly allocated across conditions. According to the Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) scores, significant evidence was found that GV and FP made CS worse. Evidence was also found that FV did not have an effect on CS. However, from the physiological data recorded, an overall lowering of heart rate for FV indicated that it might have some effect on the experience, but cannot be strongly linked with CS. Additionally, comments from some participants identified that they experienced symptoms consistent with CS. Amongst these, dizziness was the most common, with a few having issues with the usability of the travel interface. Despite some CS symptoms, most participants reported little negative impact of CS on the overall experience and feelings of immersion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine the metaphilosophical relevance of the phenomenon of sleep, suggesting that it has the potential to not only enrich the analysis of limit cases but also to test some of the ideas concerning the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology and its limits. Insofar as sleeping allows for both a first personal and a third personal description and challenges the usual primacy of the first-person point of view, exploring sleeping under the prism of its import for the phenomenological method allows to illuminate the relationships between a first personal transcendental phenomenology and a third personal naturalized one. We do this by examining Husserl’s treatment of sleep as a limit-case, and the problem of accounting for deep sleep from a first-personal perspective. Drawing from a Heidegger-inspired account of sleep, we argue that sleep demands for a type of approach that can be fairly described as ontological, and which reveals a new understanding of subjectivity as a dynamic unity of different modes of being. Although this approach challenges a first-personal based approach, it does not, however support the naturalization of phenomenology or undermine the project of a transcendental philosophy of experience.

Neurotechnologies broadly understood are tools that have the capability to read, record and modify our mental activity by acting on its brain correlates. The emergence of increasingly powerful and sophisticated techniques has given rise to the proposal to introduce new rights specifically directed to protect mental privacy, freedom of thought, and mental integrity. These rights, also proposed as basic human rights, are conceived in direct relation to tools that threaten mental privacy, freedom of thought, mental integrity, and personal identity. In this paper, our goal is to give a philosophical foundation to a specific right that we will call right to mental integrity. It encapsulates both the classical concepts of privacy and non-interference in our mind/brain. Such a philosophical foundation refers to certain features of the mind that hitherto could not be reached directly from the outside: intentionality, first-person perspective, personal autonomy in moral choices and in the construction of one's narrative, and relational identity. A variety of neurotechnologies or other tools, including artificial intelligence, alone or in combination can, by their very availability, threaten our mental integrity. Therefore, it is necessary to posit a specific right and provide it with a theoretical foundation and justification. It will be up to a subsequent treatment to define the moral and legal boundaries of such a right and its application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: As a unique part of human thinking, people can project themselves into the past or the future for mental time travel. This study attempts to expand the temporal self into the domain of the collective self. Methods: We used an adapted temporal collective self-reference paradigm to probe into the positivity bias of temporal collective self in this study. In Experiment 1, the first-person perspective was adopted for the participants to conduct the temporal collective self-reference processing, and the third-person perspective was adopted for the temporal collective self-reference processing in Experiment 2. Results: The findings indicated that no matter from the first-person perspective or the third-person perspective, people show positivity bias in the trait adjectives judgment, response times and recognition rates during the temporal collective self-processing. Discussion: This study explores mental time travel on the level of collective self, and contributes to deepening the understanding of temporal collective self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We usually observe ourselves from two perspectives. One is the first‐person perspective, which we perceive directly with our own eyes, and the other is the third‐person perspective, which we observe ourselves in a mirror or a picture. However, whether the self‐recognition associated with these two perspectives has a common or separate neural basis remains unclear. To address this, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine brain activity while participants viewed pretaped video clips of themselves and others engaged in meal preparation taken from first‐person and third‐person perspectives. We found that the first‐person behavioral videos of the participants and others induced greater activation in the premotor‐intraparietal region. In contrast, the third‐person behavioral videos induced greater activation in the default mode network compared with the first‐person videos. Regardless of the perspective, the videos of the participants induced greater activation in the salience network than the videos of others. On the other hand, the videos of others induced greater activation in the precuneus and lingual gyrus than the videos of the participants. These results suggest that the salience network is commonly involved in self‐recognition from both perspectives, even though the brain regions involved in action observation for the two perspectives are distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Micro‐phenomenology is a method that generates rich and reliable reports of singular experiences in their pre‐reflective dimension. Usually it is employed using a second‐person interviewer. In this study we attempted to train naïve subjects in using self‐inquiry version of the method. 13 subjects met twice over the course of one week, investigating their experiences of headaches, looking specifically into the pain experience itself, the experience of suffering, and the experience of absence of suffering. The analysis showed that the subject reports increase the richness of description, measured by the increase in the amount of categories described and the number of words needed to give an on target description. The analysis, informed by the participant's ideas, showed that it was possible to distinguish the experience of pain from the experience of suffering. We compare the analysis to other phenomenological studies of headaches. This reveals the strength and weakness of the micro‐phenomenological method: By de‐focusing on contextual factors it enables in‐depth descriptions of singular moments of experience, but the bracketing of interpretations may result in overlooking overarching meaning dimensions. We conclude that micro‐phenomenological self‐inquiry may potentially be employed successfully in a clinical setting with initially untrained subjects for describing certain kinds of experiences and answering complex phenomenological questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents and discusses the method of micro-phenomenological self-inquiry. Micro-phenomenology is usually performed with two persons, one interviewer and one interviewee. Micro-phenomenological self-inquiry consists of one person investigating their own experience. The different aspects of the regular micro-phenomenological interview are reviewed in relation to the process of self-inquiry. Examples of recent studies that apply micro-phenomenological self-inquiry are presented. Finally, there is a discussion of some methodological problems and objections. Advantages and disadvantages of micro-phenomenological self-inquiry are considered. Suggestions are given for what kind of research and research contexts that micro-phenomenological self-inquiry may be particularly suitable for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has manifold negative consequences for people around the world, of which the psychosocial ones have been rather underrepresented in the public eye. Regarding social distancing measures, there is already some experimental work demonstrating that the use of face masks has detrimental effects on various aspects of social cognition such as emotion reading, face identification, and perceived closeness of persons. However, while these findings provide important clues, they do not shed light on what people experience when interacting in real life in a masked society. Therefore, in critical distance to cognitivist accounts and taking Direct Social Perception (DSP) approaches seriously, we developed a first-person experimental design and conducted a study with thirty-four participants in a dyadic setting with two conditions (without vs. with face mask). Data were analyzed with mixed methods including in-depth qualitative coding at three levels, code relations analyses, and various statistical tests. Results yielded significant differences across conditions at all qualitative levels, comprising, for example, expressive behavior, and, in particular, significant decreases of content-independent, complimentary mental micro-activities. In the context of DSP, we argue in the paper that these activities suggest the constitution of a quasi-sensory modality - conceived as I-Thou sense - that oscillates between strongly and weakly embodied mental activities, as the analyses show. In sum, this study suggests that mask-wearing impairs both functional directions of mental activity in relation to more or less embodied experience and thus intervenes deeply in fundamental processes of social perception and interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has manifold negative consequences for people around the world, of which the psychosocial ones have been rather underrepresented in the public eye. Regarding social distancing measures, there is already some experimental work demonstrating that the use of face masks has detrimental effects on various aspects of social cognition such as emotion reading, face identification, and perceived closeness of persons. However, while these findings provide important clues, they do not shed light on what people experience when interacting in real life in a masked society. Therefore, in critical distance to cognitivist accounts and taking Direct Social Perception (DSP) approaches seriously, we developed a first-person experimental design and conducted a study with thirty-four participants in a dyadic setting with two conditions (without vs. with face mask). Data were analyzed with mixed methods including in-depth qualitative coding at three levels, code relations analyses, and various statistical tests. Results yielded significant differences across conditions at all qualitative levels, comprising, for example, expressive behavior, and, in particular, significant decreases of content-independent, complimentary mental micro-activities. In the context of DSP, we argue in the paper that these activities suggest the constitution of a quasi-sensory modality – conceived as I-Thou sense – that oscillates between strongly and weakly embodied mental activities, as the analyses show. In sum, this study suggests that mask-wearing impairs both functional directions of mental activity in relation to more or less embodied experience and thus intervenes deeply in fundamental processes of social perception and interaction.

In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers (J Conscious Stud 25(9–10):6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is not incoherent, even if it is implausible and empirically false. Our paper argues against this: strong illusionism is poorly established. The first part presents the reasoning leading to strong illusionism; i.e., it describes the initial conditions and relations among them for its establishment. The second part of the paper argues that strong illusionism is not constructed in a satisfactory way and calls the flaw in establishing it the pre-illusion problem. The third part demonstrates that the existing defense of strong illusionism does not save it from the pre-illusion problem, while the fourth part of the paper outlines two strategies to fight the pre-illusion problem, concluding, however, that they fail to do so, and indicates one possible way in which illusionism might be, nevertheless, coherently established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with the relationship between the first-person perspective and the experience of linguistic repetition in processes of contextualization and integration. The sense of a sign's repeatability has to do with our own historicity. An act of repetition involves a subjectively experienced lived-through sense of sameness that cannot be encapsulated by the idea of form-meaning pairings or type and token. From a phenomenological perspective I argue that a sign gets its perceived identity from its experienced appearances. That in the sign which becomes repeatable is exactly that which is the identity in all of its appearances. The fact that this identity can come forward is the sine qua non condition for the sign's continuous revitalization. The relevance of the existential implications of the phenomenon of repetition for integrational linguistics is also considered. • The spatio-temporal embeddedness of the language-making agent in particular communicational circumstances is accompanied by the inner time-consciousness that structures action, perception, and contextualization. • Linguistic experience is constituted by the sense of unity, continuity, and self-awareness provided by the inner time-consciousness. • To perform an act of linguistic repetition is to recognize identity in the different appearances of the intended sign. • The intending subject and the intended object can be distinguished but should not be studied separately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to introduce a new solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity. This solution is provided by utilising a number of theses within the field of contemporary metaphysics in order to establish a conceptual basis for a novel account and model of the doctrine of the Trinity termed Monarchical Aspectivalism, which will provide the means for proposing an alternative reading of the Athanasian Creed that is free from any consistency problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper considers a polemic thesis that Viveiros de Castro’s Amerindian perspectivism is characterized by the overcoming of the first-person perspective. Multi-natural cosmological deictic figures instead of the first-person perspective. This opposes the latter to the perspective of transcendental philosophy. The thesis of multiple worlds is an interpretation of the indigenous perspective which is determined, among other themes, by its point of view toward the West. It implies that Amerindian perspectivism should be understood as resistance to naturalism, akin to phenomenology’s origin as it is conceived in eco-phenomenology. The ontological turn of anthropology is the most concerted attempt to formulate an anthropological version of Husserl’s reduction that reduces the division of first and third-person perspectives to reveal the indigenous cosmological deictics. The opponents of the ontological turn oppose it to phenomenology.

To encode allocentric space information of a viewing object, it is important to relate perceptual information in the first-person perspective to the representation of an entire scene which would be constructed before. A substantial number of studies investigated the constructed scene information (e.g., cognitive map). However, only few studies have focused on its influence on perceptual processing. Therefore, we designed a visually guided saccade task requiring monkeys to gaze at objects in different locations on different backgrounds clipped from large self-designed mosaic pictures (parental pictures). In each trial, we presented moving backgrounds prior to object presentations, indicating a frame position of the background image on a parental picture. We recorded single-unit activities from 377 neurons in the posterior inferotemporal (PIT) cortex of two macaques. Equivalent numbers of neurons showed space-related (119 of 377) and object-related (125 of 377) information. The space-related neurons coded the gaze locations and background images jointly rather than separately. These results suggest that PIT neurons represent a particular location within a particular background image. Interestingly, frame positions of background images on parental pictures modulated the space-related responses dependently on parental pictures. As the frame positions could be acquired by only preceding visual experiences, the present results may provide neuronal evidence of a mnemonic effect on current perception, which might represent allocentric object location in a scene beyond the current view. • Neurons in the primate ventral visual pathway also encode spatial information. • The spatial signal reflects a background image at a current gaze location. • This view-center background signal can provide allocentric location information. • Preceding visual experiences modulate the current sensory signal of a background. • The modulation may be involved in scene construction process beyond current vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unprecedented advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) have given rise to ethical questions about how to recognize and respect autonomy and a sense of agency of the personhood when those capacities are themselves disordered, as they typically are in patients with DoC. At the intersection of these questions rests the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Indeed, evaluations of consciousness levels and capacity for recovery have a significant impact on decisions regarding whether to discontinue or prolong life-sustaining therapy for DoC patients. However, in the unconsciousness domain, there is the confusing array of terms that are regularly used interchangeably, making it quite challenging to comprehend what unconsciousness is and how it might be empirically grounded. In this opinion paper, we will provide a brief overview of the state of the field of unconsciousness and show how a rapidly evolving electroencephalogram (EEG) neuroimaging technique may offer empirical, theoretical, and practical tools to approach unconsciousness and to improve our ability to distinguish consciousness from unconsciousness and also nonconsciousness with greater precision, particularly in cases that are borderline (as is typical in patients with DoC). Furthermore, we will provide a clear description of three distant notions of (un)consciousness (unconsciousness, nonconsciousness, and subconsciousness) and discuss how they relate to the experiential selfhood which is essential for comprehending the moral significance of what makes life worth living.