Search

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of knowledge management on the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises during the COVID-19 period in Indonesia. Furthermore, the study also highlights the role of digital variables such as digital capability, digital orientation, and digital innovation as mediating variables. A total of 247 valid responses were collected for this study through the survey conducted among managers of SMEs in Indonesia. The collected data were analyzed using Structural Equation Modeling with the Partial Least Squares approach. The study’s findings revealed several significant insights. It established the positive impact of knowledge management on digital capability, digital orientation, and digital innovation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the study identified digital capability as a mediating factor between knowledge management and SMEs’ performance. However, the full support for the mediating roles of digital orientation and digital innovation in the relationship between knowledge management and SME performance was not confirmed, suggesting potential context-specific variations. This implies that the influence of knowledge management on SMEs’ performance is mainly channeled through digital capability. The research underscores the importance of knowledge management and digital factors in shaping SMEs’ performance, particularly in the challenging context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This study examines the impact of digital capabilities and digital orientation on the digital transformation and digital innovation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, this study assesses how the role of digital transformation and digital innovation mediates the relationship between digital capabilities, digital orientation, and SME performance during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a sample of 247 SMEs managers, data were analyzed using the structural equation modeling with a partial least square approach. The findings demonstrate the significant and positive influence of digital capability and orientation on SMEs’ digital transformation and innovation during the pandemic. Additionally, the study confirms that digital transformation and innovation positively affect SMEs’ performance during the pandemic. Furthermore, the study reveals that digital transformation and innovation mediate the relationship between digital orientation and capability on SMEs’ performance during the pandemic. However, digital innovation was not found to significantly mediate the link between digital capability and SMEs’ performance.

This paper attempts to explore the motives behind merger and acquisition strategy of Indian corporates. Covering the domestic activity over two decades, 1998--2017, the firm-level determinants of acquiring and acquired firms are studied to analyze the merger motives. The results from Logit and discrete-time hazard model show that firms with higher technological and financial productivity are more likely to go for acquisitions. On the other hand, firms that have potential to grow in the future but are struggling at present owing to low profits or losses are more likely to be acquired. The managements of firms that are not actively involved in research activities are also likely to be replaced. The findings of the article, therefore, suggest that Indian firms are using mergers for expansionary and efficiency-enhancing motives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the proof-of-work consensus protocol serve its intended purpose of supporting decentralized cryptocurrency mining? To address this question, we develop a game-theoretical model in which miners first invest in hardware to improve the efficiency of their operations and then compete for mining rewards in a rent-seeking game. We show that centralization grows with heterogeneity in mining costs, but hardware capacity constraints prevent the most efficient miners from monopolizing the mining process. Investment leads to a more decentralized network unless larger miners have a significant comparative advantage in acquiring new hardware. Our model generates empirically supported implications: (i) mining centralization is countercyclical with respect to mining reward, and (ii) a change in mining reward leads to a less-than-proportional change in hash rates. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Special Section of Management Science: Blockchains and Crypto Economics. Supplemental Material: The data file is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4840. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of competition. We lay out the conditions under which it is profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases need not improve social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In production economies with incomplete markets, shareholders disagree about the objective of the firm. We show that a weak financial intermediary, who is unable to complete markets, can offer just enough spanning to resolve this disagreement. The intermediary is limited to offering one customized contract per consumer. Knowledge of demand functions is sufficient for offering the right contracts. Once agreement among shareholders is reached, productive efficiency is restored, which in turn permits a Pareto efficient market outcome. This result shows that the first welfare theorem does not depend on complete spanning, but merely on institutions that provide the right span. However, this cannot be said about the second welfare theorem: For some wealth distributions, equilibria with transfers fail to exist due to nonconvexities caused by market incompleteness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of competition. We lay out the conditions under which it is profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases need not improve social welfare.

A long-standing question is whether differences in management practices across firms can explain differences in productivity, especially in developing countries where these spreads appear particularly large. To investigate this, we ran a management field experiment on large Indian textile firms. We provided free consulting on management practices to randomly chosen treatment plants and compared their performance to a set of control plants. We find that adopting these management practices raised productivity by 17% in the first year through improved quality and efficiency and reduced inventory, and within three years led to the opening of more production plants. Why had the firms not adopted these profitable practices previously? Our results suggest that informational barriers were the primary factor explaining this lack of adoption. Also, because reallocation across firms appeared to be constrained by limits on managerial time, competition had not forced badly managed firms to exit.

Traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable, output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand). Alternatively, a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price, also known as the Cournot–Bertrand model. When the choice of strategic variable is endogenous, the established dominant strategy is output competition. A growing body of work demonstrates, however, that the Cournot–Bertrand outcome can be a subgame‐perfect Nash equilibrium in the presence of market asymmetries. Observations of real‐world markets consistent with Cournot–Bertrand behavior bolster justification for the model and have stimulated an impressive and evolving literature on advances and applications. We lay out the roots of the Cournot–Bertrand model and explore a number of model developments. We categorize 12 primary models in the literature based on alternative assumptions. In particular, some authors consider when the timing of play as well as the choice of strategic variable are endogenous. Altogether, this research identifies when Cournot–Bertrand behavior can emerge in a dynamic setting and under alternative market conditions. We also review the Cournot–Bertrand model applications in the fields of international economics, industrial organization, labor, and public economics. We expect the literature to continue to expand in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assess the theoretical underpinnings and associated empirical findings of the three-stage sigmoid-curve relationship between degree of internationalization (DOI) and performance by re-examining the results reported in one of the prominent studies in the literature. We further conduct our own analyses of 23,474 observations of 2,620 US manufacturing firms over the period 1976-2008 and account for self-selection of firms into different degrees of internationalization by using a generalized propensity score estimator. Both sets of results show that the relationship between DOI and performance conforms to a mostly negative sigmoid curve and does not support the three-stage theorization. Further examination reveals that two major conceptual and empirical shortcomings underlie the disparity between the theoretical predictions of the three-stage model and these empirical findings. First, whereas theory relies overwhelmingly on enhanced scale of operations as a causal mechanism through which internationalization contributes to performance, empirical studies preclude proper identification of scale-related benefits. Second, theory and empirics tend to confuse temporary difficulties experienced upon entry into international markets with examining the benefits realizable at different levels of DOI, regardless of the firm’s short-term difficulties in realizing those benefits. Our empirical results show that correcting for each of these shortcomings contributes to diminishing the theory-empirics gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using new data on entry plans into the American casino industry, I find that incumbent firms invest in physical capacity when threatened with a nearby entry plan, and these strategic investments deter eventual entry. Consistent with an entry-deterrence motive, incumbents respond to the threat of entry when entry is uncertain, but not when entry is assured. The average capacity expansion of 2,300 square feet is associated with a 6.8-percentage-point greater likelihood that the entry plan fails. These findings show that investments in deterrence are viable, especially when new entrants face other significant barriers to entry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that partial equity ownership of a rival firm reduces product market competition. Acquisitions of a minority equity stake in rival firms are followed by higher output prices and higher industry profits, particularly when barriers to entry are high. Stock-price reactions of nonparticipating competitors of the acquirer and target are positive while announcement returns of customer firms are negative. Moreover, announcement returns of rivals are significantly higher and those of customers weakly lower when the customer industry is more competitive and when the acquirer and target are larger firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relational contracts literature suggests that a principal can improve contract self-enforceability by specifying initial requirements that increase the agent’s ex post rents. Initial requirements specified in hotel franchise agreements—size and quality tier of the hotel—offer a unique empirical setting to test this. Using proprietary data on 5,547 new franchised hotels and their revenues, we find that hotels far away from their franchisor’s headquarters are larger, more likely to belong to a high quality tier, and generate higher revenues ex post. This supports the idea that the agent’s ex post rents can serve as a substitute to the principal’s monitoring intensity in the mitigation of agency problems. Our findings shed light on how formal contract terms can influence informal (relational) contracts between business partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If overstatements were a symptom of the agency conflict, pay-for-performance sensitivities should have increased in response to the additional penalties for misreporting imposed by SOX. Our finding of their decrease is inconsistent with the view that overstatements were an unintended consequence of incentive pay prior to 2002. To corroborate our interpretation, we show that (i) CEO pay-for-performance sensitivities are higher among firms whose shareholders stand to benefit from overstatements; (ii) this cross-sectional relationship weakens significantly after SOX; and (iii) the within-firm decrease in pay-for-performance sensitivity is most pronounced among firms with high pre-SOX shareholder benefits from overstatements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philanthropic venture capital (PhVC), like traditional venture capital (TVC), provides funding and value-added services to a portfolio of entrepreneurial firms. However, TVC differs from PhVC, as the primary goal of TVC is to maximize the economic return of its investments. In contrast, PhVC firms expect their portfolio companies to perform well in terms of both social and economic returns. Using both American and European firms, this paper explores and compares the human capital in PhVC and TVC firm founders. Our results show that there are key differences in both general and specific human capital between these firm types. While both TVC and PhVC firm founders have high levels of commercial experience, TVC firm founders tend to hold degrees in science, engineering, business, and law more frequently than PhVC firm founders. PhVC founders also differ from TVC founders by having greater work experience in the social sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In production economies with incomplete markets, shareholders disagree about optimal production plans, and there is no natural objective of the firm. From a normative perspective, the firm should choose plans that lead to a constrained Pareto efficient allocation. From a positive perspective, all decisions of the firm should be supported by a majority of shareholders. This paper asks whether one can design objectives for the firm that meet both normative and positive criteria. The answer is negative: Constrained efficient production plans would generically be turned down by a majority of shareholders. This finding is related to the generic nonexistence of Makowski equilibria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a means towards revealing both the strategic and the day-to-day operational practicalities of managing a 'responsible business', this paper reports on research conducted over an extended period in the John Lewis Partnership (JLP). This is a major retail organization based in the UK which operates at scale (90,000 employees and annual sales of £11 billion). It has sustained itself as an employee-owned enterprise for nearly a century, and it makes explicit claims to conduct itself in a 'responsible manner' which differs markedly from the notions of responsibility maintained by many conventional businesses. But what do these commitments mean in practice and what compromises, if any, do they entail or require, and crucially how are these tensions managed? We find that there are many lessons that conventional organizations could learn from this case, and yet we also show that the process of managing in this responsible way is a practical accomplishment that requires considerable conceptual and applied skills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes a variation of the secretary problem in which two selectors with different fields of interest each want to appoint one of the n candidates with as much expertise as possible in their field. Selectors simultaneously vote to accept or reject: Unanimous decisions are respected, and candidates with a split decision are hired with probability p. Each candidate arrives with expertise x and y in the two fields, uniformly and independently distributed on [0, 1] and observable to both selectors. If a candidate with expertise pair ( x, y) is hired by unanimous decision, the payoffs to the selectors are simply x and y. However, to model the level of conformity in the firm, we deduct a positive 'consensus cost' c from the utility of a selector who has rejected a candidate who is nevertheless hired. We show (Theorem 1) that each stage game has a unique equilibrium in which there are two thresholds, z < v, and say selector I accepts candidate ( x, y) if x > v or x > z and y > v. We show that for sufficiently large p and c, decisions are unanimous, and that as the number n of candidates goes to infinity, the equilibrium value of the game goes to the golden mean. We show that as the consensus cost c increases from 0, this hurts the selectors (Theorem 4) but helps the firm (Theorem 6), whose utility from hiring candidate ( x, y) is a weighted average of x and y. Thus a little conformity is good for the firm. This paper was accepted by Yinyu Ye, optimization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postgrant validity challenges at patent offices rely on the private initiative of third parties to correct mistakes made by patent offices. We hypothesize that incentives to bring postgrant validity challenges are reduced when many firms benefit from revocation of a patent and when firms are caught up in patent thickets. Using data on opposition to patents at the European Patent Office we show that opposition decreases in fields in which many others profit from patent revocations. Moreover, in fields with a large number of mutually blocking patents, the incidence of opposition is sharply reduced, particularly among large firms and firms that are caught up directly in patent thickets. These findings indicate that postgrant patent review may not constitute an effective correction device for erroneous patent grants in technologies affected by either patent thickets or highly dispersed patent ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze a model of industry evolution where the number of active submarkets is endogenously determined by pioneering innovation from incumbents and entrants. Incumbent pioneers enjoy an advantage of additional pioneering innovation via a dynamic capability that takes the form of an improved technology for innovation in young submarkets. Entrants are motivated in part by a desire to acquire the dynamic capability. We show that dynamic capabilities increase total innovation, but whether the capability confers an advantage in terms of marginal or average cost is important in determining how the impact of dynamic capabilities is distributed across incumbent and entrant innovation rates. We complement the existing literature--that focuses on exogenous arrival of submarkets or the steady state of a model with constant submarkets--by describing how competition, free entry, and the dynamic capability of incumbents drive the evolution of an industry. The shift from immature to mature submarkets can lead to a shakeout in firm numbers, and it eventually leads to a reduction in total dynamic capabilities in an industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the profitability determinants of knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS). To do so, we consider a sample of 187 Portuguese KIBS for the period 2002 to 2009, using dynamic panel estimators as estimation method. The results indicate that size, age, liquidity, long-term debt and R&D expenditure are determinants stimulating the profitability of Portuguese KIBS, with risk being a restrictive determinant. In addition, profitability is found to be persistent over time. The empirical evidence lets us make important suggestions for political decision-makers and the owners/managers of Portuguese KIBS. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using novel transaction-level data on Chinese business groups, this study provides the first direct evidence of the coinsurance theory of business groups by investigating when different types of internal resources are transferred within a business group. We find that in Chinese business groups, a credit crunch experienced by the controlling shareholding firm (the "controller") of a publicly listed firm increases the loan based related party transactions (RPTs) including loan guarantees and intercorporate loans provided by the listed firm to the controller. In turn, when the listed firm's performance dips, the controller and its son firms provide more support to the listed firm in the form of non-loan-based RPTs. These findings directly show the dynamic interactions of members within business groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how firms' organizational form affects prices negotiated. Negotiated prices are one factor determining whether a vendor or customer captures the value from a transaction. Firms that systematically negotiate more effectively capture more value. Research has investigated individual- and market-level determinants of negotiation outcomes, but little has been done on the firm-level determinants of negotiated prices. I present a first look at one feature, sales process: whether salespeople handle the entire sale in parallel or customers begin with less experienced salespeople who can escalate difficult assignments. I model firms' choice of sales process as a biform game and test predictions of the model using a combination of transaction-level data on new car purchases in the United States and a unique survey of dealership management practices. I find that a serial process has implications consistent with improving firms' bargaining power and reducing customers' outside options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the interaction of firm product quality and pricing decisions with financial distress and bankruptcy in the airline industry. We consider an airline's choices of quality and price as dynamic decisions that trade off current cash flows for future revenue. We examine how airline mishandled baggage, on-time performance, and pricing are related to financial distress and bankruptcy, controlling for the endogeneity of financial distress and bankruptcy. We find that an airline's quality decisions are differentially affected by financial distress and bankruptcy. Product quality decreases when airlines are in financial distress, consistent with financial distress reducing a firm's incentive to invest in quality. In contrast, in bankruptcy product quality increases relative to financial distress. In addition, we find that firms price more aggressively when in financial distress consistent with firms trying to increase short-term market share and revenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike most investor-owned enterprises, cooperatives often have freedom to choose among a variety of firm objectives. Using 2002-2008 plant- and province-level data, we ask in the present article which of several alternative maximands a Korean cooperative rice processing firm pursues. In contrast to earlier studies, farmer-member supply functions are incorporated into the cooperative's optimization framework. We show that only large cooperative firms have operated at efficient scale, while small and medium-sized ones have been scale-inefficient. Because the latter operate where scale returns are increasing, mergers of small and medium-sized cooperatives likely would be cost-reducing and member-return-enhancing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A setting is considered where consumers keep track of the extent to which brands care about them, which is modeled as altruism of brands toward their target consumers. Consumers who purchase an experience good of high quality reasonably deduce that the supplier of this good is relatively altruistic toward them, and they are therefore more keen to purchase a brand extension that is also directed at them. As a result, the success of brand extensions depends on the overlap between the customers of the original product and the target customers of the extension product. The quality and demand for a brand extension can be higher if the brand is perceived as caring only for its most quality-conscious consumers rather than for all possible buyers of the good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single firm and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the initially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and transparent framework, the objective of a firm can be defined as the maximization of the total utility of its control group $${\fancyscript C}$$ measured in units of good 0. We analyze how the size and the composition of $${\fancyscript C}$$ influence the firm's market behavior and state conditions under which the firm sells its output at prices which are at, above, or below marginal costs, respectively. We discuss the assumption of competitive price perceptions and point out important differences between the concepts of a Drèze and of a Grossman-Hart equilibrium that occur in spite of the close similarity of the formulas which define them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Gerenciales is the property of Universidad ICESI and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Abstract: Managerial reasoning about performance targets and subsequent actions can be influenced by whether they focus their attention on expectations of future events or internal efforts to meet organizational goals. This study explores how managers think about expectations and aspirations by examining the semantic similarities and differences between these concepts for practicing managers and economists, the results suggesting subtle differences in how economists and managers reason about aspirations and expectations. For economists, the concept of expectations played a major role and influenced their subsequent thinking about goals and actions while managers conceptually separated factors that were controllable and uncontrollable, the concept of expectation not playing the central role for them. Implications for descriptive and prescriptive models of decision-making are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Copyright of Journal of Business Economics / Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]