Search

Much debate has taken place recently on the way in which far and extreme right actors are portrayed by mainstream media. Building on an international corpus of 30 documentaries, we combine discourse theory, corpus linguistics, and multimodal critical discourse analysis to examine how far and extreme right actors are portrayed in documentaries, a format of growing discursive importance which has been under-researched thus far. Our analysis contributes in particular to the fledgling literature on the role played by the media in the mainstreaming of racism and the far right. Crucially, it illuminates how processes of euphemisation, exceptionalisation and humanisation can lead to the legitimisation of politics otherwise opposed by the filmmakers. Beyond mapping such processes and building on more positive approaches in the field, we formulate recommendations for best practices when engaging with the far and extreme right in documentaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article identifies the conditions that made parliamentary oppositions in democratic countries more or less likely to participate in social protests against their government's COVID-19 policies from 2020 to 2021. To that end, it compares 19 cases, testing the explanatory power of causal configurations consisting of four factors. The first is the parliamentary opposition's level of power in the policy-making process. The second concerns the political-electoral moment in which the protests take place. The third and fourth refer, respectively, to the representation or non-representation of populist and far-right forces amongst the parliamentary opposition. The finding is that the parliamentary opposition's involvement in social protests is due to different causal configurations. It occurred when some kind of non-far-right populism was represented in the parliamentary opposition, the parliamentary opposition had a low level of policy-making power and the protests could be exploited for electoral gain. Another explanation is the representation of populists who are also far right amongst the parliamentary ranks, even when the other conditions are not the most favourable in terms of the political moment and the level of institutional power of the opposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While mainstream elite actors with the ability to shape public discourse (politicians, academics, and the media) generally oppose far-right politics, it is widely argued that such politics represent democratic populist grievances, whether cultural or economic: 'this is what the people want' and the mainstream should listen. Building on discourse theoretical approaches, this article uses opinion surveys on immigration to argue that rather than following 'what the people want', elite actors play an active part in shaping and constructing public opinion and legitimising reactionary politics. This article thus interrogates how public opinion is constructed through a process of mediation, how certain narratives are hyped and others obstructed. What this highlights is that rather than the result of a simple bottom-up 'democratic' demand, the rise of the far right must also be studied and understood as a top-down process: public opinion is not only a construction but also an agenda shaper, rather than a simple agenda tester. This article ultimately finds that 'the people' can be misrepresented in four principal ways: a people to be followed; a people to be blamed; a people to legitimise reactionary and elitist discourse and politics; and a circumscribed people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contemporary rise in the far right, marked by strong nationalist sentiments, xenophobia, and derogation of racial outgroups, necessitates an understanding of what drives individuals toward these views. Despite extensive research on personality and demographic factors influencing far-right support, the role of ethnic-racial socialization (ERS) remains under-explored, particularly in white families. Using a national sample of white young adults, this study examines how parental ERS strategies received during youth impact current far-right support by influencing three mediating factors: racial ingroup attitudes, racial outgroup attitudes, and conservatism. We find ERS impacts support for far-right groups. Cultural socialization, preparation for bias, and egalitarianism were linked to increased political conservatism and thus support for far-right groups. Conversely, antiracism messages correlated with reduced conservatism and thus less far-right support. Silence about race diminished positive ingroup and outgroup attitudes, enhancing far-right support, while exposure to diversity improved outgroup attitudes and thus reduced support. Interestingly, mainstream socialization increased positive attitudes toward both ingroups and outgroups, thereby reducing far-right support. These findings highlight the crucial role of parental messages in shaping political ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extreme right's influence on cultural politics is an issue that has received limited attention and most studies in this area have focused on the use of history or attitudes towards multiculturalism, although fewer have addressed cultural policy itself. Thus, the emergence of the political party VOX in Spain is analysed in order to shed light on the character of these cultural policies, whether it constitutes a shift towards the extreme right or radical populist right, or it's a continuation of the attitude towards nationalism and authoritarianism typical of the conservative right. Based on the analysis of electoral programmes and discourses in the general election campaigns and in the two autonomous regions where it is responsible for cultural policy (Castilla and León and Valencian Community), the article finds that VOX has introduced themes of the alt-right and clearly prioritises culture as a tool for cultural battles especially in terms of elements of national identity, such as in the party's promotion of anti-Catalanism and bullfighting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the protest cycle (1978-present) of the Spanish field of Catholic-inspired secular organisations that espouse neoconservative ideology (CISO-Ns) against progressive morality politics. To do so, it relies on a comparative-historical and relational approach that focuses on the evolving interplay between 1) cultural and political opportunity structures; 2) the network structure and dynamics of the CISO-N field, and its "expanded anti-rights field" composed of religious and political organisations; and 3) their tactical-discursive triangulation. The research is based on a qualitative study involving in-depth interviews, participant observation and netnography. Data show that, far from being mere conveyor belts for the ecclesiastical message, or being at the service of conservative political parties, CISO-Ns lead a complex strategy based on the "re-politicisation of religion" following a logic of their own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, many far-right parties maintain youth wings, providing opportunities to mobilise members and future party leaders. However, they are often neglected in the study of the far right's organisation. This article explores the development of the 'Young Alternative' and its ambivalent relationship with the 'Alternative for Germany'. Theoretically, it argues that far-right youth wings can act as important drivers of radicalisation. It also tries to understand conflicts between far-right youth organisations and parties by discussing the interactions between organisational development and radicalisation. Empirically, it opens the 'black box' of the German case by drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including semi-structured interviews with high-ranking 'Young Alternative' members, (social) media communication and official documents of the 'Young Alternative', 'Alternative for Germany' and intelligence services. Overall, the article underlines the importance of far-right youth wings as part of the broader party organisation and offers substantial theoretical and empirical research perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional ethics review procedures aim - in principle - to minimise harm and evaluate risks, providing an important space to consider the safety of participants and researchers. However, literature has questioned the effectiveness of the process, particularly for reviewing 'risky' topics in a risk-averse environment. This article reports the findings of interviews with 21 researchers of the far right and manosphere to understand how early career researchers perceive and engage with the process as a component of risk management. It argues that scholars experience IRBs struggling to meet their normative goal of 'no undue harm' due to a focus on legality and liability whilst lacking topical and methodological expertise. The lack of expertise produced misperceptions of risk, establishing institutional ethics as an obstacle rather than evaluative aid, creating holes in the 'safety net' that institutional ethics can provide. These findings contribute to concerns raised about the effective management of risk by early career researchers and the ethical review of 'sensitive' topics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How might we understand the forms of mediatized politics that are signified under the dreary heading of the 'culture war(s)'? This article addresses this question in the form of seven theses. Informed by a distinct theoretical reading of Laclau and Mouffe's concept of antagonism, I highlight the anti-political character of culture war discourses, particularly as amplified in a public culture dominated by the social media industry. The seven theses are prefaced by an overview of the category of 'cancel culture', in light of its recent prominence as an object of culture war discourse. I highlight the primary role of far-right actors in the normalization of culture-war conflicts that persecute different identities, but also critique the online left's entanglement in sedimented antagonisms that primarily benefit reactionary actors. The theses stress the repressive effects of culture war discourses on our collective political imagination. They redescribe some of the fault lines of a familiar terrain by thematizing the differences between a moralized and radical democratic understanding of political antagonism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contemporary far right is entangled in multidimensional ways including various forms of reciprocal influences, the diffusion of subject matters and issue‐framings, the relevance of external examples for local political discussions and an extra‐national platform for influencing transnational developments. Departing from the ‘globalisation front’ in the study of the phenomenon, this article aims to deconstruct the nature of this transnationality by focusing on the forms of indirect diffusion and both negative as well as affirmative forms of referential inspirations. In doing so, the article proceeds from providing an overview of various perceptions of transnationalism in the study of the contemporary far right to offering an empirical analysis of the Georgian case to demonstrate nuances of the transnationality within far right discourses. The analysis is based on the social media data as well as the two sets of qualitative interviews with the leaders and representatives of national‐populist formations that are utilised for reconstructing discursive topics and strategies. Ultimately, the article demonstrates the importance of negative source inspiration and drawing of fictitious scenarios on top of lesson‐drawing and mimicking of political discourses as illustrative designs of increasing transnationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have examined the effects of mainstreaming on ethnic parties in various geopolitical contexts throughout Europe. These ethnic parties consistently promote socially liberal policies, constrain ‘illiberal’ actors and prevent democratic backsliding. However, the mainstreaming of right‐wing populist (or far‐right) parties in Europe is causing mainstream ethnic parties to change their behaviours in some unexplored ways, too. In this analysis, we argue that right‐wing populists can cause ethnic parties to experience political relapse—that is, to backtrack on non‐ethnic ideological issues, thereby appearing to compromise on socially liberal policies. Political relapse occurs when ethnic and right‐wing populist parties must work together (such as in coalition governments). While political relapse can polarize and fragment ethnic parties, it also yields some strategic upshots—namely, by appealing to more conservative and disaffected voters. Based on the Swedish People's Party of Finland, this analysis explores the aftermath of the political relapse, which occurred as a result of the leadership's decision to form a coalition government with Finland's influential right‐wing party, the Finns Party, in 2023. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the Exchange feature is to publish discussions that engage, advance and initiate new debates in the study of nations and nationalism. This Exchange article is on the subject of the global far right. In the first part, Léonie de Jonge and Talita Tanscheit briefly introduce the topic, emphasising the need for such a dialogue. In the remainder of the exchange, Vasiliki Georgiadou, Daphne Halikiopoulou and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser address the following four questions: (1) Is the far right a global phenomenon? (2) What is causing it? (3) What are the implications of the rise of the far right for democracy? (4) What can we learn from comparing Europe and Latin America? By attempting to deprovincialise scholarship on the far right, our goal is to foster cross‐regional dialogue and highlight the importance of comparative research between these two regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leadership has long been acknowledged as a crucial feature of social movement activity. Theorisation has delved into the types of leadership and, more recently, the activities performed by leaders. However, comparative research on leadership and detection of any changes over time is scant. Our paper attends to these tasks by looking at the activities of two German-speaking far-right leaders. For many years, Christian Worch was one of the most active and influential neo-Nazi leaders in Germany, communicating much of his activity and strategy in the mid-2000s through a regular circular (Rundbriefe). Similarly, Martin Sellner, both as leader of the Identitarian movement and independent activist, today exercises an outsized role in the German-speaking far-right scene, including through his regular publications in the magazines Compact and Sezession. Our paper uses data of Worch’s and Sellner’s writings, scraped from webpages and gathered from archives, in a mixed-methods comparative design to identify the tasks performed by these leaders, and how frequently. Quantitative text analysis techniques guide the qualitative evaluation of leaders’ activities and reveal shifts – and continuities – in far-right movement leadership. The paper thereby contributes to scholarship on an important aspect of contemporary far-right movements as well as broader social movement literature on the topic of leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even as the far-right parties of Western Europe have made broad electoral gains, mainstream parties continue to enact a cordon sanitaire, effectively curtailing their legislative impact. Any potential ability of women far-right politicians to cooperate across party lines would open up important political opportunities not available for them within the far right. This article seeks to address the following question: are women of the far right able to cooperate with members of other political parties in ways that their men colleagues cannot? Using a network analysis of motion co-authorship across three sessions of the European Parliament, I find that there is a double marginalization of far-right women politicians – as women in far-right politics, and as far-right politicians in the European Parliament – which results in women politicians who lack influence within their parties, and within the European Parliament more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines a local manifestation of extreme right political mobilisation in Australia from the standpoint of Connell and Messerschmidt's (2005) global hegemonic masculinity. Using Messerschmidt and Rohde's (2018) methods for analysing violent extremists' public statements, we examine public blog posts by "The Lads [sic] Society" to scrutinise the relationship between local advocacy for a white ethno-state in Australia and global hegemonic masculinities. The analysis finds that localised white nationalism is both a response to, and constituted by, the tensions of global hegemonic masculinity and is, in part, an attempt to reclaim localised white hegemonic masculinity in the face of a multitude of perceived global societal failures. Through the analysis, this paper contributes to Messerschmidt and Rohde's (2018) claim that various global hegemonic masculinities simultaneously coexist and compete, while pointing to how discursive processes continue to redefine masculinities at the local level. The paper also responds to a broader invitation to incorporate gender analysis into the study of extreme political movements, enabling a more critical understandings of the motivations and experiences of those that participate in them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines three attempts to build 'party unions' of the far right in Western Europe: the Vlaams Belang's creation of its own trade union organization in 2011, which folded after failing to develop a meaningful membership base; the Front National's creation of its own sectoral trade unions in the mid-1990s, which were disbanded following a series of court rulings; and the distinctive case of Zentrum Automobil as a pre-existing sector-specific workplace group with far-right roots founded in 2009, which leading figures from the radical nationalist wing of the Alternative for Germany subsequently tried to turn into a party-sponsored trade union until an incompatibility resolution of the party executive in 2021. All three cases point to the limits of party unionism in the face of institutional constraints as well as an internal tension between anti-(neo)corporatist populism – directed against the institutional power of established 'monopoly unions' – and a commitment to industrial peace as an extension of an organic national community. Drawing on post-foundational discourse theory, the paper proposes a discourse-analytic approach as a particularly fruitful avenue for examining these tensions and limitations as well as the dynamic interplay between the conflictual and regulated nature of industrial relations more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this review essay is to examine four monographs that study the far-right and discuss their approaches as is relevant to the international level of analysis. This essay argues that these monographs engage with international analysis but do so in a way that has generally not been covered by the mainstream political science approaches to the far-right. This essay will first cover the mainstream political science approaches and international approaches of the far-right. Then this article will explore two overlooked approaches: (1) The statist approach to the far-right explores the transnational and domestic development of far-right ideology in specific states. (2) The radicalization approach focuses on the space and place of the far-right. This review essay will consider the international implications of these approaches and highlight key themes and methodologies that may prove useful to international far-right scholarship. This article concludes with the place of these monographs in the international far-right literature and the scope of this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on ethnographic research among European far-right youth movements, my article contributes to our understanding of the transnational dimension of nationalist activism and politics. In order to investigate this phenomenon, I tell a story of an event attended by Polish and Italian activists and analyse different modes of translation of ideas and practices that the studied movements engage in. In connecting the focus on translation with that of transnational networking, my article makes two main claims. First, it demonstrates that a transnational perspective is critical for an understanding of the contemporary far right. Second, it shows the ways in which the study of far-right transnationalism may contribute to broader research on transnationalism in social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ten years after the beginning of the PEGIDA protests in Dresden, the German far right is making one breakthrough after another in the electoral arena. The starting point for this reflection is the notion of deutsche Zustände ("German conditions"), which took on renewed relevance amid the emergence of PEGIDA: both in reference to Heitmayer's studies on far-right attitudes in German society (Deutsche Zustände) and Marx's famous notion that Germany lagged behind the flow of history with its lack of a bourgeois revolution ("Krieg den deutschen Zuständen!"). Indeed, in the context of the post-2010/11 global protest wave that saw the "movements of the squares" emerge around anti-austerity and/or democratizing demands, Germany presented a striking anomaly with large protest rallies of ordinary "concerned citizens" on public squares around a far-right, anti-egalitarian agenda. In reading the emergence of PEGIDA within this protest conjuncture, I argue that this seeming paradox of the "German condition" was born not least out of the failure of a square movement of the left in the form of the Blockupy protests in Frankfurt starting in 2012 and their reliance on the methods of the late 1990s alter-globalization protests in challenging the German-led Eurozone crisis management regime from within. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'exceptionalism' of Spain's lack of far-right populism has come to an end with VOX. This has spurred a debate that has converged upon another exceptionalism, that of Catalan secessionism, as the explanation of support for VOX. Challenging this consensus, this article revisits extant data to question the conclusions of past studies, framing their limitations within broader trends in populism studies that must be problematised. This problematisation is done through an innovative application of Essex discourse theory to mass-level data gathered in in-depth interviews with low-income VOX voters. The results propose a different interpretation of the success of VOX that links deprivation and values to economic policy, which had been previously discarded by studies framing VOX as exclusively 'cultural'. Building on this analysis, this paper speaks more broadly to populism studies by proposing innovative methods, by transcending dominant conceptual schemes, and by indicating a need for alternative forms of theorisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Retrospectives on Jean-Marie Le Pen highlight his most infamous statements, but almost systematically overlook a central aspect of his commitment: anti-communism. This is crucial because it is a cardinal point of the far right, inseparable from the global struggle to preserve a white Western civilization. In fact, anti-Marxism has often been the common denominator of reactionary groups, and Le Pen is its best incarnation. Throughout his career, whether in Vietnam or in the Palais Bourbon, Le Pen was convinced that he was fighting Bolshevism and its avatars tooth and nail, be they student trade unionists, Algerian independence fighters or militants of the left-wing union in all its plurality. Le Pen never lost sight of the main objective of destroying the PCF and the USSR, the supreme enemies. Without claiming to be exhaustive, here is a look back at 75 years of hate for the red.

Several studies have underscored the recent emergence of 'Russia-sympathizing' parties, particularly within the European far left and far right party families. This study aims to shed further light on the conceptions of Russia within these families by examining party positions regarding Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Utilising content analysis of party standpoints, and employing both cross-sectional quantitative and case-based qualitative analytical techniques, the research underscores the importance of ideology in shaping extreme and radical parties' attitudes towards Russia. Specifically, the findings suggest a connection between populism and Russia sympathy, with far left and far right parties more inclined to express sympathy with Russia also exhibiting higher levels of populism. Euroscepticism emerges as another factor influencing Russia sympathy, however only among far right parties. Taken together, the study offers valuable insights into the complex landscape of party politics, foreign policy and contemporary Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of far-right leaders around the world and, consequently, the threats to democratic institutions, journalists, and freedom of press have been an occasion for journalists to question whether old approaches to covering politics works in this new environment. While U.S. journalists have been reluctant to engage with politicians in debates about journalism, the fate of journalists in Brazil may serve as a proxy for journalists to think about how they defend journalism. This study examines metajournalistic discourse in two of the U.S.'s biggest newspapers about Brazilian former President Jair Bolsonaro's interactions with journalism. By discourse analyzing 221 articles from The New York Times and The Washington Post, the research identified discursive devices used by journalists to legitimize journalistic values. The findings show a pronounced metajournalistic discourse beyond opinion articles and news pieces at the international desk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of France is consubstantial to the political project of the French far right: the past is understood as the origin of a nation’s identity, as a value in and of itself from which to draw moral principles and understand the present, as a ritual of political socialization for activists, as a mobilizing story and finally as the political horizon of a desired return to France’s mythical grandeur. In this ideological vision, the past (birth, blood) determines the identity of peoples and individuals. The weaponization of history for the purposes of glorification and national cohesion goes hand in hand with the obliteration of entire sections of French and world history, veering into negationism, and the paradoxical erasure of the origins of the National Front itself.

For electoral purposes, Germany’s far-right AfD party masks its xenophobia and anti-migration policies by portraying itself as a guardian of Holocaust remembrance and defender of the State of Israel. Now with a seat in the Bundestag, it is forcing the other parties to join its positions by anticipating them.

Previous research has shown how terrorist attacks attract media attention and influence public opinion and decision-makers. However, we lack a comparative assessment of the extent to which extremist ideologies matter and how they matter. Therefore, this paper compares mass media debates over extreme right and Islamist terrorist attacks. Theoretically, it innovates by linking research on discursive critical junctures and issue-specific discursive opportunity structures, emphasising the systematic differences between the two ideologies. Empirically, the study is based on an original, large-scale content analysis of mass media debates on all seven fatal attacks in Germany since 2015 (N = 9047). It combines relational quantitative content analysis with frame and network analyses. The results show how ideologies behind terrorist attack shape political reactions and the framing of the key security threat. Notably, both types of attacks provide favourable conditions for the far right, and political elites play a central role in the diffusion of far-right frames. In contrast, victims and ethnic or religious minorities have little voice in public debates. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the impact of terrorist attacks on Western democracies by emphasising the impact of ideology and distorted threat perceptions in public debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study identifies the mnemonic strategies of the Slovak extreme-right Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko (ĽSNS) / People's Party Our Slovakia as a means of establishing a mnemonic alliance with Putin's Russia. ĽSNS's construction of mnemonic culture surrounding two critical events in Slovak history – the 1944 Slovak National Uprising and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army and its allies – is marked by an effort to overcome the ideological divide between its extreme-right ideology and Russia's identity and memory politics rooted in its anti-fascist heritage. Those two events represent an uneasy terrain for building political and mnemonic alliances between ĽSNS and Putin's Russia. Even though these two historical milestones represent a seemingly unmasterable past and an obstacle in an ĽSNS-Russia alliance, the party implemented several mnemonic strategies to reconfigure the place of these two key historical events in national memory and clear the path for a closer alliance with Putin's Russia. We argue that ĽSNS's memory construction is multidirectional rather than competitive or discordant. We unpack ĽSNS's memory construction and identify multidirectional effects and trajectories as vectors for building a mnemonic alliance with Putin's Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this special issue, our contributors move the academic conversation beyond methodological nationalism and approaches that analyze far-right movements only within their respective state contexts by interrogating the circulation of ideologies, funds, and people across sociopolitical boundaries. Our goal is to scrutinize the far right in post-communist Eastern Europe by examining the multitudinous and multidirectional ties that exist between groups at the local, regional, national, and transnational levels. Attention, moreover, is paid not just to those factors that facilitate such linkages, but also to the obstacles that hamper these flows via various detours, omissions, and other forms of resistance. In this introduction, we offer a theoretical overview and discussion of contributors' findings to argue that conduits for the dissemination of far-right discursive frames are hardly unidirectional in nature. As a result, the transitological narratives of progress and regress typically invoked to explain the emergence of the far right offer only a partial understanding of how it mobilizes, builds alliances, and circulates ideas. We unpack the conceptual pitfalls and fallacies of transitological narratives and instead foreground the concept of multidirectionality, which opens up new avenues through which to understand how far-right groups mobilize and disseminate their narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To illuminate the varied and sometimes contradictory modes of public engagement practiced by right and far-right publics, this forum contribution introduces a concept of anti-woke publics. Representing themselves as fair-minded occupants of a political middle ground, anti-woke publics characterize wokeness as a divisive and destructive leftist ideology. They draw on discursive strategies of abstraction, universalism, and ahistoricism that obscure their ideological orientation and divert public attention from the unequal, unjust, and anti-democratic consequences of their advocacy. Their public engagement exhibits a fundamental tension between professed commitments to equal opportunity and their public advocacy in defense of an unequal status quo. Anti-woke publics situate the individual as the primary social actor and champion colorblindness as the ethical orientation for engaging diverse public actors. Sharing advocacy networks with avowedly supremacist publics, anti-woke publics facilitate the wider circulation of supremacist discourses among influential and mainstream publics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The far right has moved from oppositional force to control over the last decades. This outcome is the result of a long-term process of renewal ultimately aimed at dismantling the liberal order. As the far right moves from counter-hegemonic to hegemonic force in certain contexts, it is important to acknowledge that it does not constitute a "counter-public;" counter-publics are indeed those voices that the far right seeks to silence, i.e. various minorities and opponents. Research on far-right politics is thus charged with addressing terminological and methodological challenges capable of exposing the elusive nature of this phenomenon and illiberal or anti-democratic "red flags." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introductory piece to a special issue of the Forum, we explore the inadequacies of the field of political communication in addressing the rising threats posed by illiberalism and the far right. We argue that the discipline's frameworks, developed within the context of Western liberal democracies, are ill-equipped to tackle the complexities and self-reflexive strategies of contemporary far-right movements and actor types. These formations exploit liberal norms and practices to ultimately undermine and dismantle democratic values. We call for more "democratic clarity," urging political communication scholars to adopt a clear stance in defense of democratic principles and to develop more robust conceptual tools to accurately classify and understand far-right actors. We introduce the other discussion pieces featured in this special section and ultimately point to actionable items meant to move the field forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay relates the resurgence of contemporary far-right1 politics to a distinctive querpolitics (a transverse or diagonal politics) of socially, politically, and ideologically heterogeneous assembly. This calls for a reconceptualization of the global far right beyond homogeneous understandings of ideological beliefs. Instead of ideologically aligned fellow travelers bound together by their common consent to a system of thick beliefs, far-right political formations are located within messy and fissured socio-political fields. They assemble a varied and contradictory collection of individual, transactional actors with divergent interests. Moreover, the far right is often embedded in mainstream circuits of political and social life that are distinct from and often even opposed to overtly extremist positions. I elaborate on these points through a discussion of far-right politics in Germany and India. If the former is notable as a historically significant case, the latter is where the world's largest far-right political movement is presently located. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how a preexisting far-right social movement organization responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the case of the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) in Germany. We show that PEGIDA quickly adapted its previous immigration-related collective action frame, now predominantly portraying itself as a defender of democracy, constitutionality, and civil rights, while accusing the German government of installing a 'Corona dictatorship'. In addition to improving our understanding of the development of a key far-right social movement organization during the pandemic, our article contributes to the study of far-right ideology more broadly. Examining a critical case of far-right activism, our analysis of PEGIDA underscores the need to review the conventional scholarly distinction between radical and extreme right ideology based on formal pro- and anti-democracy stances. While claiming to espouse the idea of democracy, activists sharply attacked democratic institutions and their main representatives as 'totalitarian' or 'dictatorial' – a key extremist feature of contemporary far-right discourse particularly visible during the pandemic. Indeed, PEGIDA's discursive shift during the pandemic seems to be in line with broader developments of far-right ideology in the protest arena and in party politics, where formal support of democracy goes together with a rhetoric of delegitimization of contemporary democratic institutions and their representatives. Methodologically, we draw from original empirical data collected with the tools of (virtual) ethnography and protest event analysis that we analyze through a frame-analytical lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The far right is often seen to thrive in times of crisis. The unfolding of the Great Recession, the migration crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic provide an unprecedented opportunity to delve into far-right collective actors’ relationship with ‘crisis’. With our study, we are interested to explore whether far-right mobilisation in the protest arena is indeed linked to short-term periods of crisis or part of a broader, longer-term process of societal transformation from the ground up. We deploy a new dataset on far-right protest events – part of the Far-Right Protest Observatory (FARPO) – covering 10 European countries and the period 2008–2021 (N = 4,440) to elicit and characterise nativist mobilisation at the non-institutional level. Although far-right collective actors have reacted to periods of crisis, the rate, size, and interactions surrounding their protest mobilisation have been steadily on the rise, their repertoire of action has been overwhelmingly conventional, and their claim-making dominated by trademark issues like immigration and multiculturalism. Instead of simply adapting to crisis, we contend that the far right is prompting a broader process of transformation and increasing its penetration of civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alberta, Canada is both a major extractive zone—home to the world's third largest proven oil reserves, mostly in the form of oil sands located in the north of the province—and a place whose political culture has been profoundly influenced by evangelical Christianity. It is both "petro province" and "God's province". Despite these distinct political economic and socio-cultural features, relatively little scholarly attention has been given to the contemporary relationships among them. To explore this, we profile the populist far-right social movement organization Take Back Alberta (TBA), which, by channeling the interlocking "freedom" and separatist movements into the governing United Conservative Party (UCP), played a pivotal role in Alberta Premier Danielle Smith's rise to power. We ask the following question: what role do religion and a populist defense of the fossil fuel industry (or "extractive populism") play, both ideologically and organizationally, within TBA? Drawing from TBA-related documents, including websites, podcasts, social media, and speeches, our analysis produces two key findings: first, that TBA deploys a radical, far-right version of extractive populism, which "anchors" the Danielle Smith government, and, second, that evangelical Christianity contributes to this extractive populism organizationally—by impacting TBA's membership and resource infrastructure—and discursively, by influencing the collective action frames utilized by TBA leaders in advocating for the interests of the fossil fuel industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first year of COVID-19 confirmed the standing of the populist radical right in Italy. While sitting in opposition at the national level, Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy and Matteo Salvini's League shared common criticism of the Conte II government but experienced diverging trajectories in terms of popularity. The first had enjoyed growing support since the 2018 general election, whereas the second lost out after leaving the government coalition in 2019. These changes can be partly attributed to the different agency of their leaderships. Looking at the League's performance at the helm of key regions affected by the pandemic, moreover, its governors elaborated different responses to the crisis, which ostensibly reflect the varying allegiances and visions animating the internal life of the party. Overall and collectively considered, the Italian populist radical right broke even during the first year of COVID-19, but the crisis exposed the first cracks in Salvini's leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Brazil's populist radical right (PRR), as well as the responses of PRR actors to the pandemic, during the period from March 2020 to October 2021. Despite high death rates and declining popularity in the final months of that period, the Brazilian president consistently maintained a denialist narrative that incorporated key aspects of populist ideology. Based on the analysis of opinion surveys, documents, online messages and secondary sources, we argue that explaining this denialism requires understanding Brazil's radical-right populism as more than an ideology: it is a social movement. The impacts of the pandemic on Bolsonaro's PRR government and its responses can only be understood by simultaneously analysing the top-down actions of the leader and the bottom-up role of bolsonarismo – that is, the broad coalition of actors who actively support the radical-right project. The case of bolsonarismo suggests that literature on populism in general would profit from taking right-wing movements more seriously as co-producers of populist rhetoric and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this conversation, Beat Dietschy—Swiss philosopher, theologian, and collaborator of philosopher Ernst Bloch at Tübingen University—and Ana Cecilia Dinerstein, UK-based Argentinean scholar-activist, open Marxist, and critical feminist theorist—reflect on the potential of Bloch's analyses of fascism and Nazism to comprehend the present daring political moment of authoritarian expansion by the Far Right in different contexts and degrees, on one hand, and the strengthening of territorial, social, rural, urban, feminist, and indigenous movements to stop the worsening ecological crisis by creating new practices moved by hope, on the other hand. Their dialogue explores Bloch's notions of non-contemporaneity, non-simultaneity, multiversum, and multiple dialectics, elaborating on the plural contradictions of present social relations and class struggles (in a broad sense) against and beyond global capitalism. Finally, they enquire what kind of Marxism is required to decolonize current critical praxis and theory while navigating the pessimism of the present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking as a starting point the growing body of scholarship on movement parties of the far right, this research note undertakes a reflection on the boundaries of the movement party concept from two distinct angles – the established interactive‐mobilisational approach and the more recent discursive‐organisational one – and their empirical implications for the study of far‐right movement parties in Europe today. While the former approach's emphasis on the hybridity of electoral and protest‐based collective action repertoires as the primary defining feature of movement parties suggests a wide‐ranging applicability of the concept to the far right, the latter approach's understanding of the movement party as a specific organisational type based on horizontal coordinative links between constituent movements via collective leadership structures appears to pull in the opposite direction. These differences are explored in an overview of three far‐right parties that fit both movement party definitions to varying degrees – CasaPound in Italy, Right Sector in Ukraine, and Konfederacja in Poland – followed by a discussion of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as an ambivalent case that prototypically fits the interactive‐mobilisational understanding but falls short of the discursive‐organisational one, thus magnifying the conceptual differences between the two approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate about democratic discontent and far right party support taking into account the heterogeneity of the far right voter pool. Distinguishing between peripheral far right voters driven by discontent, and core far right voters driven by nationalism, we argue that citizens' evaluations of the democratic process are associated with their electoral behaviour; but this relationship varies depending on their immigration attitudes. Using data from 9 waves of the European Social Survey (2002-2018), we confirm that whereas among the general population positive evaluations of the democratic process may serve as a deterrent for far right party support, the same assessments are unlikely to deter the far right's core ideological voters. In some circumstances, they might have a galvanising effect, prompting a backlash among some core voters. Our findings add nuance to voting behaviour theories, and illustrate why scholars should pay more attention to far right intra-partisan heterogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why, despite increased female support, do social democratic parties (SDPs) in most Western European countries face electoral decline? To study this puzzle, we harness a well-documented regularity: diminishing support for SDPs by manual workers and their increased support for the far right. We contend that this trend is intensified in contexts where the economic positions of SDPs align with market-oriented policies or converge with those of the far right. Additionally, as men are disproportionately represented among manual workers, this shift contributes to the reversal of the gender gap in support for SDPs. Drawing on public opinion data from 18 countries spanning half a century, along with labor and party economic position data, our findings substantiate this argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While far-right movements are commonly associated with masculinity and women are in the minority, it is notable that they often play significant roles within these movements. To deepen our understanding of the motivations behind women's participation, this study challenges Blee's argument that women's motivations for participating are shaped by their interactions with other members. By using the psychosocial method devised by Hollway and Jefferson and developed by Gadd, the present study argues that women's pre-participation experiences can play a vital part in drawing them to the movements. Through analyzing the life stories of six far-right women in Japan and conducting an in-depth case study of three of them, the study aims to uncover a wide range of experiences that may initially appear unrelated to far-right ideology but ultimately led these subjects to become involved in far-right movements. It highlights the importance of paying attention to their complex subjectivities, which are formed by the interplay between their unique trajectories and societal transitions concerning gender norms, particularly within the era of neoliberal "emancipation." The study finds that the duality of far-right movements, which combine conservatism with deviance, enables some women to express paradoxical desires that they experience in response to living through a transitional era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to the data revolution, academic research and media attention have increasingly focused on the technological adaptation and innovation displayed by the far right. The greatest attention is paid to social media and how groups and organizations are utilizing technological advancement and growth in virtual networks to increase recruitment and advance radicalization on a global scale. As with most social and political endeavors, certain technologies are in vogue and thus draw the attention of users and regulators and service providers. This creates a technological blind spot within which extremist groups frequently operate older and less well regarded technologies without the oversight that one might expect. This article examines the less well-studied traditional and official websites of the Ku Klux Klan, the most established and iconic of American far-right organizations. By incorporating non-participant observation of online spaces and thematic analysis, this research analyzes the evolution of 26 websites, from their emergence in the early 1990s to the present day. We examine the ways in which traditional printed communications and other ephemera have progressed with advances in technology, focusing on the following central elements of Klan political activism and community formation: Klan identity, organizational history, aims and objectives; technology and outreach, including online merchandise and event organization; and the constructions of whiteness and racism. The results add value and insight to comparable work by offering a unique historical insight into the ways in which the Klan have developed and made use of Web 1.0, Web 2.0, and Web3 technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of Italian foreign fighters who currently fight in the Russia-Ukraine conflict presents elements of high ideological complexity. The presence of different groups of highly ideologized far-right fighters fighting on opposite sides of the front emerges. Foreign fighters of the extreme right shoot each other at the front and some of them have as comrades foreign fighters of the extreme left. The main sources of this research are texts published in social media by foreign fighters and have been collected through online ethnography. The analysis of the collected texts is conducted with a qualitative thematic analysis with an inductive method. Particular attention has been paid to the phenomenon of Red-Brownism also called 'Brown-Red cocktail' that in the context of the Ukrainian conflict seems to cast doubt on whether the extreme right and the extreme left should always be considered opposing extremisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Esferas is the property of Esferas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Based on the case of Vox, the main far right party in Spain, this article problematizes the relationship between the notions of militarism and political polarization with the aim of adapting the latter to the Spanish context. Both concepts, militarism and polarization, are ambiguous and rarely used together, even sharing similar principles and premises such as radical political dichotomization, the irreconcilable nature of disagreements or the centrality of conflict. This particular approach to polarization arises from the evidence of the strong influence of military institutions and their logics in the construction of the political field and power in Spain. For this reason, this research argues that it is possible, in the precise context of the rise of the far right in Spain and based on a study of symbols, imaginative worlds, speeches and political programs of Vox, to analyze how militarism constitutes an asset and a part of political polarization.

During the past year, as the reality gradually dawned on them that Donald Trump might be reelected as U.S. president, European foreign policy analysts coalesced around the conventional wisdom that Europe must unite and "Trump-proof" itself. This new consensus, which essentially repeats arguments for European "strategic autonomy" that took place after Trump was elected the first time, represents an extraordinary collective failure. Europe's foreign policy experts have proved unable to think clearly about what has changed in Europe in the last eight years or about the relationship between their own security concerns and those of Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]