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This paper investigates qualitatively the involvement of Human Resources (HR) professionals in executive remuneration governance within large UK public companies and similar organisations, considering the complex interplay of institutional, social and cognitive factors that influence executive pay decisions. Through interviews with senior HR professionals and focus groups involving mid-ranking HR professionals, the study identifies key themes, challenges and opportunities faced by HR in navigating the executive remuneration landscape. The study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the sociological and psychological dimensions of executive pay governance. The findings highlight the practical implications for HR professionals, emphasising the need for active engagement with diverse stakeholder groups, fostering a culture of openness and transparency to ensure that executive pay practices and associated processes align with organisational values and societal expectations, while underscoring the value of learning from diverse perspectives and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – This review provides a detailed analysis of corporate governance practices across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, focusing on board characteristics, executive remuneration, capital markets and the integration of ethical and sustainable practices. It evaluates how these governance frameworks influence market performance, investor confidence and corporate sustainability within the region. Design/methodology/approach – The study synthesizes findings from 15 recent research studies, examining corporate governance mechanisms, board composition, executive compensation policies and their impact on market capitalization. The data were collected from major academic databases, including Google Scholar, Springer, Web of Science and Scopus. Findings – The analysis exhibits both similarities and differences in corporate governance frameworks across GCC countries. Important findings include a universal mandate for the separation of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman roles, varied board composition requirements and differing executive remuneration and transparency policies. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) lead in market capitalization, reflecting advanced governance practices, though disparities exist among GCC countries. The review also notes the increasing alignment of corporate governance with corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles, especially in sustainability reporting and ethical practices, highlighting a growing commitment to long-term value creation. Originality/value – This review uniquely synthesizes recent research on GCC corporate governance, offering insights on board structures, executive pay and market dynamics with a focus on ethical and sustainable practices. It provides valuable perspectives for stakeholders, policymakers and academics interested in enhancing governance frameworks in the region while contributing to the global discourse on aligning corporate governance with sustainability standards.

There are ongoing debates globally regarding excessive executive compensation, the perceived weak link between pay and performance, and the widening inequality gap. The South African corporate governance code King IV's Principle 14 addresses the need for fair, responsible, and transparent remuneration. At the same time, the newly enacted Companies Amendment Act No. 16 of 2024 in South Africa emphasizes transparency in compensation, shareholder voting, and responding to shareholder feedback. This study conducts a systematic literature review of 30 articles on the transparency of executive remuneration disclosures and their determinants by analyzing Scopus-indexed articles published between 2010 and 2023, selected through specific keyword searches. The findings suggest an increasing focus on research regarding the disclosure of executive compensation, predominantly conducted in the Global North and primarily framed through agency theory. Studies exploring the factors influencing executive remuneration and the relationship between pay and performance are prevalent, with mixed results generally indicating a positive connection. Firm size emerges as a key factor in transparency, and many studies employ binary scoring to evaluate whether executive compensation disclosure is present. This paper provides valuable insights for investors, analysts, and policymakers and adds to the current understanding of executive remuneration transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executive remuneration has traditionally attracted the attention of scholars, regulators, and public opinion. In recent years, especially after epochal corporate scandals and financial crises, executive remuneration has polarized the political debate, leading to consequences for the way it was theorized, structured, and ultimately quantified within corporations. This article specifically examines the relationship between executive compensation and sustainability, with a focus on the influence of Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) metrics in the context of European companies. The article provides a qualitative analysis of the historical debate on executive remuneration and considers the different theories informing corporate law. Furthermore, it offers a qualitative and empirical analysis of how executive compensation policies of the 300 largest companies by target capitalization in Europe – listed in the FTSE EuroFirst300 – take ESG parameters into account. Lastly, this article presents some policy considerations, particularly questioning whether executive remuneration is the right incentive for ESG compliance, and emphasizing the importance of a shift in corporate culture to effectively make corporate practices more sustainable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Orientation: The allocation of incentives based on corporate financial performance is a longstanding phenomenon aimed at aligning the interests of executives and shareholders. Yet, given rising social and environmental concerns, shareholders are increasingly pressuring companies to link sustainability matters to executive compensation. Research purpose: Disclosures on the linkages between executive remuneration and sustainability considerations were explored in South Africa, a country that is notorious for income inequality. Motivation for the study: Despite offering a well-developed corporate governance framework, South Africa experiences several social ills. If pay-performance linkages are expanded to include sustainability considerations, directors will by implication be encouraged to focus on sustainable value creation. Research design, approach and method: Content analysis was conducted on the 2019 and 2022 integrated and remuneration reports of selected banks and telecommunications companies operating in South Africa. Focus was placed on how these companies have linked sustainability aspects to incentives over the short and long term. Main findings: Improvements were noted in terms of linking sustainability considerations to executive pay. Most companies related social aspects to short-term incentives. Yet, environmental pay-performance linkages warrant more attention. Practical and/or managerial implications: Remuneration and social and ethics committee members should reflect on how executive pay can be optimally linked to material sustainability considerations. The sustainable development goals (SDGs) could be used to develop fairer and more responsible director pay policies. Contribution and/or value-add: The considered companies progressively accounted for sustainability aspects when determining executive pay in a highly unequal country. Directors are thus increasingly rewarded for ensuring a more sustainable future.

The use of malus and clawback provisions has increased in recent years due to the demand for tighter controls on incentive-based compensation. The alignment between executive pay and individual performance creates a culture of responsible decision-making and accountability within an organisation. This paper seeks to evaluate the current state of governance legislation on the clawback of remuneration in the South African context. A systematic literature review was conducted to provide descriptive insight on the technical and procedural approach applied to the clawback of remuneration. These findings were then compared to other countries so that similarities, differences, and areas of further research could be identified. Through detailed content analysis, it was found that the South African governance regime lags behind its international counterparts regarding remuneration clawback. Due to the absence of relevant statutory guidelines, discretion is frequently applied, leading to inconsistent treatment of clawback amongst listed companies. The use of clawback as a risk-mitigation mechanism is also relatively new in South Africa and comparative studies provide useful insight on the technicalities and administration processes applied abroad. The lessons learnt and strategies applied internationally serve as a benchmark for the development of clawback legislation in South Africa.

The use of malus and clawback provisions has increased in recent years due to the demand for tighter controls on incentive-based compensation. The alignment between executive pay and individual performance creates a culture of responsible decision-making and accountability within an organisation. This paper seeks to evaluate the current state of governance legislation on the clawback of remuneration in the South African context. A systematic literature review was conducted to provide descriptive insight on the technical and procedural approach applied to the clawback of remuneration. These findings were then compared to other countries so that similarities, differences, and areas of further research could be identified. Through detailed content analysis, it was found that the South African governance regime lags behind its international counterparts regarding remuneration clawback. Due to the absence of relevant statutory guidelines, discretion is frequently applied, leading to inconsistent treatment of clawback amongst listed companies. The use of clawback as a risk-mitigation mechanism is also relatively new in South Africa and comparative studies provide useful insight on the technicalities and administration processes applied abroad. The lessons learnt and strategies applied internationally serve as a benchmark for the development of clawback legislation in South Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the effect of distraction measures as a proxy for the intensity of institutional shareholders' monitoring responsibility regarding corporate executive remuneration in the South African context. We employ the more robust Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach to analyse the data from firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) covering the period 2004-2019. The results show that distraction has a significant positive impact on corporate executive remuneration. Hence, when institutional shareholders’ attention shifts due to distraction, monitoring control is relaxed, and corporate executive officers manipulate remuneration to their advantage. The results are useful for investment managers and prospective investors in their efforts to ensure governance mechanisms that enhance corporate value to the benefit of stakeholders.

This study investigates the moderating effects of two specific governance structures, board independence and CEO duality, on the relationship between the pay ratio and environmental and social performance. Controlling for the endogeneity of the pay ratio and employees' performance and skills, we use a sample of companies listed on ExecuComp (S&P1500) and apply the 3SLS method to test interaction effects. We find that board independence moderates the negative relationship between the pay ratio and environmental and social performance. Furthermore, the effect of board independence on the relationship between the pay ratio and environmental and social performance decreases when the CEO is also the chair. These results suggest that independent directors moderate the negative effects of the pay ratio on firms' environmental and social performance. Finally, the concentration of power through CEO duality decreases the effectiveness of board monitoring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on cross-country panel data, the paper investigates the possible repercussions of salary gap for employee productivity and corporate financial performance. Our empirical findings corroborate the presence of a negative tail effect of wage gap on productivity and employee morale. While worsening employee turnover and productivity, and increasing the chances of workplace controversies, high salary gap is found to be associated with a more efficient cost structure and higher profitability. Our evidence suggests that extreme salary gap may be curbed by targeted internal policies favoring internal promotion and career development, unionization, employee and managerial training. The composition of the board's remuneration committee appears to play but a minor role in shaping the scale of salary gap. The results of the study are in line with equity aversion theory and suggest that extreme wage inequality may impede firms' growth with spillover effects observable at the macro-level. Targeted policies may be necessary to counter the negative repercussions of high compensation disparities as within-firm mechanisms appear insufficient to mitigate them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a progressive shift in shareholder activism in South Africa as shareholder demands for greater levels of accountability, reasonable executive remuneration and disclosure and transparency are increasing. Frustration with increasing high-profile corporate scandals and governance failures has also caused shareholder activism to gain momentum in South Africa. This article discusses the South African legal framework relating to shareholder activism and identifies trends in shareholder activism in South Africa. While the growing increase in shareholder activism is welcomed, this article contends that South Africa still has a long way to go compared to the level of shareholder activism in the USA, the UK and Australia. Recommendations are made to enhance shareholder activism in South Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to understand whether there is alignment between executive remuneration and shareholder interests in publicly listed companies in Australia. The issue is analysed over three distinct stages of an economic cycle, and the panel fixed effects method is used to estimate the performance-remuneration models. The study finds that the long-term compoents of the remuneration package would highly incentivize CEOs and executive directors. Still, the fixed salary component exerts no such enticement for them to maximize shareholders' wealth. This new information could be useful for Australian firms as well as for firms in Asia Pacific countries due to the close relationship they share with the Australian firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a long-running cyclical public debate in the UK and Australia about the level of vice-chancellors' remuneration in publicly funded universities. Whilst governments may promise greater oversight, little appears to change. Similar trends are emerging in some other European countries. This article critically considers the determination of vice-chancellors' remuneration as a governance issue. In the context of corporatised public universities, we consider how reforms in university governance may have contributed to the shifting nature and levels of vice-chancellors' remuneration in Australia and the UK. We argue that this area requires urgent governance reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: It is common practice by companies to use pay-for-performance to motivate executives to create value, measured primarily via economic metrics. However, companies are increasingly becoming more aware of their overall effect on society and the environment. This study aimed to understand how remuneration reports have incorporated economic, environmental and social targets, within pay-for-performance bonuses. Design/methodology/approach: This study investigated how the remuneration reports by Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) listed companies have incorporated economic, environmental and social attributes in executives' bonus targets, between 2015 and 2019. Findings: The findings show that the 12 companies examined in the healthcare equipment and -services sector, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, and the food- and drug retailers sector, have increasingly disclosed economic and social aspects as part of executive remuneration targets. However, there has been little change in environmental remuneration targets, to motivate executives to focus on environmental impact. Research limitations/implications: The limitations of this study include a small sample size and qualitative data collection and -analysis, that can be subjective. Originality/value: This study contributes to the literature on remuneration incentives and identifies key events that have affected the bonus target factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to empirically investigate if board director reputation capital, interlocking board membership and executive remuneration contribute to tax avoidance of listed financial firms in Nigeria. The study employed the panel generalized method of moment. Data from 2010 to 2020 was sourced from a sample of forty (40) listed financial firms on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The findings obtained indicate that board director reputation capital (BODRC) and interlocking board membership (IBM) exerted a negative and significant on effective tax rate while executive remuneration was positive and significant on effective tax rate. Both leverage and firm size were positive on effective tax rate in the sampled firms. The study concludes that for firms to drive tax avoidance and align the interest of managers with those of the shareholders, board director reputation capital, interlocking board membership and executive remuneration are key factors to put into consideration towards achieving the goal of wealth maximization. This study contributes to knowledge, being the first to report on how board director reputation capital, interlocking board membership and executive remuneration drive tax avoidance of firms in Nigeria and in Sub-Saharan Africa at large. The study recommends that firms should consciously design a corporate board with strong network tie consisting of director with high reputation capital, interlocking board membership tie and with well pegged motivating executive remuneration to bolster the morale of the board echelons in order to influence them to engage in result oriented activities geared towards tax avoidance and shareholders' wealth maximization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the impact of corporate performance and corporate governance on executive remuneration in a Chinese market setting. Using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of 860 non-financial firms listed on Chinese Stock Exchanges over the 15 years period of 2004–2018, the study found a positive and significant association between corporate profitability and executive pay. The study further reports that ownership concentration is positively related to executive pay revealing an entrenchment effect i.e., collusion between large shareholders and top management. Consistent with managerial power and agency theory CEO duality exhibits a positive relationship with executive remuneration, while board size and board independence also reveal a positive association with executive pay, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing managerial entrenchment. Interestingly, non-state-owned enterprises report a negative relationship of board size with executive remuneration which means non-state-owned enterprises with larger board size tend to reduce executive pay because they may have better control and monitoring. Following the managerial power propositions, CEO duality weakens the performance sensitivity of executive pay, but contrary to agency theory the impact of board independence on this sensitivity is in contrast and weakens the relationship of managerial pay and performance, making the independent director's role ambiguous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Orientation: Executive remuneration remains a controversial topic. A major concern is the perceived misalignment of executive remuneration with company performance. Key performance indicators (KPIs) represent the strategic focus areas that drive a company’s performance. Aligning executive remuneration, especially the long-term incentives (LTIs), with KPIs is, therefore, paramount in attaining company performance objectives. Research purpose: This study assessed the alignment of chief executive officer (CEO) LTI objectives and company KPIs for mining companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Motivation for the study: Prior research focused mainly on the relationship between short-term executive remuneration and company performance. The present study provides insights into the composition of CEO remuneration and whether CEO LTI objectives are aligned with company strategy. Research approach/design and method: The sample comprised 34 mining companies for the period 2010–2016. A standardised methodology was applied to measure LTIs and statistical techniques (descriptive statistics and a ratings analysis) were applied to assess the alignment between CEO LTI objectives and company KPIs. Main findings: Chief executive officer remuneration showed an increasing trend, with LTIs contributing more towards total CEO remuneration towards the end of the research period. A weak to moderate alignment was found between CEO LTI objectives and company KPIs. Practical/managerial implications: Improved, transparent governance is required to address the opaque disclosure on the alignment between company KPIs and the objectives of CEO LTIs. Contribution/value-add: The study demonstrated that annual (and integrated) report disclosures generally do not clearly describe company strategy (reflected by KPIs) nor is the link between KPIs and CEO LTI objectives always evident. Stakeholders thus may well question whether CEO remuneration is aligned to attaining sustainable company performance.

Purpose: The dissatisfaction with executive remuneration worldwide has increased because it is generally believed to have been instrumental to the 2008 Global Economic crisis. Central to this is the apparent unsatisfactory relationship between business performance and chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration. The primary aim of this study was to compare the pay-for-performance association between CEOs’ remuneration and state-owned entity performance before, during and after the economic crisis. It did so by assessing the chief executive remuneration link with state-owned enterprise performance from the period 2006 to 2014. Design/methodology/approach: Twenty-one schedule 2 state-owned enterprises in South Africa. This quantitative, longitudinal study, obtained secondary data from the annual reports of state-owned enterprises from the period 2006 to 2014. Ordinary least square multiple regression analysis was used as the principal statistical method. Findings/results: The findings indicate that the link between chief executive remuneration and state-owned entity performance demonstrated different patterns in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Practical implications: State-owned entity remuneration committees should place more emphasis on the financial efficiency measurements to enhance efficiencies in South African state-owned enterprises. Shareholders and regulators should take cognisance of measures to be used to assess the potential performance of state-owned entities, through executive remuneration, especially during an economic crisis. Findings could furthermore be of importance to other academics investigating this phenomenon. Originality/value: This research provides additional knowledge to the limited research available on SOEs in South Africa. Further, it reveals that an economic downturn affects the link between CEOs’ remuneration and SOE performance. This addresses a knowledge gap concerning the pay-for-performance link in South African SOEs and in emerging economies in general.

Orientation: Agency theory predicts that agency relationships are subject to the principal-agent problem. Other theories also suggest that executives may tend to maximise sales revenues, or expand their spans of influence through growth, at the expense of the net value of the firm or its profitability. Research purpose: The purpose of this study is to test which forms of company performance are associated with higher executive variable pay ratios or determine the proportion of variable director remuneration to total remuneration. Motivation for the study: The extent to which variable remuneration is associated with different types of firm performance is unclear. Research design, approach and method: This study applies a simple panel regression model to test the extent to which the variable ratio of total director remuneration contributes differently to increases in firm revenue, total assets, return on assets, or measures of Tobin’s Q. These relationships are tested for listed companies on South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange, South Africa, for the years 2011–2014. Main findings: Variable remuneration is found to be negatively and strongly related to total revenue and negatively and weakly related to total assets (the gross measures of performance). In contrast, variable remuneration is weakly and positively related to Tobin’s Q, a measure which better reflects the interests of shareholders than gross measures. Practical/managerial implications: Firms in this context should seek to strengthen the linkages between variable remuneration and forms of performance that reflect the interests of stakeholders. Contribution/value-add: In the wake of global and local governance failures, this study suggests that the use of the variable component of executive remuneration might be helpful in aligning stakeholder interests. Further research might seek to better understand the causal mechanisms that underlie these findings.

From October 2013, UK law and regulations (the Reform) require periodic binding shareholders' approval of executive directors' remuneration policy, as well as enhanced disclosure in remuneration reports. These requirements supplement an ongoing requirement for an annual non-binding vote on compensation outcomes that are detailed in the remuneration report. Using a large sample of listed companies from 2010–2017 we investigate whether the Reform has affected pay levels, pay-performance sensitivity, the pay gap between the CEO and other employees, the amount of cash returned to shareholders, and dissent voting on the remuneration report. We find little evidence that the Reform has affected these variables in our sample firms. Using market-based tests we find that market participants anticipated an improvement in corporate governance for some key dates before the Reform came into force. Taken together, the paper's evidence suggests the Reform has not met its stated objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK was the first country to introduce so-called 'say on pay' regulation in 2002, by providing shareholders with an advisory vote on the Directors' Remuneration Report. That approach recognised that disclosure alone was not an adequate regulatory response to the widening gap between directors' pay and company performance nor to the broader political concern over the implications of this trend for social solidarity. A second stage in the evolution of the regime began in 2013 when shareholders were granted a binding vote on remuneration policy. In this article we present the results of the first longitudinal survey of the entire phase of 'say on pay' regulation in the UK to date. We examine the link between each stage of 'say on pay' regulation and the level and growth of directors' remuneration. We conclude by linking our empirical evidence to broader developments in shareholder engagement with listed companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In public companies where there is a dispersed shareholdership structure, shareholders do not have the ability to appoint and supervise the company directors. Costly decisions on the company taken by the directors and the activities of the directors who act their own interest can harm the benefits of the shareholders. In order to overcome this problem within the scope of the Agency Theory which has been developed in Anglo American Law, in contracts signed with the management reward mechanism has been developed where executive remuneration is based on performance criteria. On the other hand the costs and conflicts of interest that arise in dispersed shareholdership structure can also take place in block shareholdership structure between the block shareholders, directors and minority shareholders. In the EU countries as both dispersed and block shareholdership exist in public companies, the need to balance the benefits has been taken into consideration by the EU Commission. In EU company law, based on the Agency Theory, performance based remuneration, independent directorship, remuneration committee, public disclosure and say on pay mechanism have been identified as the main elements of setting up and conducting the executive remuneration policy. In this paper the policy of the executive remuneration is analysed within the scope of the EU by examining the aforementioned elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the potential mediating effects of executive remuneration on the relationship between prior-year earnings management and firm equity value. The occurrence of financial scandals in Malaysia has been associated with earnings management, which entails opportunistic manipulation of a firm's earnings by managers. Managers who are driven by opportunism, engage in earnings management through the manipulation of discretionary accruals (known as accrual-based earnings management method (AEM)) or real activities (known as real earnings management method (REM)) to attain personal wealth maximisation. This is because when executive remuneration is linked to firm performance, managers are incentivised to manage earnings to boost firm performance with the aim to maximise their performance-based remuneration. Thus, through executive remuneration, earnings management may affect firm equity value. However, empirical evidence on the mediating effects of executive remuneration on earnings management and firm equity value is generally scarce. Therefore, using 601 non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia's Main Market from 2013 to 2017, this study finds significant mediation of executive remuneration on the relationship between both earnings management methods and firm equity value in a different manner. This implies that the mediating effects of executive remuneration lies on the methods of earnings management. This paper, thus, provides insights to financial reporting and corporate governance regulators, and key management personnel of Malaysian public listed firms on the importance of executive remuneration on equity valuation of earnings management. This paper also methodologically contributes to literature by establishing mediation model within the earnings management area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We undertake an experiment to explore shareholder voting behaviour when the pay‐performance link is weak or strong; and when there has (has not) been a first strike in the preceding year. We find shareholders are more supportive of a remuneration package evidencing a strong pay‐performance link than a weak link. Further, shareholders are less supportive of a remuneration package when there has been a first strike in the preceding year than when there has not been a first strike. Importantly, we find that a first strike reduces the effect of the pay‐performance link on voting intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Shareholders and other stakeholders in South Africa are increasingly raising their concerns in public about seemingly excessive executive remuneration. Most of their criticism is rooted in the large and growing wage gap in the country. Aim: The authors investigated the nature of the entities whose executive remuneration policies and practices were publicly criticised, the types of challengers involved in this social movement, key issues raised and the impact that the challengers had on the targeted executives’ remuneration. Setting: Public activism involving five South African state-owned enterprises and 38 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Methods: Executives and entities that were targeted in public were identified from three online financial newspapers published between 01 January 2010 and 31 December 2016. A total of 92 events were recorded involving 65 executives. Data on these executives’ emolument and three control variables were sourced from Bloomberg. Descriptive statistics and mixed-model analysis of variance tests were employed to evaluate the quantitative secondary data. Results: In line with the extant literature, most of the targets were large, well-known companies. Individual and minority shareholders represented the largest category of challengers, followed by asset managers and trade unions. The vast majority of concerns centred on the size and composition of executives’ packages and insufficient justifications provided by remuneration committees. The total pay, bonuses and other performance-based incentives decreased significantly in the year after the companies were publicly targeted. Conclusion: The findings suggest that public ‘say on pay’ activism can be an effective mechanism in addressing seemingly excessive executive emolument.

This paper examines the impact of executives' ownership, firm profitability, board size and its components, as well as some other financial factors, on executives' remuneration in the context of Malaysia. Using a sample of 2403 firmyears during 2006-2014 among listed companies in Bursa Malaysia, the findings show that firm profitability, leverage and number of non-executive directors have negative effects on executives' remuneration. Conversely, dividends, percentage of executives' directors, board size and size of firms have positive effects on executives' remuneration. There is no evidence that executives' ownership has significant effects on their remuneration. From the viewpoint of the agency theory about the effects of larger boards, firm profitability, and executive percentage on executives' remuneration, it is perceived that the weak governance exists among listed companies in the Malaysian market. The insignificant impact of executives' ownership on their remuneration is an important finding of this research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to analyze the remuneration of executives in each phase of the business life cycle. A descriptive, documentary, survey-type study was performed with a predominantly quantitative approach, using a sample of 560 observations across 112 companies. For the definition of the current life cycle phase of each company analyzed, Dickinson's (2011) methodology was chosen, which classifies the life cycle into the five phases of start-up, growth, maturity, turbulence, and decline, based simultaneously on the signs of the operating, investment, and financing cash flows. The construction of the econometric model was based on Madhani (2012), Ventura (2013), and Koh et al. (2015). The results suggest that the highest level of executive compensation was in the turbulence phase, followed by the growth, decline, and start-up phases, with the lowest level observed in the maturity phase. It was concluded that the level of remuneration paid to the executives of the companies studied herein is related to the organizational life cycle, which corroborates the contingency and agency theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Executives or top management in any organization play the central role in designing firms' policies including their own remuneration, investments and capital related decisions. Due to their prime importance, executives have greater access to all important information related to organizations. If such personals have greater control over the board or organization, it alludes as managerial power. Concisely, if managerial power is high then the management may misuse such information for their personal benefits. Therefore, considering the importance of managerial power, the current study aims to investigate the effects of managerial power and executive remuneration on firm performance. In order to empirically test the proposed relationships, the current study applied PLS-SEM approach by using the data of Sugar & Allied industry of Pakistan Stock Exchange for the year 2014. The results of the current study indicated that direct effect of managerial power on firm performance did not exist, however, the empirical findings showed that managerial power had a significant effect on executive remuneration. Furthermore, managerial power also significantly influenced the firm performance through the executive remuneration or remuneration mediated the relationship between managerial power and firm performance. Therefore, the current study suggests that firm should take necessary actions to reduce the managerial power and design the pay of top management in a way that any harmful action of managers against the firm's wealth would significantly affect their own benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined executive remuneration and firms’ performance in Nigeria. Specifically, the study seeks to ascertain the nexus between executive remuneration, firm size and board size variables and the performance of quoted companies. The population of the study consists of all the quoted firms as at 31st December, 2014. A sample of sixty (60) companies excluding non- financial firms was selected for the period 2013 and 2014. Summary statistics such as descriptive, correlation and granger causality tests were used. Inferential statistics, using panel Generalized Least Square (EGLS) with fixed effect was used for the purpose of empirical validations. This was after the application of diagnostic test to enhance the study. The study ascertained that executive remuneration has a relationship with firm performance, but negatively impacted on it; though was not statistically significant. Firm size was ascertained not to have significant positive relationship with firms’ performance; though it has a causality relationship with the performance of the firms. Board size was found to negatively affect the performance of firms and is statistically not significant. Premised on this, the study suggests that executive remuneration of quote firms should be pegged constantly in a flexible manner. This will enable shareholders known the causality relationship between what is paid to the executive and how that influence performance.

Background: Shareholders and other stakeholders in South Africa are increasingly raising their concerns in public about seemingly excessive executive remuneration. Most of their criticism is rooted in the large and growing wage gap in the country. Aim: The authors investigated the nature of the entities whose executive remuneration policies and practices were publicly criticised, the types of challengers involved in this social movement, key issues raised and the impact that the challengers had on the targeted executives' remuneration. Setting: Public activism involving five South African state-owned enterprises and 38 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Methods: Executives and entities that were targeted in public were identified from three online financial newspapers published between 01 January 2010 and 31 December 2016. A total of 92 events were recorded involving 65 executives. Data on these executives' emolument and three control variables were sourced from Bloomberg. Descriptive statistics and mixed-model analysis of variance tests were employed to evaluate the quantitative secondary data. Results: In line with the extant literature, most of the targets were large, well-known companies. Individual and minority shareholders represented the largest category of challengers, followed by asset managers and trade unions. The vast majority of concerns centred on the size and composition of executives' packages and insufficient justifications provided by remuneration committees. The total pay, bonuses and other performance-based incentives decreased significantly in the year after the companies were publicly targeted. Conclusion: The findings suggest that public 'say on pay' activism can be an effective mechanism in addressing seemingly excessive executive emolument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This study investigates lobbying behaviour over the two phases of the 2009 Productivity Commission Inquiry into executive remuneration within Australia. Consistent with expectations, behaviours appeared related to preference for change, the costs of regulatory change relative to those of lobbying, and the need for reputational capital. Industry participants, and those from the Representative and Professional bodies emerge as key opponents. Industry presented in a conciliatory manner during the first phase, revealing a preference for the status quo, but then directly targeted specific recommendations of concern, notably the 'two strike' and 'no vacancy' rules in the second phase. Respondents from the Representative and Professional Bodies were broadly and consistently supportive of change and the Inquiry's final recommendations. We also find that these recommendations largely align with the views of the Representative Bodies, but conflict with those expressed by Industry in their second phase submissions. Finally, we find no evidence to suggest the motivation behind Industry lobbying related to poor remuneration practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of Brexit on financial services regulation in relation to three areas linked to executive remuneration. They are: the bonus cap; the clawback of pay; and the level of disclosure required by shareholders with regard to details of directors' remuneration. It will be argued that legally Brexit will have little impact on any of the three areas. UK legislation has already incorporated a great deal of EU legislation. The status quo of retaining such legal restrictions seems sensible in light of public sentiment towards unfairness in executive compensation and uncertainty towards the Brexit negotiations. Nevertheless, London faces stiff competition from other major international financial centres in a post-Brexit era. The loss of single passporting rights is also encouraging major banks to invest in other European financial centres. Brexit creates opportunities too. With the integration of digital technology, it is possible to create convenient platforms where investors can access reports on executive remuneration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given growing inequality in South Africa, shareholders are increasingly questioning the size and composition of executive remuneration packages. They are also demanding greater transparency on the criteria and processes used to award performance incentives. The researchers hence investigated the extent and depth to which a sample of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) disclosed details on their executive performance evaluations. Attention was furthermore given to whether these companies reported a link between their executives’ pay and performance. The criteria and time frames used to evaluate and reward executive performance were also explored. Content analysis was performed on 2 136 annual/integrated reports over the period 2002 to 2015. Semi-structured personal interviews were also conducted with six directors serving on local remuneration committees. Controlling for company size, a significant increase was noted in the number of JSE-listed companies that disclosed information on their executive performance evaluations over the research period. The depth of these disclosures, however, remains superficial. As such, shareholders are constrained in their ability to hold remuneration committees accountable. These committees are encouraged to adopt a wider range of performance criteria and re-assess their focus on short-term performance. It is also suggested that commerce educators cultivate an appreciation for long-term, sustainable value creation among graduates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]