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In this reply, I respond to Joshua C. Gellers’ commentary on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024a), in which I present a deeply relational, “eco-relational approach”. This approach asserts that it is necessary to consider the relationality with non-human entities such as animals and technology on a deeper level than has been done in robot ethics so far. This disrupts traditional ethical concepts. In his commentary “Not Ecological Enough: A Commentary on an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (2024), Gellers raises criticisms of my method and the consequences of the eco-relational approach. In this reply, I address these criticisms and focus especially on the ecological responsibility of the eco-relational approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The manuscript discusses the limitations of applying AI in trend research platforms for the fashion system. This analysis intends to take a position within the emergent research topic of AI. Considering its ethical implications, we explore the opportunities of implementing AI to support trend research from a design-oriented perspective, realising the relationship between fashion and trends, which is central in shaping the future. Examples of AI-powered trend platforms evidence how valuable their insights are for strategic innovation. The analysis focuses on platforms that provide tailored services using AI and expert interpretation. Virtue ethics of technology serves as a useful framework to examine this topic, proposing a new set of virtues that respond to technology’s shaping of behaviour and its disadvantages. The risks of applying AI are many-fold; the consequences perpetuate power imbalances and social inequality. Proposing guidelines for enabling a responsible practice explores how to forge ethics into AI, creating a pluralised practice.

Given much-discussed innovations in Virtual Reality as the 'ultimate empathy machine', we offer three provocations regarding the use of Virtual Reality to cultivate empathy: is empathy possible? Is empathy enough? Who controls how empathy is produced, and who is left out? As a case study, we examine the VR films that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has produced about the refugee crisis. Using this as an entry point to discuss the implications for technology-mediated moral education, our analysis aims to provide insights for educators and scholars interested in the use of VR to teach about marginalised communities facing structural injustice. In conclusion, we offer a set of practical considerations to foster reflection on the ethical and effective use of technology in moral education. We advocate for a nuanced approach that emphasises empathy as a catalyst for meaningful change, transforming passive empathy into active solidarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that students have moral reasons to refrain from using chatbots such as ChatGPT to write certain papers. We begin by showing why many putative reasons to refrain from using chatbots fail to generate compelling arguments against their use in the construction of these papers. Many of these reasons rest on implausible principles, hollowed out conceptions of education, or impoverished accounts of human agency. They also overextend to cases where it is permissible to rely on a machine for something that once required human cognition. We then give our account: you have a moral obligation to respect your own humanity (i.e., your capacity to set and pursue your own ends), and the process of writing a humanities paper is important for the cultivation of your humanity. We conclude by considering objections and offering replies. In the end, we argue that the moral reasons students have to refrain from using chatbots depend crucially on instructors' ability to make writing assignments worthwhile. This relies on instructors having the right kind of institutional support, which sheds light on implications that this duty has for administrators, legislators, and the general public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coghlan and Cox (Between death and suffering: Resolving the gamer’s dilemma. Ethics and Information Technology) offer a new resolution to the Gamer’s Dilemma (Luck, The Gamer’s Dilemma. Ethics and Information Technology). They argue that, while it is fitting for a person committing virtual child molestation to feel self-repugnance, it is not fitting for a person committing virtual murder to feel the same, and the fittingness of this feeling indicates each act’s moral permissibility. The aim of this paper is to determine whether this resolution – the repugnant resolution – successfully resolves the Gamer’s Dilemma. We argue that it does not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the ethical implications of integrating advanced immersive technologies into education using a snowball documentary methodology, considering multidisciplinary perspectives. Advocating for a holistic approach, it suggests combining legal frameworks, ethical codes, and educational programs centered on core values. The evolving ethical landscape of immersive technologies reveals varied viewpoints among researchers, with some emphasizing concerns and others highlighting advantages. Additionally, some leverage immersive technologies for ethical education in response to emerging challenges. Post-implementation, ethical challenges and norms contribute to the ongoing expansion of the topic. A closer examination identifies nuanced differences and commonalities between immersive technologies and the Metaverse, emphasizing multifaceted considerations. Legal aspects are thoroughly covered in AR, VR, and MxR technologies, while the Metaverse focuses on identity protection. In education, immersive technologies exhibit more developed ethical concerns, underscoring the richness compared to the Metaverse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deepfakes are extremely realistic audio/video media. They are produced via a complex machine-learning process, one that centrally involves training an algorithm on hundreds or thousands of audio/video recordings of an object or person, S, with the aim of either creating entirely new audio/video media of S or else altering existing audio/video media of S. Deepfakes are widely predicted to have deleterious consequences (principally, moral and epistemic ones) for both individuals and various of our social practices and institutions. In this introduction to the Topical Collection, I first survey existing philosophical research on deepfakes (Sects. 2 and 3). I then give an overview of the papers that comprise the Collection (Sect. 4). Finally, I conclude with remarks on a line of argument made in a number of papers in the Topical Collection: that deepfakes may cause their own demise (Sect. 5). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there has been growing interest in adapting virtue ethics to the ethics of technology. However, it has most typically been invoked to address some particular issue of moral importance, and there is only a limited range of works dealing with the methodological question of how virtue ethics may contribute to this field. My approach in this paper is threefold. I start with a brief discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, with a view to constructing a framework in which to then address at least some of the aspects of the growing technicization of life that call for scrutiny. I subsequently proceed further by outlining three possible models of virtue-theoretical analysis within the ethics of technology, giving special attention to those changes in human agency where technicization can be seen to exert a significant influence. Finally, I focus on the third such possibility, the extended virtue model, as a basis for calling for a more inclusive account of moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the ethical implications of integrating advanced immersive technologies into education using a snowball documentary methodology, considering multidisciplinary perspectives. Advocating for a holistic approach, it suggests combining legal frameworks, ethical codes, and educational programs centered on core values. The evolving ethical landscape of immersive technologies reveals varied viewpoints among researchers, with some emphasizing concerns and others highlighting advantages. Additionally, some leverage immersive technologies for ethical education in response to emerging challenges. Post-implementation, ethical challenges and norms contribute to the ongoing expansion of the topic. A closer examination identifies nuanced differences and commonalities between immersive technologies and the Metaverse, emphasizing multifaceted considerations. Legal aspects are thoroughly covered in AR, VR, and MxR technologies, while the Metaverse focuses on identity protection. In education, immersive technologies exhibit more developed ethical concerns, underscoring the richness compared to the Metaverse.

Copyright of Filosofija, Sociologija is the property of Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Appeals to the moral value of nature and naturalness are commonly used in debates about technology and the environment and to inform our approach to the ethics of technology and the environment more generally. In this paper, I will argue, firstly, that arguments from nature, as they are used in debates about new technologies and about the environment, are misinterpreted when they are understood as attempting to put forward categorical objections to certain human activities and, consequently, their real significance is often overlooked. Secondly, arguments from nature, particularly as they are used in the context of debates over the use of new technologies, can be understood as appealing to human nature as a way to determine human limitations. Thirdly, arguments from nature can inform our discussion of what it is to be a human being or a person, and this kind of discussion can, in turn, inform our ethical deliberations in such areas of bioethics as euthanasia, abortion, etc. Finally, I conclude that a proper understanding of these arguments can help in establishing which virtues and which vices relate to our relationship with the non-human world—that is, which character dispositions are relevant to an environmental virtue ethics, with human nature as its foundation. A proper understanding of the argument from nature provides the basis for a 'virtuously anthropocentric' environmental ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Novel and emerging technologies can provide users with new kinds and unprecedented amounts of information about themselves, such as autobiographical information, neurodata, health information, or characteristics inferred from online behavior. Technology that provides extensive personal information (PI technology) can impact who we understand ourselves to be, how we constitute ourselves, and indeed who we are. This paper analyzes how PI technology's external, quantified perspective on us affects identity based on a narrative identity theory. Disclosing the intimate relationship between PI technology and identity sheds light on a whole new range of ethical issues that have received insufficient attention so far. Personal information provided by technology is not just information that belongs to individuals but also changes them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this reply to van de Poel’s (Philosophy & Technology, 35(3), 82, 2022) commentary on O’Neill (Philosophy & Technology, 35(79), 2022), I discuss two worries about the general contextual integrity approach to evaluating technological change. First, I address van de Poel’s concern that the general contextual integrity approach will not supply the right guidance in cases where morally problematic technological change poses no threat to contextual integrity. Second, I elaborate on how the approach supplies mechanisms for balancing caution with the need for change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores how the framework of systemic risks can help govern the risks imposed through solar climate engineering research. The central argument is that a systemic perspective of risk is a useful tool for analysing and assessing the risks imposed through Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) research. SAI is a form of climate engineering that could cool the planet by enhancing its albedo through the injection of aerosols into the stratosphere. Researching such a technology creates systemic risks with a strong sociotechnical component. This component consists of the potential societal harm that a developing or new technology might cause to existing norms, values, institutions, and politics. The systemic risk framework is a valuable heuristic for this case, given the complex interdependencies of societal systems, infrastructures, markets, etc. At the same time, the systemic risk framework can be enhanced through the inclusion of a more robust and reflected ethical considerations on technological risks. Consequently, this article seeks to supplement the systemic risk governance framework with insights from technology ethics. Specifically, the paper offers an ethically reflective conception of societal value dynamism and stakeholder engagement and participation, tying it to existing systemic risk governance approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To assess the intelligence of machines, Alan Turing proposed a test of imitation known as the imitation game, famously known as the Turing test. To assess whether artificial intelligent (AI) systems could be moral or not, Colin Allen et al. developed a test of imitation in the context of morality, a test known as the Moral Turing Test (MTT), which I will, in this paper, call the moral imitation game. There are arguments against developing any type of MTT or moral imitation game. Rather than developing a moral imitation game, this paper proposes a criterion of imitation for AI systems in the moral scenario. To develop a criterion of imitation, I explore the notion of moral attribution in detail. Within the case of moral attribution, I introduce the subject‐ascriber distinction. The notion of moral attribution and the subject‐ascriber distinction is employed to address the following questions: (a) how is the assessment in MTT arranged?, (b) what is the role of the interrogator in the MTT?, and (c) what information is to be concealed from the interrogator? The first question deals with the aspect of assessment, the second question deals with the reordering of the role of the interrogator and the third one deals with the concealment aspect of the imitation game. After that, a criterion of imitation for AI systems is put forward. Using the subject‐ascriber distinction in moral attribution and David Lewis' Mad Pain and Martian Pain cases, it is argued that the notion of sentience is insignificant for the ascriber for moral attributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review-essay of Adam Rothstein's Drone (2015) analyzes drone technology, more explicitly, the emerging opportunities for commercial and private usage of drones, in two parts: While the first part is dedicated to a careful reading of Rothstein's book and an exploration of his method of tracing emerging technologies as narratives in terms of their constitutional technologies—the stories of four technologies that preceded the drone and proved integral to its emergence—the second part of this review seeks to extend his method toward recent examples of commercial and private drone-usage, exploring how the adaption of drone technology in different realms of application (such as commodity delivery, entertainment through drone-races, or even political protest and terrorism) shapes the societal conception of drones and their perceived usage. Since drones represent a derivative of military technology, a short section on the ethics of drones that engages with some of the points raised by Rothstein will show how, despite the drone's unglamorous past as a hunter from above, the adaption of drone technology in new contexts might over time change this one-sided conception of drones as mere tools of warfare and surveillance toward a balanced understanding of the risks and chances associated with this young technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Everyday (mis)uses of deepfakes define prevailing conceptualizations of what they are and the moral stakes in their deployment. But one complication in understanding deepfakes is that they are not photographic yet nonetheless manipulate lens-based recordings with the intent of mimicking photographs. The harmfulness of deepfakes, moreover, significantly depends on their potential to be mistaken for photographs and on the belief that photographs capture actual events, a tenet known as the transparency thesis, which scholars have somewhat ironically attacked by citing digital imaging techniques as counterexamples. Combining these positions, this paper sets out two core points: (1) that conceptions about the nature of photography introduce imperatives about its uses; and (2) that popular cultural understandings of photography imply normative ideas that infuse our encounters with deepfakes. Within this, I further raise the question of what moral ground deepfakes occupy that allows them to have such a potentially devastating effect. I show that answering this question involves reinstating the notion that photographs are popularly conceived of as transparent. The rejoinder to this argument, however, is that to take the sting out of deepfakes we must, once again, become skeptical of the veracity of all images, including photoreal ones. This kind of critical mindedness was warranted before the invention of photography for both pictorial imprints and written accounts from various media sources. Given this, along with the fact that photographic trickery is nothing new, deepfakes need not push us into a post-truth epistemic abyss, for they imply a decidedly old turn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay contends that the ethics around the use of spy technology to gather intelligence (TECHINT) during espionage and counterintelligence operations is ambiguous. To build this argument, the essay critically scrutinizes Cécile Fabre's recent and excellent book Spying through a Glass Darkly, which argues that there are no ethical differences between the use of human intelligence (HUMINT) obtained from or by human assets and TECHINT in these operations. As the essay explains, Fabre arrives at this position by treating TECHINT as a like-for-like replacement for HUMINT. The essay argues instead that TECHINT is unlikely to act as a like-for-like replacement for HUMINT. As such, TECHINT might transform existing practices of espionage and counterintelligence, giving rise to new ethical challenges not captured in Fabre's analysis. To illustrate the point, the essay builds an analogy between TECHINT and recent armed conflicts in which precision weapons have been deployed. Although precision weapons seem ethically desirable, their availability has created new practices of waging war that are ethically problematic. By analogy, TECHINT, though not intrinsically undesirable, has the capacity to generate new practices of intelligence gathering that are ethically problematic—potentially more than HUMINT. Ultimately, recent negative experiences with the use of precision weaponry should caution against an overly positive assessment of TECHINT's ethical desirability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Holm (Res Publica, 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-022-09546-3) argues that a class of algorithmic fairness measures, that he refers to as the 'performance parity criteria', can be understood as applications of John Broome's Fairness Principle. We argue that the performance parity criteria cannot be read this way. This is because in the relevant context, the Fairness Principle requires the equalization of actual individuals' individual-level chances of obtaining some good (such as an accurate prediction from a predictive system), but the performance parity criteria do not guarantee any such thing: the measures merely ensure that certain population-level ratios hold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Value Sensitive Design (VSD) is a design methodology developed by Batya Friedman and Peter Kahn (2003) that brings in moral deliberations in an early stage of a design process. It assumes that neither technology itself is value neutral, nor shifts the value-ladennes to the sole usage of technology. This paper adds to emerging literature onVSD for autonomous weapons systems development and discusses extant literature on values in autonomous systems development in general and in autonomous weapons development in particular. I identify opportunities, such as public debates, and threats, such as the classified nature of the design process, for VSD in autonomous weapons development. This paper contributes to academic debates about the non-neutrality of technology by pointing out that values have been and can be explicitly designed into autonomous systems. It is informative for policy makers and designers who are tasked with developing actual autonomous weapons or policies around such systems, as they learn about an established design methodology that is sensitive to societal concerns and industry needs and that can be applied to autonomous weapons systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Appeals to the moral value of nature and naturalness are commonly used in debates about technology and the environment and to inform our approach to the ethics of technology and the environment more generally. In this paper, I will argue, firstly, that arguments from nature, as they are used in debates about new technologies and about the environment, are misinterpreted when they are understood as attempting to put forward categorical objections to certain human activities and, consequently, their real significance is often overlooked. Secondly, arguments from nature, particularly as they are used in the context of debates over the use of new technologies, can be understood as appealing to human nature as a way to determine human limitations. Thirdly, arguments from nature can inform our discussion of what it is to be a human being or a person, and this kind of discussion can, in turn, inform our ethical deliberations in such areas of bioethics as euthanasia, abortion, etc. Finally, I conclude that a proper understanding of these arguments can help in establishing which virtues and which vices relate to our relationship with the non-human world—that is, which character dispositions are relevant to an environmental virtue ethics, with human nature as its foundation. A proper understanding of the argument from nature provides the basis for a ‘virtuously anthropocentric’ environmental ethics.

Much of the debate on the ethics of self-driving cars has revolved around trolley scenarios. This paper instead takes up the political or institutional question of who should decide how a self-driving car drives. Specifically, this paper is on the question of whether and why passengers should be able to control how their car drives. The paper reviews existing arguments—those for passenger ethics settings and for mandatory ethics settings respectively—and argues that they fail. Although the arguments are not successful, they serve as the basis to formulate desiderata that any approach to regulating the driving behavior of self-driving cars ought to fulfill. The paper then proposes one way of designing passenger ethics settings that meets these desiderata. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Policy regulations of ethically controversial genetic technologies should, on the one hand, be based on ethical principles. On the other hand, they should be socially acceptable to ensure implementation. In addition, they should align with ethical theory. Yet to date we lack a reliable and valid scale to measure the relevant ethical judgements in laypeople. We target this lacuna. Methods We developed a scale based on ethical principles to elicit lay judgments: the Genetic Technologies Questionnaire (GTQ). In two pilot studies and a pre-registered main study, we validated the scale in a representative sample of the US population. Results The final version of the scale contains 20 items but remains highly reliable even when reduced to five. It also predicts behaviour; for example, ethical judgments as measured by the GTQ predicted hypothetical donations and grocery shopping. In addition, the GTQ may be of interest to policymakers and ethicists because it reveals coherent and ethically justified judgments in laypeople. For instance, the GTQ indicates that ethical judgments are sensitive to possible benefits and harms (in line with utilitarian ethics), but also to ethical principles such as the value of consent-autonomy. Conclusions The GTQ can be recommended for research in both experimental psychology and applied ethics, as well as a tool for ethically and empirically informed policymaking.

The rapid development of technology is having an enormous effect on our lives. Emerging technological solutions offer new possibilities in various fields and on different levels, either for ordinary human beings or organisations and governments. However, the ethical implications of such technologies on our lives, our societies, are often not fully understood and require careful analysis. This article focuses on one type of such technologies, genetic tests available to the public, analysing the potential ethical concerns in these tests being directly provided to the consumers.

Studies of quantification are an emerging academic interest due to the datafication and quantification trends in modern society. The existing literature on this interdisciplinary field involves two approaches: a history of science approach and a sociology approach. This article argues for adding perspectives from the philosophy of technology. The philosophy of technology raises otherwise neglected ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions about the technology of quantification. Quantification as social technology is non-neutral and exhibits social constructed features, which beyond the commonly perceived realist opinions. The social-constructed quantification also has the ability to influence social agents, mediating the way humans exist in and understand the life world. Ethical and political questions about quantification call for integration into an already rich ethical and political discourse surrounding technological artifacts, actions, and political agendas. • Quantification can be seen as social technology so that the philosophy of technology can enrich studies of quantification. • Quantification is non-neutral and exhibits social constructed features, which beyond the commonly perceived realist opinions. • Post-phenomenological analysis can point to how quantitative categories influence a subject's way of being. • Ethical and political questions about quantification can be better addressed by recent theories of philosophy of technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a novel understanding of collective responsibility for AI outcomes that can help resolve the “problem of many hands” and “responsibility gaps” when it comes to AI failure, especially in the context of lethal autonomous weapon systems.

通用模型是近年来人工智能发展的重要方向之一。随着模型研发应用的增多, 模型的社会和伦理影响 受到广泛关注。文章从通用模型的特性出发、分析了模型在算法、数据和算力 3 个层面潜在的伦理挑战, 包 括不确定性、真实性、可靠性, 偏见、毒性、公平、隐私及环境问题。进一步从技术哲学的视角分析了数据 驱动的模型在人与世界关系中的中介性作用及所产生的"镜像"效应问题和透明性问题, 提出了人与世界关 系的新形态是以模型（数据）为中介的, 即"人-模型（数据）-世界"关系。最后, 从治理技术和治理机制 两方面反思了当前的应对措施及局限性。建议建立开放式、全流程、价值嵌入的伦理规约机制, 保障通用模 型在合规、合伦理的框架下发展. In recent years, the general model is one of the most important development trends of artificial intelligence. With the rapidly increasing research and deployment of general models, the social and ethical effects of general models have received extensive attention. Grounded in the characteristics of general models, this article analyzes the potential ethical challenges of the models at three levels: algorithm, data, and computing power. The detailed challenges include uncertainty, truthfulness, reliability, bias, toxicity, fairness, privacy, and environmental issues. Also, through the lens of philosophy of technology, it elaborates the important reasons for the ethical challenges: the "mirroring" effect and transparency problem caused by the data-driven general models' mediation between human and the world. This relation can be depicted as "human-model (data)-world". Finally, from the perspectives of governance tools and governance mechanisms, this article reviews the current countermeasures and reflects on their limitations. It is recommended to establish an open, full-process, value-embedded ethical restraint mechanism to ensure that the general model develops in accordance with legal and ethical requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this contribution, the author contends that the way in which Pieter Lemmens interprets the transcendental of technology, particularly through the work of Bernard Stiegler, is only one of the possible ways of understanding the transcendental of technology. His thesis is that there are many other transcendentals of technology besides technology itself. The task of a philosophy of technology beyond the empirical turn could precisely consist in exploring these multiple transcendentals of technology, along with their multiple relations. In the first section, the author considers and criticizes the "empirical transcendentality" that characterizes most of the current philosophical approaches to technology, in particular when it comes to ethical issues. In the second section, he proposes to include Lemmens' perspective in a more general theory (and consequent practices) about the transcendentals of technology. The transcendentals of technology include social symbolic forms, culture, language, media, and many other dimensions that philosophy of technology has not systematically explored yet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we investigate how to explain the difference between traditional design, engineering, and technology--which have exploited nature and put increasing pressure on Earth's carrying capacity since the industrial revolution--and biomimetic design--which claims to explore nature's sustainable solutions and promises to be regenerative by design. We reflect on the concept of mimesis. Mimesis assumes a continuity between the natural environment as a regenerative model and measure for sustainable design that is imitated and reproduced in biomimetic design, engineering, and technology. We conceptualize mimesis in terms of two interdependent boundary conditions: differentiation and participation. We subsequently develop four characteristics of biomimicry as regenerative design, engineering, and technology: technological mimesis is 1) a participative differentiation of nature; 2) supplemental to natural mimesis in biomimetic design; 3) the participative differentiation of technological mimesis is constitutive of nature; 4) the participative differentiation of technological mimesis is always limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, tens of product teams, research institutes, academic conferences, and college courses—the list goes on—have cropped up under the banner of tech ethics to grapple with the social and political impact of technology. For some, an orientation around ethics indicates a moment of humility in an industry characterized by hubris. Now even major tech corporations are seeking expertise outside of the technical sphere. In speaking tech ethics, we speak ethics to power. For others, the outlook is less rosy. Critical observers take tech ethics to just be the latest tool in the same-old corporate toolshed—new rhetoric in service of old interests. Tech ethics is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. It is power speaking ethics. But debate about tech ethics concerns more than descriptive analyses of current efforts as such. The capacities of ethical tech as a political movement are also up for scrutiny. What is the political payoff of anyone speaking ethics at all? In this article, the author approaches the question by drawing on a critical history of another moral-turned-political movement. A critical inquiry into the ascendency of human rights, the author suggests, elucidates the multiple functions of moral reasoning and rhetoric in political movements and lends insight into how they may ultimately bear on political efficacy. The 20th century history of human rights gives reason to be suspicious of moral language that is evasive of engaging political and ideological battles. However, it also points to the possibility that long-standing moral ideals may be renewed and refashioned into new claims. Tech ethics may yet play such a role: placing explicitly moral demands on those typically taken to be exempt from moral standards. This demand reaches beyond what the specialized moniker of “tech ethics” suggests.