Search

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This is a reflection on the relationship between ethnography (as practice and as product) and ethical life. I suggest that there are values internal to the practice of ethnography as fieldwork, as writing, and as reading, irrespective of the historically situated objects and values of ethnography external to it. I summarize my understanding of ethical life as it emerged from my ethnographic experience and reading, focusing on acts of practical judgment and their consequences. I reflect briefly on the ethical nature of ethnographic practice itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In “The Phenomenology of Spirit” and “Philosophy of Right”, Hegel gives a detailed specification of the theses about the war that were claimed in earlier papers and manuscripts, but his position is not fundamentally changed. In the “The Phenomenology of Spirit” Hegel advocates governments’ need and right to initiate a war from time to time in order to prevent both the isolation and atomization, and let individuals feel the death. As in the past, the war, as Hegel says, has a moment of ethical life. In the “Philosophy of Right” Hegel introduces final deliberations about war that rely on ideas of his earlier paper about natural law even more than in the “The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Hegel emphasizes the ethical role of sacrifice in the war and expresses opinions critical of not an abstract perpetual peace but a concrete philosophical project of Kant. Due to Hegel, Kant’s perpetual peace does not resemble a perpetual deception, since the required union of states is elusive and none except the world spirit in the world history can be a praetor. In line with Heraclitus, Hegel maintains that wars underlie the nature of things. I contribute to the discussions of Hegel scholars if Hegel’s philosophy glorifies a war or not as follows: I substitute the term “glorification” with the term “bellicisme” that suits better to measured, not snobbish and deprived of certain historical implications Hegel’s theses about reasonableness, necessity, the ethicality of war and ethicality of perpetual peace illness.

This article examines the recent popularization of Buddhist temple food in contemporary South Korea. It specifically probes the circumstances that have led to nuns taking on the leadership role in excavating, preserving, reinterpreting and popularizing temple food. Nuns have proactively responded to a myriad of contemporary challenges, such as food insecurity, public health, the loss of shared community and the ecological crisis, and seized the new opportunities to open up a noble space of their own by investing new value into temple food as a means to achieve enlightenment and an ethical life. The article introduces some of the leading "master chefs of temple food," a formal designation awarded to Buddhist nuns and monks who have made exceptional contributions to the development of temple food. It also illustrates how the popularization of temple food has intersected significantly with the general promotion of Korean cuisine (hansik) as authentic cultural heritage in the age of globalization, which has tended to result in the growing commercialization of temple food. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For over a century, Hegel’s view of war is seen as controversial that results in mutually exclusive interpretations. To reach a proper evaluation of Hegel’s views, it is necessary to consider both Hegel’s initial states of philosophical doctrine about war and peace, and the development of his understanding of war from early works to mature ones. In the first part of the paper, I characterize Kant’s position on war, since it was the starting point for Hegel. Contrary to popular representations about Kant as an exclusive pacifist, the philosopher of Koenigsberg had a philosophical-historical treatment of war, in which the war appeared as something sublime. However, both legal-ethical peace understanding and veto of war from the point of practical reason were not dominant in Kant’s philosophy, subordinating the sublime treatment of war. Kant’s next contemporaries could not already keep this position, emphasizing either one or the other side of war interpretation. Starting from the early writings (the paper “On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law” or manuscripts “System of Ethical Life” and “The German Constitution”), Hegel stresses an ethical aspect of war and its necessity, so that the shield is arranged on the way of systems isolation and individuals atomization, and the unity in its ethical health is saved. Perpetual peace, on the contrary, leads to diseases. The statement about equality of claims and the same truthfulness of warring parties’ rights is the originality of Hegel’s view. It makes absolutely impossible the war evaluation from the point of its justice and injustice.

Brazil has endured multiple political, economic, and environmental crises—and now the COVID-19 pandemic—which have drawn social inequalities into razor sharp relief. This contribution analyzes the resilience of rural families facing these crises in southern Bahia. These families have benefited from various redistributive policies over the years, including redistributive land reforms (RLRs), conditional cash transfers (CCTs), and recent emergency aid (EA) payments related to the pandemic. Each (re)distributive approach involves different notions of distributive justice informed by competing background theories of "the good," which hold implications for concepts of resilience. Drawing on long-term research with RLR communities in Bahia, this article considers the gains achieved by different redistributive programs. Families who acquired land through RLR projects appear more resilient, especially in the face of crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to approach the Honneth's theory of recognition from two perspectives: at first approaches the spheres of recognition from a formal ethical life purpose that maintain both universal and contextual aspects inherent to self-realization processes. Secondly, presents Thompson's critique of Honneth according to which recognition's theory fails for two main reasons: (i) it is unable to deal with the dynamics and effects of social power, that is, it dispenses with an ontological analysis of "constitutive power" and "constitutive domination"; (ii) it focuses on the intersubjective practices of recognition and forgets to focus on the normative structures and systems of functional integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today we live in a global world. Perhaps most of us could not have imagined that the modern world would reach this level. The development of the internet and technology is bringing the people in the world and the countries they live closer to each other in every field. Some of us can say that these developments have many good aspects. But we must admit that there are bigger problems than we've never experienced before. Especially when we consider the increase in consumption, our destruction of nature and other living species, and the increasing number of poor and hungry people in the world became more visible. With climate change, the gradual decrease in clean water resources, increase in drought, decrease in the amount of harvest, etc., hunger-poverty continues to increase day by day. What can we do in the face of these problems? Will humanity be able to find a way out to these problems, which will have great consequences in a short time? Philosophers like Peter Singer have tried to develop an ethical life in which we can make the world more livable in the face of our global problems, rather than being passive and hopeless. In this paper, we will discuss Singer's proposal for global ethical life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I Zombie es una serie de televisión inspirada en un cómic, en la cual se narran las relaciones de cooperación y conflicto entre zombis y humanos. Dicha convivencia es posible debido a que los zombis se parecen a los humanos cuando están bien alimentados. Esta convivencia representa, de forma figurada, algunos de los conflictos más importantes de nuestro tiempo, como el reconocimiento del otro, los límites de la moralidad kantiana, a favor de la eticidad [sittlichkeit] hegeliana. Además, ilustra problemas más concretos, como la gestión de los flujos de población o la convivencia entre nacionalismos distintos dentro del mismo Estado. Se nos enseña también que la libertad no es una cuestión de pura voluntad moral individual, sino que además necesita de instituciones para desarrollarse, sin que suponga grandes tensiones psíquicas entre egoísmo y altruismo. I Zombieis a television series inspired by a comic book, which depicts the relationship of cooperation and conflict between zombies and humans. This coexistence is made possible by the fact that zombies resemble humans when they are well fed. This coexistence figuratively represents some of the most important conflicts of our time, such as the recognition of the other, the limits of Kantian morality in favour of Hegelian ethical life [sittlichkeit]. It also illustrates more concrete problems, such as the management of population flows or the coexistence of different nationalisms within the same state. We are also taught that freedom is not a matter of purely individual moral will, but that it also needs institutions to develop, without involving great psychic tensions between egoism and altruism.

According to Hegel, the public misery caused by poverty and pandemic is a reality that individuals must face in order to sustain their livelihoods; moreover, it constitutes an important reference in the governance of different types of communities. In the context of Hegel’s philosophy of right, the public misery of the individual undergoes a transformation from the theological concept of “destiny”, to the philosophical one of “spirit”, which Hegel then constructed as a unique system for “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit). After he has formed the concept of ethical life, Hegel used it as a means to refine three governance approaches for the salvation (emancipation) of the individual; namely the governance of the church, the governance of civil society and the governance of the state. This article shows the logic of the evolution of Hegel’s three governance approaches in the process of change as he shaped the concept of ethical life. This not only reveals the inner structure of the relations and inferences of the categories in logic, but also reveals the dynamic mechanism of the proposition about “entity as subject” in phenomenology, so as to dialectically interpret Hegel’s way of salvation and his three governance approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Hegel's idea of nation and its significance for his theory of the modern state, namely, the role that 'the national' plays for his justification of right in the Philosophy of Right. It is argued that Hegel strikes a balance between historicism and a rational justification of state and law. He bases the state on a notion of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) that is both national and subjected to a world historical development toward rationality and universal right. Consequently, 'nation,' in the sense of a group of people invoking identity and rights based on a primordial common language, culture, and territory, does not cover what Hegel means by the modern nation state. 'Ethical life' is national, but it also constitutes a historically changeable community of values supported by citizens' conscious participation in communal life (patriotism). Today, Hegel's idea undermines the legitimacy of nationalistic invocations of primordial ethnic cultures within politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Din-devlet ilişkisinin yanı sıra din ve siyasette yenileşme de ilgi çeken konular arasında yer almaktadır. Bazı önemli dönemler ve dönüm noktaları bu ilişkileri şekillendirmesi açısından önemlidir. Eski İran devlet geleneği, Yunan demokrasisi, VIII. Henry İngiltere’si ve Rus Ekim 1917 Bolşevik Devrimi gibi. Fransız devrimi sonrası Avrupa’da ciddi bir biçimde yeni tarz siyasetin ne olması gerektiği ile ilgili ciddi sorun oluştu. Bu sorunların bir kısmı salt politik idi. Bunun yanı sıra din, kilise, gelenek, yenilik, muhafazakârlık, ekonomi, sınıfsal çatışma ve felsefe ile ilgi olan yeni sorunlar ortaya çıktı. Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Marks, Friedrich Engels gibi düşünürler bu tarz sorunlarla ilgilendiler. Bu konuları ele alan en önemli bir düşünür de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’dir. Hegel politikayı teolojiden bağımsız bir şekilde ele almamaktadır. Dolayısıyla o, devletin özü, tarihteki bireysel devletler, politik kurumlar, politik devrimler ve devlet şekilleri gibi konulara teolojik-politik bir açıdan yaklaşır. Fransız devrimi sonrası oluşan yeni politik durumu Martin Luther’in Protestan Hristiyanlığı ile ilintileyerek modern bir Protestan devlet formülasyonu oluşturdu. Bu noktada Hegel’in iki önemli unsuru devreye soktuğuna dikkat çekilmelidir: Törellik ve tin-hakikat birliği olarak Protestan ilke. Bu makalenin de temel amacı Hegel’in Protestan devletini bu iki olgu etrafında incelemektir. Hegel için törellik bir Protestan icadıdır. Protestan icadı olan törellikte objektiflik ve sübjektiflik; hukuk ve ahlak uyum halindedir. Hegel bununla romantiklerin iddiası olan Protestanlıktaki otorite yoksunluğunu da boşa çıkarmak istiyordu: Eğer Katoliklikte somut otorite papalık ise bu Protestanlıkta törelliktir. Protestan ilke olan tin-hakikat birliği de -törellikte olduğu gibi- ikilemleri aşan bir olgudur. Hegel, Protestan devleti Protestan ilke olan tin-hakikat birliği üzerine inşa eder. Hegel her şeyden önce Katolikliğin Tanrı’yı dışsal olarak algılayıp bilmesine karşın Protestanlığın Tanrı'yı içsel olarak bildiği görüşünü savunur. Buna göre Protestanların ve Katoliklerin Tanrı’yı farklı biçimlerde algılama tarzları sonuçta Protestanlığın ve Katolikliğin birçok inanç, ibadet ve politikasını şekillendirmektedir. Bu nedenden Luther'in reformu siyasi konularda avantajlı geçişler sağlamaktadır. Makalenin önemli yönlerini teşkil eden bu yönlerin yanı sıra, varılan bazı düşüncelerin de öneminin altınının çizilmesi gerekir. Bizce bunların başında şu çıkarsama gelmektedir: Din, devletin temeli olmanın yanı sıra devlet reformunun da temelidir. Netice itibariyle dinsel reformunu tamamlamamış ulusların politik reformları yarım kalmaya mahkûmdur. Hegel; din, devlet, reform, zamansallık arasında bir uyumu şart koşmaktadır. Metot olarak makale; yapısal, karşılaştırmalı ve sonuç çıkarmalı yöntemler kullanmaktadır. Protestan devlet; diyalektik, bilgi-eylem birliği, törellik, dinsel reform, Protestan ilke ve Katoliklik karşıtlığı etrafında yapılandırılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu makalede de kıyaslamalı anlatım elden geldiğince kullanılmaktadır. Çalışmada elde edilen sonuçlar da Katoliklik ile kıyaslamalı olarak yapılandırılmaktadır: İçsel-tinsel Protestan devlet- dışsal Katolik devlet, laik Protestan devlet laik olmayan Katolik devlet, ulusal Protestan Devlet-Katolik imparatorluk, güvenilir Protestan devlet-güvensiz Katolik devlet.

Copyright of Praktyka Teoretyczna is the property of University of Wroclaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Hegelian philosophy has a pedagogical character that is present in concept Bildung (education, formation or self-cultivation). The phenomenology of the spirit is the science of the experience of consciousness; the exposition of the learning process of the spirit in consciousness and in history. The spirit is in itself the subject that has learned itself, that knows that it knows and that does not cease to unfold in various historical forms. Thus, the spirit works, it makes itself. It is pure self-activity that is formed and educated dialectically. I support the assertion that Hegel's system of science is not only logical or historical but pedagogical in the emphatic sense that the Idea or the totality of the reality, can only be a long learning process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to provide comparative research of the concept of authentic existence in Stoicism and Phenomenology. The analysis in the article is carried out by comparing select authors’ understanding of a few key concepts which appear to be the most alike: authentic and inauthentic existence, personal renewal, seeking cosmologic framework for ethics, being part of community, and the role of death in shaping awareness of authentic existence. The analysis concludes that there are various degrees of convergence in all concepts considered in the article, which allows the argument that despite substantial differences between philosophies, concepts of authentic existence of Stoicism and Phenomenology at times have compatible aspects, and even complement each other.

Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Hegel believed the Antigone tragedy not only revealed the national spirit of ancient Greece but was indeed the greatest artwork of all time. displaying the “Logic of History”, was the critical role Antigone tragedy played in the phenomenology of spirit from the standpoint of Hegel. This article will attempt to answer how Hegel reads Antigone's tragedy and how he observes the “Logic of History” in it. Ancient Greek society, In Hegel’s point of view, has constantly been the symbol of “unity of life”. however, Hegel believes that at certain times in history, this unity of ethical life and its state of joy in Greece has been destroyed. Since Hegel believes literary works have historical-cultural implications and considers art and literature as the first medium by which the spirit becomes self-conscious, in the section “True Spirit, ethical Life” from the book Phenomenology of Spirit, he describes the fall of the ethical life of Greek society by reading of the Antigone tragedy. What Hegel understood from the Antigone tragedy was a series of painful conflicts that ensued as a consequence of a contradiction between ethical powers within Greek society. powers that had heretofore been in unreflected unity, but now that their contradictions revealed, the ethical life of society collapsed and the spirit moved to a more rational and liberated stage. These stages are in fact very much the irreversible final course of history toward achieving freedom.

The purpose of this article is to question Adorno's moral thought. Although Adorno constantly articulates morality with the social context, and although the object of his analyses is the way in which moral issues are mediated by social practices, morals and customs, his explicit privileged interlocutor in the elaboration of his moral reflection is Kant and not Hegel. Adorno intends to develop a moral theory, not an ethics. But given his presuppositions - one cannot think of a good life in a false context - he is indirectly confronted with the Hegelian concept of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and tries to respond to the difficulties it raises. He thus deploys an inverted reading of Hegel, in which it is the impossibility of relying on morals, customs, or even institutions that compels us to redefine morality. Finally, Adorno proposes a notion of the inadequacy to the world of all moral life, due to the irremediable gap between custom and morality, which generates the need for an additional step to clear a path out of the existing order. On this path, it seems that Kant "is right where he is wrong", since by defending the individual, his moral philosophy contributes to a critical theory of society. The whole question is to know how our moral practices contribute to the shaping of this world for which we are responsible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to the religion-state relationship, religious and political reform is also among the interesting topics. Some important periods and turning points such as the ancient Iranian state tradition, Greek democracy, England in the time of Henry VIII and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 are critical in shaping these relationships. After the French revolution, there was a serious problem about what the new style of politics should be in Europe. Some of these problems were purely political. In addition, new problems arose related to religion, church, tradition, reform, conservatism, economy, class conflict and philosophy. Philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels were interested in such problems. One of the most important philosophers dealing with these issues is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel does not deal with politics independent of theology. Therefore, he approaches issues such as the essence of the state, individual states, political institutions, political revolutions, and forms of state in history from a theologicalpolitical perspective. He created a modern Protestant state formulation by linking the new political situation that emerged after the French revolution with Martin Luther's Protestant Christianity. At this point, it should be noted that Hegel put two important elements into use: The ethical life and the Protestant principle as the unity of spirit and truth. The main purpose of this article is to examine Hegel’s Protestant state around these two facts. For Hegel, ethical life is a Protestant invention. Here, objectivity with subjectivity; law with morality are in harmony. With this, Hegel also wanted to negate the lack of authority in Protestantism claimed by romantics. If the concrete authority in Catholicism is the papacy, it is then ethical life in Protestantism. The Protestant principle, the unity of spirit and truth, is a fact that supersedes dilemmas, as in the case of morality. Hegel constructs the Protestant state on the Protestant principle of unity of spirit and truth. First of all, he thinks that Protestantism knows God internally, although Catholicism perceives and knows God externally. Accordingly, the way Protestants and Catholics perceive God in different ways ultimately shapes many beliefs, practices, and policies of Protestantism and Catholicism. For this reason, Luther's reform provides advantageous cases in political matters. In addition to these aspects, which constitute the critical facets of the article, the importance of some ideas should also be underlined. In our opinion, the following inference is the most meaningful: Religion is the basis of state reform as well as being the foundation of the state. As a result, the political reforms of nations that have not completed their religious reform are doomed to be left unfinished. Hegel stipulates a harmony among religion, state, reform and temporality. This article uses structural, comparative and inference methods. The Protestant state is structured in the context of dialectics, unity of theory and practice, morality, religious reform, Protestant principle and anti-Catholicism. Hegel evaluates the Protestant state, which he founded on the basis of the Protestant principle, by comparing it with Catholicism and its state. Therefore, we use comparative explanations as much as possible in this article. The results obtained from the study are also formed in comparison to Catholicism: İnternalspiritual Protestant state vs. external Catholic state, secular Protestant state vs. non secular Catholic state, national Protestant State vs. Catholic empire, reliable Protestant state vs. insecure Catholic state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hegel reads Kant's three critiques, that of the Critique of Pure reason, Practical Reason, and Judgment with a critical approach. The critique called "empty formalism", in different forms, is present in Hegel's works, from youth till death, thus sometimes is hidden in others critiques and sometimes is so obvious that hides other critiques within itself. But finally, the base of it is founded upon the idea that Kant's morality is a non-historical, formal and empty one, thus, in concrete situations of action, it cannot assist moral agents and does not tell him/her how to act. For Hegel, the main reason of this inability stems from Kant's strict and arid morality, which by transcending practical reason and detaching its relation with wants and particular and subjective inclinations, makes it empty and reduces it to a universal form of law.

This article, by descriptive- analytic method, aims Tabatabaei's interpretation of law and ethics relationship and formulates this topic according to his words. corresponding to Tabatabaei's formulation of three ways of ethical life- which is called as public ethics, religious ethics and divine ethics in this article- We can say: there are three kinds and stages of relationship between law and ethics. At first, it seems that law and ethics play a common role and make human social- individual life secure by employing Constructional Perceptions. At second level, we receipt that law and ethics are almost separate each other; in this form, law is overlapped with religious jurisprudence, and ethics will be attached to extra- task behaviors. Finally, in the third kind of relationship, law is considered as common and popular rule of human secular- nature and life. So, this rule is finished and ended by human transformation to spiritual word. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the intersection in Hegel’s political thought between Aristotelianism – with its ideas of custom, the ethical life of the polis – and constitutional modernity. It shows how Hegel appropriated the classical issue of tyranny as well as Rousseau’s legislator, Machiavelli and Spinoza to evolve a unique concept of constituent power. Ethical life, in Hegel’s hands, was bent to political modernity. This resulted in a doctrine of the substance of the political that was simultaneously constituent and constituted power. The article argues that this led to a system of law that was also a metaphysic of spirit, which linked a given constitutional order perpetually to its organising form. The ontological status of political authority and its relation to law is a core problem of modern constitutionalism, which often reverts to a founding event, a regulative (normative) order or existential agency to justify itself. Through placing the notion of constituent power in a broader historical continuum, this study shows how Hegel’s political thought reveals how constitutions are neither a mere creature of law nor of sovereign decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kadın/Woman 2000 is the property of Kadin/Woman 2000 and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

At the core of the principle of democracy is the claim that all individuals, or as many as possible, should decide for themselves and that they must be included in collective governance of the community in which the majority rules. However, drawing upon Hegel's theory of the state, I will show in this paper that in a democracy, the emphasis on individual rights, at the expense of developing the notion of universal good, is not only problematic, but dangerous because in the absence of rational authority of the state, people rely mainly on public opinion for guidance, which results in what Hegel may call the tyranny of the majority. As a consequence, democracy, which purports itself to be the champion of freedom, tends to be exclusivist and totalitarian as dissenting ideas are silenced by the "ruling majority" in actual democratic processes. In fact, the notion of "legitimacy" (i.e., legitimated by the majority) conduces to the assault on the inner will to resist rendering individuals in a democracy as "conformists." The paper concludes that, for Hegel, freedom can be realized not through democracy as espoused by the liberal theorists, but through his theory of the state the state being not only a guarantor of basic rights and liberties, but as a dimension of freedom which commits itself to a substantive vision of the universal good as the paramount object of human aspiration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explicates Hegel’s doctrine of institutions, rooted in his account of ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and his broader theory of spirit or Geist, and directed to an interdependent view of the relationship of subjective sentiment and objective arrangements. Part 1 critically reviews the “dependency thesis” (variously associated with Robert Pippin, Dieter Henrich, and Jean-François Kervégan) and its asymmetrical view of the relationship of institutions and individuals, arguing that for Hegel, for their meaning and reality institutions also depend on the knowledge and will of relevant individuals. Part 2 considers the role played by intersubjective relations in Hegel’s account of institutions, contesting the view of those (e.g., Axel Honneth) who dispute or minimize that role. Part 3 presents Hegel’s theory of institutions in line with the account of second nature proper to objective spirit, and thus as a theory of embodied sociality and an instantiation of the reflexivity specific to a theory of Geist and its animating concept of freedom. Part 4 considers the place of institutions in Hegel’s account of ethical life, itself divided into the sub-spheres of family, civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), and the state. Part 5 examines the specific account of institutions Hegel presents in his doctrine of civil society, focusing particularly on the concluding discussion of corporations. Part 6 examines the specific account of institutions that Hegel presents in the doctrine of state and its associated constitutional theory, focusing on the last of the three constitutional powers: the legislature and the public sphere enabling it. Part 7 briefly considers the normativity of Hegel’s institutional theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dansk Sociologi is the property of Djøf Forlag and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)