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The article is devoted to the analysis of the theological-academic ontological doctrine of the three types of being formulated within the framework of the Russian theological-academic philosophy of the 19th century. The study of this problem in the context of the general analysis of the phenomenon of theological-academic philosophy allows expanding our understanding of the genesis of Russian philosophy and its religious-philosophical component. The main aim of the article is the historical-philosophical analysis (on the material of philosophical courses of Russian theological academies and original works of professors of academies) of the doctrine about three types of being, which was developed within the framework of the theological-academic philosophy in Russia in the 19th century. The set goal is achieved by means of textual and religious analysis methods, as well as historical-functional, historical-genetic, and comparative research methods. The authors conclude that the specificity of theological-academic philosophizing was determined by confessional affiliation and consisted in its theistic form: the transversal theme of all theological-academic interpretations was the problem of being. Thus, theological-academic ontology took the form of the doctrine of God as an absolute being and the world as its derivative. The theological-academic doctrine of the three types of being and the synthesizing function of the absolute in relation to theological and material being cannot be characterized as quite logical and consistent. The notion of God as an absolute being is conditioned by the aspiration of theological-academic philosophers not to go beyond traditional orthodoxy and is one of the main specific features of theological-academic philosophical interpretations of religious consciousness. At the same time, the historical and philosophical analysis of the works of professors from Russian theological academies allows tracing how the powerful ideological and theoretical potential accumulated in Russian theological academies after their reforms in the 19th century contributed to the development of professional philosophy in Russia, the development of a philosophical categorical apparatus and the systematic formation of Russian philosophical thought. The development of this theme responds to the urgent research tasks of the history of philosophy. Further, this topic is very interesting not only for historians of philosophy but also for historians of religion, historians of orthodoxy, and culturologists.

The article considers the theoretical and practical consequences of the so-called "soft" version of epistemological realism in Bimal K. Matilal's philosophical project. The author offers an analytical view on Matilal's philosophy, which helps to understand it in a broader prospective, comparing his arguments on perception and objectivity with contemporary arguments in Western analytical philosophy; in fact, it is possible to view Matilal not only as the proponent of revised Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika approach, but also as the follower of realistic view on language, following L. Wittgenstein, W. Quine, H. Putnam and M. Dummett. Despite the fact that such interpretation may sound diverse or multivocal, it nevertheless helps to better understand both lineages of argumentation: the critical review of the impossibility of private language can be compared in both Western and Indian philosophical discourses, which leads into the domain of social epistemology. The second part of the article discusses the ethical arguments on the vulnerability of moral virtues, and the place of Dharma as a term in moral philosophy. Poetical and metaphorical language appears to be a fruitful strategy to discover the ineffable - and also via negativa and catuṣkoṭi - which is shown by Matilal on the example of the unacceptability of lying. The ethical ineffability and its interconnection with Matilal's commentaries on practical wisdom play the crucial part in the interpretations of Dharmaśāstra texts.

The article analyzes the features of the establishment of Russian philosophy as an academic discipline at Leningrad-Petersburg University. In this regard, the work deals with the methodological principles and guidelines for courses in the history of Russian philosophy by professors P. F. Nikandrov and A. A. Galaktionov, ideological and philosophical foundations of their study guides, and the novelty of their approach to studying Russian philosophy. It is emphasized that this stage of the study of Russian philosophy at the Leningrad University can be characterized as critical; it made it possible to study in detail the concepts of many previously unknown thinkers to the general reader. The article examines the specificity of teaching Russian philosophy at the Department of the History of Russian Philosophy chaired by professor Alexandr F. Zamaleev. The conceptual frameworks that formed the basis of the new educational research paradigm are revealed. They were based on a comprehensive analysis of Russian philosophy in the context of the development of Russian spiritual culture, which made it possible to identify certain theoretical features in Russian philosophy: anthropologism, moralism, historicism, epistemological realism, etc. Significant attention in the article is given to the analysis of the methodology for the course “Political Thought in Russia” at St. Petersburg University, its structure and basic methodological guidelines are determined. It is argued that teaching Russian political thought was based on taking into account the traditions of statehood and political consciousness that developed in Russian society. The conclusion is made that in the process of the formation of Russian philosophy as a scientific and academic discipline at Leningrad-Petersburg University, objective difficulties arose in rethinking the methodology of historical and philosophical science as well as developing a new paradigm of socio-humanitarian and philosophical knowledge.

The author claims that the conceptual content of perception can serve as an argument in favour of epistemological realism. He argues on behalf of the main theses of conceptualism in philosophy of perception, and explores the relational aspects of perceptual objects which make up the general conditions determining their reality. The relational aspects are as follows: the unity of quantitative and qualitative contents, their concomitance and inherence property in relation to an object. These general aspects are essential for epistemological realism and establish the correlates of the conceptual identification of objects of perception.

The article discusses the problem of the possibility of knowing the future, especially the future of social phenomena compared with the future of natural ones. This problem is formulated as a dilemma: the future can be explored or can be only constructed. The idea of constructive character of knowledge of the future is viewed in two possible interpretations.The first one is a special case of the constructivist interpretation of knowledge, according to which different pictures of the future are arbitrarily constructed on the basis of information about the past and current state. The second interpretaion can be presented in the form of a praxeological question: what should be an action in relation to the future, first and foremost to the future of social phenomena - cognitive or creative. It is shown that, in the first case, there is an ability to interpret knowledge of the future from the point of view of epistemological realism, in the second case, both cognitive and creative types of activity as a pragmatic position in relation to the future are necessary and cognitive activity cannot be reduced to creative one. It is also shown that forecaster’s dilemma reflects the problematic nature of forecasting under the conditions of transformation of scientific rationality and point of view of common sense, which is observed in recent decades.

Although Williams? contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests - epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams? position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of scepticism as first and foremost a methodological necessity of epistemological realism, Williams succeeds in offering an enlightening diagnosis of the sceptical paradox problem which is at the centre of epistemology traditionally construed.

Through the analysis of the epistemological assumptions of marketing-led branding models, this research investigates how these models aim to link brands with their audiences in terms of sense giving. Qualitative research has been done to explore three case studies, employing archive research, semiotics, and critical analysis. By relying on Plato’s theory of knowledge, to theoretically support this approach, and mainly considering his metaphorical style, the research analyses how a design-led brand strategy expands the scope of a marketing-led one, by amplifying the extent of the epistemological realism that supports the latter. Findings reveal that through design-led strategies, the analysed brands seize into their audiences’ everyday social practices realm and source their branding models with the creativity and imagination that is produced at that basic level of life: e.g. customising brand labels, with personal names, is an open way to connect brands with and to audiences through both recognition and the demand of being true to oneself. Hence, design-led branding can well be an approach to source brand authenticity.

The article considers one of the most significant concepts in Aristotelian philosophy: the concept of substance and its interpretation in the works of existential Thomists. The emphasis is placed on the fact that the doctrine of substance is first and foremost to be considered in the context of the identification of the subject of scientific knowledge and in the context of the way of knowing this subject. In order to illustrate the epistemological realism, which, according to Thomists, inheres in Aristotle’s philosophy the article analyzes the previous philosophers’ views on the true subject of scientific knowledge. This subject is individual being, which forms the basis of philosophical understanding of things, as a subject of scientific knowledge. It should be noted that the method of constructing of Aristotle’s science general theory is finding reasons why something is just what it is from the viewpoint of necessity. Krąpiec believes that the way Aristotle comes to the formation of the four causes is related to the specificity of the question διὰ τί (why? because of what?). This analysis through causes allows us to understand that each single entity has a composite structure. Furthermore, Aristotle considers substance as a logical and grammatical category and as a main category in the ontological sense, as the mode of the initial being of things. Therefore, categories reflect the actual structure of things, namely the way of its existence on the essential and accidental levels. The very substance itself is recognizable only through the accidents associated with it and represents itself through them. However, the substance precedes its accidents in three meanings: ontological, definitive, and epistemological.Article received 23.02.2018

Glavni cilj ovog rada je da odgovori na pitanje da li je moguće ponuditi prihvatljivo rešenje skeptičkog problema u epistemologiji na osnovu kontekstualističke teze da je pojam znanja semantički osetljiv u odnosu na različite kontekste u kojima ga primenjujemo? Odgovor na ovo pitanje biće pozitivan: moguće je ponuditi jedan odrţivi okvir za rešenje pomenutog problema, i to na osnovu stanovišta inferencijalnog kontekstualizma. Ipak, sve dok se ne postigne konsenzus u sklopu jedne opšte teorije značenja u pogledu semantičkog sadrţaja saznajnih tvrdnji, odnosno, prirode i načina njegove zavisnosti od kontekstualnih faktora, ovaj odgovor je daleko od definitivnog. Epistemički kontekstualizam, u koji spadaju konverzacioni i inferencijalni kontekstualizam, jedno je od najviše razmatranih epistemoloških shvatanja današnjice. MeĎutim, velika većina pisanih radova na tu temu usredsreĎena je na istraţivanje razloga na osnovu kojih se moţe opravdati konverzaciona verzija, dok je pitanjima koja se tiču prihvatljivosti inferencijalnog kontekstualizma pridat upadljivo manji značaj. U ovom radu pokušaćemo da ispitamo izglede kontekstualističke anti-skeptičke strategije, uzimajući u obzir obe ove verzije, kako pojedinačno, tako i u svetlu njihovog meĎusobnog odnosa. Smatrali smo da je to najbolji način da se postigne njeno dublje razumevanje, ali i da se ostvari gorenavedeni cilj istraţivanja. Radi ostvarenja postavljenog cilja, epistemičkom kontekstualizmu pristupili smo kao dvostrukom projektu. Odgovoru na pitanje do kojeg je stepena, i u kom pogledu, opravdana pretpostavka o semantičkoj osetljivosti pojma znanja na različite kontekste u kojima ga primenjujemo, pristupili smo u svetlu uverljivosti lingvističke evidencije kojom je ova pretpostavka potkrepljena. U tom smislu, osnovne razloge za zastupanje kontekstualizma u epistemologiji pronašli smo u analogijama izmeĎu glagola „znati“ i termina za koje je očigledno da su kontekstualno osetljivi (indeksikalije, pridevski izrazi i sl.), kao i u opisu upotrebe tog glagola u uobičajenoj, svakodnevnoj jezičkoj praksi. Nakon sprovedenih analiza koji su imali za cilj proveru prihvatljivosti lingvističkih argumenata (promišljanja primedbi da kontekstualističke analogije nisu adekvatne i da teza o kontekstualnoj osetljivosti pojma znanja nema uporište u aktualnoj jezičkoj praksi) dospeli smo u nerazjašnjeno područje koje se moţe izraziti u vidu pitanja gde povući granicu izmeĎu semantičke i pragmatičke dimenzije značenja (Peter Pagin, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, 2007: 25). Pesimistični stavovi u pogledu toga da je na ovo pitanje moguće ponuditi odgovor, širom su zastupljeni u filozofiji. Iz tog razloga odlučili smo se da o prihvatljivosti kontekstualističkih teorija prosudimo u svetlu uspeha sa kojim one rešavaju problem filozofskog skepticizma. Tu će nam od posebne vaţnosti biti njihovi odgovori na dva pitanja. Prvo pitanje je koliko uspešno kontekstualistička anti-skeptička strategija, zasnovana na opisu mehanizama koji uzrokuju promenu konteksta, odgovara na prigovor da nas vodi relativizmu. Videćemo da, dok prva verzija kontekstualizma ovaj problem pokušava da otkloni tako što uvodi odreĎena jezička pravila za koja se, izmeĎu ostalog, pokazuje da ne uspevaju da uverljivo prikaţu karakter aktualne epistemičke prakse, dotle druga verzija neutrališe snagu tog prigovora formirajući sliku o znanju (i opravdanju) koja je u mnogim aspektima bliţa njenoj fenomenologiji. Drugo pitanje tiče se procene uverljivosti kontekstualističke dijagnoze skeptičkog problema. Pod tim se misli na uverljivost objašnjenja izvora paradoksa, odnosno, odgovora na pitanje otkuda intuicije koje nas uvlače u skeptički problem. Videćemo da se i u pogledu ovog pitanja odgovor inferencijalnog kontekstualiste nameće kao superioran. Naime, dok zastupnici konverzacionog kontekstualizma upadaju u zamku takozvane „teorije greške”, inferencijalna teorija nastoji da razotkrije izvesne pretpostavke na kojima počiva skeptička argumentacija, a za koje pokazuje da nismo obavezni da usvojimo. Kao konačan odgovor na oba pitanja braniće se vrlo jasan stav: anti-skeptička strategija koja se temelji na tezi da je značenje pojma znanja uslovljeno inferencijalnim kontekstom efikasnija je, uverljivija, koherentnija, te stoga i prihvatljivija varijanta od one koju nudi konverzacioni kontekstualizam... The main objective of this study is to provide an answer to the question whether it is possible to reach an acceptable solution to the skeptical problem in epistemology based on the contextualist thesis that the meaning of the term “knows“ is sensitive to the contexts it is applied in? Our answer to this question will be positive: it is possible to offer a sustainable framework for the solution of the skeptical problem, based on the position of inferential contextualism. Still, until a consensus is reached within a general theory of meaning concerning the semantic nature of knowledge claims and their dependence on contextual factors, this solution is far from definitive. Epistemic contextualism, which encompasses conversational and inferential contextualism, is one of the most widely discussed epistemological projects nowadays. However, the bulk of the literature on epistemic contextualism focuses on investigating the reasons based on which the conversational version can be justified, while questions concerning the acceptability of inferential contextualism have received much less attention. In this study, we attempt to investigate the prospects of the contextualist anti-skeptical strategy, taking into account its two versions, both individually and in light of their position relative to each other. We consider this the most suitable way to provide a deeper understanding of them, and achieve our research objective. In order to achieve our objective, we have approached epistemic contextualism as a dual project. The question - to what extent, and in which way, the assumption of the contextsensitivity of the term “knows” is justified - is explored in light of the strength of the linguistic evidence it is supported by. In this sense, the main grounds supporting contextualism in epistemology were found in analogies between the verb “to know” and terms which are obviously context-sensitive (indexicals, gradable adjectives etc.), as well as in an examination of the usage of this verb in everyday epistemic practice. After investigating the acceptability of linguistic arguments (considering objections that contextualist analogies are inadequate and that the thesis on the context-sensitivity of the term “know” is not grounded in actual linguistic practice), we arrive at an area of ambiguity which could be summarized by the question where to draw the border between the semantic and pragmatic dimensions of meaning? (Peter Pagin, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, 2007: 25). Pessimistic views on the possibility of providing an answer to this question are prevalent in philosophy. For this reason, we have decided to assess the acceptability of contextualist theories in light of their success in solving the problem of philosophical skepticism. Answers to two questions will be of particular significance. The first question is how successfully an anti-skeptical strategy, based on its description of the mechanisms by which epistemic standards change, addresses the objection that it leads us to relativism. We will see that, while the first version of contextualism attempts to solve this problem by imposing certain conversational rules which, inter alia, turn out to fail in providing a convincing description of actual epistemic practice, the second version neutralizes the objection by forming a picture of knowledge (and justification) which is in many aspects closer to its phenomenology. The second question concerns an assessment of the credibility of the contextualist diagnosis of the skeptical problem. By that we mean the credibility of its explanation of the origin of the paradox, i.e. its answer to the question of where intuitions which bring us to the skeptical problem came from. We will see that, in terms of this question, the argument of the inferential contextualist turns out to be superior. While adherents of conversational contextualism fall in the trap of the so-called “error theory”, inferential theory strives to uncover certain presuppositions upon which the entire skeptical argument rests, which it turns out we are not obliged to accept. As a final response to both questions we defend a clear position: that an anti-skeptical strategy which is founded on the thesis that the meaning of the term ‟‟know“ is conditioned by an inferential context is the more efficient, more convincing, coherent and therefore more acceptable version than that which is offered by conversational contextualism

Evandro Agazzi’s volume Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts is here introduced. First, the genesis and the content of the book are outlined. Secondly, an overview of Agazzi’s philosophy of science is provided. Its main roots are epistemological realism in the Aristotelian/scholastic tradition, and contemporary science-oriented epistemology, especially in Logical Empiricism. As a result, Agazzi’s thought is nicely balanced between empiricism and rationalism, it avoids gnoseologistic dualism by stressing the intentionality of knowledge, and it insists on the operational and referential character of science. Finally, an account is given of Agazzi’s view of the origin and nature of scientific objects, which allows to understand how his sophisticated and “perspectival” realism differs both from naive realism and constructivism.

В конструктивизме метод, который тоже является конструкцией, не предполагается меняющимся во времени. Он – нечто сверхжесткое. Все ребра и оболочки этой конструкции связаны в единое целое надежным крепежом и твердой рукой мастера без зазоров и люфтов. Иначе говоря, в конструктивизме и в неклассической науке метод мыслится равным себе. Тем самым метод сакрализуется, он оказывается идолом, находящимся в центре культа. И тогда метод изымается из работы мысли, он не допускает рефлексии. Интеллект нужен ровно настолько, чтобы разобраться в инструкции к методу. Так, сакрализованный метод теряет способность быть инструментом серьезной гуманитарной аналитики. На самом же деле метод жив тогда, когда пребывает во времени, когда мыслится историчным, т. е. чем-то таким, чтó всё время собирается заново., In constructivism, a method is not supposed to change over time. He is super hard. All the ribs and shells of this design are connected into a single whole with reliable fasteners and a firm hand of a master without gaps and backlashes. In other words, in constructivism and in non-classical science, the method is thought to be equal to itself. Thus, the method is sacralized; it turns out to be an idol located in the center of the cult. And then the method is removed from the work of thought, it does not allow reflection. Intellect is needed just enough to sort out the instructions for the method, not more. So the sacral method loses the ability to be a tool for serious humanitarian analytics. In fact, the method is alive when it is in time, when it is thought historical., №1(24) (2019)

Predmet ovog istraživanja je inferencijalni kontekstualizam. Cilj je da se pokaže kako je, pored izvorne verzije koju zastupa Majkl Vilijams, moguća i drugačija, vitgenštajnovska verzija ovog stanovišta koja je prihvatljivija od Vilijamsove. Najpre ću prikazati u čemu se sastoji skeptički problem. Nakon toga ću skicirati osnovne pravce njegovog rešavanja, sa naglaskom na inferencijalnom kontekstualizmu. Izložiću osnovne ideje ovog stanovišta poput metodoloških nužnosti, epistemološkog realizma, prirodnih epistemičkih vrsti i epistemičke primarnosti. Potom ću se pozabaviti određenim internim kritikama Vilijamsovog stanovišta kako bih pokazao da im ono uspešno odoleva. Posle ovoga posvetiću se razvijanju alternativne verzije inferencijalnog kontekstualizma i utvrđivanju superiornosti ove teorije nad Vilijamsovom. Pokazaću kako se dolazi do pojmovnog prostora za formulisanje vitgenštajnovske teorije. Razmotriću prirodu neepistemičkog stava izvesnosti, ideje koja se prihvata unutar vitgenštajnovske ali ne i unutar Vilijamsove teorije, kao i način na koji je inferencijalni kontekstualizam u skladu sa ovom idejom čiji je tvorac Ludvig Vitgenštajn. Istaćiću prednost vitgenštajnovske teorije u odnosu na standardni tip interpretacije Vitgenštajnovog odgovora skeptiku. Na kraju, fokusiraću se na to da pokažem zašto vitgenštajnovska verzija predstavlja bolju teoriju od Vilijamsove. Tvrdiću da ona pruža verniji opis naše svakodnevne saznajne prakse, da je usklađenija sa načelnim antifundamentizmom inferencijalnog kontekstualizma, kao i da predstavlja uspešniju reakciju na skeptički problem u poređenju sa Vilijamsovom teorijom. U ovom istraživanju koristiću interpretativno-kritički metod, metod pojmovne i jezičke analize, kao i metod misaonog eksperimenta. The subject of this study is inferential contextualism. Its aim is to show that, in addition to the original version which is advocated by Michael Williams, a different, Wittgensteinian version of this standpoint is possible, and that it represents a more acceptable theory than Williams'. First of all I shall indicate what the sceptical problem consists of. Thereafter I shall sketch the basic directions which its solving takes, with the accent on inferential contextualism. I shall expose the basic ideas of this position such as methodological necessities, epistemological realism, natural epistemic kinds and epistemic primacy. Then I shall deal with certain internal criticisms of Williams' position in order to show that it is successfully resistant to them. After this I shall devote myself to the development of an alternative version of inferential contextualism and to demonstrating the superiority of this theory over Williams'. I shall point out how one can arrive to the conceptual space necessary for formulating the Wittgensteinian theory. Next I shall consider the nature of non-epistemic attitude of certainty, an idea which is accepted in Wittgensteinian but not in Williams' theory, as well as the way in which inferential contextualism is compatible with this idea whose originator is Ludwig Wittgenstein. Subsequently I shall highlight the advantage that Wittgensteinian theory has compared to the standard type of interpretating Wittgenstein's answer to the sceptic. Ultimately, I shall focus on demonstrating why the Wittgensteinian version represents a better theory than Williams'. I shall claim that it provides a truer description of our everyday epistemic practise, that it is to a greater extent in accordance with the principle anti-foundationalism of inferential contextualism, as well as that it represents a more successful reaction to the sceptical problem compared to Williams' theory. In this research I shall use the interpretative-critical method, the methods of conceptual and linguistic analysis, as well as the method of thought experiment

Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–99) is perhaps best known for his aphoristic writings collected in his Sudelbucher (Waste Books) and his critique of the substantial view of the self in which he argues that we should say “it thinks,” that is, “thinking is happening” rather than “I think.” However, Lichtenberg also reflects in the Waste Books and his lectures on physics on a wide range of issues in epistemology and metaphysics concerning realism and idealism that inform his thoughts on the natural sciences. In this paper, I argue that Lichtenberg rejects epistemological realism in favor of idealism and that he focuses on the heuristic and explanatory value of scientific theories rather than their ability to depict nature accurately as it is independent of our minds. I show how his reflections on idealism and the uses of scientific theories also inform his positions on natural laws, causation, induction, and debates between atomists and dynamists about the nature of matter and the cause of gravity.

The paper is dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the edition of Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality. It was the occasion to convince about a real impact of this famous book, that was translated into Czech in 1999, on the thinking and the vocabulary of Slovak and Czech sociologists. But after initial interest in this book the sociological public gradually stopped at its formal recognition. However, even those sociologists who expressed interest in the theory of Berger and Luckmann, did not taken it as a theoretical whole, with own particular philosophical program. They are satisfied by choosing from social constructivism some original concepts, that as well as „symbolic universe“ must roofed their own account. It seems, that sociologists are afraid of social constructivism for its epistemological position, which is constant challenge to the realistic approach in sociology. However, these issues may be best resolved through discussions on philosophical and epistemological topics. We note three epistemological positions, each of which was a serious challenge to the idea of social construction. The first is the position of the classical epistemological realism. The second is the principle of philosophical apriorism, which is a prerequisite for any constructivism. The third position is presented by the theory of objectivation. This principle is a component of the social constructivism. We present each of these epistemological principles as one side of an imaginary triangle. The theory of social construction of reality is closed inside this triangle. This theory is the object of the philosophical influence of the three aforementioned teachings. They embody for it the pattern of philosophising, because they state the criteria of its philosophical competence. Therefore our proposed imaginary „epistemological triangle“ was used as a test tool for to ascertain the impact of various philosophical doctrines on ideological profile of social constructivism. The use of this triangle helped us to look deeper into the philosophical foundations of social constructivism and to verify their authenticity. It also helped us to dispel fears of social constructivism and of its allegedly excessive subjectivism.

U ovom radu baviću se odnosom kontekstualističkih i eksternalističkih elemenata unutar epistemološke teorije Majkla Vilijamsa (Michael Williams). Tvrdiću da Vilijams nije jasno prikazao pravu prirodu tog odnosa. Prvo ću ukratko predstaviti Vilijamsovu kontekstualističku teoriju. Zatim ću izložiti prigovor koji Brajan Ribeiro (Brian Ribeiro) upućuje Vilijamsu i prema kojem eksternalizam, a ne kontekstualizam, ima ključnu ulogu u njegovoj teoriji. Ponudiću argumente protiv ovog prigovora. Sa druge strane, suprotno Vilijamsu, tvrdiću da eksternalizam nije nužna posledica kontekstualizma. Vilijamsova teorija predstavlja tek eksternalističku verziju osnovnog kontekstualističkog stanovišta. Moguća je i drugačija, vitgenštajnovska verzija. Naposletku, pokazaću da Vilijamsova teorija nije očigledno bolja od vitgenštajnovske. In this paper I shall deal with the relation between the contextualist and externalist elements in the epistemological theory of Michael Williams. I shall claim that Williams did not clearly explicate the true nature of that relation. Firstly, I shall briefly present Williams’ contextualist theory. Then I shall expose Brian Ribeiro’s objection to Williams according to which externalism, and not contextualism, plays a key role in his theory. I shall argue against this objection. On the other hand, contrary to Williams, I shall claim that externalism is not a necessary consequence of contextualism. Williams’ theory is just an externalist version of the basic contextualist standpoint. Another, Wittgensteinian version is also possible. Finally, I shall show that Williams’ theory is not obviously better then Wittgensteinian one.

This article is to provide a concise, yet comprehensible, explanation for the concept of obstructions of knowledge (jneyāvaraṇa) of East Asian Sākāra-vijnānavāda, mainly according to Xuanzang’s Cheung Weishi Lun, the encyclopedic commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā. The Cheung Weishi Lun is the major text for Sākāra-vijnānavāda tradition. Among the existing materials in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese, very likely East Asian Sākāra-vijnānavāda is the major tradition able to provide a clear, detailed and comprehensible interpretation on jneyāvaraṇa. In this article, jneyāvaraṇa is explained in terms of three perspectives: first, the argumentation that counters epistemological realism, from an idealistic standpoint; second, the theoretical description about the relationship between the Vijnānavāda doctrine of eight consciousnesses (vijnāna) and jneyāvaraṇa; third, various levels of jneyāvaraṇa on the path (mārga) and stage (bhūmi) that are explained within the framework of ten obstructions (āvaraṇa). The concepts of five sciences (panca vidyā) and omniscience (sarvajnā), along with jneyāvaraṇa, are used to approach the Universal (Mahayana) horizon.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5902/1984644414894Nesse artigo a ideia de que os resultados das pesquisas em educação não são incorporados adequadamente na formulação de políticas educacionais é problematizada a partir de argumentos desenvolvidos em uma perspectiva pós-estruturalista e pós-colonial. Esses argumentos tomam como objeto de análise as produções das comunidades disciplinares que pesquisam o ensino de ciências com a compreensão de que elas expressam discursos que circulam nos diferentes contextos de produção curricular. A análise rompe com a distinção entre conhecimento e cultura e passa a assumi-los como processo de enunciação de sentidos. Interessa discutir como as concepções dos pesquisadores sobre o conhecimento e as práticas docentes são informadas por um realismo epistemológico que fundamenta a dimensão transformadora que é atribuída ao conhecimento, cuja apropriação é significada como possibilidade de emancipação.

Autor podzielił tekst na pięć części. W pierwszej krótko zaprezentował najważniejsze strony w toczonej coraz gwałtowniej dyskusji nad badaniami społeczno-kulturowej tożsamości płciowej. Zasugerował także, że określenie miejsca gender studies w obrębie podstawowych metafizyczno-teoriopoznawczych stanowisk umożliwia wskazanie najważniejszych kierunków, w których winna podążyć krytyka gender studies. Część druga została poświęcona charakterystyce podstawowych metafizyczno-teoriopoznawczych nastawień do rzeczywistości. Kolejno autor zaprezentował: metafizyczny realizm, metafizyczny idealizm, teoriopoznawczy realizm oraz teoriopoznawczy idealizm. W partii trzeciej omówione zostały najważniejsze założenia, tezy oraz postulaty stawiane w ramach gender studies. Czytelnik może zapoznać się z przedstawicielami gender studies, ich poglądami i założeniami. W części czwartej ukazano punkty styczne, napięcia oraz sprzeczności pomiędzy gender studies a kluczowymi metafizyczno-teoriopoznawczymi stanowiskami. W części ostatniej autor dochodzi do przekonania, że gender studies wydają się być przejawem idealistyczno-metafizycznego oraz realistyczno-teoriopoznawczego nastawienia do rzeczywistości. Na tej podstawie formułuje pięć najważniejszych wskazań, które winni uwzględnić krytycy gender studies.

This paper argues that the historical character of our knowledge is compatible with both ontological and epistemological realism. The first part critically analyses the thesis according to which the situated nature of our cognitive practices implies that they do not refer to an extra-linguistic reality. The second section explores the claim that realism is a necessary presupposition of our communicative practices and the final part outlines the principles of a pluralist realism. Este artículo defiende la tesis según cual el carácter histórico de nuestros modos de conocer es compatible con el realismo ontológico y epistemológico. En la primera parte se examina críticamente la tesis según la cual el carácter situado de nuestra prácticas cognitivas implica que estas no se refieren a una realidad extra-lingüística. En la segunda se explora la idea según la cual el realismo es una presuposición pragmática de nuestras prácticas comunicativas y finalmente se desarrollan los principios de un realismo pluralista. This paper argues that the historical character of our knowledge is compatible with both ontological and epistemological realism. The first part critically analyses the thesis according to which the situated nature of our cognitive practices implies that they do not refer to an extra-linguistic reality. The second section explores the claim that realism is a necessary presupposition of our communicative practices and the final part outlines the principles of a pluralist realism.

In this paper I advocate a version of selective epistemological realism. I begin with analyzing the conditions in which a scientific model successfully and correctly represents an identified target. I stress that the realistic import of models rests on the truth of some predicative statements. I then examine the notions of objectivity and truth in order to be able to assess the reasons to believe in the existence of some unobserved objects posited by our best scientific theories and in the truth of some assertions about the properties that these objects possess. I distinguish between the properties that are observable in principle by means of instruments which enhance our perceptive capacities (the OP properties) and the properties that are beyond any possible observation by us, namely the properties which are purely theoretical (the PT properties), such as charm and strangeness in elementary particle physics. The OP properties are identical or similar to the observed properties of ordinary perceived things, such as velocity, volume and, admittedly more controversially, charge and mass. I propose four stringent requirements for rationally believing that an unobserved object posited by a theory possesses a specific property. Firstly, this property must be an OP property. Secondly, it must be measurable. Thirdly, it must play a causal role in producing the observed data. Fourthly, distinct independent methods for measuring this property must deliver concordant results. I then show that the generality and acceptability of these four criteria is grounded on a parallelism with the reasons we adduce for (rightly) believing in the existence of ordinary observable things which we don’t immediately perceive such as mice, in some circumstances. However, an agnostic attitude is to be recommended with respect to the possession of PT properties by an object posited by an - even successful - scientific theory.