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This study attempts to reveal the impact of distribution inequality of electoral districts on the election outcomes in Jordan. Since 1993 elections, electoral laws and regulations have been adopted that underestimate population density in Jordan, meaning that some regions with lower population densities have obtained more parliamentary seats than regions with high population density, including the governorates of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa. Successive Jordanian governments' strategies have intentionally ignored electoral geography, which reduces the chances of mainly the Palestinian component obtaining significant numbers of seats in the Parliament. Governments have also sought to mitigate the chances of Islamic, Leftist and Nationalist parties obtaining a majority of seats in the Parliament, and thus being able to exert effective pressure to hold the executive authority accountable and responsible for its actions. In addition, low levels of confidence of most Jordanian citizens in Parliament have resulted in a lack of true desire to vote, which has led to an increase in the percentage of wasted votes compared with the cast votes. The study concludes that the executive authority's domination in drawing and dividing electoral districts as part of its hegemony and control over the general policy of elections has purposefully neglected population density and geographical criteria. In light of the study results, an urgent need arises to endorse an election law that accomplishes the standards of distributive justice, maximizes the role of supportive and opposition parties, raises citizen confidence in Parliaments, reduces the percentage of wasted votes and finally activates a truly representative Parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We revisit the effect of ballot access laws on voter confidence in the outcome of elections. Previous research found weak or no relationship between voter confidence and election laws regulating ballot access. We argue this non-finding is conditioned by partisanship. Democrats and Republicans view election laws through a partisan lens, which is especially triggered when coalitions lose. Republican voters see ballot restrictions as a means of securing the vote against fraud; Democratic voters see ballot restrictions as voter suppression. We maintain that the conditional partisan effect that election laws have on voter confidence is triggered or attenuated when partisans’ candidates lose elections. We find that in states where ballot access is costly, voter confidence among partisans and supporters of the losing Presidential candidate is significantly higher for Republicans and significantly lower for Democrats than their counterparts in states with less costly ballot access laws. These effects are greater for Republican than Democrats. We discuss the implications of our findings on election ecosystems and voter confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do states differ in how difficult they make voter registration, and what effect does this have on voters? We propose and validate a new Difficulty of Registration Index (DORI) calculated via an item response theory (IRT) model of five key dimensions of registration (automaticity, portability, deadline, mode, and preregistration) for each state from 2004 to 2020. Since 2004, most states eased registration processes, with Democratic statehouses in racially diverse and young states leading the way. Using CCES data, we find that DORI is associated with increased probability that voters experience problems registering and failing to turnout (in both self-reported and validated turnout data). These effects are pronounced for young voters. This study holds lessons for how restrictive registration procedures can change the shape of the electorate and make it harder to achieve political equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Young voters make up the largest portion of the electorate but vote at the lowest rates of any age group. While scholars have studied how culture affects youth political participation, few studies have analyzed how institutional barriers affect youth voting—even though these laws have been found to affect turnout of other disadvantaged groups. Considering younger citizens are more likely to be non-habitual voters with less political knowledge, efficacy, and resources, it is possible that these laws have magnified effects for youths. This could explain why new voters, facing new restrictions to voting, are participating at lower percentages than youths of earlier cohorts. Using the 2004–2016 Current Population Survey (N = 360,000) and the Cost of Voting Index to test the effects of restrictive electoral environments on youth turnout, we find that restrictive environments disproportionately hurt young voters by decreasing the probability they turn out by 16 percentage points, compared with older voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly believed that a norm of consensus-based election reform exists in New Zealand. However, this belief has yet to be tested with systematic study of changes to the democratic rules of the game. This article empirically analyzes the extent to which partisan and restrictive election rules have been proposed and enacted since passage of the Electoral Act 1956. Using a novel matrix of election lawmaking, a wealth of primary textual sources, and interviews with key actors, the data show clear evidence that election reforms are routinely partisan and have occasionally curtailed democratic participation. An analysis of election lawmaking by political party reveals that Labour is responsible for most partisan election reforms, whereas National has passed most demobilising enactments. These trends extend to proposed members' bills and across multiple governments. The findings highlight the need for scholars to take seriously the importance of a broader array of election reforms beyond the electoral system, including voter and registration administration, franchise rules, ballot initiatives, electoral governance, and campaign finance. It also underscores the need for systematic study of election reforms in a wider variety of countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Wyborcze is the property of Lodz Scientific Society / Lodzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Election process is a fundamental issue in a democratic society. Countries that manage to undergo fair process, based on values and principles, codes of conduct, and applicable laws are able to build up stable and trustworthy institutions. The role of media in this context is of paramount importance to ensure a transparent and accountable outcome. The issue of electoral silence has been a heated debate during the election process in Kosovo, given the loopholes in the existing laws and directives. The aim of this research is to analyse the electoral silence status as one of the specific segments of electoral processes, particularly in the case of Republic of Kosovo. Research has been carried out using secondary data from the existing literatures, applicable laws, cases, media, and other relevant bodies in Kosovo.

This article examines the political power of the church, state, and local elite in the context of the local elections, particularly the elections of the gobernadorcillo, in the Province of Tayabas from 1846 to 1895. Contained in the laws, decrees, and circulars of the Spanish government were the electoral process and method for the election of the gobernadorcillo. The election laws that will be discussed in this article are the Ordenanzas de Buen Gobierno de 1768; Circular de 5 de Octubre de 1847; and Real Decreto de Mayo 19 de 1893. This research will also discuss how the Spanish government instituted electoral reforms to prevent the abuse of power from the church and state. Part of the reform in the electoral process was to preserve the balance of power which was implemented through the political system called “check and balance”.

The victory of an independent candidate who won the subnational election and excluded the traditional system of political parties is analyzed herein. As an unprecedented case in Mexico, it is analyzed considering the conditions of the political system characterized by a hegemonic political party dominating everything, where their capability to minimize the political representation has been a constant trait. Notwithstanding, the political liberalization process gradually managed to allow the political pluralism through the elections. The national election reform in 2014 provided the possibility to have independent candidates and the State of Nuevo León implemented it. fierefore, the analysis of the first independent government in Nuevo León examines the variable precedent to the wining electoral route. Thanks to a campaign basically through a social networking platform instead of a conventional election campaign, the candidate achieved an unprecedented victory both in the local and national history. Next, focused only on two variables measuring the governmental political efficacy, some empirical evidence is shown in order to analyze the results regarding the public security and corruption issues. Finally, this work addresses the context of the outgoing governor and provides the conclusions from the first governmental balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Collected Papers of the Faculty of Law in Split / Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Splitu is the property of Split Faculty of Law and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article analyzes early debates over the size of the United States House of Representatives and the requirement to elect representatives using single-member districts. It focuses on early theories of representation during the 1790s and later developments during debates over the 1842 Apportionment Act, when Congress, for the first time, reduced the size of the House and required single-member districts. It was in the course of the 1842 debates that the Whig Party legitimized these electoral changes by articulating a theory of representation that synthesized the Federalist's and the Anti-Federalist's theories. The Whigs argued that the reduced House size provided for a more efficient deliberative body and the single-member district requirement provided for better constituent representation, particularly given the development of political parties. This historical analysis enhances our understanding of representation by addressing how the Whigs legitimized electoral change, aiming to balance legislative efficiency with adequate representation in a way that became the foundation for how we currently understand representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the political power of the church, state, and local elite in the context of the local elections, particularly the elections of the gobernadorcillo, in the Province of Tayabas from 1846 to 1895. Contained in the laws, decrees, and circulars of the Spanish government were the electoral process and method for the election of the gobernadorcillo. The election laws that will be discussed in this article are the Ordenanzas de Buen Gobierno de 1768; Circular de 5 de Octubre de 1847; and Real Decreto de Mayo 19 de 1893. This research will also discuss how the Spanish government instituted electoral reforms to prevent the abuse of power from the church and state. Part of the reform in the electoral process was to preserve the balance of power which was implemented through the political system called "check and balance". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider alternative explanations for variation in voter turnout rates across the five countries in Southeast Asia that the Polity IV database suggests are most "democratic." Research on voter turnout in Western states has typically drawn connections between institutional, demographic, political, and economic variables and turnout levels. In this essay, we test each group of predictors and attempt to begin the process of isolating the factors that are most relevant to electoral participation in Southeast Asia. The research finds that many traditional explanations for voter turnout are inadequate. Yet, highquality formal democracy, combined with poor economic conditions, can reasonably predict voter turnout in the countries studied. In the end, the research qualifies our results in an attempt to prompt a more thorough discussion and understanding of democratization in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we inquire into the strategic intent behind the design of election laws. Presuming that institutional designers are strategic and rational, we identify the extent of information incompleteness as determining their objectives for rule choice. For different levels of information incompleteness, we assess empirically the validity of explaining actual choices with designers' electoral goals. Using parameter-specific predictions for players' institutional preferences (obtained from a game-theoretic model which assumes electoral success as the design goal) we find that design does not always meet the criterion of elections-aimed rationality (electoral rationalizability). We identify a structural difference between levels of electoral rationalizability in two sets of European electoral reforms, those that accompanied the late 19th-early 20th-century franchise expansion, and those during the post-communist franchise creation in East-Central Europe. For the later sub-sample we rely on a qualitative assessment of electoral rationalizability since extremely high levels of information incompleteness in these cases do not allow us to apply the model reliably. We provide evidence linking the structural difference in electoral rationalizability between the two sub-samples and the sub-sample variation in electoral rationalizability in the late 19th-early 20th century to the quality of information available to the designers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two large research programs have analyzed election-based connections between citizens and policy makers in different democracies. Studies of vote-seat representation in the tradition of Rae (1967) begin with citizens' party votes and have made substantial progress in elucidating the impact of election laws, geographic vote distributions, and the number of parties and their interactions on the proportionality of party representation. Studies of substantive representation in the tradition of Miller & Stokes (1963) begin with citizen issue preferences and link these to the positions of their representatives. Most studies outside the United States, confronting multimember districts and the cohesion of party representatives, have focused on voter-party dyads rather than geographic constituencies, and confirmed the importance of issues linked to a common electoral discourse and the greater structure of legislator issue positions. Recently, a number of explicitly comparative analyses have begun to analyze collective correspondence and confront other limitations of the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutions shape social outcomes, yet institutions themselves are products of political choices. When institutional choices are determined by the same political and social processes that they shape, institutions are endogenously selected. Here I address the question of whether this endogenous institutional selection necessarily implies endogenous institutional effects. If it does, the use of institutional parameters as independent variables explaining policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political regimes, widespread in the literature on comparative political institutions, is hard to justify. I argue, however, that strategic choice of the rules of the game implies designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects only under conditions of complete information. Under incomplete information, ex-post institutional effects do not need to be endogenous, since at the time of designing the rules the designers were not in position to control the selection of these effects. The reason why the choice of the rules does not imply the choice of their effects lies in the intervening and interactive (rather than additive) role played by the environmental parameters, including players' own characteristics, that are not revealed at the time of the institutional choice. Additionally to the model which illustrates the logic of the argument and the workings of intervening structural effects, I find supporting evidence in the processes of design of election laws in post-communist Europe, where stages of design and implementation followed each other in a very quick succession yet were characterized by substantial changes in manifested institutional preferences of the key political players. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]