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Modality compatibility refers to the similarity between the stimulus modality and the modality of response-related sensory consequences (e.g., vocal output produces audible effects). While previous studies found higher costs of task switching with stimulus-response modality-incompatible tasks (auditory-manual and visual-vocal), the present study was aimed to explore the generality of modality compatibility by examining a new response modality (pedal responses). Experiment 1 showed that the effect of modality compatibility generalizes to pedal responses when these replaced manual responses used in previous studies (i.e., higher switch costs when switching between auditory-pedal and visual-vocal tasks compared to switching between auditory-vocal and visual-pedal tasks). However, in single-task conditions there was no influence of modality compatibility. Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether modality compatibility depends on the frequency of task switches. To this end, one task occurred very frequently, overall decreasing the task switching frequency. Importantly, the results showed a robust task-switching benefit of modality-compatible mappings even for a highly frequent task, suggesting that the sustained representation of potentially competing response modalities affects task-switching performance independent from the actual frequency of the tasks. Together, the data suggest that modality compatibility is an emergent phenomenon arising in task-switching situations based on the necessity to maintain but at the same time separate competing modality mappings, which are characterized by ideomotor ‘‘backward’’ linkages between anticipated response effects and the stimuli that called for this response in the first place.

Modality compatibility refers to the similarity between the stimulus modality and the modality of response-related sensory consequences (e.g., vocal output produces audible effects). While previous studies found higher costs of task switching with stimulus-response modality-incompatible tasks (auditory-manual and visual-vocal), the present study was aimed to explore the generality of modality compatibility by examining a new response modality (pedal responses). Experiment 1 showed that the effect of modality compatibility generalizes to pedal responses when these replaced manual responses used in previous studies (i.e., higher switch costs when switching between auditory-pedal and visual-vocal tasks compared to switching between auditory-vocal and visual-pedal tasks). However, in single-task conditions there was no influence of modality compatibility. Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether modality compatibility depends on the frequency of task switches. To this end, one task occurred very frequently, overall decreasing the task switching frequency. Importantly, the results showed a robust task-switching benefit of modality-compatible mappings even for a highly frequent task, suggesting that the sustained representation of potentially competing response modalities affects taskswitching performance independent from the actual frequency of the tasks. Together, the data suggest that modality compatibility is an emergent phenomenon arising in task-switching situations based on the necessity to maintain but at the same time separate competing modality mappings, which are characterized by ideomotor "backward" linkages between anticipated response effects and the stimuli that called for this response in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human ability to anticipate the consequences that result from action is an essential building block for cognitive, emotional, and social functioning. A dominant view is that this faculty is based on motor predictions, in which a forward model uses a copy of the motor command to predict imminent sensory action-consequences. Although this account was originally conceived to explain the processing of action-outcomes that are tightly coupled to bodily movements, it has been increasingly extrapolated to effects beyond the body. Here, we critically evaluate this generalization and argue that, although there is ample evidence for the role of predictions in the processing of environment-related action-outcomes, there is hitherto little reason to assume that these predictions result from motor-based forward models. The idea that motor predictions modulate the perceptual processing of action-outcomes in health and mental disease has been widely acknowledged. Motor-based forward models have been implicated in the processing of a variety of action-outcomes, ranging from body-related to environment-related outcomes. Here, we argue that the presumed involvement of motor-based forward models in the prediction of action-outcomes beyond the body is limited and hitherto unjustified. To move forward, cognitive prediction sources have to be incorporated in research on action-outcome processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is ample evidence that actions are guided by anticipating their effects (ideomotor control) in the manual domain, much less is known about the underlying characteristics and dynamics of effect-based oculomotor control. Here, we address three open issues. 1) Is action-effect anticipation in oculomotor control reflected in corresponding spatial saccade characteristics in inanimate environments? 2) Does the previously reported dependency of action latency on the temporal effect delay (action-effect interval) also occur in the oculomotor domain? 3) Which temporal effect delay is optimally suited to develop strong action-effect associations over time in the oculomotor domain? Participants executed left or right free-choice saccades to peripheral traffic lights, causing an (immediate or delayed) action-contingent light switch in the upper vs. lower part of the traffic light. Results indicated that saccades were spatially shifted toward the location of the upcoming change, indicating anticipation of the effect (location). Saccade latency was affected by effect delay, suggesting that corresponding time information is integrated into event representations. Finally, delayed (vs. immediate) effects were more effective in strengthening action-effect associations over the course of the experiment, likely due to greater saliency of perceptual changes occurring during target fixation as opposed to changes during saccades (saccadic suppression). Overall, basic principles underlying ideomotor control appear to generalize to the oculomotor domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Automatic acquisition of action effect associations may serve as a parsimonious account of how people acquire the basis for intentionally controlled action. However, recent research suggests that learning or the expression of action effect links might depend on whether task demands impose either a stimulus based mode of action control or an intention based action control mode. In the current study we develop a paradigm that allows the mode of action control to be varied via instructions while keeping stimuli identical. Participants were to respond to the location of a cloud of dots. Their actions were followed by predictable visual effects, either consistently congruent or incongruent with the location of the action. In Experiment 1, a displaced new cloud of random dots was presented as a spatial action effect. In Experiment 2 an arrow was presented as effect with a pointing direction congruent or incongruent to the response position. The location of the stimulus in the reference frame was easy to detect in some of the trials while the location of the cloud of dots was completely ambiguous in others. The instruction manipulation targeted the latter trials, suggesting to one group of participants to freely choose a key in a difficult trial, while asking another group to react to their spontaneous impression in the event of a difficult stimulus. In this way, we aimed at rendering actions either as stimulus driven or internally generated. By this we could investigate how effect anticipation changed with practice depending on action mode. We employed the impact of action effect compatibility on speed and choice of action as a measure for action effect anticipation. Our results suggest that action effect associations can be acquired when instructions suggest stimulus based action control or intention based action control. Instructions aiming at the mode of task processing can influence when and how action effect links influence behavior.

Evidence for the anticipation of environmental effects as an integral part of response planning comes mainly from experiments in which the effects were physically presented. Thus, in these studies it cannot be excluded that effect codes were activated during response preparation only because the effects were displayed as external stimuli before response execution. In order to provide more clear-cut evidence for the anticipation of response effects in action planning, we performed a series of three experiments using a new paradigm, where displaying effect codes before the response was avoided. Participants first learned arbitrary effects of key-pressing responses. In the following test phase they were instructed to execute a response only if a Go stimulus was presented after a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The Go stimulus was either compatible or incompatible with the effect, but independent of the response. In Experiment 1 we tested the paradigm with two responses and two effects. We found a significant compatibility effect: If the Go stimulus was compatible with the response effect, responses were initiated faster than in incompatible trials. In Experiment 2 response effects were only present in the acquisition phase, but not in the test phase. The compatibility effect disappeared, indicating that the results of Experiment 1 were indeed related to the anticipation of the forthcoming response effects. In Experiment 3 we extended this paradigm by using a larger number of stimuli and response alternatives. Again we found a robust compatibility effect, which can only be explained if the effect representations are active before response execution. The compatibility effects in Experiments 1 and 3 did not depend on the SOA. The fact that the Go stimulus affected response preparation at any time indicates that the role of effect anticipation is not limited to response selection.

Voluntary action – in particular the ability to produce desired effects in the environment – is fundamental to human existence. According to ideomotor theory we can achieve goals in the environment by means of anticipating their outcomes. We aimed at providing neurophysiological evidence for the assumption that performing actions calls for the activation of brain areas associated with the sensory effects usually evoked by the actions. We conducted an fMRI study in which right and left button presses lead to the presentation of face and house pictures. We compared a baseline phase with the same phase after participants experienced the association between button presses and pictures. We found an increase in the parahippocampal place area (PPA) for the response that has been associated with house pictures and fusiform face area (FFA) for the response that has been coupled with face pictures. This observation constitutes support for ideomotor theory.

Human actions are guided either by endogenous action plans or by external stimuli in the environment. These two types of action control seem to be mediated by neurophysiologically and functionally distinct systems that interfere if an endogenously planned action suddenly has to be performed in response to an exogenous stimulus. In this case, the endogenous representation has to be deactivated first to give way to the exogenous system. Here we show that interference of endogenous and exogenous action control is not limited to motor-related aspects but also affects the perception of action-related stimuli. Participants associated two actions with contingent sensory effects in learning blocks. In subsequent test blocks, preparing one of these actions specifically impaired responding to the associated effect in an exogenous speeded detection task, yielding a blindness-like effect for arbitrary, learned action effects. In accordance with the theory of event coding, this finding suggests that action planning influences perception even in the absence of any physical similarities between action and to-be-perceived stimuli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Voluntary actions are thought to be selected with respect to their intended goal. Converging data suggests that medial frontal cortex plays a crucial role in linking actions to their predicted effects. Recent neuroimaging data also suggests that during action selection, the brain pre-activities the representation of the predicted action effect. We review evidence of action effect prediction, both in terms of its neurophysiological basis as well as its functional consequences. By assuming that action preparation includes activation of the predicted sensory consequences of the action, we provide a mechanism to understand sensory attenuation and intentional binding. In this account, sensory attenuation results from more difficult discrimination between the observed action effect and the pre-activation of the predicted effect, as compared to when no (or incorrect) prediction is present. Similarly, a predicted action effect should also reach the threshold of awareness faster (intentional binding), if its perceptual representation is pre-activated. By comparing this potential mechanism to mental imagery and repetition suppression we propose a possible neural basis for the processing of predicted action effects. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In routine sequential behavior, we sometimes become aware of having committed an error. However, often we do not. Here, we investigated the processes underlying conscious error detection within a typing paradigm. Our assumption according to the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis is that the (explicit) judgment of having made an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between expected and actually experienced performance which then is attributed to an error. In 4 experiments, participants were instructed to type single words without seeing what they were typing and, afterwards, to judge whether typing was correct. Experiments 1 through 3 tested the assumption that conscious awareness about an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between an expectation and the experienced performance. Experiment 4 investigated the assumption of a separate attribution process triggered by the perceived discrepancy. The results support the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis and argue for a two-stage model of conscious error detection. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

“Strong” versions of the ideomotor theory of action control claim that anticipations of the environmental effects that actions bring about are mandatory for response selection. This is considered to be the one and only way of how actions can be voluntarily selected. We studied this notion in a series of four experiments where we adapted the flanker paradigm to investigate the involvement of effect codes in the preparation of motor responses. Participants first learned that their responses to stimulus letters were contingently followed by the presentation of a new letter on the screen. In the second phase of the experiments, the action-demanding letters were presented together with the effects of the correct response, effects of other responses, or neutral letters. Varying the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between target stimuli and the flanking effect stimuli provides the opportunity to investigate the temporal dynamics of the activation of effect codes. Hence, flanker stimuli were presented before, simultaneously with, or after the onset of the target. The results indicate that effect-related information from the flanker stimuli is involved in the preparation process, but mainly in later phases of response preparation. The observed pattern of results suggests that, at least under conditions where responses are determined by stimuli, effect codes are activated in course of response planning to enable the evaluation of the executed response and the monitoring of response execution, but they do not automatically activate the responses themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The last decade has seen a proliferation of empirical studies that seek to understand how the cognitive system links voluntary motor actions with their perceptual effects. A view that has found considerable support in this research is the ideomotor approach to action control which holds that actors select, initiate, and execute a movement by activating anticipatory codes of the movement''s sensory effects. We, first review the empirical evidence from different paradigms showing that effects of voluntary actions become anticipated during response production. In a second step we survey empirical data investigating the nature of the mechanisms that link voluntary motor actions with their intended and expected perceptual effects. We argue that the integration, or binding, of perceptual and motor codes occurs in action planning where features of intended effects are selectively bound to features of the actions that are selected to achieve these effects in the environment. As a final step we will summarize empirical findings that may elucidate the particular roles of effect-code activation in response production and control. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]