Search

In both Western culture and contemporary social theory, the term person is commonly used as an equivalent of human being, individual and subject. Faced with this substantialist semantics, and starting from the recovery of the original meaning of the Latin term persona, carried out by de baroque political philosophie to theoretical cement the emerging european states. To do this, a genealogical tour will be carried out that will start with Thomas Hobbes analysis of the person as an actor. We will then review some of the most conspicuous representatives of the sociological tradition, in whose work the person is conceptualizated not merely as an actor, but as an social actor. To do this, we will explore the Works of Tönnies, Simmel and Goffman -in the latter case, in connection with Mead's theory of self-. Finally, base don the concepts of double contingency and communication, as constitutive problema and characteristic operation of the social systems, the article propose a socio-structural radicalization of the sociological approach to the person, in order to determine conceptually which basic needs of the social orders meets the construction of human beings as social actors, and how this construction is the key factor for the structuring of their consciousness, wich leads to the development of the self. The fundamental thesis on wich this sociological radicalization is based is the interpretation of the person as one of the basic forms of social structuring: the social addressing; that is, the understanding of human beings as social addresses that help to determine and reduce the complexity os social systems as systems of communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Niklas Luhmann is one of the most important social scientists of the last century. He wrote a great many and high-quality works that stimulated social research. Despite this, Luhmann has not received the recognition he deserves in Turkey. The following article is an attempt to pres)ent Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. For this, his predecessors are first introduced; these are Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons. Then, Luhmann’s model of society in the triangle of system, environment, and communication media is discussed. It is shown that Luhmann conceptually departed from the idea of culture, values, norms, and the indi)vidual. Instead of them, he let the system guide him as an independent entity. Instead of them, he proposes the function of symbolically generalized communication media for the stability of soci)ety. By society, Luhmann does not mean the concrete society but the semantics of this society, that is, the society as an object of the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution explores The Status of Law in World Society by looking at the practice turn in particular. Without challenging Kratochwil’s interest in practices per se, this contribution poses two questions: first, it acknowledges that the ‘practice turn’ itself is, like every intellectual movement, ambiguous with conflicting trends and developments. One of these ambiguities, however, concerns the position of the observer. Leaving this position undefined, the practice turn transports this ambiguity into constructivism with important repercussions on what constructivists assume to know and where the boundaries of their possible critique are. Second, this contribution asks whether there is a conflict between an interest in practices and the question of order. In particular, the latter incorporates the question of the ‘third’ that Kratochwil acknowledges, but does not develop in more detail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we propose that in the sociological theory of Niklas Luhmann is possible to reconstruct two different treatments regarding the problem of social order. On the one hand, a problem which is related to the recognition of an order of reality that is social in its own right; and on the other hand, one that is connected with the matter of regulation and control over the action. This duality is particularly observable when we analyze the different meanings and valuations that the problem of contingency of action has in the elaboration of the general proposal of the author. The analysis allows us to present the hypothesis that in social theory, there is diversity not only in the answers granted to the problem of order, but also in the ways in which the problem is conceived. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose · This article investigates the emergence of subsystems in societies as a solution to the double contingency problem. > Context · There are two underlying paradigms: one is radical constructivism in the sense that perturbations are at the centre of the self-organising processes; the other is Luhmann's double contingency problem, where agents learn anticipations from each other. > Approach · Central to our investigation is a computer simulation where we place agents into an arena. These agents can learn to (a) collect food and/or (b) steal food from other agents. In order to analyse subsystem formation, we investigate whether agents use both behaviours or just one of these, which is equivalent to determining the number of self-referential loops. This is detected with a novel measure that we call "prediction utilisation." > Results · During the simulation, symmetry breaking is observed. The system of agents divides itself up into two subsystems: one where agents just collect food and another one where agents just steal food from other agents. The ratio between these two populations is determined by the amount of food available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconstructs the concept of double contingency in Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory. Our analysis is organized around three axes. First, we study the connection between the problems of double contingency and of social order, outstanding among which are the critical reception of Talcott Parsons and phenomenology. In the second, we examine the hypothesis of the emergence of social order, where the reception of early German romanticism and the theory of emergence are particularly relevant. In the third, we dialogue with the secondary bibliography, fundamental for situating and contextualizing the reconstruction achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Violence on psychiatric wards involving staff and patients is a significant problem in many countries. Whilst patient psychopathology is often a factor, the violent interaction between ward staff and patients is often comparable to other violent interactions in the outside world. Thus, approaches from the social sciences can help to analyse the interactional patterns on psychiatric wards in order to benefit from their similarity to “ordinary” violent interactions. The concepts of aversive stimulation and double contingency are applied here to conclude that many acts of violence on wards occur following frustration or other rule imposition by staff. Both staff and patients can be seen as coping with perceived threat presented by the other in the interaction in a context of uncertainty about the behaviour of the other. The combination of misunderstanding, reciprocal anger and need for safety underpins an escalating tension in the interaction. These notions help us to understand these interactions better and could be incorporated in training for mental health staff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that in Parsons' later works there is an implicit alternative to his normative solution to the problem of order. Luhmann's theory of self-reference and Pizzorno's notion of mutual identification are firstly invoked to recast the Parsonsian problematic in a `post-normative' light. On the basis of Parsons' later theory of societal solidarity, ritual and myth, I propose further that his concept of symbolic communication of affect delineates the process through which individuals recognize each other and thereby constitute social order. Mediated with symbols that are grounded in the human condition, communication of affect may substitute institutionalization of value to be the condition of possibility of social order. I also demonstrate that the significance of affect is a theme shared by the Chinese tradition of Confucianism, which is introduced to refine the humanistic intent of Parsons' theory and broaden its scope of applicability outside the Western context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the ego/alter ego constellation of social interaction. Every social interaction constitutes a situation with double contingency, which is recognized as such by both sides: both know that both know that one could also act differently. The circularity of the relationship brings about indeterminacy; self-commitment would presuppose that others commit themselves and vice versa. How is this infinity problem solved? How can we account for the possibility of social interaction, and social order? Both Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann have devoted considerable attention to the theorem of double contingency. Here, I analyze their theoretical formulations on this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whereas the voluminous work of Niklas Luhmann (1927–98) can be considered as a major focus of discussions in theoretical sociology in the German-speaking world, it has only been translated sporadically and remains widely unknown in the English-speaking world. This review article provides a general introduction to Luhmann's systems theory. Section I embeds systems theory in a broader philosophical context and traces its particular legacy. It demonstrates, in contrast to Luhmann's rhetoric of starting afresh, that his theory inherits and reformulates the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In Section II, Luhmann's basic concept of system is developed, modeled on his early understanding of formal organization. The epistemological and ontological uncertainty that lies beneath the necessity of organizing proves to be the raison d'être of social systems in general. Finally, in Section III, the problem of uncertainty is translated into a situation of double contingency which, according to Luhmann, makes up the core of every form of socialization. It is shown how systems theory provides an alternative to conceiving society as being either normatively or rationally constituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]