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Theists commonly hold that God endows humans with rights. Standard explanations draw on natural law theory or divine command theory. However, the natural law account does not give God a central role in explaining our rights, and the divine command account does not assign human nature a significant explanatory role. A successful theistic explanation of human rights must meet three conditions: (1) God must directly explain human rights; (2) human nature must also directly explain human rights; (3) this dual contribution must explain why morality forbids rights violations by grounding the deontic reasons associated with rights. I propose a holiness account of rights. On this view, God endows human nature with rights by making human nature holy, and God does so by fashioning humans with one of God's essential properties: the capacity to love. This theory satisfies all three conditions and explains the deontological character of rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Benefit to the world" and "Heaven's intent" are not, as is often assumed, separate criteria for action in Mozi's 墨子 ethics; they are the same in extension but not intension. When Mozi speaks in terms of "Heaven's intent," it is to highlight the criterion's retrospective orientation and its scope; taking a cue from Heaven's reactions to past deeds, agents specify the scope of "the world" by reference to the past performance of persons regarding benefit to the world. This diverges from a principle that is often attributed to Mozi, of considering the benefit of all equally without regard for past performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erik Wielenberg has presented an objection to divine command theory (DCT) alleging that DCT has the troubling implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations. Matthew Flannagan has replied to Wielenberg's argument. Here, I defend the view that, despite Flannagan's reply, the psychopath objection presents a serious problem for the versions of DCT defended by its most prominent contemporary advocates — Robert Adams, C. Stephen Evans, and William Lane Craig. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The horrendous deeds objection to metaethical divine command theory (MDCT) says that since God can command anything whatsoever, even things that are horrendous, MDCT seems to imply that God can make any action, no matter how repugnant, morally obligatory. Defenders of MDCT frequently claim, by way of response, that since God is essentially omnibenevolent, it is impossible that he commands us to do horrendous things. I have recently argued that it is irrelevant that God cannot issue horrible commands. The argument runs as follows: On MDCT, God has moral grounding power — the power to make an action morally obligatory by commanding that we do it. Given that omnipotence is possession of maximal power, every omnipotent being has this power. In some possible world, there exists a non-benevolent omnipotent being who issues horrible commands. Therefore, on MDCT, there is a possible world in which some horrendous action is morally obligatory. Matthew Flannagan has responded to this argument on behalf of the divine command theorist. Flannagan argues that since, on MDCT, moral obligations are constituted by God's commands, and no other being can perform God's actions, no other being can possess moral grounding power. In this paper, I criticize Flannagan's argument. His argument assumes that when some phenomenon is constituted by the actions of an agent, no other agent's actions can constitute this phenomenon. I argue that this assumption is false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I address a family of objections I label the So What? objection to robust non-naturalist realism (or, just non-naturalism). This objection concludes that non-naturalism fails to identify the moral properties in virtue of failing to explain why non-natural properties would have all the features we expect moral properties to have and can be extended to provide the conclusion that the non-naturalist is therefore immoral. I argue that So What? is question-begging because it disallows non-naturalists their central theoretical claim: there are ethical properties iff they are fundamental properties (and, in virtue of that, non-natural). I then diagnose the error anti-non-naturalists make explicitly: those who object to non-naturalism along the lines of So What? either fail to understand precisely what the theory claims or fail to understand non-naturalist motivations for going in for that theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thesis. Divine Command Theory (hereafter DCT) is a metaethical theory belonging to the category of moral realism of the non-cognitive type, whose popularity is growing. In this thesis, we show some of the reasons that have triggered the need to address the normativity of ethical concepts, because of which DCT receives its justification. Concept. Our argument begins with an analysis of a critical moment in contemporary ethical discourse, the question of normativity, relating Hume's law to the contemporary problem of solipsism, philosophical pluralism, and epistemic reductionism in moral philosophy. We show the strengths of the moral reasoning offered by Divine Command Theory and point out its weaknesses, which have to do with the fact that God is not a perfect system of moral axioms, but a being who acts morally and perfectly. Results and conclusion. Divine Command Theory is an important metaethical approach that offers a solid space for the establishment of different ethical frameworks with normativity weights, but on the other hand harbours question marks that should not be overlooked. These are questions of justice and love in terms of God's model of reasoning, since both aspects are paradoxical from a theological point of view and, moreover, run the risk of a self-referential fallacy on the part of the interpreter of God's commandments. The problematic aspects of this theory that we point out do not in any way undermine its validity, but rather anticipate an even deeper level of reflection on ethical realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics of Divine Command Theory (DCT) have advanced the counterpossible terrible commands objection. They argue that DCT implies the counterpossible 'If a necessarily morally perfect God commanded us to perform a terrible act, then the terrible act would be morally obligatory.' However, this counterpossible is false. Hence, DCT is false. Philipp Kremers has proposed that the intuition that the counterpossible above is false is due to conversational implicatures. By providing a pragmatic explanation for the intuition, he thinks that DCT proponents can then maintain that the counterpossible is actually true. In this article, I argue that Kremers's conversational implicature response fails because (a) there is good reason to think that no conversational implicature arises given what critics of DCT have expressed, (b) a competent reader would not understand the critics' utterance that TCC is false as implicating that TCC* is false, and (c) the counterpossible terrible commands objection can be easily modified to be immune to the conversational implicature response by cancelling any potential implicature. Thus, an appeal to conversational implicatures cannot save DCT from the counterpossible terrible commands objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between morality and religion has long been a contentious issue in philosophy and theology. In recent years, the notion of inconsistency between morality and religion has gained traction, with advocates on both sides. Some argue for morality over religion, while others dismiss morality in favor of reinforcing religious practice. This article critically examines the perspective of a proponent of the latter approach, which was reflected in IRIB and other major Iranian official media. The central idea is the substitution of morality with piety (taqwa or fear of God). After analyzing various aspects of this concept, we highlight some of its major flaws, including its reliance on an inadequate conception of morality, neglect of themes within the Quran and Shiite hadiths regarding the importance of morality in religion, and disregard for the logical implications of invalidating innate and pre-religious morality. I conclude that emphasizing the inconsistency between morality and religion and proposing to replace morality with piety is not only untenable from a religious standpoint but also detrimental to attracting youths to religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this paper, I look at a number of evolutionary and cognitive explanations (supernatural punishment theory, big gods theory, moral dyad, and costly signaling) that purport to explain why people hold beliefs concerning a close connection between God and morality. I assess whether any of these theories provide a reason for epistemic concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we understand the relation between God and morality? This article aims to address this question by constructing a theistic metaethical theory informed by postphenomenological mediation theory. According to postphenomenological mediation theory, properties and values are not independent entities but are instead mutually constituted through the relationships that they participate in. By emphasizing relationships and understanding goodness as harmony, the theory allows God and creation to jointly constitute goodness. This alternative theory is compared to the metaethical theories proposed by Robert M. Adams and Mark C. Murphy, which represent the two primary strands of theistic metaethics: theological voluntarism and natural law theory, respectively. The alternative theory exhibits certain advantages and resolves some of the issues found in Adams' and Murphy's theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of metaphysical grounding refers to a dependence relation—a relation between facts that is asymmetrical and non-causal. I aim to apply this concept to a Divine Command Theory (DCT) of moral obligations. Divine command theorists say that moral obligations arise from God’s commands. I argue that the three main views on the relation between the divine command and the obligation—causal, supervenience, and identity—do not capture all that we desire in a moral theory of obligations. After attempting to clarify metaphysical grounding in general, I articulate the distinction between what I call normative grounding and metaethical grounding. I then use this distinction to criticize Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s discussion of DCT and to highlight the compatibility of DCT with other ethical theories.

John Duns Scotus’un ahlak felsefesi, Tanrı’nın irade ve kudretine ayırdığı geniş alan dolayısıyla, ilahi buyruk teorisinin klasik bir örneği olarak ele alınır. Ancak, bazı düşünürler, onun ahlak felsefesinin ya bir tutarsızlık içerdiğini ya da doğal yasanın da Scotus düşüncesinde önemli bir rol oynadığını gündeme getirmişlerdir. İlahi buyruk teorisi ile doğal yasa teorisinin birbiriyle çelişen ya da aynı anda savunulması mümkün olmayan öğeleri göz önüne alınınca, Scotus’un bir tutarsızlık içinde olduğundan şüphelenilebilir. Ancak Orta Çağ’ın önde gelen düşünürlerinden olan ve eserlerinde kullandığı ustaca akıl yürütmeler dolayısıyla Doctor Substilis (incelikli zeka sahibi) lakabıyla tanınmış bir düşünürün tüm felsefesini üzerine bina ettiği görüşleri konusunda çelişki içinde olduğunu söylemek hızlıca varılmış bir sonuç olabilir. Bu makale, Scotus’un doğal yasa ve ilahi buyruk teorisini bir tutarsızlığa mahal vermeden nasıl kullandığını ve iki teori arasındaki sözde gerilimi nasıl cevapladığını gösterebilmeyi amaç edinmekte; söz konusu iki teorinin aynı anda kullanılmasının, birbirlerinin eksik yönlerini ortadan kaldırabileceğini savunmaktadır.

According to many, human autonomy is necessary for moral action and yet incompatible with being morally accountable to God's divine commands. By issuing commands that ground normative facts, God demands our accountability without understanding our normative reasons for moral action, which crushes human autonomy. Call this the Autonomy Objection to Theism (AOT). There is an unexplored connection between models of normative reason and AOT. I argue that any plausible AOT must be stated in terms of an adequate model of normative reason. There are two broad metaethical categories for models of normative reason: anti-realist or realist views. I defend the thesis that both anti-realism and realism about normative reasons fail to support AOT by means of a dilemma. If the AOT defender adopts anti-realism about normative reasons (subjectivism and constructivism), AOT loses its force. However, if the AOT defender adopts moral realism, they face the same problem as the theist, as normative fact constrains autonomy. Consequently, AOT is a problem for all moral realists, including non-theists, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg, among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a theological critique of divine command theory, a metaethical theory stating that moral wrongness is constituted by God's command. First, I argue that this theory does not qualify as a Christian moral theory because it lacks connections to central parts of Christian theology, such as Christology. This argument does not imply that the theory is wrong nor that it is inconsistent with Christianity—only that it is not Christian as such. Second, I argue that divine command theory does not fit well with the New Testament's vision of the moral life, in which being conformed to the image of Christ has primacy over adherence to law. This argument implies that the Christian ethicist should look elsewhere for a metaethical theory. I next argue in favour of a moral theory of imitation, in which the moral life consists of imitating God, the prime exemplar of goodness, which is made possible through an imitation of Christ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Atheist moral philosopher Erik Wielenberg recently argued that Divine Command Theory is implausible as an explanation of objective morality because it fails to explain how psychopaths have moral obligations. In this paper I explain that everyone agrees the consciences of psychopaths don't work as they should, but there's disagreement among experts as to whether: A. The consciences of psychopaths don't inform them of what's right and wrong and that they should do what's right or B. The consciences of psychopaths do inform them of these things but merely don't generate the appropriate moral emotions. I argue that, based on the psychological research, a strong case can be made for B and thus under DCT psychopaths do have moral obligations because their consciences inform them of what's right from wrong and that they should do what's right. I also argue that even if A is true, God can, and does, make psychopaths aware of what's right and wrong and that they should do what's right through other means such as rationality, society, parents, culture, direct verbal commands, etc. Therefore, even if A is true, then psychopaths still have moral obligations under DCT because they do know what's right from wrong and that they should do what's right. Lastly, I turn the tables on Wielenberg and point out that his theory is even worse than DCT when it comes to providing an explanation for the moral rights and obligations of psychopaths [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erik Wielenberg has offered a fascinating argument from moral psychology against a sophisticated theistic account of moral obligations: Divine Command Theory (DCT). This argument focuses on the pathology known as psychopathy—a perennial interest for those concerned with abnormal and moral psychology. The argument can be labeled the argument from psychopathy for convenience. The strength of the argument is that it forces the DCT-ist to maintain that there are some human beings who have no moral obligations yet still do evil actions. This, he argues, is an implausible thesis. Therefore, DCT is false. In this paper, I defend DCT and argue that there is good reason to be neutral or skeptical that psychopaths have moral obligations and, to the degree that they do, they are able to grasp morality in a way consistent with DCT. Furthermore, if the argument does present a serious problem for DCT, then it does so for Wielenberg's own view, Robust Normative Realism (RNR), just as much as DCT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The divine command theory holds that morality finds its origin in God or that God is somehow closely connected to morality. Many people across the world hold a related, though different belief that Religious belief is required for proper moral behavior. In this paper, I look at a number of evolutionary and cognitive explanations (supernatural punishment theory, big gods theory, moral dyad, and costly signaling) that purport to explain why people hold beliefs concerning a close connection between God and morality. I assess whether any of these theories provide a reason for epistemic concern.

This paper criticises James Sterba's use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba's argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents' actions but not God's actions. I will also criticise Sterba's criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Most interpretations of Gen 2–3 center the motifs of divine command, human obedience, and divine punishment. These ideas, however, are not intrinsic to the narrative. They represent only one possible way of interpreting certain semantic and narrative ambiguities in the story. One can also read Gen 2–3 as a story about a divine warning and a consequential decision. This alternative reading does a better job making sense of the narrative details and better reflects the unique way the J source of the Pentateuch understands how God interacts with humanity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we understand the relation between God and morality? This article aims to address this question by constructing a theistic metaethical theory informed by postphenomenological mediation theory. According to postphenomenological mediation theory, properties and values are not independent entities but are instead mutually constituted through the relationships that they participate in. By emphasizing relationships and understanding goodness as harmony, the theory allows God and creation to jointly constitute goodness. This alternative theory is compared to the metaethical theories proposed by Robert M. Adams and Mark C. Murphy, which represent the two primary strands of theistic metaethics: theological voluntarism and natural law theory, respectively. The alternative theory exhibits certain advantages and resolves some of the issues found in Adams’ and Murphy’s theories.

The Muʿtazilī theologians, particularly the later Imāmī ones, developed numerous interesting arguments against divine command theory. The arguments, however, have not received the attention they deserve. Some of the arguments have been discussed in passing, and some have not been discussed at all. In this article, I aim to present and analyse the arguments. To that end, I first distinguish between different semantic, ontological, epistemological, and theological theses that were often conflated in the debate, and examine the logical relation among them. Then I go over the Muʿtazila's arguments determining, among other things, which of the theses was targeted by each argument. In presenting the arguments, I focus mainly on the late kalām period, the period falling roughly between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries of the common era, as the arguments were at their most sophisticated level by this time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence 'God is (morally) good' is a tautology. In this article, I show that a charitable interpretation of R. M. Adams' version of divine command metaethics is not committed to accept this assumption. I conclude that Maitzen's objection merely manages to refute a strawman version of divine command metaethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study aimed primarily to examine the relationship between Allah centeredness and moral disengagement. The second aim of the study was to examine the relationship of both variables with demographic variables such as gender and, age, and marital and educational status. The study was conducted using, a relational screening model and descriptive analyzes, and consisted of 502 participants, aged between 16 and 70 who had graduated from primary/secondary school, high school, university or from second or third cycle degree programs. The data collection process of the study was performed using at demographic information form, Scale of Allah Centeredness, and Scale of Moral Disengagement. In the study, a negative significant relationship was found between Allah centeredness and moral disengagement. It was also found that the explanatory effect of Allah centeredness on moral disengagement was 5.6%. Significant relationships were detected between Allah centeredness and moral disengagement variables and age, gender, and educational status. The findings were compared with the literature data in the discussion section, and interpretations and recommendations were made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to many, human autonomy is necessary for moral action and yet incompatible with being morally accountable to God’s divine commands. By issuing commands that ground normative facts, God demands our accountability without understanding our normative reasons for moral action, which crushes human autonomy. Call this the Autonomy Objection to Theism (AOT). There is an unexplored connection between models of normative reason and AOT. I argue that any plausible AOT must be stated in terms of an adequate model of normative reason. There are two broad metaethical categories for models of normative reason: anti-realist or realist views. I defend the thesis that both anti-realism and realism about normative reasons fail to support AOT by means of a dilemma. If the AOT defender adopts anti-realism about normative reasons (subjectivism and constructivism), AOT loses its force. However, if the AOT defender adopts moral realism, they face the same problem as the theist, as normative fact constrains autonomy. Consequently, AOT is a problem for all moral realists, including non-theists, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg, among others.

Atheist moral philosopher Erik Wielenberg recently argued that Divine Command Theory is implausible as an explanation of objective morality because it fails to explain how psychopaths have moral obligations. In this paper I explain that everyone agrees the consciences of psychopaths don’t work as they should, but there’s disagreement among experts as to whether: A. The consciences of psychopaths don’t inform them of what’s right and wrong and that they should do what’s right or B. The consciences of psychopaths do inform them of these things but merely don’t generate the appropriate moral emotions. I argue that, based on the psychological research, a strong case can be made for B and thus under DCT psychopaths do have moral obligations because their consciences inform them of what’s right from wrong and that they should do what’s right. I also argue that even if A is true, God can, and does, make psychopaths aware of what’s right and wrong and that they should do what’s right through other means such as rationality, society, parents, culture, direct verbal commands, etc. Therefore, even if A is true, then psychopaths still have moral obligations under DCT because they do know what’s right from wrong and that they should do what’s right. Lastly, I turn the tables on Wielenberg and point out that his theory is even worse than DCT when it comes to providing an explanation for the moral rights and obligations of psychopaths

This paper presents a theological critique of divine command theory, a metaethical theory stating that moral wrongness is constituted by God’s command. First, I argue that this theory does not qualify as a Christian moral theory because it lacks connections to central parts of Christian theology, such as Christology. This argument does not imply that the theory is wrong nor that it is inconsistent with Christianity—only that it is not Christian as such. Second, I argue that divine command theory does not fit well with the New Testament’s vision of the moral life, in which being conformed to the image of Christ has primacy over adherence to law. This argument implies that the Christian ethicist should look elsewhere for a metaethical theory. I next argue in favour of a moral theory of imitation, in which the moral life consists of imitating God, the prime exemplar of goodness, which is made possible through an imitation of Christ.

Christians sometimes adopt a relativist theory of ethics called divine command theory (DCT). This ethical theory holds that ethical principles depend entirely on God's revealed commands and that these commands can be broken so long as God commands it. A Christian realist alternative to DCT is natural law ethics (NLE). NLE claims that ethical principles are apparent through nature and logical because God is the creator and all humans share in the divine image. This paper looks at the theological basis for both theories and recommends that the latter has more support from the Bible, Christian history, secular and inter-faith sources, and science. Natural law ethics allows Christians and non-Christians to identify common values even when the philosophical ground of those values varies. Using consultation and working collaboratively with "one another" allows us to "nd consensus on complex ethical problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common objection to divine command meta-ethics ('DCM') is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this 'essential goodness response' has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God's moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I formulate a skeptical argument against the possibility of adhering to the divine will in a non-accidental way. In particular, my focus in the article is on a widely embraced modal condition of accidentality, according to which non-accidentality has to do with a person manifesting dispositions that result in a given outcome in a modally robust way. The skeptical argument arises from two observations: first, various authors in the epistemology of religion have argued that it is often not possible to reason reliably about religious matters, and second, non-accidentally adhering to a given norm is often associated with reasoning about the requirements of the norm in question in a reliable way. In addition to pointing out the existence of the argument, I outline strategies in which religious thinkers could reasonably challenge it by denying that reliable reasoning about the requirements of divine will is necessary for adhering to it in a non-accidental manner. Hence, I argue that the possibility of non-accidental adherence to the divine will does not depend solely on whether it is possible to reliably reason about what it requires one to do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the following meta‐ethical question: do moral values have a special position among other values? According to Robert Adams, moral values do have a special position and are of overriding importance. I argue that the "overridingness" thesis is inconsistent with Adams's value theory that only God has value in himself and all other things are valuable to the extent that they resemble God. I consider some possible ways of integrating the overridingness thesis that are latent in Adams's work and argue that none succeeds. My main contribution is to propose a solution to the inconsistency in Adams's theory. I argue that a theological account of beauty gives us reason to reject the overridingness thesis. Morality overrides some other concerns, but not all other concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents’ actions but not God’s actions. I will also criticise Sterba’s criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail.

This article reviews al‐Ghazālī's conception of Divine Command Theory (DCT) in light of contemporary philosophical developments. There are two well‐known objections against DCT. These include the problem of arbitrariness (PoA), which states that God randomly chose our moral framework for no reason given His capability to choose any moral commands; and the problem of God's goodness (PoGG), which questions God's goodness if morality could be other than what it is. Modern defenders of DCT have attempted to counter these objections through various strategies. This article juxtaposes al‐Ghazālī's interpretation of DCT with modern strategies to illustrate how these two issues are untroubling concerns in al‐Ghazālī's framework. In doing so, it highlights where and how they differ in their approaches. Additionally, it critiques interpretations suggested by some contemporary thinkers who suggest that al‐Ghazālī may not be a strict proponent of DCT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synthesizing the metaethical aspects of George Lakoff's conception of Strict Father Morality (SFM) and Divine Command Theory (DCT) helps us to have a better understanding of the Trump phenomenon, US President Trump regularly deviating from accepted facts and his supporters having no problem with this practice. We misunderstand the situation if we presume that Trump's mendacity and his supporters' credulity fully account for this situation. More specifically, I argue that the authoritarian thread that runs through SFM/DCT provides Trump with the justification, in his view as well as in the eyes of his supporters, to dictate the meaning of key concepts, for example, truth, fairness, and justice. As a result, when Trump says something that seems plainly false, I argue that we better understand the situation if we regard Trump as taking himself to be defining what the term in question means. This situation has far-reaching ramifications, from destabilizing the meaning of key moral terms to all issues becoming partisan issues to the loss of expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1980, George F. Hourani and, more recently in 2010, Mariam al-Attar argued that Islam is not compatible with divine command theory. They rehearsed some standard objections (namely the objectivity of morality, divine goodness, moral knowledge) targeted against meta-ethical divine command theory taking the Qur'an into consideration, and argued that it should be discarded from an Islamic point of view. In addition, they criticized divine command theory since it involves obedience to God and, therefore, does not allow moral reasoning but rather is the source of religious fundamentalism and violence. Although these objections are powerful when applied to the early Ashʿarite version of divine command theory, they are not powerful against recent formulations of it presented by Christian philosophers. For example, a divine command theory like that of Robert Merrihew Adams is well suited to respond to these objections. Thus, divine command theory, in its recent formulations, is a genuine option for Muslims and should be given due consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Divine command theories (DCTs) come in several different forms but at their core all of these theories claim that certain moral statuses (most typically the status of being obligatory) exist in virtue of the fact that God has commanded them to exist. Several authors argue that this core version of the DCT is vulnerable to an epistemological objection. According to this objection, DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God's commands. But there is confusion as to the precise nature and significance of this objection, and critiques of its key premises. In this article, I try to clear up this confusion and address these critiques. I do so in three ways. First, I offer a simplified general version of the objection. Second, I address the leading criticisms of the premises of this objection, focusing in particular on the role of moral risk/uncertainty in our understanding of God's commands. And third, I outline four possible interpretations of the argument, each with a differing degree of significance for the proponent of the DCT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One prominent response, based on the work of Robert Adams, Edward Wierenga, and others, to the Euthyphro objection to the divine command theory is to point out that God is essentially omnibenevolent. The commands of an essentially loving being will not be arbitrary since they are grounded in his nature, nor is it possible for a loving God to issue horrendous commands such as the gratuitous torture of infants. This paper argues that this response is inadequate. The divine command theory attributes to God the power to make an action morally obligatory. Given the reasonable assumption that any omnipotent being has the same powers as God, contemplating the commands of a malevolent deity is enough to cast doubt on the claim that any being, loving or otherwise, has the power to make an action morally obligatory just by commanding it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a classic mantra amongst many theists that divinity is the origin and fountain of ethical norms and only God can weave the warp and weft of the web of moral values. There has also recently been a concerted effort to rehabilitate religion in the field of philosophy in general and the subdiscipline of ethics specifically by harking back to this type of ethical grounding. Although the trend under the rubric of theistic ethics has as much claim to recognition as any other branches of applied ethics, its proponents and practitioners appear to harbor the higher ambition of underwriting ethics in toto and thereby furnish the fundamental foundations for moral judgments. The contention seems to be that without theism ethics will be rudderless and devoid of its proper footing and focus. It is, therefore, the purpose of this paper to see how far this ambition can be sustained in view of a significant number of issues that theism faces in its liaison with ethics specifically and philosophy in general. The hope is that such a survey will allow a more measured approach to the interaction between religion and ethics that would ultimately benefit both parties in this transaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]