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The main conclusions of two classical theories of justice can be represented as solutions to a decision making problem. Rawls' second principle of justice is a result of applying the maximin criterion for decision-making behind the 'veil of ignorance'. The utilitarian principle of maximizing average utility, meanwhile, can be traced back to applying the Laplace criterion of decision making behind the veil of ignorance. This article makes explicit the different assumptions about preference measurement and assumptions about interpersonal comparisons of utility that need to be made to use either of these principles. Once these assumptions are made explicit, it becomes clear that the choice between theories of justice cannot be exclusively settled by an exchange of arguments for one kind of distributional arrangement over the other, but is also a question of what kind of measurement assumptions are more plausible in a given context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern society makes extensive use of automated algorithmic decisions, fueled by advances in artificial intelligence. However, since these systems are not perfect, questions about fairness are increasingly investigated in the literature. In particular, many authors take a Rawlsian approach to algorithmic fairness. Based on complications with this approach identified in the literature, this article discusses how Rawls’s theory in general, and especially the difference principle, should reasonably be applied to algorithmic fairness decisions. It is observed that proposals to achieve Rawlsian algorithmic fairness often aim to uphold the difference principle in the individual situations where automated decision-making occurs. However, the Rawlsian difference principle applies to society at large and does not aggregate in such a way that upholding it in constituent situations also upholds it in the aggregate. But such aggregation is a hidden premise of many proposals in the literature and its falsity explains many complications encountered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation.

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls's difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible "fair" that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suppose we assume that the parties in the original position took Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory as constituting their general knowledge of human psychology that survives through the veil of ignorance. How would this change the choice situation of the original position? In this paper, I present what I call 'prospect utilitarianism'. Prospect utilitarianism combines the utilitarian social welfare function with individual utility functions characterized by Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory. I will argue that, once prospect utilitarianism is on the table, Rawls's original arguments in support of justice as fairness as well as his arguments against utilitarianism are, at best, inconclusive. This shows that how implausible a choice for utilitarianism in the original position is heavily depends on what one assumes to be general knowledge of human psychology that the original contracting parties know. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most influential theories of justice in planning theory and practice has been, without doubt, that of John Rawls. The very idea of the just city is indebted to Rawls's view. However, the way in which Rawlsian theory of justice has been imported into planning often seems debatable. This article aims to discuss this aspect critically. The objective is not merely to discuss certain planning approaches inspired by Rawls; it is also to investigate, in more general terms, what meaning and role (any theory of) justice could and should have for planning and urban policies. In revisiting John Rawls's view, the article is structured around two points: first, a critical discussion on how Rawls's theory of justice has been generally applied to urban policies and planning; second, an exploration of an alternative way to interpret and apply certain Rawlsian insights (often undervalued) in this field. The article is not intended to defend and recommend Rawls's normative theory as a whole (i.e. in its entirety), but to evidence certain Rawlsian contributions of a general nature that are particularly important. Nor is it the aim of this article to contribute directly to the development of a specific substantive idea of the just city; instead, it is to highlight fundamental methodological and analytical caveats that are crucial in this regard. Rather than a "theory of the just city", this article develops a "meta-theory of the just city": that is, an approach specifying precautions and conditions for any coherent and convincing just city theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Certain ethical views hold that we should pay more attention, even exclusive attention, to the worst-case scenario. Prominent examples include Rawls's Difference Principle and the Precautionary Principle. These views can be anchored in formal principles of decision theory, in two different ways. On the one hand, they can rely on ambiguity-aversion: the idea that we cannot assign sharp probabilities to various scenarios, and that if we cannot assign sharp probabilities, we should decide pessimistically, as if the probabilities are unfavorable. On the other hand, they can rely on risk-avoidance: the idea that we should pay more attention to worse scenarios, even when we can assign sharp probabilities. I distinguish these two foundations. I also show how they can be modified to support versions of these views that pay more but not exclusive attention to worst-case scenarios. Finally, I argue that risk-avoidance provides a superior foundation than ambiguity-aversion for the Difference Principle and the Precautionary Principle; in particular, it correctly identifies which ethical facts should matter to those who champion these principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The original position together with the veil of ignorance have served as one of the main methodological devices to justify principles of distributive justice. Most approaches to this topic have primarily focused on the single person decision-theoretic aspect of the original position. This paper, in contrast, will directly model the basic structure and the economic agents therein to project the economic consequences and social outcomes generated either by utilitarianism or Rawls's two principles of justice. It will be shown that when the differences in people's productive abilities are sufficiently great, utilitarianism dominates Rawls's two principles of justice by providing a higher level of overall well-being to every member of society. Whenever this is the case, the parties can rely on the Principle of Dominance (which is a direct implication of instrumental rationality) to choose utilitarianism over Rawls's two principles of justice. Furthermore, when this is so, utilitarianism is free from one of its most fundamental criticisms that it 'does not take seriously the distinction between persons' (Rawls 1971 [1999]: 24). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia contains one of the earliest and best-known criticisms of John Rawls's theory of justice in general and the difference principle in particular. The discussion of Nozick's critique of Rawls in the literature has focused on his argument against "patterned" conceptions of justice, of which the difference principle as Nozick understands it constitutes merely one version among others. In this article I consider the objection Nozick raises against the difference principle specifically, namely that it unfairly favors the "worse endowed" over the "better endowed" members of society. I argue that Nozick's charge of unfairness against the difference principle is ambiguous between two distinct interpretations of the difference principle and as such divides into two distinct objections, the pre-cooperative and the cooperative fairness objection. I then argue that neither of these two interpretations of the difference principle represents the actual, Rawlsian difference principle accurately and that, more fundamentally, Nozick lacks the concept of politics as the distinctive moral category implicitly at work in Rawls's theory of justice. Not as much of Nozick's charge of unfairness against the difference principle therefore remains on reflection as may have appeared at first sight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Rawls famously argued that the Difference Principle would be chosen by any rational agent in the original position. Derek Parfit and Philippe Van Parijs have claimed, contra Rawls, that it is not the Difference Principle which is implied by Rawls' original position argument, but rather the more refined Lexical Difference Principle. In this paper, we study both principles in the context of social choice under ignorance. First, we present a general format for evaluating original position arguments in this context. We argue that in this format, the Difference Principle can be specified in three conceptually distinct ways. We show that these three specifications give the same choice recommendations, and can be grounded in an original position argument in combination with the well-known maximin rule. Analogously, we argue that one can give at least four plausible specifications of the Lexical Difference Principle, which however turn out to give different recommendations in concrete choice scenarios. We prove that only one of these four specifications can be grounded in an original position argument. Moreover, this one specification seems the least appealing from the viewpoint of distributive justice. This insight points towards a general weakness of original position arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When distributing the benefits produced by social cooperation, Rawls's difference principle targets a specific group (i.e., the least advantaged group) and requires its expectations to be maximized. One natural worry is whether the practical application of the difference principle comes with a significant cost to other groups in society. Rawls was quite aware of this potential worry and gave his earnest efforts to respond to it. His solution comes from his notions of chain connection and close-knitness. Rawls's claim was that whenever society satisfies both chain connection and close-knitness, the practical implementation of the difference principle will (a) always lead to strict Pareto improvements, and, as a result, (b) the final state will be Pareto optimal. In this article, it will be shown that under close scrutiny neither of these claims holds even when society is both chain connected and close-knit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that campus closures and shifts to online instruction in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic created an obligation to offer courses asynchronously. This is because some students could not have reasonably foreseen circumstances making continued synchronous participation impossible. Offering synchronous participation options to students who could continue to participate thusly would have been unfair to students who could not participate synchronously. I also discuss why expostfacto consideration of this decision is warranted, noting that similar actions may be necessary in the future and that other tough pedagogical cases share important similarities with this case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others.

John Rawls proposed two criteria for the delimitation of acceptable inequalities. The universal gain principle requires inequalities to be beneficial for all, and the difference principle requires them to be beneficial for the least advantaged. These principles are commonly believed to have originated in Rawls's work, but they were both clearly expressed in the writings of Nicolas de Condorcet. Contrary to Rawls, Condorcet did not imbed them in the framework of a social contract, but instead sought their foundations in natural rights. Whereas Rawls recommends us to find out what social arrangements rational reasoners would choose in a hypothetical pre-social situation, Condorcet proposes that we ask the underprivileged in our society whether or not they consider themselves to benefit from the prevailing social and economic inequalities. Thus, Condorcet's original version of the difference principle puts social inequalities to a different test than its latter-day, hypothetical version. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of justice that Rawls discussed in his famous book "A Theory of Justice" has had a profound influence on contemporary political and moral philosophy, as well as, to some extent, philosophy of education. Many philosophers of education have applied or criticized Rawls's concepts – above all the concepts of autonomy, the person, fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle – which he developed as an essential part of his theory of justice. In this paper I will discuss very briefly only one of the problems that philosophers of education face when applying his concepts of the autonomous person and the difference principle. The essence of this problem is expressed in the question of whether or not to respect the limits of the applicability of these concepts set by Rawls himself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper critically addresses A Theory of Justice. It is first illustrated that Theory implies a paradigm shift at the time of its publication. This is followed by a critical analysis of central aspects of Theory, especially the reflexive equilibrium and the difference principle. The paper then reconstructs Rawlsian work. First by showing the continuities and discontinuities between Theory and Political Liberalism and by critically examining "overlapping consensus" and "public reason". Subsequently, by examining A Law of Peoples and its idea of tolerance and the rejection of global distributive justice. Finally, the paper addresses Rawls's role as a public intellectual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rawlsian accounts of tort law have argued for one of two extreme positions. Sometimes it is affirmed, as does Arthur Ripstein, that tort law must remain indifferent to the distributive goals that animate most part of Rawls’s conception of justice (e.g. the difference principle). For others, like Kevin Kordana and David Tabachnick, tort law is only defensible from a Rawlsianism perspective to the extent the former’s distributive effects are desirable. Distancing itself from both these extreme views, the paper explains why parties in Rawls’s original position cannot disregard issues of convergence between law and interpersonal morality. On one hand, convergence prevents tort law from being a mere tool to the pursuit of distributive goals. On the other hand, assuring convergence between tort law and interpersonal morality still allows for some distributivism in the realm of torts.

Generally, social justice has two sides which are intercorrelated and inter-dependend: a) constitutive social justice (for example, the so called commutative social justice); b) regulative social justice (for example, the so called distributive social justice). The paper approaches the regulative social justice, more exactly, an automatic mechanism to get it. To this end, an automatic stabilizer to provide distributive social justice, according to the Rawlsian principle of difference. Such an automatic stabilizer is grounded on the wealth, more precise, on the share of the wealth which is not invested in order to benefit to the more disadvantaged class of the society. Paper does not test empirically the proposal, such a propose remaining for next intervention in this publication.

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If Rawls's A Theory of Justice has achieved fame among economists, this is due to his Difference Principle, which says that inequalities of resources should be to the benefit of the less fortunate, or more operationally, that allocations of resources should be ranked by the maximin criterion. We extend the Rawlsian maximin in two ways: first, by resorting to the more general min-of-means formula of decision theory, second, by addressing the case where the resources accruing to each individual are uncertain to society. For the latter purpose, we resort to the ex ante versus ex post distinction of welfare economics. The paper axiomatically characterizes the ex ante and ex post forms of the Rawlsian maximin and compares them in terms of egalitarian criteria. It finally recommends and axiomatizes a compromise egalitarian theory that mixes the two forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace's principle of insufficient reason and Wald's maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi's and Rawls's theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace's principle of insufficient reason and Wald's maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls's principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Certain sorts of disputes about principles of distributive justice that have occupied a great deal of attention in recent political philosophy turn out to be fundamentally unresolvable, when they are conducted in ignorance of whether an important subclass of basic social goods exists within any particular society. I employ the folktale 'Stone Soup' to illustrate how such distributional goods might come into existence. Using the debate about John Rawls's Difference Principle as an example, I argue that a proper appreciation for the axiological status of these goods shows that disputes about principles (at least as these have been conducted within the Rawlsian tradition) should be relegated to a subsidiary status relative to other, more fundamental concerns about the ethics of economic distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Academic Inquiries / Akademik Incelemeler Dergisi is the property of Akademik Incelemeler Dergisi (Journal of Academic Inquiries) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Many governments and charities adopt Rawlsian difference principle by maximizing the welfare of the least advantaged and giving priority to equality over efficiency. There are two views about which domain the principle should be applied to. The first applies it to the final distribution of income. Previous empirical studies have focused on this but found little evidence supporting it. The other view linked the principle with Rawlsian primary goods: Since the cost of losing primary social goods is huge, people will maximize the benefit of the least advantaged behind the veil of ignorance, such that everyone has access to necessary means. According to the latter reading of Rawls, we experimentally imposed a great cost for losing primary goods, and observed a salient majority of subjects obeying this principle, unlike previous studies finding a minority. Moreover, even if we lowered the cost for losing primary goods, more than one-third of the subjects still adopted this principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the temporal unit of egalitarian concern. In the intertemporal context, the differences between egalitarian views can be appreciated not only in inequality analysis but also as regards the ideal egalitarian distribution to be established. In this paper, three intergenerational egalitarian principles (Complete Lives Egalitarianism, Corresponding Segments Egalitarianism and Simultaneous Segments Egalitarianism) are analysed and CSE is argued to be the appropriate egalitarian benchmark. The relations between the three principles and other moral ideals, namely maximin and utilitarianism, are also analysed. It is proved that CLE and CSE are compatible with a concern for the worst off and, partially, with a utilitarian concern, while the adoption of SSE implies a worse trade-off between egalitarianism and the other moral ideals.