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ABSTRACT This interdisciplinary research explores the complex interplay between democratic erosion and migration crises, recognising their profound implications for social cohesion. With universities serving as bastions of knowledge and inclusion, their role in addressing these challenges is paramount. By implementing targeted programs and initiatives, universities actively contribute to mitigating the adverse effects of these crises and promoting social cohesion within their campuses and surrounding communities. The research objectives encompass a comprehensive examination of existing strategies and programs implemented by universities worldwide, focusing on identifying successful approaches and practices. Additionally, the study seeks to uncover the underlying challenges and obstacles faced by universities in effectively addressing democratic and migration crises, ranging from institutional constraints to sociopolitical factors. Universities hold significant sway in shaping policy discourse and influencing decision‐making processes at local, national, and international levels. Through rigorous research methodologies, including mixed‐methods approaches involving qualitative case studies and large‐scale surveys, this study aims to provide nuanced insights into the root causes and consequences of democratic erosion and migration crises. Ultimately, this research contributes to advancing scholarly understanding in the fields of democratic governance, human mobility, and social cohesion. By offering actionable insights and innovative solutions, it strives to empower policymakers, practitioners, and affected communities to effectively navigate and address these complex challenges, fostering resilience and harmony in societies worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introductory piece to a special issue of the Forum, we explore the inadequacies of the field of political communication in addressing the rising threats posed by illiberalism and the far right. We argue that the discipline's frameworks, developed within the context of Western liberal democracies, are ill-equipped to tackle the complexities and self-reflexive strategies of contemporary far-right movements and actor types. These formations exploit liberal norms and practices to ultimately undermine and dismantle democratic values. We call for more "democratic clarity," urging political communication scholars to adopt a clear stance in defense of democratic principles and to develop more robust conceptual tools to accurately classify and understand far-right actors. We introduce the other discussion pieces featured in this special section and ultimately point to actionable items meant to move the field forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies addressing the normative questions of whether social media use positively or negatively affects citizens' levels of democratic engagement and satisfaction with democracy have produced mixed findings. This study tests the proposition that political polarization plays an important contingent role in explaining these relationships. Combining Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) and World Values Survey (WVS) data, this study examines how issue polarization and affective polarization at the country level shape the relationships between social media use for political information and democratic outcomes in 27 developed democracies. The findings show divergent consequences of social media use contingent on affective polarization. In the countries with high affective polarization, social media use increased democratic engagement (i.e. participation and voting) and decreased satisfaction with democracy (i.e. political satisfaction and perceived quality of democracy), which may have implications for democratic erosion and backsliding. In the countries with low affective polarization, social media use increased the perceived quality of democracy but had no effect on political satisfaction. Issue polarization had a limited contingent influence. The findings contribute to the literature by explicating the dynamics of country-level affective polarization that can shape and contextualize the relationship between social media use and democratic engagement in democracies across the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 16 January 2024, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) published its Guidelines on Democratic Law-making for Better Laws. The creation of the Guidelines was driven by the acknowledgment that strengthening democratic institutions and processes is essential in the era of democratic and constitutional erosion and decay and the recognition that contemporary law-making displays several weaknesses. Based on its decades of experience in assessing legislation and legislative processes in the OSCE participating states, ODIHR intended to provide an overview of the guiding principles of the law-making process that ensure that both the process and the resulting laws comply with the requirements of democracy, the rule of law and human rights commitments. The Guidelines offer a new and rich source of inspiration for scholars devoted to strengthening democracy. This paper identifies new(er) avenues for research in democratic erosion and revival, institutional protection of the democratic legislative process, constitutional change, and the impact of constitutional rights. Further, based on some non-OSCE participating states related examples, it shows how the potential inspirational reach of the Guidelines and the research paths it potentially encourage might go beyond the geographic scope of the OSCE participating states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I apply Curato and Fossati's (2020) concept of "authoritarian innovation" to analyze historic changes in labor governance in the United States that have undermined democratic participation in the workplace and in the polity. Drawing from comparative political economy and welfare state theories, I argue that since the 1930s the U.S. has had not one unified, national labor regime but two competing, subnational regimes: the New Deal and its legacy in the industrialized North and West Coast, and a counter-regime based initially in the former Confederate Southern states. The more anti-union, anti-welfare, and anti-democratic Southern regime survived the Civil Rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, gained ascendance nationally with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, and expanded its boundaries in the 2010s into the deindustrialized Midwest. The "dual regime" analysis highlights critical transitions and divergent paths in the reshaping of American democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we demonstrate how social movements try to adjust to closing political opportunities during democratic erosion with a case study of the 2023 electoral cycle in Turkey. Using the framework of Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow’s analysis of the reciprocal relationship between social movements and elections, we conclude that many previously influential movements found themselves offside as the political field and the rules of the game changed. The peculiarities of this case provide insights to social movement scholars to study changing structural factors in countries that experience democratic backsliding to various degrees. While anti-incumbent movements and parties react to democratic erosion/try to prevent it by becoming more active, the right-wing movements might strengthen these regimes through alliances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the violent January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, federal authorities have sought to hold participants and organizers accountable for their assault on American democracy. Troublingly, however, a substantial fraction of the public opposes the prosecution of participants in the assault on the Capitol and rejects charging former president Trump with crimes relating to the planning and execution of the attack. Why does a substantial fraction of the American public oppose accountability for perpetrators of the January 6 attack? In this article, we argue that racial attitudes play a central role in determining individuals' attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack. Elaborating on the theory of "racial spillover," we argue that former president Trump's frequent use of racial rhetoric—which established a racialized identity and cemented a close relationship between negative racial attitudes and support for his presidency among members of the mass public—created conditions in which these attitudes were likely to "spill over" into the ostensibly non-racialized domain of attitudes toward holding perpetrators, planners, and inciters accountable for the attack. Because attitudes toward accountability for the Capitol attack are inextricable from Trump's racialized persona, we hypothesize that negative racial attitudes should be associated with increased opposition to accountability for those responsible for the attack. Using data from four original, nationally representative surveys fielded between 2021 and 2023, we find strong evidence for our racial spillover hypothesis and show that individuals with more negative racial attitudes are more opposed to accountability for those responsible for the Capitol attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politik is the property of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

AbstractThis paper explores the role of opposition parties within the context of global democratic erosion, with a focus on Turkey. It investigates the multifaceted role of opposition actors in the process of autocratisation, challenging conventional portrayals of them as mere victims or resilient forces. Drawing on a comprehensive analysis of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), spanning the critical period of 2002–2022 under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), this research uncovers how opposition strategies have evolved in response to changing political dynamics. The paper introduces two new concepts, rigid opposition and flexible opposition, to elucidate the adaptive nature of opposition strategies in the face of autocratisation. It underscores the transition of the CHP from a rigid stance, characterised by identity-based polarisation, to a more flexible approach, involving strategic alliances and inclusive discourse. This transformation is not a binary success–failure paradigm but rather a complex adaptation with inherent risks. While flexibility is crucial to limit autocratisation, its potential pitfalls carry the risks of contributing to autocratisation and the dilution of party identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiracy seems to be everywhere, and not only in the United States, where the "rigged election" conspiracy led a US president to reverse the results of a national election. We consider what is distinctive about contemporary conspiracism and argue that the prevalence of fact-free conspiratorial narratives marks a shift from what Hofstadter called the "pedantic" style of conspiracy theory. We show how conspiracism today threatens democratic institutions and sketch how the articles in this volume (on conspiracism) advance our understanding of conspiracy and democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, many once stable democracies have experienced various degrees of disruptive communication, along with the erosion of core institutions such as the press, elections, courts, and the rights of citizens. We propose a framework to compare the logics of illiberal and liberal democratic communication and contrast traditionally dominant communication norms of tolerance, civility, responsiveness, and reasoned resolution of differences in liberal democracies with transgressions of those norms by illiberal rightwing movements, parties, leaders, and voters. We suggest that unlike 'counter publics' that seek inclusion in liberal democratic systems, engagement with illiberal communication creates "transgressive publics" that attempt to exclude others in the process of promoting ethnic and religious nationalism. This framework offers a corrective to recent scholarship on democratic public spheres that focuses mainly on why the ideals of more inclusive and egalitarian communication are ever more remote. We shift the focus to the systematic disruptions of mainstream public communication and the authority of public institutions. Our analysis develops a broader theoretical context in which interactions between illiberal leaders and publics occur, with the aim of understanding national variations in how communication systems contribute to democratic erosion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disability advocacy organisations face challenges in eroding democracies. Populist governments often employ strategies to curb the operation of organisations critical towards their policies. This study explored how the disability movement can advocate for human rights in an eroding democracy. Data was collected in Hungary, a ‘poster child’ of illiberalism, covering the last 25 years. Results show that the space for disability rights advocacy has been shrinking for the Hungarian disability movement. Opportunities to influence and monitor public policy-making have been diminishing. Disability advocacy organisations have been less included in consultations and decisions about policies affecting disabled people. Due to fear of repercussions, disability movement actors often employ self-censorship when talking publicly. The meaning of human rights and civil society have changed in the public discourse. Legal obligations to consult with the disability movement, existing human rights laws, and statutory human rights bodies seem less and less effective amid eroding democratic structures. The disability movement has become fractured.

This article claims that the state and, more precisely, whether the state has a rational-legal or a patrimonial public administration, affects (1) the extent to which democratic standards are met and (2) the costs of abandoning office and the support leaders unwilling to accept electoral defeat can expect to have within the state and their party. Further, this argument is elaborated so as to account for the typical political regime in contemporary Latin America, durable poor-quality democracies. Latin America's semi-patrimonial states are held to determine this outcome through two mechanisms: selective collusion and political opportunism. The plausibility of the theory about mechanisms is gauged. Additionally, implications for the field of comparative democracy studies are spelled out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the implications of the proposals of the Minister of Justice and the Chair of the Knesset’s Constitution Committee to overhaul the judiciary of Israel. These proposals, if legislated, will undermine basic principles of democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. In the absence of a complete formal constitution and its relatively weak system of checks and balances, Israel has developed several institutions that protect the rule of law and human rights, including a Supreme Court with the power of judicial review of legislation; a balanced and professional system for selecting judges; a strong legal civil service, with a relatively independent attorney general. The so-called legal reforms deal specifically with these institutions, and seek to weaken or annul them. As such, this judicial overhaul is tantamount to a revolutionary attempt to change the regime and would undermine the democratic character of Israel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposal introduced in January 2023 for a ‘judicial overhaul’ in Israel has been characterized as a seismic event. Labeled a ‘reform’ by supporters and a ‘coup’ by skeptics, the proposal is better understood as part of a long process rather than a sudden event. This process involves gradual but persistent executive aggrandizement advanced by weakening multiple institutions of horizontal accountability and the media, alongside the imposition of restrictions on oppositional organizational capacity. Accordingly, the process should be defined in terms of autocratization. The spokes analogy is invoked to highlight the interconnectedness between the various realms that collectively underpin the regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the intricate dynamics of data monopolies, referred to as "data-opolies", and their implications for democratic erosion. Data-opolies, typically embodied by large technology corporations, accumulate extensive datasets, affording them significant influence. The sustainability of such data practices is critically examined within the context of decentralized Web3 technologies amidst Artificial Intelligence (AI) disruption. Additionally, the article explores emancipatory datafication strategies to counterbalance the dominance of data-opolies. It presents an in-depth analysis of two emergent phenomena within the decentralized Web3 emerging landscape: People-Centered Smart Cities and Datafied Network States. The article investigates a paradigm shift in data governance and advocates for joint efforts to establish equitable data ecosystems, with an emphasis on prioritizing data sovereignty and achieving digital self-governance. It elucidates the remarkable roles of (i) blockchain, (ii) decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), and (iii) data cooperatives in empowering citizens to have control over their personal data. In conclusion, the article introduces a forward-looking examination of Web3 decentralized technologies, outlining a timely path toward a more transparent, inclusive, and emancipatory data-driven democracy. This approach challenges the prevailing dominance of data-opolies and offers a framework for regenerating datafied democracies through decentralized and emerging Web3 technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which peculiar uncertainties does democratic erosion (DE) pose to opposition actors? How have these uncertainties influenced the behavior of opposition actors during Turkey's autocratization since the early 2000s? What can we learn from this case regarding the links between DE and opposition behavior? The latter should be treated as an integral part of explaining DE—the gradual decline in the quality of multiple aspects of democracy under popularly elected governments. We argue that a contextual uncertainty, "regime uncertainty" (RU) challenged Turkish opposition actors, compounding the other and related uncertainties they faced such as institutional and strategic uncertainties and affecting their resilience against DE. RU concerns the ambivalence that DE's inherent qualities generate about what the regime is, or is becoming. The resulting intra-opposition divisions and indecisions raise the question of whether the primary context, frame and end of opposition politics should be issue- and party-based competitive politics or defending democracy against an imminent threat. Hence, RU generates recurring rifts over "normal" versus "extraordinary" politics. We analyze the Turkish experience and intra-opposition politics in four sub-periods (nascent DE, consolidation of erosive power, advanced DE, breakdown and post-breakdown opposition experimentation). Turkish opposition actors' RU perceptions and resulting behaviors evolved on highly non-linear paths. We offer novel analytical/theoretical tools and argue that the agency and capacity of oppositions to overcome RU in a country, alongside their ability to surmount other challenges, should be considered an integral part of democratic resilience against erosion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does the ability of political leaders to control the bureaucracy vary? With strong meritocratic recruitment and tenure protections, Brazil appears an ideal case for successful bureaucratic resistance against political control. However, our analysis reveals how Bolsonaro overcame initial resistance by recalibrating strategies, ultimately dominating many key sectors of the bureaucracy. Drawing on over 100 interviews with public officials, we find that strategies of political control and bureaucratic resistance unfold in a dynamic, yet often predictable, pattern based on leaders' previous experiences and their ability to learn, adjust, and tighten their grip on the instruments of the state. The Bolsonaro administration transformed the regulatory framework and targeted individual state employees, reducing arenas of contestation and inducing public sector workers to remain silent, implementing the president's policy preferences. We examine these control strategies in environmental agencies, their replication, and potential long-term consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 2023, Guatemala faced a political crisis marked by three critical moments that threatened democratic stability. The process of democratic weakening intensified during the general elections with the exclusion of prominent opposition candidates under fabricated accusations. Additionally, the Public Ministry attempted to suspend the legal status of the Semilla party before the second round, and accusations of fraud were leveled against Semilla by nine parties affiliated with the ruling coalition. These actions jeopardized democracy, triggering widespread international condemnation and intervention by the Organization of American States. Despite Arévalo's overwhelming victory in the second round, new attempts by the Public Ministry to reverse the election results in the post-election stage have raised doubts about a peaceful transfer of power. However, these attacks on electoral integrity by actors in the government served as catalysts for citizen's collective action in defense of the electoral results. In tandem with careful international support for the pro-democratic coalition, these citizen-led initiatives successfully thwarted further democratic backsliding. This essay aims to outline the primary attacks on electoral integrity observed during the general elections, identify institutional factors contributing to electoral uncertainty, and reflect on the future of democracy in Guatemala. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De-democratization may take the form of executive-led attacks as well as incremental decrepitude, gradual emptying of underlying constitutional values, and state inertia. Contrary to general wisdom, both exogenous erosion and endogenous decay are heavily affected by informality. As courts are often the first institutions affected by de-democratization, this Article analyzes informality in erosion and decay of judicial institutions. It argues that such institutions interact with democracy in two core directions. The first one is endogenous and describes the decay of democratic judiciaries as a result of a long-term incongruence between formal and informal judicial institutions. The second direction captures the gradual erosion of informal institutions that have positive effects on judicial democratic resilience. These two processes, decay and erosion of informal judicial institutions, should not be overlooked. While they are less visible, slower, and often unintentional, they are as dangerous as frontal executive-led attacks on courts, because they significantly increase the window of opportunity for politicians who wish to downgrade the substance of democracy or even implement a regime change.

The Philippines has historically been known to have one of the most robust and politically active civil societies in the world. With a deep affinity with democracy, civil society became a reliable bulwark against abuses of power and endemic corruption. However, it came under attack under the populist, illiberal Duterte administration (2016–2022) through intimidation, persecution, massive disinformation, and even outright violence. This article examines why Philippine civil society – despite its attempted pushback against democratic erosion – was generally neutralized by Duterte. Apart from its weakened state given polarizing elite conflicts in the 2000s, Duterte engaged in executive assaults against civil society through the four strategies of exploiting divisions within civil society; securitizing public; regulating civic space to weed out opposition voices; and controlling the media environment. This article concludes by examining the implications of a weakened civil society and prospects for its reinvigoration under a restored Marcos dynasty, which won the 2022 Philippine presidential elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

De-democratization may take the form of executive-led attacks as well as incremental decrepitude, gradual emptying of underlying constitutional values, and state inertia. Contrary to general wisdom, both exogenous erosion and endogenous decay are heavily affected by informality. As courts are often the first institutions affected by de-democratization, this Article analyzes informality in erosion and decay of judicial institutions. It argues that such institutions interact with democracy in two core directions. The first one is endogenous and describes the decay of democratic judiciaries as a result of a long-term incongruence between formal and informal judicial institutions. The second direction captures the gradual erosion of informal institutions that have positive effects on judicial democratic resilience. These two processes, decay and erosion of informal judicial institutions, should not be overlooked. While they are less visible, slower, and often unintentional, they are as dangerous as frontal executive-led attacks on courts, because they significantly increase the window of opportunity for politicians who wish to downgrade the substance of democracy or even implement a regime change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last year Israel has been going through its most severe constitutional crisis in its history. The newly elected right-wing government has initiated a judicial overhaul that would limit the authority of the judiciary and grant the executive almost absolute powers. In response, the country has witnessed unprecedented civil protestations and opposition from nearly all segments of civil society, academia and economic sectors. In this article we argue that the judicial overhaul must be analysed as a populist constitutional project. We also explain that compared with other systems, Israeli democracy is especially vulnerable to populism, because of its unique institutional design factors coupled with social factors. Only with understanding these factors can one grasp the risks that the judicial overhaul poses to Israeli democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have associated gun culture with liberal individualism, but this is inconsistent with participants' emphasis on political duty and obligation, the dominance of White men in this space, and the centrality of negative racial and gender priors. I argue that militarism – the valorization of firearms as a sign of good citizenship – is a constitutive part of one dimension of American identity which I call "ascriptive martial republicanism," which combines the ideal of armed service with White male supremacy. I trace the origins of this conception of Americanism to the American Revolution and the military institutions that developed in the early republic. As a product of the 19th century military establishment, the National Rifle Association (NRA) brought this ideology into the 21st century, long after government abandoned it under pressure from the progressive movements of the 1960s. Through its political and legal advocacy, the group succeeded in making it once again part of the country's institutional core via Supreme Court decisions. This new institutional regime represents a threat not only to the multicultural ethos but to democratic stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper identifies the different roles played by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court under the 1988 Constitution, adopted after 21 years under authoritarian rule. The aim is to shift the focus of the discussion regarding the counter-majoritarian difficulty, which insists on the illegitimacy of judicial review, to the difficulty of being counter-majoritarian, examining the institutional obstacles and limitations attendant upon judicial independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The empirical section presents data about executive illiberalism and the balance of power in the national legislature for thirteen Latin American presidents. We test our argument in four negative cases (episodes) in Argentina since 1983. We use primary sources including 125 original interviews to explain how two presidents who attempted to centralize power fell short of eroding democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of literature on the role of courts in democratic backsliding claims that court-packing weakens liberal democracy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The goals of the actors who produce court-packing help to explain why the co-optation of the judiciary can have a substantial negative effect on liberal democracy in some (although not all) cases. In this respect, we distinguish two types of court-packing. First, policy-driven court-packing occurs when politicians manipulate the composition of courts in order to assure a quick implementation of policies. Although this tends to negatively affect judicial independence, it is not per se a first step towards regime change. Second, regime-driven court-packing happens when politicians alter the composition of the courts with the goal of eroding democracy. In this case, court-packing's negative effect on judicial independence has a systemic negative effect on different dimensions of liberal democracy. Relying on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, we conceptualize these two types of court-packing by comparing two cases: Carlos Menem (1989–99) in Argentina, seeking judicial support to carry out pro-market economic reforms, and Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present) in Venezuela, seeking to control the judiciary in the context of democratic backsliding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notable development in 21st-century American politics is the rise of affective polarization: partisans increasingly dislike and distrust those affiliated with the other political party. We offer a wide-ranging review of the nature of party identification; the factors that contribute to affective polarization; and the consequences of this kind of polarization on electoral politics, democratic transgressions, and democratic functioning. We conclude that there is scant evidence of a direct link between affective polarization and democratic backsliding in the U.S., and we argue that understanding the erosion of democratic norms and institutions means that we should consider a wider range of potential causal factors among elites and the general citizenry. Affective polarization has likely made democratic functioning more difficult, though, so interventions to address it are worthwhile: these should focus on core causes rather than on behavioral symptoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica (0103-3506) is the property of Revista Juridica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years, weaker and consolidated democracies alike were in many instances caught by a wave of autocratisation. However, given the protractedness in the time of the phenomenon of democratic erosion, it is not unlikely that the process overlaps with multiple electoral cycles. This gives to those parties committed to liberal democracy a window to organise themselves and challenge the incumbent at the ballots. The present study investigates whether the political division between incumbent parties and organised pro-democratic opposition in Poland, Hungary, Bolivia and Turkey coincides with a political cleavage that fits Baiern and Maier’s three-dimensional conceptualisation of the term. Through a quantitative approach, it emerges that indeed authoritarian and liberal values (Normative dimension) substantially account for the divergence in political support (Organisational dimension) by the different educated groups (Social dimension) in all the countries under observation. These findings not only support the existence of an educational cleavage outside of Western and Northern Europe, but also highlights its centrality in the ongoing fight for democracy. Furthermore, Hungary appears as a peculiar case, since democratic commitment accounts more than the authoritarian-liberal scale in explaining the support (or lack of it) for the incumbent party by the Hungarian educational groups.

The subject "defensive democracy" came back in Brazil during the government of former President Jair Bolsonaro, since the other two Branches identified the need to fight the democratic erosion provoked by him. With the recent change of government, the Executive Branch, reportedly inspired by the alluded theory, created an office for the defense of democracy, under the supervision of the Attorney General, whose main goal is to protect the integrity of the public action and the preservation of the three Branches and their members, ensuring the exercise of their constitutional functions. The Brazilian Office for Democracy Defense follows the example set by Germany in the second post-war period, when this European country created, for the same reasons, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). Based on this background, the main goal of this paper is to present the two government initiatives mentioned above, in addition to tracing the possible parallels between Germany and Brazil in the creation of a culture of "defensive democracy" and, what is more relevant, in the effective defense of democracy. The research method used was the "comparative" and the research technique was the "bibliographic review". The results obtained point to the fact that the creation of agencies for the defense of democracy, as occurred in Germany and Brazil, contributes to the strengthening of democratic values, not only institutionally, but also within society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The events of January 6th were a clear example of threats to American democracy. De-democratization is a process that preceded Trump's election and that can still be seen in the United States and around the world. Social theorist Charles Tilly wrote about how becoming a democracy is not a unidirectional, one-time event or goal, but a non-linear process. This paper analyzes developments in the United States that signal rises and falls in the level of democracy over the last several decades. It discusses Donald Trump's rise to power, the insurrection on January 6th, 2021, and the state of inclusion of ethnoracial minorities in the United States. It uses Tilly's proposed processes of democratization and de-democratization. This more nuanced understanding of democracy and state–society relations helps avoid celebratory stances about the promise of electoral politics as well as pessimistic assessments about the imminent arrival of fascism and authoritarianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the intricate dynamics of data monopolies, referred to as “data-opolies”, and their implications for democratic erosion. Data-opolies, typically embodied by large technology corporations, accumulate extensive datasets, affording them significant influence. The sustainability of such data practices is critically examined within the context of decentralized Web3 technologies amidst Artificial Intelligence (AI) disruption. Additionally, the article explores emancipatory datafication strategies to counterbalance the dominance of data-opolies. It presents an in-depth analysis of two emergent phenomena within the decentralized Web3 emerging landscape: People-Centered Smart Cities and Datafied Network States. The article investigates a paradigm shift in data governance and advocates for joint efforts to establish equitable data ecosystems, with an emphasis on prioritizing data sovereignty and achieving digital self-governance. It elucidates the remarkable roles of (i) blockchain, (ii) decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), and (iii) data cooperatives in empowering citizens to have control over their personal data. In conclusion, the article introduces a forward-looking examination of Web3 decentralized technologies, outlining a timely path toward a more transparent, inclusive, and emancipatory data-driven democracy. This approach challenges the prevailing dominance of data-opolies and offers a framework for regenerating datafied democracies through decentralized and emerging Web3 technologies.

How are courts used to erode democracy? Using the literature on democratic backsliding and judicial politics as a theoretical framework, in this work, I show the path of how courts are captured by incumbents and then used to subvert democracy. Comparing some cases from the Latin American region, I contend that the judicial erosion of democracy unfolds in three interactive steps: incumbents (a) lead public attacks on the judiciary; (b) push judicial purges; and/or (c) pack the courts, then they use the new weakened high court to undermine democratic institutions legally and harass political opponents. Related Articles: Basabe‐Serrano, Santiago. 2012. "Presidential Power and the Judicialization of Politics as Determinants of Institutional Change in the Judiciary: The Supreme Court of Ecuador (1979‐2009)." Politics & Policy 40(2): 339–61. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2012.00348.x. Moreno, Erika, and Richard C. Witmer. 2015. "Where Capacity and Incentives Meet: Presidential Decree Authority and Property Rights in Latin America." Politics & Policy 43(3): 315–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12118. Nohlen, Dieter. 2009. "Constitutional Jurisdiction and the Consolidation of Democracy." Politics & Policy 37(1): 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00159.x. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic erosion, also referred in the academic literature as democratic backsliding, occurs when the democratic institutions, instruments, and mechanisms that a state possesses start to lose their functionality, thus resulting in weaker democracies, making them vulnerable to become an authoritarian or illiberal regime. Considering the rise of populist and nationalist tendencies displayed throughout Europe in recent years, this article focuses on Poland, addressing three principal aspects: What changes can be identified and traced in Poland that led to democratic erosion? Were there any precursors or facilitators to this erosion? How does the opposition respond to the process of democratic erosion? In order to answer these questions, we turned to the existing literature, as it offers the necessary complex understanding of the current dynamic. We analysed different democratic indexes that allowed us to compare multiple indicators and we followed the chain of events that contributed to creating the context for illiberal actors to enter the political scene. Some of the problems this article addresses are related to the effect Poland's democratic backsliding has in matters such as the electoral process, government functionality, civil society, individual rights, school system, justice and media, and the overall welfare of the population. Our research brings forward the role that the socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the population have in the tailoring of Poland's political path centred around the changes between 2015 and 2021. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What if citizens feel that election outcomes are the result of electoral manipulation and fraud rather than the outcome of a genuinely democratic process? Do they still obey the laws and regulations of newly elected governments, or do they refuse to give governments their allegiance? Analyzing individual-level survey data from Germany, this study sheds light on the nexus between electoral integrity perceptions and compliance. It shows that citizens who perceive the integrity of elections as compromised are more likely to view election-related non-compliance justified. Moreover, citizens’ views concerning the fairness of elections and the justifiability of election-related non-compliance matter for their law-abiding behavior in other domains: Those who consider the electoral process fraudulent and election-related non-compliance justifiable adhere less often to governmental regulations pertaining to the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. These findings entail important implications for effective democratic governance and questions of electoral backsliding and democratic erosion more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper aims to investigate the global democratic decline and examines specific indicators and qualitative data released by major research bodies around the world (Center for the Future of Democracy, Freedom House, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Idea International). It focuses on the status of democracy, quality of democracy and citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. An overall conclusion is that the world experiences the worst democratic decline from the past two decades. Furthermore, a closer analysis is being completed for the United States of America situation with the purpose of understanding the democratic erosion from 2016-2020. The current research concludes with a series of recommendations regarding the social polarization, the spread of disinformation and the ultraconservative movements, and improvements needed for the overall health of democracy.

Charismatic leaders, who loathe sharing power, often anoint sycophantic successors who fail to become powerful leaders in their own right. Curiously, however, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018), the handpicked successor of Alvaro Uribe (2002–2010), became a remarkably effective leader who served two terms and oversaw Colombia's landmark 2016 peace agreement. We investigate this unlikely outcome and develop a novel theory to reveal a pathway through which some handpicked successors of charismatic leaders can establish independent authority. We argue that success is more likely when the successor breaks away from the predecessor. However, doing so requires the successor to engage in a sequential and highly strategic process we label tightrope walking, in which the new leader gains the predecessor's endorsement to win office, expands his/her coalition by incorporating new allies from outside the predecessor's base, and reforms the predecessor's unsustainable policies and narrative. To substantiate our theory, we trace how Santos moved through each stage of the tightrope-walking process and ultimately broke from Uribe to achieve independent authority. The results suggest a rare but important mechanism through which charismatic movements can be challenged from the inside out, curtailing or reversing democratic erosion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]