Search

Sir Angus Houston reviews the ongoing vital importance and current health of the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) focusing on the defence and security partnership that has developed between Australia and the United States since its inception. He then examines promising progress being made under both Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 of the 2021 Australia, United Kingdom, United States Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS). He concludes by considering the likely foreign policy of Donald Trump, president-elect of the United States, who will assume office on 20 January 2025. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares Hungary's defence modernisation policy with that of the other Visegrad countries and finds that Poland has invested the most in developing its military capabilities and, together with the Czech Republic, has benefited considerably from rising international demand stimulated by the war. Both combined the purchase of modern equipment with the award of government contracts to local suppliers. Slovakia followed the same pattern, but without significant export capacity. Hungary, on the other hand, was unable to prevent the collapse of its former defence industry. As a result, its current development programme uniquely integrates the goals of army modernisation with the plan for rebuilding the sector, which relies heavily on the participation of large European companies, whose role is less important in the other countries. Two other distinctive features of the Hungarian modernisation policy are its embeddedness in broader economic and regional policies, and the creation of six distinct territorial clusters where the reorganisation of the sector is taking place.

Copyright of Revista UNISCI is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exposed divisions in European strategic culture and threat perception. The search for a lowest-common-denominator response to the threat has hampered the European reply to the Russian aggression, often forcing the EU to move at the speed of its slowest member, whether in supplying ammunition and equipment to Ukraine or setting up the defence industry needed to accelerate such a supply in the future. Notwithstanding the importance of keeping a broad coalition together, this article argues that it is now time to create a vanguard of like-minded European nations, led by France, Poland and, though not an EU member, the UK, but open to other states, which can force the creation of a new strategic culture able to meet the Russian threat. This 'Beowulf Group', named after the Danish hero from the Anglo-Saxon epic who stood up to the marauding monster Grendel, could establish a Strategic College for Europe, a joint Elite European Reserve Legion and a strategic communications centre, to move European policy in a more active direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ruslands invasion af Ukraine var en skelsættende begivenhed for dansk sikkerhedspolitik. Men hvad har det medført? På overfladen har det resulteret i en række nybrud. En aftale om forsvarssamarbejde er blevet indgået med USA, forsvarsbudgettet er kommet i samklang med NATO’s målsætninger, Danmark yder massiv militær støtte til Ukraine, og forsvarsforbeholdet i EU er blevet afskaffet. Forsvarspolitisk forstærkede invasionen en igangværende omstilling af Forsvaret fra udsendelsesparate enheder til afskrækkelse i nærområdet. Det var dog en udvikling, der længe havde været undervejs, og som ikke mindst var drevet af et betydeligt pres for øgede forsvarsudgifter fra USA og NATO og dalende efterspørgsel efter bidrag til internationale stabiliseringsindsatser. Invasionen cementerede, at tiden, hvor et højt ”output” kunne kompensere for et lavt ”input”, reelt var ovre, om end bevægelsen havde været tydelig længe. Nyt var imidlertid, at Tyskland i 2022 annoncerede massive forøgelser af forsvarsbudgetterne, hvilket blev katalysator for tilsvarende oprustning i Danmark. Hovedsøjlen i dansk sikkerhedspolitik var fortsat forholdet til USA og NATO, men minimumsbarren for et godt forhold var nu hævet. Nyt var var det også, at Danmark positionerede sig som en af de absolut største bidragydere til Ukraine. Endelig var ophævelsen af forsvarsforbeholdet i EU et nybrud, hvilket var muliggjort af et holdningsskift i befolkningens syn på europæisk samarbejde som følge af invasionen. Danmark vil sandsynligvis bestræbe sig på at forsvare og fastholde denne linje, også når Donald Trump i 2025 igen bliver præsident i USA, samtidig med at landet vil gøre alt, der står i dets magt, for at bevare det transatlantiske bånd intakt. Abstract in English: Keep the Americans in and the Russians Out: Security Policy Trends in Denmark after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine To all appearances, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a defining moment in Danish security policy. We have seen the establishment of a new defence cooperation agreement with the US, defence budgets are surpassing NATO guidelines, an ambitious and extensive military support plan for Ukraine has been pursued, and Denmark has removed, by referendum, its three-decades-old opt-out from European defence cooperation. In terms of defence policy, the invasion also accelerated a shift in focus away from extensive international engagement in distant parts of the world to putting a much greater emphasis on Denmark’s own immediate neighbourhood. In strategic terms, however, the change has been more limited, and the development must also be regarded as a continuation of a broader shift starting long before the 2022 invasion. Where it had earlier been possible for smaller allies like Denmark to compensate for low defence expenditures through the willingness to deploy its armed forces abroad, the appetite for such missions had been on the decline in the US and NATO for over a decade, leaving Denmark increasingly vulnerable to criticism on defence spending. This became especially pronounced when Germany decided to substantially increase defence spending in 2022. As such, the article argues, the main thread in Danish security policy, before and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has been the continuous desire to keep the US in Europe in order to deter Russia. This policy will remain the cornerstone of Danish security policy when Donald Trump once again moves into the White House in 2025, and the Danish government can be expected to do everything within its power to keep the transatlantic relationship intact.

The regime of Confidence- (and Security-) Building Measures (C(S)BMs) represented an effort to re-imagine Arms Control in Europe and reduce the possibility of unwanted escalation due to misunderstanding or misperception. The regime was first developed during the Cold War due to concerns about large-scale military exercises, and its ongoing importance has come into sharp relief given that NATO and Russia have increasingly engaged in similar manoeuvres. However, despite the C(S)BMs, military exercises represented a point of conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union, and there is little indication that the regime led to the development of confidence in the benign intent of other participants. What prevented this from occurring? This paper compares the theory and logic of confidence-building with the negotiations around the CSBMs, highlighting three primary points of discontinuity that undermined the ability of the regime to fully deliver on its potential. The competitive nature of negotiation about its terms resulted in incomplete transparency, the conflation of the concepts of 'confidence' and 'security' shifted the focus towards assessing an adversary's military capability rather than intent, and the regime's inflexibility meant that it did not account for technological changes that otherwise altered understanding of proximate threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the Australian government's defense policy from 2020 to 2024 and finds that during this period, it underwent a significant revision. It was determined that a ten-year period of strategic warning of an attack on Australia could no longer be the basis for defense planning. Therefore, there are significant implications for strategic risk management in Australia, and urgent action is required, including increased military readiness, accelerated capability development, increased defense spending, and a shift away from business-as-usual approaches to policy development, risk management, and defense force training. The government's immediate actions to re-prioritize the defense force's capabilities included: investment in conventional nuclear-armed submarines through the AUKUS partnership, the development of the defense force's ability to accurately engage long-range targets and the production of munitions in Australia, improving the ability of defense forces to operate from northern Australian bases, increasing the ability to rapidly translate revolutionary new technologies into defense capabilities in close partnership with Australian industry, investing in the growth and retention of a highly qualified workforce, deepening diplomatic and defense partnerships with key allies in the Indo- Pacific region. The AUKUS tripartite security partnership has been identified as necessary for Australia to acquire asymmetric capabilities. AUKUS will provide the Australian Defense Force with advanced capabilities in areas such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and maritime situational awareness. The AUKUS partnership takes on particular significance amid China's development of a new generation of nuclear submarines that will be quieter and harder to detect. It is proposed to focus scientific research in Ukraine on accelerating the integration of new revolutionary technologies into defense capabilities, investing in the development and retention of a highly qualified workforce in the defense sector, and developing defense industrial priorities. Given the problems in Ukrainian defense procurement, special attention should be paid to researching the experience of reforming the Australian defense procurement system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the present stage the Republic of Türkiye is all the more actively claiming the role of a regional leader and at the same time, using the favourable geopolitical position at the junction of two civilizations, seeks to strengthen influence in global politics. The statehood of independent states is impossible without strengthening their own security, and that allows for the development of international military dialogue. Türkiye as a world power is to restore its prosperity from the times of the Ottoman Empire. Best evidence is the creation of Turkish military bases beyond its national borders. Moreover, such actions of the Turkish leadership are considered not only a political ambition but also a pragmatic calculation. First overseas military base of Türkiye in modern times was created in one of the most turbulent countries in the world – Somalia. Currently, Türkiye has a military presence in Somalia. Hence, this study examined the main stages of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Somalia. Relations between the two countries have passed a certain historical path of development and have been characterized by periods of activation revival also stagnation. It was concluded that despite the fact that political, economic and military cooperation between Türkiye and Somalia had huge potential, there were some of constraining factors affecting their further development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 30th October 2023, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia presented the new White Paper on Defence of the Republic of Serbia. Today, after more than a decade from the publication of the previous white paper, a question arises regarding its role in the system of defence. Primarily, this document familiarises the national and foreign public with processes, achievements, and projections for the development of the system of defence of the Republic of Serbia in a transparent and public manner. Changed conditions in which the system of defence of the Republic of Serbia functions that refer to the technological development and modern channels of communication impose a need to review the role of the white paper, which represents the primary problem of the research. In addition to the role of informing national and foreign public, these documents also have a political, and sometimes the role of a guidance. This paper will in greater detail analyse the novelties in the new White Paper on Defence, and compare the role with previous documents, and identify key differences by means of the method of content analysis and comparative analysis. Apart from identifying the roles and novelties in the new White Paper on Defence, the aim of the paper is to provide proposals for the enhancement of the production of new white papers on defence, having in mind their significance in the strengthening of the process of transparency in the field of security and defence. The basic hypothesis of the paper is that the practice of publishing the white paper on defence in the Republic of Serbia exclusively for the purpose of providing information is obsolete, and that it is necessary to redirect the role of future white papers on defence towards a more detailed and concrete definition of the defence policy of the Republic of Serbia.

Total defence is a concept that should ensure the response of the state in situations caused by war and other extraordinary circumstances. This comprehensive approach of the state system's response requires that all segments of society as a whole actively act in order to preserve the sovereignty and security of the state. In order for a society to be able to respond positively to threats, challenges and risks, it is necessary that the strategy of deterrence be based on the concept of total defence. The historical beginnings of the establishment of the concept of total defence go back to the period after the Second World War, while the development of the concept intensified during the Cold War. The mentioned periods are characterized by an increase in the fear of aggression and potential occupation, which predicted that states would strengthen their own readiness for defence. The aim of this paper is to present, based on the experiences and examples of other countries, lessons learned that could be used to build the concept of total defense in the Republic of Serbia. The authors, finding important features of the application of the concept of total defense in countries around the world, tried to provide important lessons for strengthening military neutrality and building the concept of total defense of the Republic of Serbia.

The article examines the defence policy of the Australian government at the beginning of the XXI century. Australia's defence white papers of 2000, 2009, 2013, and 2016 are analyzed for that purpose. It has been established that during this period, Australia's defense policy was characterized by consistency and clearly defined strategic interests and objectives. Factors that determined the development of Australia's security environment, strategic objectives of the Australian Defence Forces, and directions for strengthening Australia's defence capabilities are considered. It is shown that, in the view of the Australian government, Australia's security and prosperity primarily depend on the rules-based global order. Such a global order is based on the overall architecture of international governance that has developed since the end of World War II. This governance framework includes the United Nations, international laws and conventions, and regional security architectures. At the same time, the framework of the rules-based global order is under pressure and has shown signs of fragility. The balance of military and economic power between countries is changing, and some countries are willing to challenge the rules of the global security architecture. Under such conditions, in addition to protecting Australia from military attack, the tasks of the Australian Defence Force are to make a practical military contribution to the maintenance of the rules-based global order in general and stability in the Indo-Pacific region in particular. It found that a strong Australia-United States Alliance is at the core of Australia's security and defence planning. Access to state-of-the-art technology and equipment from the United States of America is critical to sustaining the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force. It has been established that despite the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS), the Australian government adheres to the principle of self-reliance in defence of Australia's territory against military attack. It is proposed to take this approach as a basis for developing and implementing Ukraine's defence policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defence cooperation “beyond peacetime” to also encompass operational military cooperation in crisis and armed conflict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime. While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have created strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational plans – their “war plans” – and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an alignment policy between the Nordic states.

Marking the fortieth anniversary of the Falklands War, this special issue brings together new research, and opens avenues for further investigation, on the armed conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands that stretched between April and June 1982. Across four articles, it explores the broad themes of combatant experience, conflict memory, international relations and policy, from an interdisciplinary investigation of the conflict landscape to an examination of cinematic portrayals of Falklands veterans, and from the application of the lens of the global Cold War to an appraisal of the impact of the conflict on UK defence policy. The special issue also includes a previously unpublished naval memoir of the war, highlighting the continued emergence of new sources that makes the Falklands War a potentially highly productive area of study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of new technologies, combined with the current risks and threats to international peace and security, contributes to the diversification of the new challanges of the present international security environment and makes the global geopolitical situation increasingly unpredictable. The future of war brings with it completely new challenges, and Germany, like the other European countries, will have to prepare for them. In this context, Germany's foreign policy requires a radical change. Thus, in order to effectively deal with the increasing complexity of security challenges, a national security strategy with long-term applicability is now essential. This document will provide a comprehensive guide and engage all authorities with security responsibilities to form a vision on the major future issues of German security policy. The German National Security Strategy will represent the fundamental document of the Federal Government in the field of foreign and security policy and will constitute, in the period to come, the basis for the strategic orientation of German security and defense policy. An important role in this process will be played by the Bundeswehr, the main instrument of the defence and security policy available to the Federal Government to guarantee the freedom and security of Germany and its allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions between civil and military authorities over issues such as budgets and strategic posture are unavoidable in pluralistic societies. Scholars of Civil-Military Relations (CMR) have identified a range of practices through which civil-military contestation occurs, and examined their implications for issues such as military effectiveness. This literature, however, has yet to incorporate critical approaches to knowledge into its analysis. Seeking to fill this gap, this article explores how the British military's presentation of its professional knowledge has been increasingly shaped by the political context of British defence policy. More specifically, it argues that the British armed forces' presentation of opaque imaginations of future war in military doctrine has sought to entrench the role of Defence in an environment of increasingly integrated governmental responses to security challenges. To do this, the article focuses specifically on two concepts that have become increasingly significant in the British defence establishment's articulation of its professional authority and strategic purpose – Multi-Domain Integration (MDI) and the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC). The article therefore contributes to the literature a fresh perspective of the role of military doctrine and epistemic practices in civil-military contestation, as well as a critical account of the politics of knowledge in British defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais is the property of DADOS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The war in Ukraine has had an extensive impact upon societies not directly involved in the military fighting. Traditional and social media has been filled with references to the war and discussions concerning how individuals as well as society as a whole would cope if war were to erupt in Sweden. In this context, an often overlooked issue is the relationship between humans and animals. This article discusses challenges to the total defence system, brought on by the norms of the 2020s, concerning the social relationship between humans and animals. It presents a number of areas wherein the relation between humans and animals is likely to raise questions and invoke conflict with existing regulations of the total defence: views of security, laws and regulations for wartime and crisis situations, and the development of social relations between humans and animals. Finally, some ideas are presented regarding how a total defence including animals could be materialized, and which changes such ideas would pose to the present total defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Federal Republic of Germany and its armed forces, the Bundeswehr, stand as a cornerstone of the European and NATO defence and security. It is vitally important to understand one of the major European conventional powers’ policies, concepts and overarching capabilities, along with the history behind them in a 21st century evermore complex security environment. The following paper examines the Bundeswehr historical evolution the major focal points in its strategy and capabilities development, since the beginning of the Cold War. The paper extends the historical discussion towards the present moment and the security policies undertaken in the 21st century, reaching the major policy re-evaluations occurring in 2022 and their importance both for the German state and its allies.

Since its establishment, the two organisations, NATO and the European Union (EU) have acted to find the most effective ways, adapted to the constantly changing international environment, to carry out their basic missions and to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship. The EU, especially after the end of the Cold War, has made significant progress in the direction of building and strengthening a common defence policy as well as the necessary means for its implementation in accordance with its security interests. During the resolution of certain security crises in Europe, but also outside it, there were certain differences between the USA and certain allies, some of them members of both NATO and the EU, regarding the necessary actions to perform the security responsibilities. The differences between the two organisations were mainly represented by the assessment of the threats, the institutions involved in the decision-making to trigger military actions, the requirements for military capabilities, the optimal ratio between political and military means in resolving crises and the share of military expenses in the gross domestic product. Moreover, the steps taken at the EU level have not always been the most appropriate for the development of credible military capabilities and for independent military actions, in crises where NATO as a whole is not involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes that a small state’s approach to total defence will be strong influenced by the nature of its strategic environment. It compares the defence approaches of Poland and New Zealand to identify whether the different contexts of their strategic environments necessitate divergent strategies for defending their state. The theory of population ecology of organisations will be used to frame the different options available to small states in their strategic environments and applied to the cases in order to explain their different approaches to total defence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Swedish defence sector has for the last 30 years been subject to expenditure reductions and changed policy as well as management reforms inspired by the ideas of New Public Management (NPM). The purpose of this article is to provide insights into the major management reforms in the defence sector. We describe and discuss the reforms and the implications for the defence sector in the context of expenditure reductions and changed defence policy. We conclude that the earlier management reforms served as instruments to reduce defence expenditure and that the reforms have affected how agencies and the Government interact and how politicians are able to influence the sector. Furthermore, there are indications that these reforms have contributed to the management challenges we can observe in the defence sector today. These challenges correspond to important features of an efficient network. This implies that there might be a need of a different perspective to improve public management of the defence sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Synthetic Environment (SE) takes the power of computing, digital processing, artificial intelligence, extended reality technology, and other advancements borrowed from the gaming industry to create a computer simulation with near-perfect levels of realism. Designed to enable connectivity across all domains and platforms, SE has the potential to dramatically improve military training, force development, situational awareness, and communications. Our article provides a technical overview of SE and offers a high-level analysis of its use in Canada, the US, UK, and Australia. Informed by dozens of interviews and a roundtable workshop held with experts from academia, industry, and government, this article relates SE to Canada's future defence policy. We argue that leveraging SE effectively will require that Canada commit to a long-term SE program, promote new government-industry partnerships, encourage top-down leadership from both civilian and military officials, and consolidate domestic skillsets and industry knowhow to maintain and retain Canadian sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the gap between strategic commitments and budgetary constraints continues to grow, defence organisations have introduced performance management initiatives to support decision-making and to improve governance. However, introducing managerial practices in public organisations, including defence, proves to be challenging. As performance management initiatives within defence suffer from an implementation gap, strategic benefits are not being harnessed. In our study, we first exploit the results of a systematic literature review to better anchor the encountered challenges within the literature. We then apply thematic analysis to a unique dataset from twelve NATO countries to propose a new defence-specific performance management framework for the strategic level. As the framework preserves the benefits of existing initiatives while mitigating most recorded challenges, it is proposed as a new guide for designing and assessing defence performance management efforts. Thereby, professionals and scholars are provided with a powerful instrument to address the implementation gap. Moreover, the theoretical and empirical lens adopted facilitates alignment between performance management initiatives, defence policy, defence strategy, and strategic objectives. Notably, policy goals and strategic "ends" are clearly connected to critical processes and resources. Thereby, the proposed framework better supports discussions with key defence stakeholders pertaining to the gap between commitments and constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The democratisation of national defence policies and systems plays a vital role in making any country more democratic. The democratic transition of this sector in Slovenia and Montenegro has experienced a challenging reform process and it is now time for reflection. This paper aims to identify the main characteristics and issues of the democratisation process in the field of national defence in both countries and, by comparing them, to look for key similarities and differences. The paper argues and confirms that the Slovenian and Montenegrin national defence and security systems were initially faced with serious post-socialist democratic deficits, but gradual democratisation then brought drastic improvements to the quality of their democracy. The process of joining NATO and the change from a military threat perception to a non-military threat perception created space for many reforms. Greatest steps forward in democratisation in both countries entailed nominating civilian defence ministers, having a reasonable number of civilian defence experts involved in the military business, establishing working parliamentary monitoring committees, reducing defence budgets and reallocating funding to other sectors. Progress was also observed in reducing the total number of soldiers, establishing a fully professional armed force, assuring that women in the armed forces were properly represented and increasing the deployment of soldiers to foreign stabilisation operations in a sign of becoming security providers.

Armed forces the world over have three primary functions – force development, force deployment and force employment. Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but it is especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of credible military deterrence. Usually, a defence policy presupposes the development of armed forces that are effective at executing their mandate, a condition that is measurablein terms of the discipline, skill and quality of the organisation. The study on which this article reports, used this concept to describe how change management – especially by focusing on incorporating effective prioritisation – could enhance the current defence policy. A general analysis of South African defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the policymakers had thoroughly considered the effectiveness of the armed forces when they wrote the White Paper on Defence of 1996 and the Defence Review of 1998. By 2006, the South African Army had interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own very much in alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications. The present study suggests that the principal reason for the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from the lack of effective prioritisation of defence. This article, therefore, concludes that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been largely unsuccessful in complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itselfmay be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context. Furthermore, it is concluded that military effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful. Finally, the schizophrenic organisational culture of the defence force may be the primary cause of its moving ever closer to reneging on its constitutional mandate.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), on the basis of which the EU builds its defence identity, has a broad spectrum. It focuses not only on the defence component of the CSDP, but also on associated areas such as defence industry and market, defence research and development, and supports them with related legislation and various policy and financial instruments. On the one hand, this prevents the issue of European defence from being easily confined. On the other hand, this reflects the robustness of the EU’s approach to European defence and its willingness to mobilize all available resources. The article describes the evolution of European defence, its major milestones and actors, related processes and rules, and the key tools that are now largely concentrated under the umbrella of the CSDP. Current issues of European defence, including scenarios of its possible future development, are also addressed, as well as the contribution of the Czech Republic.

Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defence cooperation "beyond peacetime" to also encompass operational military cooperation in crisis and armed conflict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime. While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have created strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational plans -- their "war plans" -- and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an alignment policy between the Nordic states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a consequence of Russia's aggressive actions - initially with regard to the annexation of Crimea, and the beginning of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014 - many European Union countries have revised their current security and defence policies. The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, initiated on 24 February 2022, only strengthened this tendency. For Poland, one of NATO's major eastern flank states, the need to improve the management of national security that corresponds to the challenges and threats that lie ahead has become self-evident. The goal of this article is to look at the assumptions of the defence policy of the Republic of Poland, and to evaluate the country's defence potential based on the implemented modernisation schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian strategic studies scholars have traditionally made an outsized impact on the world stage. This reflection upon the past, present and future of their field begins by seeking to explain why. It then takes stock of Australian strategic studies today, finding a flourishing field that stacks up remarkably well, even when measured against the exploits of its illustrious past. The essay concludes by identifying the main challenges and opportunities facing Australian strategic studies going forward, suggesting possible approaches for addressing these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses remote warfare from an ontological security perspective, arguing that remote warfare needs to be understood as a response to states' internal self-identity needs. We develop this claim by analysing an emerging aspect of remote warfare: Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA is aimed at building up the security forces of partners, sharing best practice, assisting in security sector reform, fostering collaboration, and overall contributing to conflict resolution. Focusing on the UK, we show how and why ontological security needs are a driving force behind the UK's SFA program. We outline the UK's specific autobiographical narrative, which we call a "global engagement identity," explore the crises that induced ontological insecurity, and show how the UK's SFA program can be read as a routinised foreign policy practice aimed at taming uncertainty and reinforcing ontological security. This paper makes three contributions. First, it analyses remote warfare through an ontological security framework, thereby moving the focus from "security-as-survival" to "security-of-being." Second, it highlights the importance of SFA as a remote warfare tool. Third, it shows the centrality of ontological security in understanding UK defence policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A connected battlespace aims to enable seamless, real-time connectivity between various military assets across all domains of contemporary warfare. Such a program, however, cannot be accomplished without the use of space-based assets that are designed to store and transmit data; enable communications, surveillance, and imagery; and bolster interoperability between different military forces and services. Given recent technological advancements, coupled with international interest and the diminishing cost of launching satellites into low Earth orbit, this article explores the opportunities and drawbacks associated with the Canadian Armed Forces' embrace of novel space-based technologies. Following dozens of consultations and a stakeholder workshop held with academic, industry and policy experts, we argue that developing, procuring, and exploiting these capabilities is essential for Canada's future force development, augmenting situational awareness in a pan-domain environment, and retaining a degree of sovereignty in an era marked by disruptive technologies, strategic uncertainty and great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the context and development of the Israel Defence Industries (IDI) during the period 1930–2018. During this timeframe, the IDI was forced to transform several times with the Israel Ministry of Defence acting as the main facilitator. Well established links among government institutions, academia, investors and the IDI contribute to armament quality and innovations which supports market expansion. Nevertheless, US support remains an important enabler in facilitating the IDI developments. Nowadays, the IDI is an important player in Israeli economics that contributes to the exports and facilitates developments in other sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security and defence policy documents have sparked academic interest since their publication has become a common international practice in the 1990s. Yet, broad comparisons across time and countries have been scarce. This article presents information from a new dataset on security and defence documents published by OECD countries. Specifically, we analyse what type of documents were published by each country between 1990 and 2019, which security concerns they identify, and what level of importance is given to different agendas of security and defence. The dataset reveals an unexpected level of diversity, including an apparent lack of a common framework even among countries belonging to NATO or the European Union. In terms of content, there was a recent recurrence of traditional security topics, along with the prominence of some newer ones. Overall, the documents reveal a surprising lack of consistency and completeness with regards to provisions for policy execution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Military Challenges / Sodobni Vojaški Izzivi is the property of Sciendo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Military Science Review / Hadtudományi Szemle is the property of National University of Public Service and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In 2019, the Spanish Defence Staff launched an "adaptation" process to adjust the structure of the force and its catalogue of military capabilities up to the year 2035. It replaced the "transformation" that had guided the country's defence planning from 2004 to 2018 to develop the future armed forces model envisaged in the 2003 Strategic Defence Review. This article begins by analysing the transformation process and its main effects on the evolution of the Spanish military and the reasons behind the drive to adapt. It then goes on to explain its main components and objectives, and concludes by scrutinising the main factors that may condition its development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the relationship between national security policymaking and the defence sector. The goal is to understand how a lack of attention to national security policymaking affects the defence sector and vice-versa using Brazil as a case study. Our main argument is that a lack of attention in national security policymaking by civilian elites can weaken political controls over the armed forces, inhibit effective defence reforms that challenge military prerogatives, and, over time, reinforce militarization in national security policymaking, especially in its three main pillars: defence, intelligence, and public safety. We call this process national security neglect. Our case study shows that as internal security challenges grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the military to dealing with public safety, border security, and national security policymaking. Civilians also delegated civilian posts to the armed forces in defence, public safety and intelligence, instead of engaging in broader reforms. This led to a vicious cycle of military dependency, deteriorated the already fragile political controls over the armed forces, inhibited defence reforms, and increased the military role in the state and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italy represents an important case of defense policy change after the Cold War. While during the bipo-lar era the country rarely intervened abroad and was deeply constrained in its defense policy by do-mestic as well as international factors, in the post-Cold War era, Italy has constantly intervened in major conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East and Afghanistan. Yet, in the past decade, and especial-ly after the 2011 Libyan intervention, Italian activism has consistently diminished. The purpose of this article is to describe this trend and to review theories that have been put forward to explain Italian activism (and retrenchment). While several insights can emerge from multiple studies dedicated to the topic, we argue that some elements such as legacies and institutional constraints have been some-what overlooked and actually open promising avenues for research.

The research described in this paper was conducted in the framework of institutional research project Strategic Alternatives (STRATAL) within the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of University of Defence, The Czech Republic. Article assesses the development of Czech Defence policy in 2017 and first half of 2018. Authors analyse key change drivers in external environment (security threats, EU strategic autonomy, transatlantic link). In second step authors evaluate measures taken in political, military, administrative, economical and societal domain in response to key change drivers and highlight related risks to effective defence policy formulation and implementation.