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Long before experimental psychology, religious writers, orators, and playwrights described examples of lie detection based on the verbal content of statements. Legal scholars collected evidence from individual cases and systematized them as "rules of evidence". Some of these resemble content cues used in contemporary research, while others point to working hypotheses worth exploring. To examine their potential validity, we re-analyzed data from a quasi-experimental study of 95 perjury cases. The outcomes support the fruitfulness of this approach. Travelling back in time searching for testable ideas about content cues to truth and deception may be worthwhile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asking unexpected questions, asking the interviewee to sketch the room, and asking the interviewee to make a timeline are techniques that have been shown to help an interviewer detect deceit. However, evidence of the efficacy of these techniques comes from studies of North American and North-West European participants, who are on average more individualistic (i.e., value individual achievements and uniqueness over group achievements) than people from other parts of the world. In two experiments involving participants with individualistic and collectivistic cultural backgrounds, we provide a more culturally diverse test of these techniques. Specifically, this study describes two experiments that investigated these interviewing techniques with people who are recent migrants to the UK. Experiment 1 used the LIWC categories "I," "we," "cognitive processes," and "social processes" as the dependent variables; Experiment 2 measured details provided in a sketch and a timeline. The results show no e [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asking unexpected questions, asking the interviewee to sketch the room, and asking the interviewee to make a timeline are techniques that have been shown to help an interviewer detect deceit. However, evidence of the efficacy of these techniques comes from studies of North American and North-West European participants, who are on average more individualistic (i.e., value individual achievements and uniqueness over group achievements) than people from other parts of the world. In two experiments involving participants with individualistic and collectivistic cultural backgrounds, we provide a more culturally diverse test of these techniques. Specifically, this study describes two experiments that investigated these interviewing techniques with people who are recent migrants to the UK. Experiment 1 used the LIWC categories “I,” “we,” “cognitive processes,” and “social processes” as the dependent variables; Experiment 2 measured details provided in a sketch and a timeline. The results show no effects of veracity in either of these experiments, although various effects of cultural differences in the outcome variables were observed. This suggests that cues to deception may not necessarily generalize to people from different cultural backgrounds. These results highlight the importance of conducting lie detection research across different countries and cultures.

Laboratory-based deception-detection experiments often fail to capture the features of everyday life lie detection among ordinary citizens. In this study, we examined how people [try to] detect deception in real life. Over 10 weeks, every time the participants felt they had detected a lie, they filled in an online survey. Results show that, in everyday life, many lies are detected unexpectedly, often from non-behavioral indicators, that people suspecting deception search for both behavioral cues and non-behavioral information, but that non-behavioral information is more useful to detect deception. The study addresses aspects unexplored in prior studies on everyday life lie detection, provides new insights, and has theoretical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study was an examination into whether the use of memory-enhancing techniques (mnemonics) in interviews can be helpful to distinguish truth tellers from liars. In the previous study (Izotovas et al., 2018), it was found that when mnemonic techniques were used in the interview immediately after the event, truth-tellers reported more details than liars in those immediate interviews and again after a delay. Moreover, truth-tellers, but not liars, showed patterns of reporting indicative of genuine memory decay. In the current experiment, participants (n = 92) were asked to read the repeated statements reported by participants in the Izotovas et al.’s (2018) study and decide whether the statements they read were truthful or deceptive. One group of participants (informed condition) received information about the findings of the previous study before reading the statement. The other group received no information before reading the statement (uninformed condition). After participants made veracity judgements, they were asked an open-ended question asking what factors influenced their credibility decision. Although truthful statements were judged more accurately in the informed condition (65.2%) than in the uninformed condition (47.8%), this difference was not significant. In both conditions deceptive statements were detected at chance level (52.2%). Participants who relied on the self-reported diagnostic verbal cues to deceit were not more accurate than participants who self-reported unreliable cues. This could happen because only the minority of participants (27.4%) in both conditions based their decisions on diagnostic cues to truth/deceit.

For more than a century, verbal content cues to deception have been investigated to assess the credibility of statements in judicial contexts. Among the many cues investigated, Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA) and criteria based on the reality monitoring (RM) approach have been most prominent. However, research with these cues used as 'tools' has not fully exploited their potential. We critically discuss statistical approaches used in past research and recommend a series of 12 principles or guidelines researchers should follow to design, analyze and report future studies on detecting deception with verbal content cues. To illustrate some of these points, we present analyses from two separate studies: A quasi-experiment in a field setting conducted with adults with intellectual disabilities who truthfully or deceptively described a negative autobiographical event to an interviewer, and a large-scale simulation study where adults wrote an account of either an experienced or an invented significant life event. Accounts in both studies were rated with CBCA and RM criteria, as well as by 'naive' raters. The guidelines should help to increase the quality and transparency of research in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Research shows that people believe deception can be detected from behavioral cues despite their past experience of detecting lies from non-behavioral, contextual information (evidence, third-person reports, etc.). However, in previous research, the question about beliefs was necessarily general, while the question about revealing information was always about a specific lie. In this study, we addressed this problem. Method: Participants first indicated how they believed lies can be detected (beliefs; Questionnaire 1 or Q1). Next, they described either how they, in their past, detected a specific lie, several lies, or how they, in general, detect lies in their everyday lives (revealing information; Q2). Results: Regardless of the focus of Q2, and in line with prior research, behavioral cues were reported less often, and contextual indicators more often, in responding to Q2 than in responding to Q1. However, contrary to prior findings, behavioral cues still predominated in the responses to Q2. Conclusions: We found no evidence that the specific-vs.-general focus of the questions changed the pattern of results, which apparently depended solely on whether participants reported beliefs or revealing information. We provide explanations for the prevalence of behavioral cues in Q2 responses, and make suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Furthermore, Levine ([8]) mentioned that while suspicion or distrust decreases accuracy for truths and increases accuracy for lies, this would not explain elimination of the veracity effect as found in Stel et al. ([18]). Keywords: deception; distrust; deception cues; lie detection; consciousness EN deception distrust deception cues lie detection consciousness 1 3 3 10/25/21 20211021 NES 211021 Introduction People often mistake other people's deceits for truths (i.e., the truth bias; McCornack and Parks, [13]). In his commentary on Stel et al. ([18]), Levine ([8]) agreed that (1) distrust hampers correct deception judgments and that (2) distrust involves conscious processing. [Extracted from the article]

Previous research has shown that in real-life situations people detect lies mostly from non-behavioral information (e.g., physical evidence, third-party information, confessions...) rather than from behavioral cues. Novotny et al. (J Nonverbal Behav 42:41–52, 2018. 10.1007/s10919-017-0263-2) argued that while lies are detected primarily from non-behavioral information, initial suspicion of a lie can be triggered primarily from behavioral cues. They conducted two studies and claimed support for their hypotheses. However, there are a number of problematic issues with Novotny et al.'s research and conclusions. We conducted analyses based on the frequencies and percentages they reported, and used meta-analytical techniques to combine their findings concerning discovered lies with those of previous research. The results show that lies are indeed detected from non-behavioral information more often than from behavioral cues. However, contrary to Novotny et al.'s assertions, suspicion is not triggered primarily from behavioral cues—rather, there is a trend in favor of non-behavioral information. Even so, behavioral cues play a bigger role in eliciting suspicion than in lie discovery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tradicionalmente, la investigación en detección de mentiras ha asumido que, al mentir, el ser humano muestra espontáneamente indicios conductuales. Sin embargo, las recientes integraciones meta-analíticas constatan que tales indicios no abundan. Esto ha imprimido un cambio de rumbo en la investigación, que ha tomado dos vías distintas: (a) el desarrollo de estrategias activas de entrevista para detectar mentiras y (b) el empleo de indicios contextuales (en lugar de conductuales) de la mentira. Éste es el primero de dos artículos en los que revisamos esta investigación. Empezamos describiendo las orientaciones tradicionales, así como las evidencias que las cuestionan y que justifican el cambio de orientación, y argumentamos que las nuevas estrategias activas de entrevista deben fundamentarse en modelos teóricos sólidos y coherentes de base cognitiva. En el siguiente artículo (de esta misma sección monográfica), se describen específicamente estrategias concretas de entrevista para detectar mentiras, así como la orientación de los indicios contextuales.

Deception detection research has traditionally assumed that when humans deceive they spontaneously display tell-tale behavioural indicators. However, recent meta-analytical integrations reveal that such indicators do not abound. This has produced a shift in deception research, which has taken two different directions: (a) the development of active interviewing strategies to detect deception, and (b) the use of contextual (rather than behavioural) indicators of deception. This paper is the first of two articles where we review this research. We begin by describing the traditional approaches, as well as the evidence that questions these approaches and justifies the shift in focus. We also argue that the new active interviewing approaches should be grounded on solid and coherent cognitive models. In the subsequent article (published in this same issue), specific interviewing strategies to detect deception will be described along with the contextual indicia approach.

Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However, when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1) and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency, evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.'s (2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy), apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used.

Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However, when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1) and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency, evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.'s (2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy), apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a repeat strategy to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after one week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).

Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after 1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deception detection research has traditionally assumed that when humans deceive they spontaneously display tell-tale behavioural indicators. However, recent meta-analytical integrations reveal that such indicators do not abound. This has produced a shift in deception research, which has taken two different directions: (a) the development of active interviewing strategies to detect deception, and (b) the use of contextual (rather than behavioural) indicators of deception. This paper is the first of two articles where we review this research. We begin by describing the traditional approaches, as well as the evidence that questions these approaches and justifies the shift in focus. We also argue that the new active interviewing approaches should be grounded on solid and coherent cognitive models. In the subsequent article (published in this same issue), specific interviewing strategies to detect deception will be described along with the contextual indicia approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research questions the validity of behavioral deception cues; however, people believe behavioral cues are reliable deception indicators. Police officers and community members indicated both how lies can be detected (beliefs), and how they discovered a lie in the past (revealing information). Officers did the latter twice, prompted with a professional versus a personal context. For both groups, beliefs were primarily behavioral (e.g., demeanor) and revealing information contextual (evidence, third-party information, etc.). Officers responded similarly regardless of context. Relative to community members, officers provided more cues and referred more often to verbal contradictions and active detection strategies when asked about beliefs. Practitioners should be made aware of the discrepancies between their beliefs about deception cues and useful information to detect lies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Masip, J., Bethencourt, M., Lucas, G., Sánchez-San Segundo, M. & Herrero, C. (2012). Deception detection from written accounts. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 53, 103-111. Most research into deception detection in written accounts has been conducted on transcripts instead of written messages, and has focused on identifying valid verbal deception correlates instead of also examining untrained readers' spontaneous lie-detection attempts (accuracy rates, the cues they use, and so on). Also, the question of whether good liars are also good detectors has not been examined using written accounts. In Study 1, 78 participants handwrote a story and then judged the veracity of another participant's story. Accuracy was at chance level. Good liars were not better detectors than poor liars, but participants who thought they were good liars also thought they were good detectors. The higher the participants' fluidity scores on a standardized test, the poorer liars they were and the better liars they thought they were. The cues participants said they used were related to their judgments but unrelated to actual veracity. In Study 2, some Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) categories (with the Spanish-language dictionary) permitted a 68% classification rate of the written accounts of Study 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]