Search

The evolution of the prominent role of the cerebellum in the development of composite tools, and cumulative culture, leading to the rise of Homo sapiens is examined. Following Stout and Hecht's (2017) detailed description of stone-tool making, eight key repetitive involvements of the cerebellum are highlighted. These key cerebellar learning involvements include the following: (1) optimization of cognitive-social control, (2) prediction (3) focus of attention, (4) automaticity of smoothness, appropriateness, and speed of movement and cognition, (5) refined movement and social cognition, (6) learns models of extended practice, (7) learns models of Theory of Mind (ToM) of teachers, (8) is predominant in acquisition of novel behavior and cognition that accrues from the blending of cerebellar models sent to conscious working memory in the cerebral cortex. Within this context, the evolution of generalization and blending of cerebellar internal models toward optimization of social-cognitive learning is described. It is concluded that (1) repetition of movement and social cognition involving the optimization of internal models in the cerebellum during stone-tool making was the key selection factor toward social-cognitive and technological advancement, (2) observational learning during stone-tool making was the basis for both technological and social-cognitive evolution and, through an optimizing positive feedback loop between the cerebellum and cerebral cortex, the development of cumulative culture occurred, and (3) the generalization and blending of cerebellar internal models related to the unconscious forward control of the optimization of imagined future states in working memory was the most important brain adaptation leading to intertwined advances in stone-tool technology, cognitive-social processes behind cumulative culture (including the emergence of language and art) and, thereby, with the rise of Homo sapiens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cultural transmission of behaviour patterns across animal populations and between generations has been rigorously demonstrated in diverse vertebrate species and also in insects, but controversies continue about exactly what distinguishes nonhuman from human cultural learning. A contentious contemporary debate concerns a hypothetical 'zone of latent solutions' (ZLS), conceptualized as all that members of a species can acquire by individual learning. The ZLS hypothesis proposes that cumulative culture is restricted to humans because of a unique ability to copy behavioural innovations beyond our species' ZLS. Apes and other taxa are argued instead to be limited to copying only behaviours that are already within their ZLS, thus constraining their capacity for cumulative culture. Here I suggest that empirical tests of this hypothesis are scattered through the research literature covering social learning experiments and I collate relevant instances. Over 20 such studies spanning mammals, birds, fish and insects demonstrate social learning of novel actions new to the species that no individual acquires through its own efforts. Many offer particularly compelling refutation of the ZLS hypothesis because in addition to documenting an absence of individual level learning, they incorporate designs showing that observers match whichever of two alternative forms of action they witnessed or include multistep actions that are clearly challenging for individuals of the species studied to acquire by individual learning. • A ZLS hypothesis argues only humans socially learn actions beyond individual learning. • Review of past literature yields 26 experiments whose findings counter this. • Studies span apes, other mammals, birds, reptiles and insects. • Ten two-action experiments show copies of either option acquired by observers. • Other studies show copying of difficult multistep actions beyond individual learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bees have been excellent model systems to study social learning – the ability of animals to change their behaviour based on observations of other individuals. Researchers have investigated several aspects of social learning in bees, including how it can lead to cultural traditions. A recent study also argues that bees have the capacity to socially learn behaviours that they could not innovate on their own. To understand these findings better, I review what we know about the mechanisms underlying social learning in bees and use these findings to compare social learning and culture in bees and humans. The findings suggest that the seemingly complex social behaviours of bees could arise from simple mechanisms underlying learning in general. I highlight the importance of investigating cognitive mechanisms and how they might differ across animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of Artificial Life research, as articulated by Chris Langton, is "to contribute to theoretical biology by locating life-as-we-know-it within the larger picture of life-as-it-could-be." The study and pursuit of open-ended evolution in artificial evolutionary systems exemplify this goal. However, open-ended evolution research is hampered by two fundamental issues: the struggle to replicate open-endedness in an artificial evolutionary system and our assumption that we only have one system (genetic evolution) from which to draw inspiration. We argue not only that cultural evolution should be seen as another real-world example of an open-ended evolutionary system but that the unique qualities seen in cultural evolution provide us with a new perspective from which we can assess the fundamental properties of, and ask new questions about, open-ended evolutionary systems, especially with regard to evolved open-endedness and transitions from bounded to unbounded evolution. Here we provide an overview of culture as an evolutionary system, highlight the interesting case of human cultural evolution as an open-ended evolutionary system, and contextualize cultural evolution by developing a new framework of (evolved) open-ended evolution. We go on to provide a set of new questions that can be asked once we consider cultural evolution within the framework of open-ended evolution and introduce new insights that we may be able to gain about evolved open-endedness as a result of asking these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cumulative culture, the accumulation of modifications, innovations, and improvements over generations through social learning, is a key determinant of the behavioral diversity across Homo sapiens populations and their ability to adapt to varied ecological habitats. Generations of improvements, modifications, and lucky errors allow humans to use technologies and know-how well beyond what a single naive individual could invent independently within their lifetime. The human dependence on cumulative culture may have shaped the evolution of biological and behavioral traits in the hominin lineage, including brain size, body size, life history, sociality, subsistence, and ecological niche expansion. Yet, we do not know when, in the human career, our ancestors began to depend on cumulative culture. Here, we show that hominins likely relied on a derived form of cumulative culture by at least ~600 kya, a result in line with a growing body of existing evidence. We analyzed the complexity of stone tool manufacturing sequences over the last 3.3 My of the archaeological record. We then compare these to the achievable complexity without cumulative culture, which we estimate using nonhuman primate technologies and stone tool manufacturing experiments. We find that archaeological technologies become significantly more complex than expected in the absence of cumulative culture only after ~600 kya. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Occupation of the foraging niche requires an extensive body of ecological knowledge, and humans rely heavily on social learning to master this curriculum in a safe, efficient, timely manner. This presents a formidable information management problem: In the absence of writing, how did ancestral hunter-gatherer societies accurately store and transmit their accumulated knowledge from generation to generation? Pronounced patterns in forager oral story corpora suggest a partial answer. Cross-culturally, these stories exhibit similar themes, genres, and characters, which in turn map onto critical domains of ecological knowledge. These stories also exhibit pronounced consistencies in their formal properties, predictably utilizing strategies that engage attention (e.g., ostensive communication) and facilitate memorization (e.g., repetition, rhythm, imagery). These patterns suggest that storytelling is an information technology that addresses key problems posed by our entry into the information niche: in conjunction with other forms of symbolic behavior (e.g., ritual, visual art, song, dance, games) storytelling provides a mnemonic framework for encoding accumulated knowledge, rules for faithfully copying it, and regular occasions for refreshing and transmitting it. Collectively, these behaviors may have been instrumental in the emergence of cumulative culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a mathematical model of cultural evolution to study cultural traits that shape how individuals exchange information. Current theory focuses on traits that influence the reception of information (receiver traits), such as evaluating whether information represents the majority or stems from a trusted source. Our model shifts the focus from the receiver to the sender of cultural information and emphasizes the role of sender traits, such as communicability or persuasiveness. Here, we show that sender traits are probably a stronger driving force in cultural evolution than receiver traits. While receiver traits evolve to curb cultural transmission, sender traits can amplify it and fuel the self-organization of systems of mutually supporting cultural traits, including traits that cannot be maintained on their own. Such systems can reach arbitrary complexity, potentially explaining uniquely human practical and mental skills, goals, knowledge and creativity, independent of innate factors. Our model incorporates social and individual learning throughout the lifespan, thus connecting cultural evolutionary theory with developmental psychology. This approach provides fresh insights into the trait-individual duality, that is, how cultural transmission of single traits is influenced by individuals, who are each represented as an acquired system of cultural traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans have evolved culturally and perhaps genetically to be unsustainable. We exhibit a deep and consistent pattern of short-term resource exploitation behaviours and institutions. We distinguish agentic and naturally selective forces in cultural evolution. Agentic forces are quite important compared to the blind forces (random variation and natural selection) in cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution. We need to use the agentic policy-making processes to evade the impact of blind natural selection. We argue that agentic forces became important during our Pleistocene history and into the Anthropocene present. Human creativity in the form of deliberate innovations and the deliberate selective diffusion of technical and social advances drove this process forward for a long time before planetary limits became a serious issue. We review models with multiple positive feedbacks that roughly fit this observed pattern. Policy changes in the case of large-scale existential threats like climate change are made by political and diplomatic agents grasping and moving levers of institutional power in order to avoid the operation of blind natural selection and agentic forces driven by narrow or short-term goals. This article is part of the theme issue 'Evolution and sustainability: gathering the strands for an Anthropocene synthesis'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans are one of the most successful species in the planet as we inhabit almost every ecosystem on Earth. This success has been attributed to our cultural proficiency, which allows us to store in the collective minds of our populations complex knowledge that no single individual could innovate on its own. In this way, we acquire most of our behavioural repertoire from experts in our communities and, contrary to any other species, we build upon this collectively-stored information to create novel solutions to face ever-more-challenging problems. This ratcheting of behavioural complexity has led to our culture being coined cumulative. The fact that not even our closest living relatives, the great apes, possess this type of culture begs the question of when did cumulative culture evolve in our lineage. In this piece, I discuss how the field of experimental primate archaeology has contributed to this question by describing several stone-tool experiments conducted with great apes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For most of human evolution, accumulated cultural knowledge has been stored in memory and transmitted orally. This presents a daunting information management problem: how to store and transmit this knowledge in a portable format that resists corruption. One solution–widespread among foragers–is to encode knowledge in narrative. However, this strategy depends on accurate performance of the story. Significantly, some forager cultures have rules regulating myth performance, although the extent of this phenomenon is unknown. We hypothesize that these rules subserve high-fidelity transmission across generations. Accordingly, we predicted that, across forager cultures, myth-telling rules will mandate: (P1) transmission by the most proficient storytellers (P2) under low-distraction conditions with (P3) multiple individuals and (P4) multiple generations present, and the application of measures that (P5) prevent, identify, and/or correct errors, (P6) maintain audience attention, (P7) discourage rule violations and/or (P8) incentivize rule compliance. To test these predictions, we searched the forager ethnographic record for descriptions of myth performance, and coded them for prescriptions/proscriptions regarding narrator age, performance context, audience composition, narrative delivery, and audience comportment, as well as sanctions associated with rule transgression or compliance. Results indicate that rules regulating myth performance are widespread across forager cultures, and are characterized by features that reduce the likelihood of copy errors. These findings help elucidate the role that anthropogenic ratchets played in the emergence of cumulative culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prerequisite for copying innovative behaviour faithfully is the capacity of observers' brains, regarded as 'hierarchically mechanistic minds', to overcome cognitive 'surprisal' (see 2.), by maximising the evidence for their internal models, through active inference. Unlike modern humans, chimpanzees and other great apes show considerable limitations in their ability, or 'Zone of Bounded Surprisal', to overcome cognitive surprisal induced by innovative or unorthodox behaviour that rarely, therefore, is copied precisely or accurately. Most can copy adequately what is within their phenotypically habitual behavioural repertoire, in which technology plays scant part. Widespread intra- and intergenerational social transmission of complex technological innovations is not a hall-mark of great-ape taxa. 3 Ma, precursors of the genus Homo made stone artefacts, and stone-flaking likely was habitual before 2 Ma. After that time, early Homo erectus has left traces of technological innovations, though faithful copying of these and their intra- and intergenerational social transmission were rare before 1 Ma. This likely owed to a cerebral infrastructure of interconnected neuronal systems more limited than ours. Brains were smaller in size than ours, and cerebral neuronal systems ceased to develop when early Homo erectus attained full adult maturity by the mid-teen years, whereas its development continues until our mid-twenties nowadays. Pleistocene Homo underwent remarkable evolutionary adaptation of neurobiological propensities, and cerebral aspects are discussed that, it is proposed here, plausibly, were fundamental for faithful copying, which underpinned social transmission of technologies, cumulative learning, and culture. Here, observers' responses to an innovation are more important for ensuring its transmission than is an innovator's production of it, because, by themselves, the minimal cognitive prerequisites that are needed for encoding and assimilating innovations are insufficient for practical outcomes to accumulate and spread intra- and intergenerationally. • Stress is laid on the observation of innovative behaviour as a prerequisite for cultural accumulation by copying. • The capacity of an observer's mind to tolerate cognitive surprise induced by unorthodox behaviour is a requisite for copying. • There is a significant difference between chimpanzee and human " Zones of Bounded Surprisal ". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the unique features of human culture? Culture is not uniquely human, but human culture is uniquely cumulative. Cumulative culture is a product of our collective intelligence and is supported by cognitive processes and learning strategies that enable people to acquire, transform, and transmit information and technologies within and across generations. Technological and social innovations are currently driving unprecedented changes in cultural complexity and diversity. Innovation is a cognitively and socially complex, multistep process that typically requires (cumulative) cultural learning to achieve. I argue that the technological solutions that characterize twenty‐first‐century innovation can only be explained by understanding both the capacity to learn from and build upon the insights of others and the transmission systems that store the knowledge and technologies of previous generations. Human uniqueness is a product of cumulative cultural learning, transmission, and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human capacity for technological innovation and creative problem-solving far surpasses that of any species but develops quite late. Prior work has typically presented children with problems requiring a single solution, a limited number of resources, and a limited amount of time. Such tasks do not allow children to utilize one of their strengths: their ability to engage in broad search and exploration. Thus, we hypothesized that a more open-ended innovation task might allow children to demonstrate greater innovative capacity by allowing them to discover and refine a solution over multiple attempts. Children were recruited from a museum and a children's science event in the United Kingdom. We presented 129 children (66 girls, M = 6.91, SD = 2.18) between 4 and 12 years old with a variety of materials and asked children to use those materials to create tools to remove rewards from a box within 10 min. We coded the variety of tools children created each time they attempted to remove the rewards. By comparing successive attempts, we were able to obtain insights about how children built successful tools. Consistent with prior research, we found that older children were more likely than younger children to create successful tools. However, controlling for age, children who engaged in more tinkering—who retained a greater proportion of objects from their failed tools in subsequent attempts and who added more novel objects to their tools following failure—were more likely to build successful tools than children who did not. Public Significance Statement: This study advances how we understand young children's problem-solving skills and capacity for innovation. Prior work has focused on whether children achieve an innovative solution or not; this study captures children's innovative process. Results demonstrate that children who decided to keep more objects from a prior design and who also added more novel objects to their tools following failure were more likely to build successful tools than children who did not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A major evolutionary transition in individuality involves the formation of a cooperative group and the transformation of that group into an evolutionary entity. Human cooperation shares principles with those of multicellular organisms that have undergone transitions in individuality: division of labour, communication, and fitness interdependence. After the split from the last common ancestor of hominoids, early hominins adapted to an increasingly terrestrial niche for several million years. We posit that new challenges in this niche set in motion a positive feedback loop in selection pressure for cooperation that ratcheted coevolutionary changes in sociality, communication, brains, cognition, kin relations and technology, eventually resulting in egalitarian societies with suppressed competition and rapid cumulative culture. The increasing pace of information innovation and transmission became a key aspect of the evolutionary niche that enabled humans to become formidable cooperators with explosive population growth, the ability to cooperate and compete in groups of millions, and emergent social norms, e.g. private property. Despite considerable fitness interdependence, the rise of private property, in concert with population explosion and socioeconomic inequality, subverts potential transition of human groups into evolutionary entities due to resurgence of latent competition and conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of human societies with complex language and cumulative culture is considered a major evolutionary transition. Why such a high degree of cumulative culture is unique to humans is perplexing given the potential fitness advantages of cultural accumulation. Here, Boyd & Richerson’s (1996 Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare. Proc. Br. Acad. 88, 77–93) discrete-cultural-trait model is extended to incorporate arbitrarily strong selection; conformist, anti-conformist and unbiased frequency-dependent transmission; random and periodic environmental variation; finite population size; and multiple ‘skill levels.’ From their infinite-population-size model with success bias and a single skill level, Boyd and Richerson concluded that social learning is favoured over individual learning under a wider range of conditions when social learning is initially common than initially rare. We find that this holds only if the number n of individuals observed by a social learner is sufficiently small, but with a finite population and/or a combination of success-biased and conformist or unbiased transmission, this result holds with larger n. Assuming social learning has reached fixation, the increase in a population’s mean skill level is lower if cumulative culture is initially absent than initially present, if population size is finite, or if cultural transmission has a frequency-dependent component. Hence, multiple barriers to cultural accumulation may explain its rarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The limited evidence of complex culture in non-human primates contrasts strikingly with human behaviour. This may be because non-human primates fail to use information acquired socially as effectively as they use information acquired individually. Here, monkeys were trained on a stimulus discrimination task with a win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) reward structure. In a social learning condition, the experimenter performed an information trial by choosing between the available stimuli; in an individual condition, monkeys made this choice themselves. The monkeys' subsequent test trials displayed the same stimulus array. They were rewarded for repetition of rewarded ('win-stay') and avoidance of unrewarded ('lose-shift') information trial selections. Nine monkeys reached our pre-determined performance criterion on the initial two-stimulus stage. Their ability to generalise the WSLS strategy was then evaluated by transfer to a three-stimulus stage. Minimal differences were found in information use between the social and individual conditions on two-stimuli. However, a bias was found towards repetition of the information trial, regardless of information source condition or whether the information trial selection was rewarded. Proficient subjects were found to generalise the strategy to three-stimuli following rewarded information trials, but performed at chance on unrewarded. Again, this was not found to vary by source condition. Overall, results suggest no fundamental barrier to non-human primates' use of information from a social source. However, the apparent struggle to learn from the absence of rewards hints at a difficulty with using information acquired from unsuccessful attempts; this could be linked to the limited evidence for cumulative culture in non-human primates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant view of cumulative technological culture suggests that high-fidelity transmission rests upon a high-fidelity copying ability, which allows individuals to reproduce the tool-use actions performed by others without needing to understand them (i.e., without causal reasoning). The opposition between copying versus reasoning is well accepted but with little supporting evidence. In this article, we investigate this distinction by examining the cognitive science literature on tool use. Evidence indicates that the ability to reproduce others' tool-use actions requires causal understanding, which questions the copying versus reasoning distinction and the cognitive reality of the so-called copying ability. We conclude that new insights might be gained by considering causal understanding as a key driver of cumulative technological culture. Cumulative technological culture, which describes the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques over generations, is at the root of the evolution of human technology and is considered one of the most important scientific topics of our time. High-fidelity transmission is commonly thought to be the key driver of cumulative technological culture. The cultural niche hypothesis assumes that this transmission rests upon copying abilities, which allow individuals to reproduce others' tool-use actions without the need of understanding them. We investigate whether the opposition between copying versus understanding possesses a cognitive reality by examining the cognitive science literature on tool use. Evidence suggests that the ability to reproduce others' tool-use actions requires causal understanding, which challenges the validity of the copying hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A mere few decades ago, culture was thought a unique human attribute. Evidence to the contrary accumulated through the latter part of the twentieth century and has exploded in the present one, demonstrating the transmission of traditions through social learning across all principal vertebrate taxa and even invertebrates, notably insects. The scope of human culture is nevertheless highly distinctive. What makes our cultural capacities and their cognitive underpinnings so different? In this article I argue that in behavioural scientists' endeavours to answer this question, fruitful research pathways and their ensuing discoveries have come to exist alongside popular, yet in the light of current empirical evidence, highly questionable scenarios and even scientific blind alleys. I particularly re-evaluate theories that rely on the centrality of a supposed uniquely human capacity for imitative copying in explaining the distinctive capacity for massive cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) in our species. The most extreme versions of this perspective suffer logical incoherence and severe limits on scientific testability. By contrast the field has generated a range of rigorous observational and experimental methodologies that have revealed both long-term cultural fidelity and limited forms of CCE in non-human species. Attention now turns to directly investigating the scope, limits and underlying cognition of non-human versus human CCE, with a broader approach to factors additional to cultural transmission, notably the role of invention, innovation and evolved motivational biases underlying the scope of CCE in the species studied. • Accumulating evidence demonstrates both culture and cumulative culture in animals. • In this light I offer a re-evaluation of contrasts between human and animal culture. • I argue that multiple popular theories range from shaky to misleading. • A suite of methodological advances is nevertheless yielding significant advances. • A specific focus now emerges in the comparative study of cumulative culture itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the increase in the use of dynamical modeling in the literature on cultural evolution makes current models more mathematically sophisticated, these models have yet to be tested or validated. This paper provides a testable deep active inference formulation of social behavior and accompanying simulations of cumulative culture in two steps: First, we cast cultural transmission as a bi-directional process of communication that induces a generalized synchrony (operationalized as a particular convergence) between the belief states of interlocutors. Second, we cast social or cultural exchange as a process of active inference by equipping agents with the choice of who to engage in communication with. This induces trade-offs between confirmation of current beliefs and exploration of the social environment. We find that cumulative culture emerges from belief updating (i.e., active inference and learning) in the form of a joint minimization of uncertainty. The emergent cultural equilibria are characterized by a segregation into groups, whose belief systems are actively sustained by selective, uncertainty minimizing, dyadic exchanges. The nature of these equilibria depends sensitively on the precision afforded by various probabilistic mappings in each individual's generative model of their encultured niche.

Since Darwin's theory of evolution, adaptationism is frequently invoked to explain cognition and cultural processes. Adaptationism can be described as a prescriptive view, as phenotypes that do not optimize fitness should not be selected by natural selection. From an epistemological perspective, the principle of a prescriptive definition of adaptation seems incompatible with recent advances in epigenetics, evolutionary developmental biology, ethology, and genomics. From these challenges, a proscriptive view of adaptation has emerged, postulating that phenotypes that are not deleterious will be evolutionary maintained. In this epistemological investigation, we examine how the shift from adaptationism to a proscriptive view changes our view of cognition and culture. We argue that, while adaptationism leads to cognitivism and a view of culture as strategies to optimize overall fitness, the proscriptive definition favors embodied theories of cognition and a view of culture as the cumulative diffusion of behaviors allowed by the constraints of reproduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conducted a nationally representative survey of parents' beliefs and self‐reported behaviors regarding childhood vaccinations. Using Bayesian selection among multivariate models, we found that beliefs, even those without any vaccine or health content, predicted vaccine‐hesitant behaviors better than demographics, social network effects, or scientific reasoning. The multivariate structure of beliefs combined many types of ideation that included concerns about both conspiracies and side effects. Although they are not strongly related to vaccine‐hesitant behavior, demographics were key predictors of beliefs. Our results support some of the previously proposed pro‐vaccination messaging strategies and suggest some new strategies not previously considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cumulative cultural evolution is often claimed to be distinctive of human culture. Such claims are typically supported with examples of complex and historically late‐appearing technologies. Yet by taking these as paradigm cases, researchers unhelpfully lump together different ways that culture accumulates. This article has two aims: (a) to distinguish four types of cultural accumulation: adaptiveness, complexity, efficiency, and disparity and (b) to highlight the epistemic implications of taking complex hominin technologies as paradigmatic instances of cumulative culture. Addressing these issues both clarifies the cumulative culture concept and demonstrates the importance of further cumulative culture research into non‐human animals and ancestral hominins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Darwin posited that social competition among conspecifics could be a powerful selective pressure. Alexander proposed a model of human evolution involving a runaway process of social competition based on Darwin’s insight. Here we briefly review Alexander’s logic, and then expand upon his model by elucidating six core arenas of social selection that involve runaway, positive-feedback processes, and that were likely involved in the evolution of the remarkable combination of adaptations in humans. We discuss how these ideas fit with the hypothesis that a key life history innovation that opened the door to runaway social selection, and cumulative culture, during hominin evolution was increased cooperation among individuals in small fission-fusion groups.

Teaching likely evolved in humans to facilitate the faithful transmission of complex tasks. As the oldest evidenced hunting technology, spear hunting requires acquiring several complex physical and cognitive competencies. In this study, we used observational and interview data collected among BaYaka foragers (Republic of the Congo) to test the predictions that costlier teaching types would be observed at a greater frequency than less costly teaching in the domain of spear hunting and that teachers would calibrate their teaching to pupil skill level. To observe naturalistic teaching during spear hunting, we invited teacher–pupil groupings to spear hunt while wearing GoPro cameras. We analysed 68 h of footage totalling 519 teaching episodes. Most observed teaching events were costly. Direct instruction was the most frequently observed teaching type. Older pupils received less teaching and more opportunities to lead the spear hunt than their younger counterparts. Teachers did not appear to adjust their teaching to pupil experience, potentially because age was a more easily accessible heuristic for pupil skill than experience. Our study shows that costly teaching is frequently used to transmit complex tasks and that instruction may play a privileged role in the transmission of spear hunting knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some theories propose that human cumulative culture is dependent on explicit, system-2, metacognitive processes. To test this, we investigated whether access to working memory is required for cumulative cultural evolution. We restricted access to adults' working-memory (WM) via a dual-task paradigm, to assess whether this reduced performance in a cultural evolution task, and a metacognitive monitoring task. In total, 247 participants completed either a grid search task or a metacognitive monitoring task in conjunction with a WM task and a matched control. Participants' behaviour in the grid search task was then used to simulate the outcome of iterating the task over multiple generations. Participants in the grid search task scored higher after observing higher-scoring examples, but could only beat the scores of low-scoring example trials. Scores did not differ significantly between the control and WM distractor blocks, although more errors were made when under WM load. The simulation showed similar levels of cumulative score improvement across conditions. However, scores plateaued without reaching the maximum. Metacognitive efficiency was low in both blocks, with no indication of dual-task interference. Overall, we found that taxing working-memory resources did not prevent cumulative score improvement on this task, but impeded it slightly relative to a control distractor task. However, we found no evidence that the dual-task manipulation impacted participants' ability to use explicit metacognition. Although we found minimal evidence in support of the explicit metacognition theory of cumulative culture, our results provide valuable insights into empirical approaches that could be used to further test predictions arising from this account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prepared Core Technologies, often considered a hallmark of the Middle Paleolithic Mousterian, have recently been observed, to some extent, in many late Lower Paleolithic Acheulian sites. This may indicate a Lower Paleolithic origin of the Levallois method, although the circumstances leading to its emergence, spread and assimilation are still debated. We aim at contributing towards this intriguing issue by studying patterns of flint procurement and exploitation at Late Acheulian Jaljulia (Israel; ∼500–300 kya). We classified artifacts into flint types, using four samples: a general sample, bifaces, “regular” cores with one/two striking platforms, and prepared cores, divided into proto-Levallois, prepared (general) and discoid cores. A geologic survey located potential flint sources, and a petrographic analysis was used to assign flint types to sources. Our results show that while local Turonian flint of the Bi’na Formation dominates the general sample, selectivity in using specific flint types was observed, including among local materials. While brecciated flint types are especially common among handaxes and discoid cores, among proto-Levallois and prepared cores (general), fine-textured homogenous flint types are more common, suggesting that such flint types are better-suited when improved control over the end-product was desired. Based on our results, and following previous suggestions, we support the hypothesis that prepared core technologies in the Levant did not originate from one single technological trajectory. We support the idea that the production of predetermined blanks was based on knowledge gathered from several technological trajectories, including mainly biface shaping and the production of flakes from regular cores. This novel method was most likely transmitted time and again between individuals, gradually adjusting it to produce improved end-products. We see these conclusions as additional support for the view of prepared core technologies at the Late Acheulian as a demonstration of cumulative culture, and the existence of high-fidelity social learning mechanisms in practice already during the late Lower Paleolithic of the Levant.

Culture can be defined as "group typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a community that rely on socially learned and transmitted information" (Laland and Hoppitt, 2003, p. 151). Once thought to be a distinguishing characteristic of humans relative to other animals (Dean et al., 2014) it is now generally accepted to exist more widely, with especially abundant evidence in non-human primates, cetaceans, and birds (Rendell and Whitehead, 2001; Aplin, 2019; Whiten, 2021). More recently, cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) has taken on this distinguishing role (Henrich, 2015; Laland, 2018). CCE, it is argued, allows humans, uniquely, to ratchet up the complexity or efficiency of cultural traits over time. This "ratchet effect" (Tomasello, 1994) gives the capacity to accumulate beneficial modifications over time beyond the capacities of a single individual (Sasaki and Biro, 2017). Mesoudi and Thornton (2018) define a core set of criteria for identifying CCE in humans and non-human animals that places emphasis on some performance measure of traits increasing over time. They suggest this emphasis is also pertinent to cultural products in the aesthetic domain, but is this the case? Music, art and dance evolve over time (Savage, 2019), but can we say they gain beneficial modifications that increase their aesthetic value? Here we bring together perspectives from philosophy, musicology and biology to build a conceptual analysis of this question. We summarise current thinking on cumulative culture and aesthetics across fields to determine how aesthetic culture fits into the concept of CCE. We argue that this concept is problematic to reconcile with dominant views of aesthetics in philosophical analysis and struggles to characterise aesthetic cultures that evolve over time. We suggest that a tension arises from fundamental differences between cultural evolution in aesthetic and technological domains. Furthermore, this tension contributes to current debates between reconstructive and preservative theories of cultural evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cumulative cultural evolution (CCE)—defined as the process by which beneficial modifications are culturally transmitted and progressively accumulated over time—has long been argued to underlie the unparalleled diversity and complexity of human culture. In this paper, I argue that not just any kind of cultural accumulation will give rise to human-like culture. Rather, I suggest that human CCE depends on the gradual exploitation of natural phenomena, which are features of our environment that, through the laws of physics, chemistry or biology, generate reliable effects which can be exploited for a purpose. I argue that CCE comprises two distinct processes: optimizing cultural traits that exploit a given set of natural phenomena (Type I CCE) and expanding the set of natural phenomena we exploit (Type II CCE). I argue that the most critical features of human CCE, including its open-ended dynamic, stems from Type II CCE. Throughout the paper, I contrast the two processes and discuss their respective socio-cognitive requirements. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social learning in non-human primates has been studied experimentally for over 120 years, yet until the present century this was limited to what one individual learns from a single other. Evidence of group-wide traditions in the wild then highlighted the collective context for social learning, and broader 'diffusion experiments' have since demonstrated transmission at the community level. In the present article, we describe and set in comparative perspective three strands of our recent research that further explore the collective dimensions of culture and cumulative culture in chimpanzees. First, exposing small communities of chimpanzees to contexts incorporating increasingly challenging, but more rewarding tool use opportunities revealed solutions arising through the combination of different individuals' discoveries, spreading to become shared innovations. The second series of experiments yielded evidence of conformist changes from habitual techniques to alternatives displayed by a unanimous majority of others but implicating a form of quorum decision-making. Third, we found that between-group differences in social tolerance were associated with differential success in developing more complex tool use to exploit an increasingly inaccessible resource. We discuss the implications of this array of findings in the wider context of related studies of humans, other primates and non-primate species. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The biological approach to culture focuses almost exclusively on processes of social learning, to the neglect of processes of cultural coordination including joint action and shared intentionality. In this paper, we argue that the distinctive features of human culture derive from humans' unique skills and motivations for coordinating with one another around different types of action and information. As different levels of these skills of 'shared intentionality' emerged over the last several hundred thousand years, human culture became characterized first by such things as collaborative activities and pedagogy based on cooperative communication, and then by such things as collaborative innovations and normatively structured pedagogy. As a kind of capstone of this trajectory, humans began to coordinate not just on joint actions and shared beliefs, but on the reasons for what we believe or how we act. Coordinating on reasons powered the kinds of extremely rapid innovation and stable cumulative cultural evolution especially characteristic of the human species in the last several tens of thousands of years. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various studies have investigated cognitive mechanisms underlying culture in humans and other great apes. However, the adaptive reasons for the evolution of uniquely sophisticated cumulative culture in our species remain unclear. We propose that the cultural capabilities of humans are the evolutionary result of a stepwise transition from the ape-like lifestyle of earlier hominins to the foraging niche still observed in extant hunter–gatherers. Recent ethnographic, archaeological and genetic studies have provided compelling evidence that the components of the foraging niche (social egalitarianism, sexual and social division of labour, extensive co-residence and cooperation with unrelated individuals, multilocality, fluid sociality and high between-camp mobility) engendered a unique multilevel social structure where the cognitive mechanisms underlying cultural evolution (high-fidelity transmission, innovation, teaching, recombination, ratcheting) evolved as adaptations. Therefore, multilevel sociality underlies a 'social ratchet' or irreversible task specialization splitting the burden of cultural knowledge across individuals, which may explain why human collective intelligence is uniquely able to produce sophisticated cumulative culture. The foraging niche perspective may explain why a complex gene-culture dual inheritance system evolved uniquely in humans and interprets the cultural, morphological and genetic origins of Homo sapiens as a process of recombination of innovations appearing in differentiated but interconnected populations. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on study of social learning in robots. Topics include playing a significant role in the lives of numerous vertebrate taxa and perhaps of invertebrates raising the prospect of cultural evolution in the world of machines; and integrating different contributions from different individuals and spreading through social learning.

Cultural evolution depends on both innovation (the creation of new cultural variants by accident or design) and high-fidelity transmission (which preserves our accumulated knowledge and allows the storage of normative conventions). What is required is an overarching theory encompassing both dimensions, specifying the psychological motivations and mechanisms involved. The bifocal stance theory (BST) of cultural evolution proposes that the co-existence of innovative change and stable tradition results from our ability to adopt different motivational stances flexibly during social learning and transmission. We argue that the ways in which instrumental and ritual stances are adopted in cultural transmission influence the nature and degree of copying fidelity and thus also patterns of cultural spread and stability at a population level over time. BST creates a unifying framework for interpreting the findings of otherwise seemingly disparate areas of enquiry, including social learning, cumulative culture, overimitation, and ritual performance. We discuss the implications of BST for competing by-product accounts which assume that faithful copying is merely a side-effect of instrumental learning and action parsing. We also set out a novel "cultural action framework" bringing to light aspects of social learning that have been relatively neglected by behavioural ecologists and evolutionary psychologists and establishing a roadmap for future research on this topic. The BST framework sheds new light on the cognitive underpinnings of cumulative cultural change, selection, and spread within an encompassing evolutionary framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Population size has been proposed to promote cumulative culture in humans. Experimental evidence from adult humans suggests that one explanatory mechanism might involve combining beneficial information from multiple models. However, it is possible that such combinatory social learning requires cognitive capacities restricted to adult humans. In our task, children aged 5-10 were exposed to two models who consecutively searched a 333 array for rewards. Models revealed different correct and incorrect reward locations. This information could be used by the child to maximise their own score on the same task. We were interested in children's ability to select rewarded locations, and avoid unrewarded ones, revealed by both models. We also manipulated the spatial and temporal displacement of the information available. Results showed that the youngest children were unable to fully benefit from the additional information provided by the two models under spatial and/or temporal displacement. Such displacement likely applies in most real-world cases of cumulative culture therefore our result may offer insight into the constraints on cumulative culture in nonhumans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Culture can be defined as “group typical behaviour patterns shared by members of a community that rely on socially learned and transmitted information” (Laland and Hoppitt, 2003, p. 151). Once thought to be a distinguishing characteristic of humans relative to other animals (Dean et al., 2014) it is now generally accepted to exist more widely, with especially abundant evidence in non-human primates, cetaceans, and birds (Rendell and Whitehead, 2001; Aplin, 2019; Whiten, 2021). More recently, cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) has taken on this distinguishing role (Henrich, 2015; Laland, 2018). CCE, it is argued, allows humans, uniquely, to ratchet up the complexity or efficiency of cultural traits over time. This “ratchet effect” (Tomasello, 1994) gives the capacity to accumulate beneficial modifications over time beyond the capacities of a single individual (Sasaki and Biro, 2017). Mesoudi and Thornton (2018) define a core set of criteria for identifying CCE in humans and non-human animals that places emphasis on some performance measure of traits increasing over time. They suggest this emphasis is also pertinent to cultural products in the aesthetic domain, but is this the case? Music, art and dance evolve over time (Savage, 2019), but can we say they gain beneficial modifications that increase their aesthetic value? Here we bring together perspectives from philosophy, musicology and biology to build a conceptual analysis of this question. We summarise current thinking on cumulative culture and aesthetics across fields to determine how aesthetic culture fits into the concept of CCE. We argue that this concept is problematic to reconcile with dominant views of aesthetics in philosophical analysis and struggles to characterise aesthetic cultures that evolve over time. We suggest that a tension arises from fundamental differences between cultural evolution in aesthetic and technological domains. Furthermore, this tension contributes to current debates between reconstructive and preservative theories of cultural evolution.

Weapons technology is a key factor contributing to cultural evolution because it enables humans actively to protect themselves from a variety of natural threats and expand their access to resources. In contrast to non-military technologies, the purpose of which is to subordinate and shape inanimate, non-intentional or trivial, regular states, weapons primarily serve to assert one’s own will against self-determined, intentional and non-trivially acting organisms. This functional idiosyncrasy establishes the basis for a continuous arms race, which begins with the need to anticipate phenotypical and mental abilities of animals and other humans through weapons technology before leading to the anticipation of attack and defence capacities of groups and, ultimately, the anticipation of accumulated intelligence and productive accomplishments of entire political states. The dynamics of development in weapons technology prove that weapons are simultaneously an index and a motor of cultural and cognitive evolution. Weapons reflect the organizational and technical capabilities of cultures, indicating special cognitive capacities bound up with the abstract anticipation of enemies as well as the ability to produce mental models of complex adversarial entities. At the same time, weapons relay intercultural and internal selection pressures by playing a decisive role in the processes of general technological and organizational innovation. This innovation also influences the formation of practices, norms, motives and self-images. As such, weapons technology concretizes an integral principle governing cultural evolution and civilizational history. Author(s): Davor Löffler, John J. McGraw and Niels N. Johannsen Title (English): Weapons in and as History: On the Ontogenerative Function of Materialized Preemption and Intelligence in Weapons Technology Journal Reference: Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol. 16, No. 1-2 (Summer - Winter 2019) Publisher: Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities - Skopje Page Range: 68-77 Page Count: 10 Citation (English): Davor Löffler, John J. McGraw and Niels N. Johannsen, “Weapons in and as History: On the Ontogenerative Function of Materialized Preemption and Intelligence in Weapons Technology,” Identities: Journal for Politics, Gender and Culture, Vol. 16, No. 1-2 (Summer - Winter 2019): 68-77.