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Enligt gällande västliga militära planeringsdoktriner, inklusive den svenska som den formuleras i Svensk planerings och ledningsmetod (SPL), är tyngdpunktsanalyser av såväl motståndaren som den egna sidan avgörande steg i planeringsprocesserna på både strategisk och operativ nivå. Tyngdpunkten kan anfallas eller påverkas direkt eller indirekt, i det ideala fallet genom att slå mot kritiska sårbarheter. Kritiska sårbarheter kan ofta vara av teknisk karaktär, vilket historiska erfarenheter visar. Bristande teknisk förståelse riskerar därmed leda till att kritiska sårbarheter hos fienden inte exploateras och att våra egna inte skyddas. De nyckelfaktorer som bygger upp tyngdpunkten ska enligt doktrinerna identifieras genom systemanalys. Beskrivningarna av vad en systemanalys är eller hur denna kan genomföras saknar dock både tillräckligt djup och tydlighet för att kunna användas praktiskt och ge önskad kvalitet. Detta riskerar att ge stora konsekvenser för den fortsatta planeringen. I uppsatsen föreslås en utvecklad metod för tyngdpunktsanalys, med fokus på hur de kritiska sårbarheterna identifieras och värderas. Metodens huvudsakliga moment är modellering och klassificering, där klassificeringsmomentet sker med en föreslagen metod som hämtat stöd från såväl verkansprocessen som civil forskning om systemsårbarheter. Metoden operationaliseras i uppsatsen och prövas i en fallstudie med två fall. Slutsatserna från undersökningen indikerar att den föreslagna metoden är användbar och har förklaringskraft i de undersökta fallen. För att analysen av kritiska sårbarheter ska nå tillräcklig kvalitet krävs djupa systemkunskaper och inte minst resurser i form av personal och tid. Den föreslagna metoden behöver prövas i sin helhet för att utvärdera den praktiska användbarheten., According to contemporary western military doctrines, and Swedish doctrine is no exception, analyses of the centers of gravity of enemy and friendly forces are vital steps in the planning process at the strategic and operational levels of war. Centers of gravity might be attacked or influenced directly or indirectly, ideally by targeting critical vulnerabilities. Critical vulnerabilities are often of a technical nature, as shown by historical experience. A lack of technical understanding might lead to enemy vulnerabilities not being exploited and our own not being adequately protected. According to doctrine, a center of gravity’s key factors should be identified through systems analysis of enemy and friendly forces. However, descriptions of what these analyses are, or how they should be conducted, lack sufficient depth and clarity to be used in practice and provide sufficient quality. This is likely to have negative consequences for continued planning. This thesis proposes a developed method for center of gravity analysis, focusing on the identification and evaluation of critical vulnerabilities. The main elements of the method are modeling and classification, where the classification is conducted using a proposed method, supported by a method within the targeting process, and by civilian research into system vulnerabilities. The full method is operationalized in the thesis and tested in a two-case study. The conclusions from the study indicate that the proposed method is usable and has explanatory value in the cases studied. To achieve sufficient quality in the analysis of critical vulnerabilities, in-depth systems knowledge and, not least, resources in terms of staff and time are required. The proposed method needs to be tested in its entirety to evaluate its practical usability.

The overarching goal of this research study is to gain a greater understanding of the effects and implications that anti-GPS threats can have on the employment of GPS within the MAGtF given the context of a plausible, real-world scenario. The study begins by providing an overview of key concepts relevant to the problem and examines current and emerging threats within the contemporary environment. The study then conducts a qualitative assessment of the impact Anti-GPS threats can have on a MAGTF's capabilities using several plausible vignettes. It examines and assesses potential rival claims and opposing viewpoints in relation to the study s assessment. Finally, the study provides recommendations regarding future GPS use within the MAGTF.

The death of Usama bin Laden (UBL) and the Arab Spring have led to multiple pronouncements suggesting that Al Qaeda's (AQ) strategic defeat is near. Such judgments may be premature, as AQ's operational center of gravity (COG) -- its affiliate network collectively known as AQ and Associated Movements (AQAM) -- has not been significantly weakened by these events, and enables AQ to remain a viable terror organization. Tied together by a common ideology which still finds resonance in a post-Arab Spring Muslim world, AQAM retains the capability and intent to conduct terror operations despite the loss of their ideological leader. Moreover, UBL's death and the Arab Spring may offer AQAM certain opportunities for growth, as AQAM elements vie for strategic control of the movement and exploit potential dissatisfaction with Arab Spring outcomes. As AQAM evolves in the post-UBL, post-Arab Spring world, approaches to combating its influence must evolve as well, with renewed emphasis on countering AQ's narrative while broadening kinetic efforts to reduce AQAM's freedom of movement at the operational level of war.

A strategic center of gravity analysis of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reveals four mutually-supporting critical capabilities that provide the Party's primary capacity to maintain dominant power and authority in China. However, a major deficiency assumed by one critical capability also becomes a critical vulnerability assumed by the entire system, weakening the CCP's capacity to cope with additional stress. This paper provides an initial set of essential definitions for key center of gravity-related attributes, proposes a construct for the term political resilience, and outlines an analytical framework for the study. The paper explains the history and organizational nature of the CCP as a strategic center of gravity followed by a comprehensive examination of each critical capability. Using this analysis, the study yields five major findings: a mutual buttressing effect among the Party's critical capabilities; a focus to bind the nation to the Party; a current lack of synergism of instabilities; the mixed-impact of China's looming demographic challenges; and potential domestic constraints on the CCP's near-term ability to pursue pragmatic policies. The paper concludes with a brief look at the Party's ultimate future in China., Strategy Research Project.

This paper argues that to counter border spillover violence, America must control the border with Mexico and generate the public and political commitment to do so. This study applies a military problem solving methodology to identify how best to counter spillover violence. The methodology, which is described in a student text at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, enables the author to sift through the data of six prominent, recent studies which address the U.S.-Mexico drug problem. The conclusions and emphasis that arise from the methodology discern that border control, which is downplayed in the six prominent studies, should be--in fact--the U.S. government's critical focus., The original document contains color images.

Försvarsmaktens förändring genom reformarbetet mot ett insatt insatsförsvar, har lett till ett fokus mot delvis nya uppgifter. Expeditionära operationer är en sådan uppgift, som innebär förändrade krav och förmågor på materiel och personal. Problemet, som uppsatsen vill belysa, är att vid planering och genomförande är taktiska uppgifter i operationsområdet dimensionerande i för hög grad. På det viset läggs inte tillräcklig kraft på hur förbandet ska komma på plats och hur bäst förutsättningar för uthållighet ska säkerställas över tiden. Det är därför angeläget att en noggrann analys genomförs i planläggningsskedet, så att egna kritiska sårbarheter kan identifieras. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka vilka kritiska sårbarheter som är tydligast ur ett logistiskt perspektiv, vid en vald expeditionär operation. Innebörden är att identifiera de kritiska sårbarheterna som uppstod och de som skulle ha kunnat påverka den expeditionära operationens målsättning. Den expeditionära operationen som behandlas är den svenska insatsen i Tchad 2008. Analysverktyget som används för att genomlysa den är en operationalisering av Milan Vegos operationella faktorer tid, rum och styrka. Resultatet pekar på tre områden som kritiska sårbarheter. De identifierades vid deployering och redeployering, inom hälso- och sjukvården samt av att förbandet inte klarade att hantera den omfattande mängden materiel och förnödenheter., The Swedish Armed Forces have, as a consequence of the transformation, focused on partly new tasks. Expeditionary operations are one of these tasks, which denote changed demands on equipment and necessary competence of the personnel. The problem this study will try to clarify is the risk within focus too much on the tactical task in the area of operations. In that way the planning doesn't evaluate the needs in its entirety. To overlook details in the deployment and the endurance in the area could create critical vulnerabilities already in the planning of the operation. The purpose of this study is to investigate the most obvious critical vulnerabilities, in a logistic perspective, during a chosen expeditionary operation. Both to identify the critical vulnerabilities arisen and those which could have had an affect on the aim of the expeditionary operation. The expeditionary operation is the case-study of the Swedish participation in EUFOR Chad/CAR 2008. The tool that is used to analyze the case-study is the author's interpretation of Milan Vegos operational factors time, space and force. The result of the study shows three areas as critical vulnerabilities. They were identified at deployment and redeployment, within the medical service and that the force couldn't manage to deal with the amount of equipment and supplies

With the U.S. military tasked to conduct multiple concurrent global operations and enemies who eschew traditional warfare, it has become vitally important to protect critical U.S. vulnerabilities and ensure the safety of the U.S. center of gravity. Likewise, with the U.S. military shifting towards capabilities-based planning and application of the military aspect of national power with limited resources, an accurate determination of an adversary's critical vulnerabilities will enable friendly forces to select a course of action that best attacks the enemy's center of gravity via indirect means. A methodical deconstruction and analysis of the center of gravity enables a precise identification of the critical vulnerabilities to attack or defend. Although numerous methods have been developed for critical factors analysis, they are individually inadequate to accurately and consistently provide the information vital to operational success. The methodology presented in this paper offers a logical, pragmatic synthesis of established best practices that will better allow operational commanders to apply all aspects of national power to destroy the enemy's center of gravity and also protect the U.S. center of gravity.

After over 6 years of national effort, which has included the loss of nearly 4,000 service members in combat operations and the expenditure of over 500 billion dollars of national wealth, many questions have been raised regarding the nation's strategy to counter a threat based on a radical revolutionary religious ideology. Some argue that this threat constitutes a global insurgency. This Strategy Research Project examines the nature of this 21st century threat and analyzes the option of "strategic paralysis" to counter it. The analysis begins with consideration of the global insurgency as a "system of systems." It continues with a discussion of its cultural, ideological, and political ideals and its strategic ends, ways, and means. The author then describes the ends, ways, and means of the current U.S. strategy for combating this global threat. Finally, he proposes a strategic adaptation of John Warden's "Five Rings" Model as a means to identify critical threat nodes and use the instruments of national power to impose strategic paralysis on the enemy., USAWC Strategy Research Project.

The transformation into a world based on communication and information leads to Information Operations (IO) becoming more important than ever. Thus, there is a need to develop new methodologies for successful IO that take into account the change towards network-enabling warfare capabilities. In a network-centric warfare approach it is important to understand the opponents' network structure and communication system and how they use these resources. Equally important is to understand one's own network structure in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Every type of network has it own vulnerabilities in the form of vital nodes, links, and platforms, regardless of whether it is a communications, organizational, or biological network. If one understand one's own structure as well as that of one's opponents, the chances of effective IO increase greatly. A fruitful way forward is to use theories based on center of gravity (CoG) and critical vulnerabilities (CV). This paper first discusses the logic of networks in general terms and then considers different types of networks and their respective abilities to resist attacks of different kinds due to center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Twenty briefing charts summarize the presentation., Presented at the Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS) held in San Diego, CA, on 20-22 Jun 2006. The original document contains color images.

If the United States is to be successful in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), it is essential for the nation to sustain strong economic capabilities. The U.S. economy is a center of gravity that is also a target of Al Qaeda and other jihadis. Terrorists are patient; they are prepared to let internal pressures on the U.S. economy weaken other elements of U.S. national power. Specific threats include critical vulnerabilities such as the oil supply, the budget deficit, and lack of unity of effort in interagency strategy, policy, and resource management. Opportunities exist for the United States to marginalize the threat to the U.S. economy. However, the complexity of the problems, the political risk associated with some of the solutions, the duration to realize the outcomes, and institutional drag make unity of effort extremely difficult to achieve. Sustainable solutions are achievable if the political will can be generated to make effective long-run fiscal policy decisions. The United States has the economic advantage in the GWOT campaign. However, we must improve fiscal responsibility to sustain our domestic capability to finance counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, in collaboration with other nations, private industry, and academia, the nation should use market forces as a weapon against terrorists. Federal government spending should be limited to 20 percent (plus or minus 3 percent) of Gross Domestic Product. Discretionary and mandatory spending programs should be redesigned with spending caps to be sustainable and minimize the drag they place on the budget deficit. Furthermore, the U.S. Government should establish an economic fusion cell in the National Security Council to improve strategy, policy, and resource integration. Finally, the United States should accelerate efforts to bring viable fuel alternatives such as the Hydrogen Fuel Cell Initiative to the mass market.

Network-centric warfare (NCW), as a theory of war, relies on the premise that ubiquitously networked forces and capabilities will outperform forces that are not. Put another way, all things being equal, the side with the ability to network will generally win. Fundamentally, then, the key enabler of NCW is represented by the functioning of the network that connects sensors, shooters, and decision makers in a system exploiting the synergy of its dispersed parts. While the ubiquity and health of the network is therefore paramount, weapons designed to attack the electronic components of that network can, in an instant, vaporize U.S. technological and operational superiority and render future, NCW-based combatant commanders and military forces impotent. This paper explores the relationships between NCW, systems and chaos theories, Col. John R. Boyd's decision-making model, and their impact on a potential operational center of gravity and its subsequent vulnerabilities; identification of likely threats posed by potential adversaries to hold U.S. networked forces at risk; and recommended solutions to defend against those threats.

As history has shown, it is important to correctly identify the nature of a war in which one is engaged so that an appropriate strategy can be developed to win the war. As the United States enters the fourth year in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), it is important to examine three issues that are crucial for winning the war: first, a re-assessment of the GWOT as a war against global insurgency rather than a war against terrorism; second, an analysis of the concept of the center of gravity as it relates to the GWOT; and third, an examination of potential enemy and friendly centers of gravity and their impact on the conduct of the war. Through this examination of the GWOT, the author hopes to point out some possible shortcomings of current U.S. strategy and provide possible alternatives that could be followed to ensure victory in the shortest time and at the lowest possible cost.

The thesis of this paper is that religion is the center of gravity for radical Islamic terrorists, and that is precisely where a Combatant Commander should focus his attention to accomplish his theater objectives in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The author begins with a brief history of Islam and selected sects, shedding insight as to the origin of the radical Islamic terrorist ideology. He then identifies the relationship between Islam and terrorism, focusing on the concept of "jihad." When a commander identifies the wrong Center of Gravity of the enemy, it can have grave consequences in warfare. The author defines Center of Gravity and its importance for the Combatant Commander. Critical strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities are three very important factors that can help identify the enemy's Center of Gravity. The author demonstrates the fallacy of "jihad" as it pertains to terrorism as well as suicide bombers. In the GWOT, the strategic Center of Gravity lies in the hearts and minds of uncommitted Muslims. Ultimately, the Combatant Commander must make the most of his information warfare and psychological operations personnel if he is to have the greatest impact on the enemy's Center of Gravity.

The Armed Forces have come a long way in understanding centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. The former are equated to strength, the latter to weakness. As stated in "The Joint Staff Officer's Guide," multiple centers of gravity may exist on a given level of warfare and change during a campaign, sometimes unexpectedly when an enemy shifts the weight of its attack, thus uncovering an new center of gravity. Nevertheless, ambiguities abound. That same publication contains the following statement: "Centers of gravity are the characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. On the strategic level, centers of gravity might include a military force, an alliance, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself." According to this definition, a military force cannot be a center of gravity, yet it is cited as an example. It also presents a choice among characteristic, capability, or location, when in reality all three exist simultaneously in mutual dependency. A force operating in a given location is ineffective without essential characteristics and capabilities. Moreover, the use of terms such as "foundation of capability," "hub of all power and movement," and "dominant characteristics" is ambiguous enough. And worse, they are invariably accompanied by an expansive list of examples that include alliances, communities of interest, public opinion, and "national strategy itself." Clausewitzian centers of gravity are not characteristics, capabilities, or locations. They are dynamic and powerful physical and moral agents of action or influence with certain qualities and capabilities that derive their benefit from a given location or terrain. Further analysis is required to clearly define the relationship between centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities, thus enabling planners to better focus sources of power on developing successful campaigns., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), n35 p20-27, Oct 2004.

Advanced by Carl von Clausewitz, the concept of center of gravity is a popular strategic theory. Military transformation assigns a dominant role in doctrine to this concept despite its roots in the industrial age. Yet after more than two decades of controversy, the meaning of center of gravity remains unsettled. Fortunately, some of the confusion can be eliminated by returning to its original sense. Both the concept and its analogue in the mechanical sciences have common properties: neither is a source of strength, but rather a point at which physical and psychological forces meet. As a result, doctrine should be revised -- in particular, Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," and Joint Pub 5-00.1, "Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning," to establish a clear understanding of the meaning of center of gravity. Each service has applied the concept of center of gravity differently. In the mid-1990s the military attempted to consolidate individual service perspectives into a single definition. The Armed Forces have reached a critical point. On the one hand, the concept of center of gravity could be replaced by "center of criticality" to more accurately represent its original meaning. Then center of gravity can be deleted from the military lexicon. On the other hand, if the concept is retained to focus on an element that compels an enemy to collapse, center of gravity should be redefined to mean focal point. By choosing the latter path, planners would be better positioned to incorporate ideas such as effects-based operations. But the concept must be applied judiciously. At a time when an enemy can operate in a decentralized manner globally, certain situations may arise in which the idea does not apply and pursuing it will not benefit warfighters., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), n35 p10-17, Oct 2004.

For more than two centuries America has relied upon both expeditionary and mainland-based forces to win wars. Large air and land forces have operated in concert with naval striking and expeditionary forces to provide national security from enemies with similar military structures. However, the end of the Cold War produced new threats to national security as new enemies chose not to field large armed forces, like those of the Soviet Union, but decided in favor of smaller, asymmetric groups, as demonstrated by Al Qaeda and their attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. Simultaneously, America also has been forced to reassess its historical practice of basing forward-deployed forces in friendly countries during peacetime and conflict, as evidenced by Turkey's refusal to permit American forces to use their country as a staging area for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consequently, American forces must transform into lighter, more agile expeditionary forces that will be primarily based at sea to defeat future threats quickly and decisively abroad. However, will basing Joint Force Commanders (JFC), JFC headquarters, Component Commanders, and the preponderance of Joint Forces at sea during conflict create critical vulnerabilities for Theater Combatant Commanders? Conceptually, Sea Basing will provide Theater Commanders with the advantages of sovereign security, immediate employability, and operational independence. However, operational protection of a sea-based JFC's headquarters, Component Commanders, and Joint Forces will be the most crucial element of future mission success. What are the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Sea Basing Joint Forces? Are they significant? This study evaluates the overall effectiveness and utility of Sea Basing to the Combatant Commander by critically analyzing the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of Sea Basing Joint Theater Forces.