Search

The people of Afghanistan continue to face challenges in primary health care despite the expenditure of over $92 billion on humanitarian assistance. Therefore, using the Afghanistan experience as a model, what interventions by the United States Army are optimal in the development of host-nation health systems during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations? To answer this, statistical analysis evaluated 14 countries with an insurgency against 42 non-insurgency countries that spanned diverse economic, geographic, and cultural backgrounds. Analysis showed that high-income nations were better than insurgent countries in every category that achieved statistical significance. As such, COIN goals should not include healthcare expectations similar to those in high-income nations. In addition, it appears that insurgency imposes an opportunity cost on the overall health of a society, which serves to exacerbate conditions more than a simple economic classification would suggest. Finally, stability operations within COIN should consider childhood malnutrition rates and the access to improved water sources as good examples of potential measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that may positively influence broad segments of the host-nation populace. These findings grant insight in defining the role that the Army should provide in facilitating primary health care within the context of a broader COIN strategy in coordination with unified action partners.

This monograph examines alternative approaches to U.S. COIN operations in the eastern Pashtun tribal areas in Afghanistan that are sensitive to and inclusive of the key elements of the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali. The author reviews Pashtuns and their code of conduct, Pashtunwali, to explain how Pashtuns live and interact within their environment in Afghanistan. This review provides a historical perspective and context for an examination of U.S. operations from 2007 to 2009 in the eastern Pashtun tribal areas, focusing on the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. Two alternative approaches, one which focuses on engaging tribes individually and one which focuses on the development of governance at the district level, are also evaluated to determine if the respective approaches offer a better way to accomplish the stated objectives of the clear-hold-build approach and the underlying supporting tasks. Research revealed that U.S. COIN operations do not effectively engage Pashtuns because the clear-hold-build approach as applied is not sensitive to or inclusive of key elements of Pashtunwali. Both alternative approaches are sensitive to and inclusive of Pashtuns and Pashtunwali and because of this are more likely to yield positive results in a COIN environment in Afghanistan., The original document contains color images.

This thesis examines the role of paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency operations being launched by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA). The Philippine government and the AFP firmly believe that the present Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA) is an essential component of the AFP's Operational clear-hold-support methodology. Many scholars have argued that separating the Communist guerrillas from the populace is an important element in winning the counterinsurgency campaign. Isolating the Communist insurgents is done through the creation of local militia. However, some authors contend it would be dangerous for any government to train paramilitary forces because, in the long term, the governments are unsure of the future loyalties of these paramilitary forces. They may currently be working for the government, but as they work and gain skills, these paramilitary forces could use these same skills against the government in the future. Thus, it is quite dangerous to train paramilitary forces. The Philippine paramilitaries are good examples of paramilitary forces being used effectively for counterinsurgency. Their primary task of protecting the communities and the people from the coercive and abusive acts of the Communist insurgents are achieved. They are an effective counterinsurgency force because of proper training as well as command and control. This thesis concludes that the Philippine government and the AFP are headed in the right operational direction for utilizing paramilitary forces for village defense and as the protectors of the people. The paramilitary forces in the Philippines need the proper training as well as command and control in order to make these paramilitary forces effective counterinsurgency forces., http://archive.org/details/counterinsurgenc109451269, Colonel, Philippine Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Many of the "small wars" that have occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War fit the profile of insurgent conflicts: they pit a constituted state vs. a counter-state, the counter-state relies on a support structure within the population, and the center-of-mass of these conflicts is political and psychological rather than military in nature. The urbanization boom in many underdeveloped countries has stretched the social services and infrastructure of the cities beyond the breaking point, and this dynamic may contribute to the occurrence of insurgency. Increasingly, political entrepreneurs have operated within urban areas to enlist disaffected individuals in campaigns of political conflict. This study argues that the most effective way to counter an insurgency is through a strategy of indirect approach that seeks to dismantle the insurgent support structures. The United States can support friendly governments that are combating insurgent violence through a "vertically integrated" advisory effort spearheaded by Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces can assist a supported nation to develop a "counter-mobilization" framework that targets the opportunity, means and motives that allow an insurgency to exist. To attain success, the US should exploit the insurgents' vulnerabilities, defeat their strategy and allow SOF to advise on intelligence collection activities, http://archive.org/details/insurgencyinurba109457721, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

After eight years of conventional U.S. Army involvement in Afghanistan, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) have remained organized and trained to defeat a peer or near-peer enemy in a direct, symmetrical conflict. The complex socio-ethnical structure of Afghanistan requires something new, but an analysis of international forces involved in a century of Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) operations indicates a variety of metrics of successful organization and training. Something new can be found in something old. Through the analysis of historical COIN conflicts and combatants in Algeria, Philippines, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, the modern military analyst can determine effective metrics for the assessment, selection, organization and training of contemporary COIN forces. Counterinsurgency Operations are not merely a less-intense form of conflict within the Range of Military Operations, but an entirely different arc of the warfare continuum and require specialized units, operations, tactics and skills that are beyond capabilities of an organic IBCT. In the current fight, IBCTs receive a number of these enablers upon arrival into theater, and enjoy a margin of success during their tour. This thesis finds a correlation between training and organizing COIN-specific forces prior to their engagement in the conflict, and the eventual success or failure of that force in a COIN struggle. Though success in COIN comes with higher risk and is more manpower intensive, the lower technological and logistical demands warrant additional research from a force design perspective. Based on the preponderance of low-intensity conflicts over the incidents of highintensity conflict during the post-WWII era, America may be wise in establishing designated "COIN" battalions and brigades within the standing force package., The original document contains color images.

In December of 2006, the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps published FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. Prior to this neither the Army nor the Marine Corps had published a manual dedicated to counterinsurgency (COIN) in 20 and 25 years respectively. The operational trends the United States military has experienced since the nation entered the Long War in 2001 propelled an effort by both services to create a manual for "leaders and planners at the battalion level and above." While the manual provides soldiers and Marines with a broad scope of planning considerations, the authors missed a tremendous opportunity to reinvigorate the study of small wars and counterinsurgency by neglecting to incorporate the Small Wars Manual into FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. The only mention Counterinsurgency gives to the Small Wars Manual is a listing in the annotated bibliography; sound doctrine provided by the Small Wars Manual does not appear anywhere within the main text of Counterinsurgency. The absence of any meaningful mention of the Small wars Manual is highly disturbing since the work offers timeless and enduring lessons, advice, considerations, and techniques in dealing with insurgents and revolutionaries. The authors should have drawn more material from the United States Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual because, in terms of discussing leadership, training, cultural considerations, and the fluid and dynamic nature of the COIN environment, the Small Wars Manual surpasses Counterinsurgency in both content and context.

This thesis describes how field artillery fires should be planned and executed in a counterinsurgency fight. Based upon historical research, there are numerous missions that the field artillery community can and must be able to execute in a counterinsurgency fight in order to be successful. Field artillery fires are still relevant on the battlefield, and leaders at all levels must understand how to properly employ them in order to apply the appropriate force required to defeat the enemy and at the same time attempt to minimize the collateral damage that a misplaced artillery round can cause. Additionally this thesis addresses some of the transformational issues that the field artillery community must be aware of in the current fight. Artillery is not going to win the hearts and minds of those local nationals who are neither supportive to an insurgency organization nor against it, but it will provide the protection for the Soldiers on the battlefield. Artillery fires are needed in the current counterinsurgency fight in Iraq., The original document contains color images.

This paper will inform the operational commander how the FBI can participate in a counterinsurgency campaign. It will document what is already in place, how the FBI investigator attacks organized and or disorganized criminal enterprises and how the Bureau uses the task force approach to combat those groups. It will draw parallels between organized criminal enterprises and insurgency groups. The purpose of this paper is to provide some insight as to an effective way to implement FBI and other law enforcement agents in a counterinsurgency campaign. Because many of the current joint FBI and U.S. Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are classified, this unclassified paper will not be able to provide details on specific structures in place and the operational successes that have resulted from those arrangements. This paper will outline the existing relationships, point out parallels in methods and targets, and suggest a potential use for the assets.

This study examines the Integrated National Police as it is presently organized and studies its operational employment in Philippine government efforts against Communist insurgency. Recent developments in the Philippine local police system have proved the police have a significant role in the overall government counterinsurgency operations. While the traditional role of providing effective and efficient police service is the INP's main contribution to the effort, the police manpower resources and the inherent popular support they enjoy suggest greater role in counterinsurgency operations. Given the adequate administrative, operational and logistical support, training, and the proper leadership at all levels of command, the local police as a national organization could be a very effective force in operations against Communist insurgency in the Philippines. (Author)

The enclosed study was conducted during the period 16-25 March 1964 and describes the artillery employment in the Republic of Vietnam and contains interesting and pertinent information concerning the combat development aspects of artillery employment in counterinsurgency operations. The document provides background, organization and function of various artillery headquarters, employment, an illustration regarding a typical artillery communications net, support of operations, elements that affect employment, security, observers, etc. Table 1: total tubes and unit distribution. Table 2: total number of positions and 1-tube positions. Table 3: artillery area coverage. Table 4: average coverage per tube by weapon and corps. Table 5: percentage of district headquarters with artillery in the immediate vicinity. Table 6: nets, equipment, methods of operation. Table 7: ammunition allocation. Table 8: ammunition expenditure. Table 9: percent ammunition expended.

The purpose of the evaluation was to determine if an airborne acoustic ground fire detector (AAGFD) would serve as a satisfactory hostile fire warning means for Army helicopter crews and as a projectile counting instrument for the collection of data basic to aircraft survivability studies. Four of these devices, developed for Combat Developments Command Experimentation Center by the Stanford Research Institute, were installed on UH-1B helicopters for a period of 56 days. The document provides background information, description of materiel, using organizations, data collection, and a discussion. Annex A- operating instructions and data collection forms (used during the AAGFD evaluation). Annex B- static reliability test (with a chart detailing percent of rounds detected compared with the miss-distance in feet). Annex C- test of AAGFD on airboats. Annex D- mission flight data. Annex E- distribution.

Significant organizational or unit activities for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967.

Unit activities for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1966.

Throughout the period 1 May 69 to 69, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) conducted operations within the scope of the II FFORCEV Operation Toan Thang in AO Montana Scout northeast of Tay Ninh, north of Dau Tieng in the vicinity of the "fishhook" of the Cambodian border, AO Commanche warrior southeast of the ESE of Phuoc Vinh, and AO Kentucky Cougar, the AO Montana Scout, plus the addition of Phuoc Long and Binh Long [provinces], extending east to the II CTZ border. Emphasis on operations at the beginning of the reporting period was generally in AO Montana Scout with artillery units deployed to support maneuver forces conducting offensive operations, interdicting movement of major enemy forces south into critical III CTZ areas, and locating, reducing, or eliminating enemy base camps, supply bases, training and rest camps, and river crossing sites throughout the TAOR. As intelligence revealed an increasing threat on the outskirts of Bien Hoa, 3rd Brigade shifted its resources to AO Commanche Warrior and subsequently to AO Creek II, where great amounts of enemy material were located and were further denied to hostile forces. Toward the end of June 1969, the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) with the 11st ACR (-) under OPCON concentrated again to the north and initiated operations in AO Kentucky Cougar. Additional emphasis was placed on assistance to RVNAF units, enhancing pacification throughout the TAOI, and interdicting primary enemy infiltration and exfiltration routes. The period was marked with numerous stand-off and heavy ground attacks against artillery fire support bases, and heavy enemy contact in AO Montana Scout.

At the beginning of the period the 1st ACD had begun to deploy from the I Corps Tactical Zone (ICTZ) to the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). The 2nd Brigade in the ICTZ and its supporting artillery remained engaged in Operation Comanche Falls II (destroy the enemy and his installations in Base Area 101) followed by Comanche Falls III (oriented on the VC infrastructure in the My Chon Valley). Operation Liberty Canyon (the phased move of all elements of the 1st ACD from ICTZ to III CTZ) was conducted concurrently with the brigades committed to combat immediately upon arrival in the III CTZ. Upon closing of the tactical elements in III CTZ, the 1st ACD began Operation Sheridan Sabre (a screening operation to deny infiltration to the NVA Divisions massed in Cambodia). Sheridan Sabre continued through the end of the reporting period. Navajo Warhorse (a brigade sized operation in the III and IV CTZ's) was conducted concurrently.

Throughout the period the 1st ACD conducted operations as part of II FFORCEV Operation TOAN THANG Phase II (1 February through 16 February) and Phase III (17 February through 30 April) in the III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ). Operations were conducted in AO Sheridan Saber (northern III CTZ along the Cambodian Border), AO Cheyenne Saber (northeast of Long Binh/Bien Hoa/Saigon complex in War Zone D), AO Navajo Warhorse II (south of Tay Ninh and west of Cu Chi in the vicinity of the Parrot's Beak and Angel's Wing of the Cambodian border) and AO Montana Scout (northeast of Tay Ninh north of Dau Tieng in the vicinity of the Fishhook of the Cambodian border). Emphasis on operations at the beginning of the reporting period was generally in the Sheridan Saber AO with artillery units deployed to support maneuver units conducting offensive operations, interdicting movement of major enemy forces south into critical III CTZ areas, and locating and reducing or eliminating enemy base camps, supply bases, training and rest camps, and river crossing sites throughout the Sheridan Saber AO. The period was marked with numerous stand-off attacks on artillery based LZs, extremely heavy enemy contact in AO Sheridan Saber, AO Navajo Warhorse II, and Montana Scout AO.

This monograph analyzes the Italian counterinsurgency campaign conducted in Libya between 1922 and 1931 from an operational standpoint. Starting from an adverse situation, the Italian colonial troops quelled a widespread insurgent movement in ten years. The operational approach devised and implemented by the Royal Italian Army commanders envisaged the integration of military and political actions in multiple operational cycles sequenced in time, space, and purpose. Before the advent of modern counterinsurgency doctrine, the Royal Italian Army's methodology accounted for the population's role, the critical vulnerabilities of inter-tribal relations, and the articulation of operations to achieve progressive territorial control. This campaign constitutes a meaningful case study outside the French and British-inspired dogmas of current counterinsurgency doctrine. The study of the Italian experience in Libya sheds light on an important yet scarcely known chapter of Italian military history. A colonialist zeitgeist, entailing a different context and a less restrictive use of military force, inspired the Italian commanders' decisions in countering the Libyan insurgency. Nonetheless, the analysis of those actions and decisions reserves interesting findings. First, it captures the potential fragility of insurgent networks that thrive in a tribal system. Building on that, the study shows the effectiveness of exploiting the fissures between different tribal segments while degrading the insurgents' capabilities by military means. Second, the Italian experience emphasizes the importance of mastering the sequencing of effects through multiple military and political actions to attain the assigned strategic goals. Predating the modern idea of operational art, this campaign offers a meaningful example of its application. Lastly, this historical example highlights the pitfalls deriving from the lack of a systematic and distributed system for organizational learning. Although a select

In October 2014, the countries of Lake Chad Region comprising of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria decided to improve their cooperation to combat the activities of the Boko Haram Insurgents. The cooperation commenced with the pledging and contribution of troops to re-invigorate the existing MNJTF located in Baga. On January 2015, the BHI overran the town of Baga and took over the MNJTF headquarters. The Baga attack by the BHI threatened Nigeria's territorial integrity as well as the regional stability and security of countries in the LCR. Consequently, the countries in LCR stepped up military responses to contain the threat. This regional initiative sparked joint efforts that led to the establishment of a reinforced MNJTF. The joint effort was to strengthen the force and expand the MNJTF mandate to include counterterrorism and COIN actions. This study considers information operations as part of a holistic federal government strategy for lasting peace in the Lake Chad region. In particular, the study analyzes information operations based on two military operations selected as case studies. The research further proffers structural, and doctrinal solutions to security forces' Information Operations processes in LCR. These solutions, are expected to make security forces more effective as part of the regional efforts to bring peace and stability to the NE Nigeria and LCR in particular.

The Nigerian military (NM) has actively intervened in domestic conflict spots across Nigeria between 1960 and 2017. The dynamic nature of domestic conflict in Nigeria, manifesting as insurgency, terrorism, riots, militancy, criminality, banditry, among others, has attracted a range of military operations (ROMO) from the NM. In the various deployments of the NM for counterinsurgency roles, ROMO has been determined by the intensity of violence. The effectiveness of the NM in ROMO has determined the duration and intensity of each domestic counterinsurgency in Nigeria. The study identified the basic challenge that faced the NM in domestic COIN was they were tasked to perform duties they are not properly trained and prepared for. The constraints faced by the NM in ROMO resulted from the need to change from conventional military roles to unconventional ones—a change that required a minimum use of force and policing/law enforcement duties. The study also identified the "constabularization" of the NM and the militarization of the civil polity as major outcomes of ROMO. The study submits that for the NM, ROMO appears demanding in terms of military professionalism.

The Peruvian Government was involved against terrorist groups from 1980 to 2000. Currently, terrorist military actions have decreased. The Sendero Luminoso (SL) have changed their tactics and procedures, and nowadays SL provides security to the drug cartels. Nonetheless, the political branch of SL continues performing ideological and indoctrination activities in cities and towns. The research question is: what are the Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) changes that the Peruvian Army should implement during counterinsurgency operations against the informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000? This is a qualitative research to attempt to understand the doctrine, modalities, techniques, support activities, means and types of communication used by the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Army PSYOPS since 2000. The conclusions address that the Peruvian Army must reformulate its PSYOPS doctrinal framework in terms of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF-P).

The Philippine-American War and Moro War demonstrate the failure of an insurgency to achieve objectives if there is a lack of support from the populace. The American occupation of the Philippine islands in 1898 provoked sentiments of anti-imperialism among the populace. The result was a hastily organized guerilla campaign that led to the Philippine-American War (1899- 1902). The insurgency of the Moro War attempted to unite the populace to force the withdrawal of the United States. During both wars, American commanders and forces adapted policies and objectives to counter the insurgency and gain the support of the local population. This monograph examines the strategy of the insurgency campaigns for the insurrectos and Moro insurgents. The decentralized organization, lack of resources, and objectives created conditions that weakened the insurgency. The inability of the insurgencies to gain support from the populace resulted in the absence of effort to fight the invading American military.

Today's maneuver leaders face an unpredictable and complex operating environment against a spectrum of adaptable enemies, all while resources continue to diminish. The 2015 edition of Maneuver Forces in Battle is a unique look at maneuver leaders and their Soldiers across the Range of Military Operations as they adapted to enemies during the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan and their transitions to national sovereignty. The lessons learned over the past decade of conflict are critical for our leaders to understand and internalize as we prepare for the increasing complexity on the future battlefields. The vignettes in this manual take the reader across the Warfighting Functions and the range of military operations through the eyes and actions of our company-grade leaders who often found themselves at the decisive point of military operations.

After more than a decade of a war on terror, the United States Department of Defense has aggressively built foreign armed forces in an attempt to prevent the failure of struggling states, which often become safe havens for insurgent networks. In this quest to establish rule of law and legitimacy, the US government often focuses on strengthening host nation armies to promote internal and external security. Armies, however, do not experience the same degree of personal contact with a society, as does a police force. Ironically, police development is often an after-thought in nation building activity, in both preemptive and post combat stability operations. When proactive police development does occur, intergovernmental agencies or Special Operations Forces who lack practical policing experience and expertise often perform this task. In counterinsurgency operations, the support of a local population is the enemy's center of gravity. In order to contain evolving terror and criminal networks in a Phase Zero environment, US statesmen and military leaders could deploy expeditionary US Army Military Police assets in conjunction with Special Operations Forces (SOF), the US Department of State, and other intergovernmental agencies to train and develop constabulary police forces in unstable states. This combined effort would result in capable and robust police forces that are able to offer local populations security and safety. More importantly, foreign police would earn the trust and confidence of vulnerable local nationals, who tend to seek protection from insurgent networks in volatile states. Building constabulary police forces in a peacetime atmosphere is a way to deter internal conflict and insurgency before a state fails and requires the deployment of combat arms organizations and subsequent rebuilding.

The people of Afghanistan continue to face challenges in primary health care despite the expenditure of over $92 billion on humanitarian assistance. Therefore, using the Afghanistan experience as a model, what interventions by the United States Army are optimal in the development of host-nation health systems during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations? To answer this, statistical analysis evaluated 14 countries with an insurgency against 42 non-insurgency countries that spanned diverse economic, geographic, and cultural backgrounds. Analysis showed that high-income nations were better than insurgent countries in every category that achieved statistical significance. As such, COIN goals should not include healthcare expectations similar to those in high-income nations. In addition, it appears that insurgency imposes an opportunity cost on the overall health of a society, which serves to exacerbate conditions more than a simple economic classification would suggest. Finally, stability operations within COIN should consider childhood malnutrition rates and the access to improved water sources as good examples of potential measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that may positively influence broad segments of the host-nation populace. These findings grant insight in defining the role that the Army should provide in facilitating primary health care within the context of a broader COIN strategy in coordination with unified action partners.

As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan end, it is useful to analyze the current state of stability operations within the U.S. Army and determine its ability to conduct these types of operations in the future. Analyzing the state of stability operations in the post-Vietnam War era gives us a useful benchmark in analyzing the current state of the Army's ability to conduct stability operations. A study of the de-evolution of stability operations doctrine in the period between the end of the Vietnam War and the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) provides insight on how prepared the U.S. Army was in conducting stability operations at the beginning of GWOT. The peacekeeping missions of the 1990s also provide insight into the ability of the Army to conduct stability operations, and are helpful to compare the operations of the 1990s with the operations in the first decade of the 2000s. Finally, by analyzing how both operations on the ground and doctrinal changed in GWOT, this monograph provides insight into the adaptability of the Army in executing these types of operations. The important question for future study is the U.S. Army's level of preparedness in conducting stability operations in the future.

This monograph examines alternative approaches to U.S. COIN operations in the eastern Pashtun tribal areas in Afghanistan that are sensitive to and inclusive of the key elements of the Pashtun code of Pashtunwali. The author reviews Pashtuns and their code of conduct, Pashtunwali, to explain how Pashtuns live and interact within their environment in Afghanistan. This review provides a historical perspective and context for an examination of U.S. operations from 2007 to 2009 in the eastern Pashtun tribal areas, focusing on the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. Two alternative approaches, one which focuses on engaging tribes individually and one which focuses on the development of governance at the district level, are also evaluated to determine if the respective approaches offer a better way to accomplish the stated objectives of the clear-hold-build approach and the underlying supporting tasks. Research revealed that U.S. COIN operations do not effectively engage Pashtuns because the clear-hold-build approach as applied is not sensitive to or inclusive of key elements of Pashtunwali. Both alternative approaches are sensitive to and inclusive of Pashtuns and Pashtunwali and because of this are more likely to yield positive results in a COIN environment in Afghanistan.

Seeks to review concepts of defense as practiced in South Vietnam (SVN). The enemy, his tactics, the terrain, and the weather are different from those previously encountered by US forces, but the defensive concepts, that have proven the most successful in Vietnam, are the same that have proven successful in other areas in the past. Minor variations to adjust to local conditions are able to provide friendly forces with the necessary fundamentals of a good defensive posture. The full utilization of new equipment and weapons make the situation even more favorable for the defender. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

This issue of Lessons Learned deals with an operation which is considered significant in that a complete range of activities from initial search and destroy operations through restoration of civil government is represented. Operation HAPPY VALLEY, conducted from 12-31 October 1965, is typical of extended clearing and securing operations conducted with an intent to remain in and pacify an area. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

Fortified base camps are the pivots of Viet Cong (VC) military operations. Local force units tend to place reliance on numerous small base camps dispersed throughout their area of operations. The camps are usually extensively booby trapped and protected by punji stakes, mines and spike traps. Main force base camps are not usually so well guarded. Years of labor and immense amounts of material have gone into building a complex network of base camps throughout the country. A semi-guerrilla army cannot survive without its base camps. However, remote and concealed, the base camps cannot be easily moved or hidden indefinitely. To find and destroy these camps is a prime objective of the military effort. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

The use of rockets has proved to be an effective method of attacking friendly installations. The purpose of this Lessons Learned is to familiarize personnel with the type of rockets employed by the enemy in South Vietnam, to review past rocket attacks, to consider the aspects of denial, reaction and protection and to cite post-attack observations. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

Looks at search and rescue, giving detailed information on search and recovery operations and what air personnel can do to increase odds of survival and rescue. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

The first generation of passive night vision devices began use in December 1965. The Air Concept Team in Vietnam used the image intensification night vision equipment in order to obtain data on the employment, maintenance, system performance and to recommend the basis of issue. Some preliminary results of the evaluation and suggested techniques for employment are included in this paper. The Air Force test Unit completed an evaluation of this equipment on aerial observation, surveillance and attack missions. Their evaluations are also reflected in this publication. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

Imitative Communications Deception (ICD) is the deliberate intrusion on an enemy's communications channels for the purpose of introducing information, in a manner imitating his own communications, in order to deceive or confuse him. Analysis of captured documents, interrogation reports and the number of reported ICD attempts indicate that the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army are becoming more adept at exploiting allied communications. One of the consequences of this increased proficiency in Signal Intelligence has been the deliberate intrusion into friendly forces' communications to introduce or to gain information intended to produce situations of tactical advantage to the VC/NVA. This issue of Lessons Learned will set forth documented examples of VC/NVA attempts at Imitative Communications Deception against allied communications in Vietnam. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

Devoted to population and resources control conducted by two separate forces: the US 1st Cavalry Division, Air Mobile (AM) and the Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV). The lessons learned covers the combined cordon and search operations conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) with a supporting National Police Field Force (NPFF) Battalion. These operations were designed for attack and destruction of the Viet Cong (VC) and his infrastructure in hamlets/villages with minimal impact on the friendly civilian populace. The portion of this lessons learned pertaining to ROKFV presents their system of evacuating civilians from combat areas and the procedures and techniques used for this type of operation. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

This lessons Learned is devoted to the details of the destruction of the VC infrastructure on Vinh Loc Island. This operation was conducted by the 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile); Vietnamese (ARVN) combat units; and all available Government of Vietnam (GVN) paramilitary forces. The Lessons Learned covers the planning, cordon, initial attack, deliberate search for the infrastructure and the follow-on action by a combined force. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

In 1980 the Sendero Luminoso insurgency led by Abimael Guzman Reynoso initiated its armed struggle in the Andes of the Peruvian rural areas. From 1980 to 1999 the Sendero Luminoso generated chaos and violence in the country utilizing different procedures and tactics. Abimael Guzman was captured in 1992 and Sendero Luminoso's influence began to decrease. After 1999 the Sendero Luminoso withdrew to remote areas and Comrade Victor Quispe Palomino took the lead with new tactics, techniques, and procedures and providing security to the drug cartels. The Peruvian Army trained to conventional warfare in the 80's began its counterinsurgency operations with some mistakes learning counterinsurgency tactics in response to the advance of insurgents attacks. In 2001 the interim government of Agustin Paniagua deactivated the Peruvian National Intelligence System, and moved the counterinsurgency military bases to the cities concluding that the Sendero Luminoso was close to defeat. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the counterinsurgency doctrinal changes that the Peruvian Army learned from the Sendero Luminoso insurgency from 2001 to 2013.

This monograph shows how understanding three conceptual tradeoffs of complex versus complicated, complexity at large-scale versus fine-scale, and exploration of potential problems versus exploitation of known solutions can help the military practitioner better learn, anticipate and adapt to difficult problems. It does so by defining the three conceptual tradeoffs and then applying them to Operation Iraqi Freedom for the United States in 2003 and the Israeli incursion into Southern Lebanon by the Israeli Defense Forces in 2006. These difficult operations involved conventional, guerrilla, counterinsurgency and irregular operations that provide two relevant examples to help the military practitioner better prepare for 21st century operations.

This lesson learned is devoted primarily to the organization and employment of artillery in a counter insurgency environment. Its purpose is to highlight some of the significant differences in organizing for counterinsurgency , as opposed to organization for conventional warfare. Artillery employment concepts in Vietnam have differed considerably from those used in the past. Assuming these concepts to be valid, certain changes in organizations and techniques are justified to achieve more efficient use of available resources. Produced by U. S. Army Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

Using the theme "The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775--2007," the 2007 Conference of Army Historians featured over sixty formal papers exploring the nature of unconventional warfare and its significance throughout history. The event also included several workshops and sessions on administrative issues of common concern across the Army historical community and much informal discussion and networking. From the opening of the conference to the final dinner, where U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard A. Cody addressed the current operating environment and answered hard questions from the audience about the future, the conference informed participants about differing aspects of the type of warfare confronting the U.S. Army in the Global War on Terrorism today. The fifteen papers selected for this publication are not only the best of those presented, but they also examine irregular warfare in a wide and diverse range of circumstances and eras. Together, they demonstrate how extremism was intimately connected to this type of warfare and how Americans have, at different times in their history, found themselves acting as insurgents, counterinsurgents, or both. The titles of the papers themselves reflect how often the U.S. Army has engaged in such irregular operations despite a formal focus on conventional warfare. Using imperial British and Italian examples, several presentations also underline how the ease of conquering lands is often no indication of the level of effort required to pacify them and integrate them into a larger whole. Each paper provides useful insights to the reader, soldiers and historians alike.