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One apparent feature of mental time travel is the ability to recursively embed temporal perspectives across different times: humans can remember how we anticipated the future and anticipate how we will remember the past. This recursive structure of mental time travel might be formalized in terms of a 'grammar' that is reflective of but more general than linguistic notions of absolute and relative tense. Here, I provide a foundation for this grammatical framework, emphasizing a bounded (rather than unbounded) recursive function that supports mental time travel to a limited temporal depth and to actual and possible scenarios. Anticipated counterfactual thinking, for instance, entails three levels of mental time travel to a possible scenario ('in the future, I will reflect on how my past self could have taken a different future action') and is centrally implicated in complex human decision-making. This perspective calls for further research into the mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny of recursive mental time travel, and revives the question of links with other recursive forms of thinking such as theory of mind. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reliability of previous findings on two crucial aspects of counterfactual thinking, namely the content of counterfactual modifications and their impact on future performance, has been questioned for the frequent use of tasks characterised by simple causal domains, that restrict participants' possibility to consider a broad range of modifications. To overcome this limitation, we utilised a new experimental task featuring a complex causal domain to investigate such key aspects. The results indicated that participants tend to generate counterfactuals about elements outside their control, especially when presented with a challenging version of the task (Study 1a) and, to a lesser extent, when they receive negative feedback on their performance (Study 1b). Moreover, despite occasional implementations of actions mentioned in controllable counterfactuals, being engaged in counterfactual thinking did not lead to subsequent performance improvements (Study 2). The implications of these findings for the debate on the function of counterfactual thinking are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to stop unwanted memories from coming to mind is theorised to be essential for maintaining good mental health. People can employ intentional strategies to prevent conscious intrusions of negative memories, and repeated attempts to stop retrieval both reduces the frequency of intrusions and improves subsequent emotions elicited by those memories. However, it is still unknown whether memory control can improve negative emotions immediately, at the time control is attempted. It is also not clear which strategy is most beneficial for emotion regulation; clearing the mind of any thoughts of negative memories via direct suppression, or substituting memory recall with alternative thoughts. Here, we provide novel evidence that memory control immediately regulates negative emotions associated with autobiographical memories of morally wrong actions. Repeated control significantly improved negative emotions over time, regardless of the strategy used to implement control. Thought substitution involving either positive diversionary thinking or counterfactual thinking both induced positive feelings, whereas direct suppression neutralised emotions, regardless of whether memories were positive or negative. These empirical findings have implications for clinical practice as they indicate that memory control strategies could be effective emotion regulation methods for real-world intrusive memories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People often reflect on how things end up and imagine how they could have turned out differently. The pervasive cognitive process of imagining alternative scenarios of actual events is termed counterfactual thinking (CT). Though evidence has been established linking CT and personality, little is known about the association between CT and trait anxiety and its underpinning neural substrates. This study leveraged multi-modality fMRI to address these issues. We conducted voxel-based morphometry analyses and functional connectivity analyses using a relatively large sample (n = 85) to explore the neural basis of the relationship between upward CT and trait anxiety. The behavioral data revealed a positive correlation between upward CT and trait anxiety. The VBM results found that upward CT was negatively associated with the GMV in the left precentral gyrus. Further, functional results revealed functional connectivities of the left precentral gyrus-dmPFC positively predicted upward CT. Finally, the impact of trait anxiety on upward CT was mediated by this functional connectivity. The results suggest that the somatosensory and monitoring network play vital roles in the influence of trait anxiety on upward CT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective Design Methods Results Conclusions Anticipated regret has been implicated in health‐related decision‐making. Recent work on influenza vaccination has suggested that anticipated relief, too, may influence individuals' decisions to engage in positive health behaviours. To explore these affective components further and address the generality of possible mechanisms underlying these associations, we examined whether anticipated relief and anticipated regret independently predict testicular self‐examination (TSE) intention and behaviour. Given claims about differences in their nature and function, we distinguished between counterfactual relief (relief that a worse outcome did not obtain) and temporal relief (relief that an unpleasant experience is over).Prospective correlational.At Time 1 (July 2022), 567 cis‐gendered males were asked to complete measures of anticipated regret, anticipated counterfactual and temporal relief, measures of the Theory of Planned Behaviour and measures of anxiety and shame. One month later, the same participants were recontacted and asked about their engagement in TSE in the previous month.Anticipated counterfactual relief and anticipated regret are independent, positive, predictors of intention to engage in TSE and, indirectly, TSE behaviour itself. Interestingly, anticipated temporal relief was negatively associated with intention to engage in TSE and, indirectly, behaviour.Our results suggest that it may be the counterfactual nature of anticipated regret and anticipated relief that underlies their positive association with TSE and other health‐promoting behaviours. Interventions designed to increase engagement in preventive health behaviours, such as TSE, may benefit from the consideration of both positively and negatively valenced counterfactual emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, Ross and Woodward (2022) argued that the reversibility of an outcome – that is, whether the outcome can be undone – affects causal judgments. One prediction of their account is that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption scenarios, where people typically judge that events that produce the outcome earlier are more causal than preempted alternative events that would have otherwise produced the outcome. Ross and Woodward’s account predicts that when the outcome is reversible, people would judge these events similarly – as in standard overdetermination cases. In three experiments, we found no evidence that reversibility affects causal judgments in late-preemption cases. We discuss how these results affect the experimental philosophy and cognitive science of causation, causal modeling, and experimental jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision-makers may follow either the direct-response method or strategy method. While the two elicitation methods are theoretically equivalent, it is uncertain whether they lead to the same outcomes in practice. To explore this issue, we conduct an experiment based on a reward-punishment game under both methods, in which functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is used to provide neural evidence for uncovering the underlying behavioural mechanisms. The results show that both the reward and punishment rates are significantly higher under the strategy method compared to the direct-response method. We develop behavioural models to explain these differences and identify the ownership effect, strategic thinking, and counterfactual thinking as potential drivers. Comparison of neural activity between the two treatments demonstrates that during reward/no-reward decisions, the direct-response treatment accrues stronger activation in the bilateral anterior insula, indicating that decision-makers overweigh reward cost due to ownership effect, which consequently leads to reduced willingness to impose rewards. Conversely, during punishment/no-punishment decisions, the strategy treatment causes stronger activations in the bilateral anterior insula and inferior parietal lobule, implying that decision-makers perceive strong unfairness due to counterfactual thinking, which further results in more punishment decisions. Moreover, our findings reveal that strategic thinking influences decision-making during long-term interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagine you are a real estate agent and are showing a prospective buyer a house with a lake view, but it is foggy, and the view is less than ideal. Are you inclined to tell the prospective buyer, "Unfortunately, it is foggy outside. If it were not foggy, the view would be even better!"? Eight studies, spanning diverse domains, reveal a novel discrepancy: most presenters (e.g., the seller) choose to communicate such upward counterfactual information (UCI) to experiencers (e.g., the prospective buyer), believing it will enhance experiencers' impressions (e.g., of the house)—yet UCI actually worsens their impressions. This discrepancy arises because presenters insufficiently account for the fact that they possess more knowledge about the presented target than experiencers do; they fail to realize that noting an imperfection reveals it. Accordingly, when experiencers are knowledgeable about the target, either because the imperfection is obvious or because they can easily envision the upward counterfactual, the discrepancy attenuates. Finally, the presenter–experiencer discrepancy occurs only when the counterfactual information is upward, such that presenters do not overcommunicate downward counterfactual information, which rules out a desire to share any information as an alternative mechanism for presenters' communication decisions. Together, this research highlights the prevalence and costs of sharing UCI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the causal responsibility attributions of adults and children to mechanical devices in the framework of the criticality-pivotality model. It establishes that, to assign responsibility, people consider how important a target is to reaching a positive outcome (criticality) and how much the target contributed to the actual outcome (pivotality). We also tested theoretical predictions about relations between the development of counterfactual thinking and assessments of pivotality. In Experiment 1, we replicated previous findings in adults using our task. In Experiment 2, we administered this task and a brief counterfactual reasoning questionnaire to children aged between 8 and 13 years. Results showed that children also considered both criticality and pivotality when they attributed responsibility. However, older children were more sensitive than younger ones to pivotality. Also, we found a positive correlation between children's pivotality judgements and a measure of counterfactual thinking. Results are discussed regarding the model's relation to counterfactual thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counterfactual theories propose that people's capacity for causal judgment depends on their ability to consider alternative possibilities: The lightning strike caused the forest fire because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have ensued. To accommodate a variety of psychological effects on causal judgment, a range of recent accounts have proposed that people probabilistically sample counterfactual alternatives from which they compute a graded measure of causal strength. While such models successfully describe the influence of the statistical normality (i.e., the base rate) of the candidate and alternate causes on causal judgments, we show that they make further untested predictions about how normality influences people's confidence in their causal judgments. In a large (N = 3,020) sample of participants in a causal judgment task, we found that normality indeed influences people's confidence in their causal judgments and that these influences were predicted by a counterfactual sampling model in which people are more confident in a causal relationship when the effect of the cause is less variable among imagined counterfactual possibilities. Public Significance Statement: People are thought to identify an event as a cause of an effect when altering it would make a difference to the effect. Despite stable patterns in causal judgments across scenarios, however, people often disagree about the causes of particular effects. Here, we asked how people determine their confidence in such judgments, and we found evidence that people are more confident in their judgments when the difference made by the cause to the effect is robust to changes in background factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking others' perspectives is a challenging task, especially when inferring them from written reports. In three experiments, we investigated how to modulate the illusory transparency bias, an error in perspective taking during reading. We modified the traditional illusory transparency task by adding a final sentence that informed participants about an outcome. The outcome was either consistent or inconsistent with a biased response. We found that the illusory transparency bias disappeared when the outcome provided was inconsistent (Experiment 2) but increased when it was consistent (Experiment 1). Experiment 3 tested whether the size of the bias depended on the relationship between the event and the message. In the counterfactual condition, the message was dependent on the event, while in the semifactual condition it was not. Again, a modulation of the bias was obtained. The results are discussed in terms of their theoretical implications and their relationship to other cognitive biases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mobility of skilled employees from developing to developed cities is a prominent phenomenon in China. However, little is known about whether and how micro factors (e.g., unfair treatment) in the workplace affect employees' cross-city mobility. The aim of this study is thus to investigate the effect of employees' perceived workplace unfairness on their intentions to withdraw from the city where they work, specifically, to shed light on the moderating role of urban identification in this effect. Through a survey of 453 skilled employees working in developing cities in northeast China, this study reveals that (a) both perceived distributive and procedural unfairness have a positive effect on employees' urban dissatisfaction, which in turn reinforces their urban withdrawal intention; (b) urban identification can amplify the positive effect of perceived distributive/procedural unfairness on urban dissatisfaction; and (c) the positive joint effect of perceived distributive/procedural unfairness and urban identification on urban dissatisfaction can further carry over to urban withdrawal intentions. This study therefore sheds new lights on how employees' workplace unfairness shapes their withdrawal intentions toward the city where they work and how their urban identification moderates this process, offering implications for how developing cities and firm managers can retain skilled employees. Plain language summary: Numerous prior studies have argued that individuals' urban identification (a sense of belonging and/or affective commitment to a city) helps them to accept the city's imperfections and facilitates their intentions to stay. This implies that urban identification plays a buffering role in individuals' reactions to a city's imperfections. However, this study challenges the buffering role of urban identification with the argument: if employees experience unfairness in the workplace regarding distribution and procedures, and they attribute blame to the city, an increase in their intentions to leave the city may be witnessed. More importantly, urban identification will play a "love becomes hate" amplifying effect between the experience of workplace unfairness and the intentions to leave the city. Empirical analyses based on a survey of 453 employees from developing cities in northeastern China confirms the above arguments. The key implication is that for employees working in developing cities who experience unfairness in the workplace and attribute blame to the city where they work, fostering their urban identification does not buffer their intentions to leave the city, but may instead reinforce their willingness to leave. The main limitation of the very present study is that our findings are based on only one sample from developing cities in Northeast China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How might frequent gamblers convince themselves to keep playing despite persistent losses or after a win that should be savored? The purpose of this research is to examine the unexplored question of how frequent gamblers' use counterfactual thinking to motivate their desire to continue gambling. Using a sample of n = 69 high and n = 69 low frequency gamblers in a field setting, we found that infrequent gamblers tended to consider how the perceived outcome of losing "could have been better" (i.e., upward counterfactual thinking), and how a winning outcome "could have been worse" (i.e., downward counterfactual thinking). This pattern of counterfactual thinking is considered typical in many settings and may, in a gambling context, support a potentially more responsible approach by helping infrequent gamblers to learn from past mistakes to avoid significant future losses and to savor wins to protect returns gained. Alternatively, we found that frequent gamblers were more likely to generate 'dual counterfactuals' which include both upward and downward counterfactuals in response to losses and wins. We argue that this dual pattern of counterfactual thinking may allow frequent gamblers to more easily justify their desire to continue gambling. Findings suggest that challenging gamblers counterfactual thinking patterns could assist clinicians in moderating the potential for high-risk behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People selectively enforce their moral principles, excusing wrongdoing when it suits them. We identify an underappreciated source of this moral inconsistency: the ability to imagine counterfactuals, or alternatives to reality. Counterfactual thinking offers three sources of flexibility that people exploit to justify preferred moral conclusions: People can (a) generate counterfactuals with different content (e.g., consider how things could have been better or worse), (b) think about this content using different comparison processes (i.e., focus on how it is similar to or different than reality), and (c) give the result of these processes different weights (i.e., allow counterfactuals more or less influence on moral judgments). These sources of flexibility help people license unethical behavior and can fuel political conflict. Motivated reasoning may be less constrained by facts than previously assumed; people's capacity to condemn and condone whom they wish may be limited only by their imaginations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Societies are increasingly divided about political issues such as migration or counteracting climate change. This attitudinal polarization is the basis for intergroup conflict and prevents societal progress in addressing pressing challenges. Research on attitude change should provide an answer regarding how people might be persuaded to move away from the extremes to take a moderate stance. However, persuasive communication often most strongly affects those who hold a moderate attitude or are undecided. More importantly, barely any research has explicitly aimed at mitigating extreme attitudes and behavioral tendencies. Addressing this gap, this article summarizes research demonstrating that (different types of) intraindividual conflicts might be a means to mitigate polarized attitudes. Goal conflicts, cognitive conflicts, counterfactual thinking, and paradoxical thinking facilitate cognitive flexibility. This, in turn, seems to initiate the consideration of alternative stances and mitigate the polarization of attitudes. We discuss the limitations of the existing research and the potential of this approach for interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACTBackground: After exposure to a potentially traumatic event, survivors may experience thoughts about ‘what could have happened’, referred to as counterfactual thoughts (CFTs). CFTs have been found to have a negative impact on survivors’ mental health. This is the first study to investigate whether parents of trauma survivors experience CFTs and the association with psychological distress in this group.Objective: The main aim of the present study is to investigate CFTs in parents of trauma survivors and the relationship between the frequency and vividness of CFTs and psychological distress.Method: The participants (N = 310, 191 females) were parents of the youths targeted in the terror attack on Utøya island, Norway, in 2011. Frequency and vividness of CFTs, posttraumatic stress reactions (PTSR), and symptoms of anxiety and depression were measured 8.5–9 years post-terror.Results: The majority of the parents (74%) reported having experienced CFTs at some time point since the attack. For almost one-third of the parents, CFTs were still present more than eight years after the attack. Higher frequency and vividness of CFTs were uniquely associated with higher levels of PTSR, anxiety, and depression.Conclusion: The present findings suggest that frequent and vivid CFTs may contribute to mental health problems in parents of trauma survivors and should be addressed in therapy.

We investigated age differences in mental time travel by comparing young, middle-aged and older adults, with equal number of participants in each age decade, from age 22 to 79. Participants generated and phenomenologically rated one experienced and one imagined past event, and two imagined future events. The results showed event type effects with richer phenomenology for experienced than imagined events, but no age group differences. Specifically, experienced events were more vivid, detailed, and were re-lived in the mind more than the other event types. All events were highly central to life, revealing no event type effects on centrality. For both past events, older age groups generated more distant events. There were no age group differences for temporal distance for the two future events. Both future events were from a near future. The results suggest that for events that are central to life, phenomenological experience may be similar across the adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When individuals make uncertain decisions, they often evaluate the correctness of their choices in what is referred to as decision-making confidence. The outcomes of such decision-making can lead to counterfactual thinking wherein alternative possible outcomes are contemplated. This, in turn, can elicit counterfactual emotions including upward and downward counterfactual thinking, which, respectively, refer to regret and relief. Decision-making confidence and counterfactual emotions have key effects on how individuals learn from the past and prepare for the future. However, there has been little understanding of how these experiences are related. For this study, 98 total adults were recruited with the goal of assessing the connections between decisionmaking confidence and sensations of regret and relief when completing a cardbased gambling task. The results of this study suggest that decision-making confidence may reduce the intensity of relief while increasing the degree of regret experienced. These findings thus emphasize the important effect that decision confidence has on emotional processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do people evaluate causal relationships? Do they just consider what actually happened, or do they also consider what could have counterfactually happened? Using eye tracking and Gaussian process modeling, we investigated how people mentally simulated past events to judge what caused the outcomes to occur. Participants played a virtual ball‐shooting game and then—while looking at a blank screen—mentally simulated (a) what actually happened, (b) what counterfactually could have happened, or (c) what caused the outcome to happen. Our findings showed that participants moved their eyes in patterns consistent with the actual or counterfactual events that they mentally simulated. When simulating what caused the outcome to occur, participants moved their eyes consistent with simulations of counterfactual possibilities. These results favor counterfactual theories of causal reasoning, demonstrate how eye movements can reflect simulation during this reasoning and provide a novel approach for investigating retrospective causal reasoning and counterfactual thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Counterfactuals, thoughts about "what might have been," play an important role in causal judgment, emotion, and motivation, and spontaneously arise during daily life. However, current methods to measure spontaneous counterfactual thinking are cumbersome and subjective. The current research adapts a paradigm from the Spontaneous Trait Inference literature to develop the Spontaneous Counterfactual Inference measure (SCFI), which uses false recognition of counterfactual statements as a measure of spontaneous counterfactual thought. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the SCFI is sensitive to precursors of counterfactual thinking: norm violation and counterfactual closeness. Study 2 demonstrates that the SCFI converges with the generation of counterfactual statements in an open-ended writing task. The SCFI also predicts two important consequences of counterfactual thought, blame (Study 3), and intention endorsement (Study 4). The SCFI thus offers a new tool for researchers interested in counterfactual thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has provided compelling evidence that children experience the negative counterfactual emotion of regret, by manipulating the presence of a counterfactual action that would have led to participants receiving a better outcome. However, it remains unclear if children similarly experience regret's positive counterpart, relief. The current study examined children's negative and positive counterfactual emotions in a novel gain-or-loss context. Four- to 9-year-old children (N = 136) were presented with two opaque boxes concealing information that would lead to a gain or loss of stickers, respectively. Half of the children chose between two keys that matched each box, whereas the other half were compelled to select one box because only one of the two keys matched. After seeing inside the alternative, non-chosen box, children were significantly more likely to report a change in emotion when they could have opened that box than when they could not have. The effects were similar for children who lost stickers and won stickers, and neither effect varied with age. These findings suggest that children may become capable of experiencing regret and relief around the same time, although their expression of these counterfactual emotions may vary with actual and counterfactual gains and losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagined events can be misremembered as experienced, leading to memory distortions. However, less is known regarding how imagining counterfactual versions of past events can impair existing memories. We addressed this issue, and used EEG to investigate the neurocognitive processes involved when retrieving memories of true events that are associated with a competing imagined event. Participants first performed simple actions with everyday objects (e.g., rolling dice). A week later, they were shown pictures of some of the objects and either imagined the same action they had originally performed, or imagined a counterfactual action (e.g., stacking the dice). Subsequent tests showed that memory for performed actions was reduced after counterfactual imagination when compared to both veridical imagination and a baseline condition that had not been imagined at all, providing novel evidence that counterfactual imagination impairs true memories beyond simple forgetting over time. ERPs and EEG oscillations showed evidence of separate processes associated with memory retrieval versus post-retrieval processes that were recruited to support recall of memories that were challenging to access. The findings show that counterfactual imagination can cause impairments to sensorimotor-rich event memories, and provide new evidence regarding the neurocognitive mechanisms that are recruited when people need to distinguish memories of imagined versus true events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: After exposure to a potentially traumatic event, survivors may experience thoughts about ‘what could have happened’, referred to as counterfactual thoughts (CFTs). CFTs have been found to have a negative impact on survivors’ mental health. This is the first study to investigate whether parents of trauma survivors experience CFTs and the association with psychological distress in this group. Objective: The main aim of the present study is to investigate CFTs in parents of trauma survivors and the relationship between the frequency and vividness of CFTs and psychological distress. Method: The participants (N = 310, 191 females) were parents of the youths targeted in the terror attack on Utøya island, Norway, in 2011. Frequency and vividness of CFTs, posttraumatic stress reactions (PTSR), and symptoms of anxiety and depression were measured 8.5–9 years post-terror. Results: The majority of the parents (74%) reported having experienced CFTs at some time point since the attack. For almost one-third of the parents, CFTs were still present more than eight years after the attack. Higher frequency and vividness of CFTs were uniquely associated with higher levels of PTSR, anxiety, and depression. Conclusion: The present findings suggest that frequent and vivid CFTs may contribute to mental health problems in parents of trauma survivors and should be addressed in therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Managing risk from natural hazards and other types of critical risks is fundamental to the viability, sustainability, and resilience of organizations of all types and sizes. It is, crucially, an important part of demonstrating their purpose and commitment to society and the broader environment, which incorporates what they do to help tackle climate change. Counterfactual thought is the process of reimagining the past, for example, for a particular event that has occurred, as being different than what actually transpired. In this study, we investigate how this process and mindset of counterfactual thinking can have specific value in helping people in organizations to have a more robust way of analyzing and managing risk. The role and potential impact of counterfactual-based practices on risk mitigation and management, and an increased focus on purposeful resilience in a business context, has not previously been widely studied. We have conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with people in senior positions in various organizations, global contexts, scales, covering a range of industries and sectors including construction and property, engineering, mining, nonprofit, and consulting. Through these interviews we identify: (1) existing challenges of current risk management systems; (2) types of risks of concern in the organizations interviewed; (3) the current and potential use of counterfactual practices in these organizations; and (4) the perceived value of counterfactual practices within the business setting for risk mitigation and resilience. We share best practices that emerged from the study, especially the role of leadership, diversity, and inclusion as a necessary foundation for successful implementation of counterfactual risk practices. The findings from this project can be used to inform businesses interested in adopting emerging downward counterfactual risk and resilience practices to improve their preparedness to manage critical and evolving risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: This study aimed at exploring (1) the motor and non-motor correlates of counterfactual thinking (CFT) abilities in non-demented amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) patients and (2) the ability of CFT measures to discriminate these patients from healthy controls (HCs) and patients with and without cognitive impairment. Methods: N = 110 ALS patients and N = 51 HCs were administered two CFT tasks, whose sum, resulting in a CFT Index (CFTI), was addressed as the outcome. Patients further underwent an in-depth cognitive, behavioral, and motor-functional evaluation. Correlational analyses were run to explore the correlates of the CFTI in patients. Logistic regressions were performed to test whether the CFTI could discriminate patients from HCs. Results: The CFTI was selectively associated (p ≤ 0.005) with fluency andmemory subscales of the Edinburgh Cognitive and Behavioral ALS Screen (ECAS), but not with other variables. CFTI scores discriminated patients from HCs (p < 0.001) with high accuracy (82%), but not patients with a normal vs. defective performance on the ECAS-Total. Conclusion: CFT measures in non-demented ALS patients were associated with verbal fluency and memory functions, and they were also able to discriminate them from HCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traumatic events often lead to counterfactual comparison (CFC), defined as comparing one's current attributes to that of a hypothetical mentally simulated alternative that might have occurred but is counter to the facts. CFC can differ in its direction and in terms of the referent of action. The mentally simulated alternative may be evaluated as more favorable (upward CFC) or less favorable (downward CFC) and the counterfactual alteration (e.g., preventing the event) may have been performed by oneself (self-referent) or others (other-referent). The frequency and engendered affective valence of CFC differ between trauma survivors and correlate with PTSD symptoms. However, knowledge about the mechanism involved is lacking. Individuals differ in how they regulate the engendered affective valence following CFC, suggesting that dispositional affect regulation styles may be implicated in this relationship. We therefore examined the affective styles of adjusting, concealing, and tolerating and their relationship with CFC frequency and engendered affective valence. In 556 individuals who had encountered at least one traumatic event, we examined this question separately for (1) upward self-referent CFC, (2) upward other-referent CFC, (3) downward self-referent CFC and (4) downward other-referent CFC. Most effects were found for upward (rather than downward) CFC and particularly for upward self-referent CFC. The frequency of engaging in upward self-referent CFC was associated with all three affective styles and with engendered affective valence. Different emotion regulation processes appear to be associated with more frequent engagement in upward self-referent CFC and more negative engendered affective valence. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Data from two U.S. online samples (N = 613) indicated that conservatives consistently perceived face mask use as less important than did liberals. This difference was attenuated with high counterfactual engagement. Both studies provide correlational evidence of this robust moderation. Study 2 provides further insight into differences between liberals' and conservatives' emotional responses to COVID‐19 information, and suggests that during on‐going negative events, downward counterfactuals may not provide relief. Overall, these studies document the politicization of public health behavior, and find that emphasizing the causal links between behavior and COVID‐19 prevention may improve conservatives' attitudes toward CDC guidelines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ObjectivesThis study aimed at exploring (1) the motor and non-motor correlates of counterfactual thinking (CFT) abilities in non-demented amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) patients and (2) the ability of CFT measures to discriminate these patients from healthy controls (HCs) and patients with and without cognitive impairment.MethodsN = 110 ALS patients and N = 51 HCs were administered two CFT tasks, whose sum, resulting in a CFT Index (CFTI), was addressed as the outcome. Patients further underwent an in-depth cognitive, behavioral, and motor-functional evaluation. Correlational analyses were run to explore the correlates of the CFTI in patients. Logistic regressions were performed to test whether the CFTI could discriminate patients from HCs.ResultsThe CFTI was selectively associated (p ≤ 0.005) with fluency and memory subscales of the Edinburgh Cognitive and Behavioral ALS Screen (ECAS), but not with other variables. CFTI scores discriminated patients from HCs (p < 0.001) with high accuracy (82%), but not patients with a normal vs. defective performance on the ECAS-Total.ConclusionCFT measures in non-demented ALS patients were associated with verbal fluency and memory functions, and they were also able to discriminate them from HCs.

Narrative creativity training has recently shown promise as a tool for increasing self-efficacy and resilience in adult learners. The training employs dramatic and literary techniques such as perspective-shifting, counterfactual (i.e., what-if) thinking, and causal (i.e., why) thinking to improve real-world problem solving. To explore whether narrative creativity training could have similar benefits for younger populations, this study piloted a test on elementary students. A five-minute randomized controlled trial conducted with 32 third, fourth, and fifth grade students yielded increased self-efficacy and creative problem-solving, and a five-day longitudinal trial conducted with 28 students from the same population was associated with increased resilience. The results suggest the potential practical benefits of incorporating theater, literature, comics, and other story-based art into elementary school curricula.

Across human and animal societies, punishment is used as a means of responding to cheating and modifying the behaviour of others. A growing body of work shows that human punishment decisions involve representing both the outcomes of transgressions as well as whether a transgressor chose to do wrong. An important question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals demonstrate a similar sensitivity to choice when punishing. Understanding whether and to what extent animals integrate information about choice into their punishment decisions can shed light on the selective pressures and cognitive mechanisms that shape punishment. Here we explore this question by comparing punishment in cooperative pairs of reef-dwelling cleaner wrasses, Labroides dimidiatus , and humans, Homo sapiens. In study 1, we investigate whether punishment in adult male cleaners is influenced by whether females had a choice to cheat. In study 2, we ask the same question of human adults, using a novel task inspired by the cooperative interactions between pairs of cleaners and their client fish. Our results support previous work finding that punishment of cheating in humans is sensitive to whether transgressors chose to cheat: they punished more when the alternative option was cooperation. However, we did not find a similar sensitivity to alternative options in cleaners. Our results provide a direct comparison of the role of alternative options in punishment decisions in humans and a distantly related cooperative species. We suggest that important cognitive constraints may be in place that limit cleaners' ability to simultaneously represent both the choice a transgressor makes as well as the choices they could have made. • We examined punishment in cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus). • We investigated whether cleaners are sensitive to others' options when punishing. • We compared cleaners to humans in a task modelled on cleaner fish–client mutualism. • Punishment was sensitive to alternative options in humans but not in cleaner fish. • Cleaners might be unable to represent others' choices based on alternative options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines how counterfactual potency (CP), the multiplicative effect of the likelihoods of the "if" and "then" clauses of counterfactuals, determines the effects of counterfactuals on behavioral intentions. In Study 1, we found that participants who read highly (vs. minimally) mutable vignettes perceived the counterfactuals as more likely and endorsed relevant intentions more. However, CP did not mediate the effect of mutability on intentions. In Studies 2 and 3, we found that CP directly affected intentions and also mediated the effects of mutability on intentions when mutability was specifically manipulated via controllability (Study 2) or norm violation (Study 3). Finally, Study 4 used archival reaction time data to show that more concrete counterfactuals were perceived as more likely and subsequently facilitated intentions. Taken together, the current research provides evidence that more likely counterfactuals facilitate behavioral intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transtheoretical model has been used as a model of behavior change for tobacco users. However, it does not account for perceptions of past behavior that may provide additional guidance toward smoking cessation. No studies have examined associations between the transtheoretical model, content themes of smoking experiences, and counterfactual thoughts (i.e. "If only...then..."). Mturk participants (N = 178; 47.8% female) completed measures of smoking attitudes, behavior, and stage and processes of change use. Participants described a past negative smoking event and an event-related counterfactual thought-listing task. Participants in the precontemplation stage endorsed fewer processes of change. Also, participants in the action stage reported significantly more counterfactuals about cravings (e.g. If only I could have controlled my urge to smoke...) inferring that they may be identifying cravings or urges as relevant barriers toward smoking cessation. Identifying these self-relevant thoughts may provide additional ways to address and overcome barriers toward achieving long-term smoking cessation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beneficiaries can have prior expectations of not receiving benefits and imagine ex‐post that benefits were not given. The present study examined the preregistered hypothesis that these two kinds of absence simulations increase gratitude. Both Studies 1 and 2 were conducted in a Japanese university. In Study 1, reading a manipulated vignette made participants in the absence simulation condition expect not to receive a benefit, while those in the control condition were made to expect to receive it. In Study 2, after reading a benefit‐receiving vignette, those in the absence simulation condition imagined the situation where they did not receive it, while those in the control condition again imagined receiving it. In both studies, all the participants rated their gratitude for certain fixed benefits in each vignette. Results showed that gratitude in neither of the two absence simulation conditions was higher than that of the respective control conditions, suggesting that simulating the absence of benefits does not increase gratitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is threefold: to offer a vision of human flourishing in the academy premised upon 'living in truth', embracing lived experience and being in relation; to explore counterfactual thinking across the life-course, from the period of compulsory schooling to the end of life, with the emphasis on the latter; and to critique the practice of drawing upon philosophy to provide an interpretative framework through which to address the arts, drawing upon the work of Cora Diamond. The movement towards death is explored through three vignettes, focusing on the lived experience of three 'characters' facing the prospect of their imminent demise: the philosopher Richard Rorty, the English television dramatist and screenwriter Dennis Potter and a consultant physician (the father of one of the authors). Drawing upon the work of the historian Timothy Snyder, the relevance of the claim made by Vaclav Havel that 'essence precedes existence' is explored in relation to the climate of the contemporary education system. The primacy of essence over existence is also a key feature of the vignettes of the lives of the three players that form the centrepiece of the article. These enable us to 'think without thinking', which is perhaps a counterfactual claim par excellence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Rumination is associated with counterfactual thinking (CFT) and regret, but underlying mechanisms in this association are uninvestigated. Rumination is characterized by attentional biases and focusing attention towards accomplishments versus lost opportunities influences CFT and regret. The goal of this study was to investigate the association between self-critical rumination and attention towards accomplishments and lost opportunities, and how this may underly the link between rumination and CFT and regret. Methods: Hundred healthy female participants performed a risk-taking task while (a) attention towards accomplishments and lost opportunities, and (b) self-reported CFT and regret were measured. Results: Analyses showed that participants with high (versus low) rumination tendencies focused less on accomplishments, and this mediated the association between rumination and regret. Conclusion: These findings suggest that reduced attention towards accomplishments may be an underlying mechanism in the link between rumination and regret, and interventions could target this attentional bias for therapeutic benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crime control theater (CCT) policies are adopted in response to public outcry for action and are widely accepted, but ineffective at reducing crime (e.g. Sex Offender Registration and Notification; SORN). The study examined the influence of a university's SORN policy adherence (no/minimum/above & beyond), expert testimony on policy effectiveness (absent/present), and sample (student/community) on jurors' decisions, counterfactual endorsement, and anger. Participants (N = 674) read a vignette in which parents sued a university for the wrongful death of their daughter by a registered sex offender. Greater counterfactual thinking (if the university had done more than different outcome) and likelihood of a liable verdict were expected when expert testimony was absent (greater belief SORN policy effectiveness), or university failed to adhere to the policy. University response and expert testimony had the expected effects on liability measures and counterfactual endorsement. Additionally, counterfactual endorsement was influenced by sample (greater community endorsement). Also, the community sample was less calibrated and more punitive in their decisions – increased liability judgments and damages. Counterfactual endorsement and/or anger mediated the effects of university response, expert testimony, and sample on liability measures and damages. These findings suggest that anger and counterfactual thinking are important mechanisms driving public support for CCT policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Visual question answering(VQA) is a multi-modal task that combines computer vision and natural language proces-sing,which is extremely challenging.However,the current VQA model is often misled by the apparent correlation in the data,and the output of the model is directly guided by language bias.Many previous researches focus on solving language bias and assisting the model via counterfactual sample methods.These studies,however,ignore the prediction information and the difference between key features and non-key features in counterfactual samples.The proposed model can distinguish the difference between the original sample,the factual sample and the counterfactual sample.In view of this,this paper proposes a paradigm of contrastive learning based on counterfactual samples.By comparing these three samples in terms of feature gaps and prediction gaps,the VQA model has been significantly improved in its robustness.Compared with CL-VQA method,the overall precision,average precision and Num index of this method improves by 0.19%,0.89% and 2.6% respectively.Compared with the CSSVQA method,the Gap of the proposed method decrease to 0.45 from 0.96.

Backgrounds: Decision-making deficits have been reported as trans-diagnostic characteristics of vulnerability to suicidal behaviors, independent of co-existing psychiatric disorders. Individuals with suicidal behaviors often regret their decision to attempt suicide and may have impairments in future-oriented processing. However, it is not clear how people with suicidal dispositions use futureoriented cognition and past experience of regret to guide decision-making. Here, we examined the processes of regret anticipation and experience in subclinical youth with and without suicidal ideation during value-based decision-making. Methods: In total, 80 young adults with suicidal ideation and 79 healthy controls completed a computational counterfactual thinking task and self-reported measures of suicidal behaviors, depression, anxiety, impulsivity, rumination, hopelessness, and childhood maltreatment. Results: Individuals with suicidal ideation showed a reduced ability to anticipate regret compared to healthy controls. Specifically, suicidal ideators' experience of regret/relief was significantly different from that of healthy controls upon obtained outcomes, while their disappointment/pleasure experience was not significantly different from healthy controls. Conclusion: These findings suggest that young adults with suicidal ideation have difficulty predicting the consequences or the future value of their behavior. Individuals with suicidal ideation showed impairments in value comparison and flat affect to retrospective rewards, whereas individuals with high suicidality showed blunted affect to immediate rewards. Identifying the counterfactual decisionmaking characteristics of at-risk suicidal individuals may help to elucidate measurable markers of suicidal vulnerability and identify future intervention targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the current study, we investigated how a gratitude intervention of counterfactual thinking influenced COVID-19 experiences, dispositional gratitude levels, and psychological well-being. College students from a university in the Pacific Northwest (N = 152; Mage = 22.5, SD = 2.6) completed an online survey where they were randomly assigned into either a gratitude treatment group, where they practiced counterfactual thinking, or a control group, where counterfactual thinking was not practiced, and self-reported their COVID-19 experiences, gratitude levels, and psychological well-being. We sought to explore whether counterfactual thinking could mitigate the effects of COVID-19 by increasing gratitude and personal well-being. Statistical analyses indicated that the treatment group exposed to counterfactual thinking reported higher gratitude levels than the control group, t(115) = 2.81, p = .006; t(113) = 3.01, p = .003. A series of Pearson correlations found a small, statistically significant negative relationship between COVID-19 experiences and personal well-being, r(125) = –.23, p = .02. It was found that gratitude and personal well-being were statistically significant and positive, r(125) = .77, p = .001; r(121) = .85, p = .001. Results showed a statistically significant difference between the gratitude control and gratitude treatment groups regarding personal well-being when controlling for the severity of COVID-19 experiences, F(2, 102) = 5.97, p = .004, partial eta squared = .11. This study contributes to existing literature by providing an empirical demonstration that counterfactual thinking can improve gratitude and personal well-being, as well as mitigate negative COVID-19 experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]