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This article contributes to the development of contestable market theory by investigating how competitiveness in the eSports industry influences the size of this industry, as measured by the volume of monetary prizes. We use data on each gamer’s prize earnings for each tournament from 1999 to 2015 to estimate panel vector autoregression (V.A.R.) model with fixed effects. The main finding is that competition does not increase industry size. This result confirms the hypothesis from the contestable market theory that perfect competition does not always facilitate better development, especially in industries where natural barriers result in a small number of leading firms or teams.

Economic success, and a commitment to the social benefits of inclusive training opportunities are important goals for public vocational education and training (VET). Currently, in Australia, VET policy is a shared responsibility between the Commonwealth and the States and Territories. Priorities for investment are juggled between: a) improving efficiency and responsiveness; and b) providing societal prosperity. Amid recent VET educational reforms and policy directives the authors of this paper undertook a pilot study examining language, literacy and numeracy support and inclusive teaching and learning practices in a Diploma of Nursing course. The data highlighted implications arising from new market driven education reforms. This article reports on identified factors that influenced inclusive learning opportunities, noticeably associated with two recent policy developments: the release of the FSK Foundation Skills Training Package (IBSA 2014); and the Queensland's Higher Skills Program Policy 2014-15.

V tem članku se avtor ukvarja z vprašanjem, v katerih primerih naj država oziroma njena pristojna regulatorna telesa na "liberaliziranih" infrastrukturnih trgih vršijo ex ante regulacijo. V ta namen uporablja ekonomsko teorijo kot instrument za presojo utemeljenosti ex ante regulacije. Avtor v tej zvezi ugotavlja, da je ex ante regulacija intenzivno oblastno poseganje na trg, ki se v tržnem gospodarstvu uporablja le izjemoma. Tipičen primer, ko naj se vrši ex ante regulacija, je t. i. položaj "ozkega grla", položaj, ko sta kumulativno izpolnjena dva pogoja, in sicer ko gre za infrastrukturo, ki je neophodna za poslovanje oz. delovanje podjetja na spodnjem, vertikalno povezanem trgu, vendar zaradi učinka naravnega monopola ne obstaja dejanski substitut, in ko zaradi učinka nepovratnih oz. ireverzibilnih stroškov ne obstaja potencialen substitut, ki bi discipliniral lastnika oziroma imetnika edine infrastrukture. In this article the author deals with the question in which cases the state or its competent regulatory body should perform ex ante regulation on 'liberalized' infrastructure markets. The author for this purpose applies economic theory as an instrument for assessing merits of ex ante regulation. The author in this regard ascertains that ex ante regulation means intensive public authority intervention on the market, which should be applied only exceptionally in a market economy. A typical example when ex ante regulation should be performed, is the so called bottleneck situation, i. e., a situation when two cumulative conditions are met. Namely, when there is an infrastructure indispensable for business activities on the downstream market but there is no active substitute because of a natural monopoly effect, and when there is no potential substitute that would discipline the owner of the sole infrastructure because of sunk costs.

Bu çalışmanın amacı Türkiye mobil haberleşme piyasasının Yarışılabilir Piyasalar Modelinin temel şartlarını sağlayıp sağlamadığının incelenmesidir. Çalışmanın kapsamı Türkiye mobil haberleşme piyasası ile sınırlı olmakla birlikte, diğer ülkelerdeki mobil piyasa yapılanmaları da hemen hemen aynı olduğu için elde edilen sonuçlar genelleştirilebilmektedir. Türkiye mobil haberleşme piyasasının modele uygunluğunun analiz edilebilmesi için öncelikle piyasanın mevut yapısı incelenmiştir. Sonrasında piyasada faaliyet gösteren firmaların ayrı ayrı karları ve genel piyasa karı incelenmiştir. Piyasa karının pozitif çıkması ve 2005 – 2017 yılları arasında piyasaya hiçbir firmanın giriş yapmamış olması, çalışmanın yönünü piyasaya giriş engellerini ve batık maliyetleri incelemeye yöneltmiştir. Çalışmanın sonucunda piyasaya girişte önemli bir giriş engeli oluşturan batık maliyetlerin Türkiye mobil haberleşme piyasası için geçerli olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Çünkü piyasaya giriş yapmak isteyecek firmaların yüksek miktarda lisanslama bedellerine katlanması gerekmektedir. Sonuç olarak piyasanın Yarışılabilir Piyasalar Modelinin temel şartlarını sağlamadığı tespit edilmiştir. Diğer taraftan sanal mobil şebeke işletmelerinin piyasaya entegre edilmesinin mobil piyasanın daha etkin çalışmasını sağlayacağı ve Yarışılabilir Piyasalar Modelinin işleyişine yardımcı olacağı sonucuna varılmıştır. The aim of thisstudy is to examine whether Turkey mobile communication market satisfies the essential requirements of the Contestable Markets Model. Although the study was limited by the scope of Turkey mobile communication market, the results obtained may be generalized because mobile market structures in other countries almost the same. For analyzing the compatibility of the Turkey mobile communication market to the model, current structure of the market was examined primilary. Afterwards, the profits of the companies operating in the market andt he general market profit are examined. The positive profile of the market profit and the absence of any firm entry into the market between 2005 and 2017 led the study to examine the entry barriers and sunk costs of the market.As a result of the study, the sunk costs have become a major obstacle to entry into the market. Because firms that are willing to enter the market need to bear a high amount of licensing fees. As a result, it has been determined that the market does not meet the basic requirements of the Contestable Markets Model. On the other hand, the integration of virtual mobile network operators into the market has resulted in a more efficient operation of the mobile market and its will bring closer mobile communication market to the Contestable Markets. 135

Tam ödemeli ihaleler efor sarf etmenin kazanmadan bağımsız olarak maliyetli olması açısından farklı müsabakaları anlamamıza yardım eder ve bu nedenle son zamanlarda yoğun ilgi görmüştür. Diğer ihale çeşitlerinden farklı olarak, müzayede tasarımcıları hedeflerine bağlı olarak bu maliyetten faydalanabilirler. Müzayede tasarımcısına fayda sağlayacak şekilde toplam efor eniyilemesi tam ödemeli ihaleler çerçevesinde çalışılmıştır. Fakat literatürde tanımlanan ihale ödülleri, oyuncuların efor seviyelerinden bağımsız olarak tayin edilmektedir. Bu çalışmada ödülü oyuncuların efor seviyelerine bağlı olarak belirlemede iki ana neden vardır. İlki, ödülü eforlara bağlı olarak tanımlamak ihale tasarımcısı açısından eforlardan bağımsız duruma göre daha faydalı olabilir. İkincisi, böyle bir oyunun denge nitelikleri oyuncuların ödüle verdiği değer ile sarf ettikleri efor arasındaki ilişkiyi anlama açısından kullanışlı olabilir (olacaktır).Çalışmamızdaki ihale yapısında elde edilen denge nitelikleri, literatürde ödülün önceden belirlendiği ihalelerden önemli ölçüde farklılaşmaktadır. Daha da önemlisi, toplam eforu motive etme yoluyla modelimiz ihale tasarımcısına daha yüksek bir fayda sağlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, içsel ödül modelimiz deneysel çalışmalarda oyuncuların kendi aksiyonlarına verdikleri değeri anlamada önemli bir araç olabilir (olacaktır). Çalışmamız, yarışmada sarf edilecek toplam eforla ilgilenen ihale tasarımcısı için ödülü toplam efora bağlı kılmanın faydalı olacağını göstermektedir. All-pay auctions have received considerable attention since they provide insight about wide range of competitions where effort is costly regardless of winning or losing. Unlike other types of auction, auctioneer could benefit from these sunk costs depending on his objective. The problem of maximizing total expected effort in all-pay auctions has been studied to manage the sunk costs favoring the designer. However, current literature lacks identifying dependence of prize valuation in ones effort in these games. This dependence is interesting to analyze for two reasons. First, from the designer's perspective, conditioning the prize on the effort could be profitable. Second, the equilibrium characteristics of such a game could be helpful in understanding bidding behavior by identifying the relation between the perception of the prize and their efforts. The result of our analysis show that the equilibrium characteristics significantly differ from the current literature where the prize is predetermined. Moreover, in motivating higher total effort, our model achieves higher designer surplus. Therefore, endogenous prize model could be a valuable tool in experimental studies for understanding players' valuation of their action. Moreover, conditioning prize on the total effort can be beneficial for a designer interested in maximizing the total effort. 30

This report shows how competition policy can help African countries boost inclusive and sustainable development. Prepared by the World Bank Group (WBG) in partnership with the African Competition Forum, the study reviews the implementation of competition frameworks in Africa and examines competition issues that affect market performance in three important sectors for Africa's competitiveness: cement, fertilizers, and telecoms. It uses the WBG's Markets and Competition Policy Assessment Tool to identify how competition rule and their enforcement could be made more effective, and to highlight economic and regulatory characteristics of cement, fertilizers and telecoms markets that dampen competition and increase the risk of anticompetitive business practices. Conservative estimates put forward by this report suggest that addressing weak competition in principle staple foods across three countries would have the effect of lifting around 500,000 people above the poverty line by lowering consumer prices. Fundamental market reforms to increase competition in key input services would also boost economic growth. For example, professional services reforms would deliver an additional 0.16–0.43 percent of additional annual gross domestic product growth. While the benefits of competition are clearly observable in Africa, considerable effort is still required to ensure effective implementation of competition laws and incorporation of competition principles in government policies.

Este artículo analiza la estrategia de la United Shoe Machinery Company, empresa que dominó el mercado mundial de maquinaria para calzado en la primera mitad del siglo XX, su penetración en Latinoamérica y en el resto del mundo y los procesos judiciales antimonopolio que sufrió en Estados Unidos. A pesar de su posición de práctico monopolio, la empresa tuvo un desempeño eficiente que impulsó la innovación tecnológica y la modernización de la industria del calzado en muchos países. The United Shoe Machinery Company dominated world market for footwear machinery in the first half of the twentieth century. This article analyzes the company’s strategy, its penetration in Latin America and the rest of the world, and the impact on the company of antitrust lawsuits in the United States. The conclusion is that, despite its practical monopoly, the company had an efficient performance, which fueled technological innovation and modernization of footwear industry in many countries. Este trabajo se ha realizado con el apoyo del Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad del Gobierno de España, a través del proyecto HAR2012-33298.

Background In most developed nations, there has been a shift from public services to a marketisation of public goods and services - representing a significant reform process aiming to transform the way in which community-based human services, such as health, are delivered and consumed. For services, this means developing the capacity to adapt and innovate in response to changing circumstances to achieve quality. The availability of rigorous research to demonstrate whether a market approach and contestability, in particular, is a coherent reform process is largely absent. Contestability operates on the premise that better procurement processes allow more providers to enter the market and compete for contracts. This is expected to create stimulus for greater efficiencies, innovation and improved service delivery to consumers. There is limited understanding, however, about how community-based providers morph and re-configure in response to the opportunities posed by contestability. This study focuses on the effect of a contestability policy on the community-managed mental health sector. Methods/design A realist review will be undertaken to understand how and why the introduction of contestability into a previously incontestable market influences the ways in which community-based mental health providers respond to contestability. The review will investigate those circumstances that shape organisational response and generate outcomes through activating mechanisms. An early scoping has helped to formulate the initial program theory. A realist synthesis will be undertaken to identify relevant journal articles and grey literature. Data will be extracted in relation to the emerging contextual factors, mechanisms and outcomes and their configurations. The analysis will seek patterns and regularities in these configurations across the extracted data and will focus on addressing our theory-based questions. Discussion Increasingly, community-based mental health markets are moving to contestability models. Rigorous research is needed to understand how such markets work and in what contexts. The knowledge gained from this study in community-based mental health will provide valuable lessons in how contestability works, in what circumstances and who benefits when. The results of the proposed research will be useful to policy-makers and may be applicable in other contexts beyond the community-based mental health sector. Systematic review registration PROSPERO CRD42015016808

Türkiye'de ekonomik istikrarın sağlanması için temel sektörlerden birisi olan bankacılık sektörünün sağlam bir yapıya kavuşması için rekabet ve yarışılabilirlik düzeyinin artırılması gerekmektedir. Bu amaçla, 2001 yılında bir bankacılık sektörü yeniden yapılandırma programı uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. Piyasa yapısının belirlenmesinin, bu amaca ulaşılıp ulaşılmadığını göstermesi açısından önemli bir gösterge olduğu düşünüldüğünden, rekabet ve yarışılabilirlik açısından sektörün piyasa yapısının belirlenmesi çalışma alanı olarak seçilmiştir. Bu amaçla çalışmada, öncelikle bankacılık ile ilgili genel bilgilere yer verilmiştir. Daha sonra bankacılık sektöründe piyasa yapılarından hareketle rekabet ve yarışılabilirlik incelenerek, rekabet ve yarışılabilirliği ölçmeye yönelik yaklaşımlar özetlenmiştir. Türk bankacılık sektörünün yapısı dönemler itibariyle özetlendikten sonra, uygulama bölümünde 27 mevduat bankasının 2003-2012 dönemine ait panel veri seti kullanılarak sektördeki rekabet ve yarışılabilirlik ölçülmüştür.Oluşturulan modellerin tahmin sonuçları Türk bankacılık sektörünün, yarışılabilirlik şartlarını taşıyan monopollü rekabet piyasası olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Elde edilen bir diğer sonuç ise Türk bankacılık sektöründe ölçek büyüklüğünün piyasa yapısını etkileyen önemli bir değişken olduğudur. Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Bankacılık Sektörü, Rekabet, Yarışılabilirlik, Yarışılabilir Piyasalar Teorisi, Panzar-Rosse Modeli. In order to maintain economic stability in Turkey, and to create a strong structure for banking sector, one of the main sectors, competition and contestability level should be increased. For this reason, in 2001, a new banking sector restructuring programme was implemented. As determining market structure is an important indicator in showing whether it reaches this aim or not, sector's market structure, determining sector's market structure in terms of competition and contestability, has been selected as the field of study. For this reason, in the study, first starting from market structures in banking sector, competition and contestability has been examined, and approaches for measuring competition and contestability have been summarised. After summarising Turkish banking sector within periods, in application section, competition and contestability in the sector have been measured by using 27 banks' 2003-2012 period panel data sets.Empirical results of the models created indicate that Turkish banking sector is a monopolistic competition market meeting the conditions of contestability. Another result obtained from the study is that scale size is a crucial variable affecting market structure of Turkish banking sector.Keywords: Turkish Banking Sector, Competition, Contestability, Contestable Markets Theory, Panzar-Rosse Model. 165

This paper addresses two puzzles related to industrial dynamics and competition. The first of these puzzles is that a high degree of globalization may well go hand in hand with increasing concentration. I show that one of the most globalized sectors of the electronics industry, hard disk drives (HDD), also displays one of the highest degrees of concentration : multinational corporations, after all, may not be such effective « spoilers of concentration », as claimed by Richard Caves (1982). The second puzzle that I address in this paper is that, despite an extremely high degree of concentration, this industry fails to act like a stable global oligopoly. So far, market share volatility has been restricted to the oligopoly members. There are however indications that this may change and that market contestability may improve. Some possible explanations are reviewed, building on a conceptual framework introduced by G.B. Richardson (1996 and 1997). I analyze how globalization affects competition and distinguish forces that foster concentration and forces that are conducive for market disruption. I conclude with suggestions for future research on the determinants of market structure and firm behavior., Cet article s'intéresse à deux énigmes concernant la dynamique industrielle et la concurrence. La première de ces énigmes est le fait que la globalisation est parfaitement compatible avec une concentration accrue. Je montre que l'un des secteurs les plus globalisés de l'industrie électronique, le système d'entraînement des disques durs (HDD) est aussi celui qui a le degré de concentration le plus élevé : les entreprises multinationales peuvent après tout ne pas être aussi effectivement destructrices de la concentration que le prétendait Richard Caves (1982). La seconde énigme est le fait que, en dépit de ce degré élevé de concentration, cette industrie ne se comporte pas comme un oligopole stable. À ce jour, la volatilité des parts de marché n'affecte que les membres de l'oligopole. Il est possible cependant, si l'on en juge d'après certaines indications, que ceci pourrait changer et que la contestabilité du marché puisse s'améliorer. J'examine un certain nombre d'explications possibles, dans le cadre conceptuel introduit par G.B. Richardson (1996 et 1997). J'analyse comment la globalisation affecte la concurrence, en distinguant les forces qui favorisent la concentration et celles qui induisent la rupture du marché. La conclusion fait quelques suggestions pour des recherches ultérieures sur les déterminants des structures de marché et des comportements., Ernst Dieter. High-Tech competition puzzles - How globalization affects firm behavior and market structure in the electronics industry. In: Revue d'économie industrielle, vol. 85, 3e trimestre 1998. pp. 9-30.

Opportunism, either governmental or private, may become a powerful deterrent against public-private project financing, especially considering the scale of the investment in infrastructure. The parties can secure themselves against counterparty opportunism by assigning the investor an exit (put) option and the public agent a bail-out (call) option on the private investor's shares. This paper presents a mechanism for converting natural monopolies into contestable markets using over-the-counter option contracts that combine the stability of long-term contracts and the flexibility of short-term contracts. The exit/bail-out option mechanism reduces entry barriers by streamlining incomplete long-term contracts and avoiding contractual problems related to bounded rationality and opportunism.

The work discusses a basic proposition in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection (Bester, 1985). By working out the sequence of market transactions, we show that the effectiveness of collateral in avoiding equilibrium rationing depends on an assumption of uncontestability of the loan market. If contestability is restored to its proper place, the separation of borrower by means of sufficient collateral does not impede the emergence of credit rationing, which results from a coordination failure among risk-neutral banks. As a consequence, even in a risk-neutral environment with suitable endowments, the use of collateral in credit contracts could not be a socially efficient screening-device. Our conclusion on rationing does not stand in contrast with the general result of Gale (1996).

This paper provides a new game theoretic model consistent with the premises of contestable markets. Two firms repeatedly compete for a natural monopoly position. The limit price of the incumbent is disciplined by a hit and run strategy of the entrant. In this model, contrarily to thewell known Maskin and Tirole model (1988): i) productive efficiency is encouraged, the more efficient firm gets a higher rent as an incumbent than the one the less efficient firm would, ii) rent dissipation does not necessarily prevails, even in the case of equally efficient firms. This opens the way to a reassessment of the merits of contestable markets.

The working report looks at the actual situation of the German broadband cable market in the context of merger control and sector specific regulation. A crucial problem in dealing with the cable market whether in antitrust cases or in the regulatory context is the precise assessment of the economic conditions, especially the arguable question if the network has still characteristics of a natural monopoly still a common argument in network industries. The report therefore uses the basic concept of the disaggregated identification of network-specific market power. The unique structure of the German broadband cable industry with its horizontal and vertical separation of the distribution network shows a highly contestable market with elements of competitive franchise bidding. On the other hand the cable market is suffering from that separation due to problems of inefficiency, especially in times of dynamic changes in communications with powerful intermodal competitors like Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG) with an innovative IPTV infrastructure. To this date these market characteristics have been ignored.

We provide some existence results of stable pricings for natural monopoly as defined in the theory of contestable markets. The main addings are based on the assumption of separated markets and the possibilities of entries. We borrow tools from cooperative game theory. Following the work of Bendali et al. (Revista de Matematicas Aplicadas, 2000), we make full use of parameterized cores of games with side payments to characterize subsidy free and sustainable pricings.

We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games., L'existence de tarifications sans subventions croisées et soutenable est prouvée dans un marché contestable multiproduit où les firmes ont la possibilité de discriminer les marchés locaux, composés d'une partie de la ligne commerciale et d'une partie d'agents. Les résultats sont obtenus sous une hypothèse de fonction de coût à partage équitable, et sous des conditions de bord des fonctions de demandes. Le problème de tarification est modélisé par des coeurs-équilibres de jeux de coût paramétrés.