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Low-carbon development is a global trend and a requirement from governments and industries. Many companies produce green products based on brown products to implement green product segmentation strategies, and the platform economy can help them achieve green development. Considering a manufacturer who can choose a pure brown, green low-price segmentation or green high-price segmentation strategy, we construct three corresponding platform supply chain models. By comparing the optimal results of the three models, we observe how the manufacturer performs in terms of economic and ecological benefits, as well as social welfare. Our results show that the proportion of green consumers and the green preference of green consumers have a positive impact on the manufacturer's profit. The manufacturer can make the most profit when it produces both brown and green products and sets a higher price for the green products. The green product segmentation improves social welfare, and the manufacturer can achieve a win‒win situation in terms of economic and social benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the 'Cap-and-Trade' mechanism of carbon emission, the low carbon management of supply chain is an indispensable link in the process of enterprise emission reduction. Constrained by carbon price and consumers' environmental awareness, this paper establishes a two-stage game model between retailers and manufacturers under decentralized and centralized decisions. Under the decentralized decision, this paper analyzes the optimal carbon emissions before and after the transfer, the conditions of transfer and the changes of profits with the proportion of transfer. Under the centralized decision, Nash equilibrium is used to study the distribution of additional profits. Conclusions are obtained as follows. (a) There are thresholds for carbon price and consumers' environmental awareness on carbon emissions, and the optimal emissions on both sides of the threshold will vary with the cost of emission reduction. (b) In a decentralized decision, the participation of retailers in abatement depends on the market abatement costs and abatement benefits, while a certain range of transfer rates can optimize the profitability of retailers. (c) In the centralized decision, manufacturer and retailer formulate emission reduction strategies jointly and share the extra profits equally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyses the green channel coordination problem in a two-echelon supply chain where demand is a function of the selling price and the product's green quality. The retailer decides on the selling price while the manufacturer regulates the green quality of the product. To initiate the channel coordination and to establish a win-win outcome for both parties, a hybrid of 'greening cost sharing' and 'revenue sharing' contract (HGRS) is developed. This study contributes to the literature by providing an analytical approach to address the channel coordination and pricing issues in a green supply chain under the consumer environmental awareness while the manufacturer has the ability of enhancing, with investments, the product's green quality. Our study reveals that: (a) the proposed HGRS contract is capable of achieving channel coordination while both supply chain members gain more profit than in decentralised decision making, (b) the new suggested contract enhances the product's green quality, reduces the selling price, and stimulates the market demand, and (c) HGRS contract results in more satisfied customers (by offering low prices) as well as more sustainable operations (by increasing greenness level) at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated by the observation that many energy-intensive manufacturers are adopting energy efficiency to deal with rapidly increasing consumer environmental awareness (CEA), this paper is the first attempt that extends CEA into the energy-saving area using several mathematical models and investigates how an energy-intensive manufacturer, facing choices of self-saving, shared savings and guaranteed savings, determines the optimal strategies of improving energy efficiency when CEA is considered. When the actual savings per unit is deterministic (DU scenario), we derive the optimal strategies of improving energy efficiency for both the manufacturer and the energy service company (ESCO) under the two energy-saving modes: self-saving and shared savings. Our results show the following: (1) CEA always has positive impacts on the optimal predicted savings per unit and the optimal profits of both the manufacturer and the ESCO; (2) interestingly, the impact of CEA on the optimal choice between energy saving modes may not exist. Furthermore, when the actual savings per unit is stochastic (UU scenario), and if the energy-intensive manufacturer introduces guaranteed savings, we find that most of the optimal strategies under the UU scenario are similar to those under the DU scenario. Finally, through numerical studies, we demonstrate the important results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) is a complex network with unique environmental features and attributes that requires specific managerial policies and strategies. Quantitative models can provide a solid basis for these policies and strategies. This study expands the work of Shoaeinaeini et al. (2021) on Green Supply Chain Management. We propose a bi-objective facility location, demand allocation, and pricing model for CLSC networks. The proposed model considers two conflicting objective functions: maximising profits and minimising emissions. We show consumer environmental awareness can predict the products’ rate of return and determine a more suitable price for new products and the acquisition price for used products. The cap-and-trade policy has been implemented at its fullest potential, allowing the trading of carbon quotas. Therefore, companies may decide to produce less to sell more quotas or vice-versa, effectively picking the most profitable option. The model is solved and tested with the commercial solver BARON. The model effectively shows the trade-off between generating profits and emission reduction. Companies are able to turn a profit while abiding by the government’s intention of reducing emissions. The comparison with a single-objective version of the model highlights that the concurrent optimisation of economic and environmental objectives yields better results. The acquisition price of used products is a value worthy of monitoring. The government should focus on policies to assist the reverse flow of used products.

Supply-side fiscal policy holds that the growth of the country is stimulated through fiscal expansion designed to foster increased production. Subsidies given by the government to producers save many essential industries from higher cost of production thus encouraging them to increase supply of goods and services. On the other hand, subsidies provided to the public have benefitted them from paying higher prices for consumer products thus enhancing their welfare. However, these subsidies and incentives may promote overproduction and encourage overconsumption since cost of production becomes much cheaper after being subsidized. This has consequences on the consumer environmental awareness (CEA) as excessive use of certain products e.g. fuel, may result in environmental pollution. Using a systematic literature review, we explore subsidy and environmental awareness among consumers. We focus on environmental awareness as an interesting issue to bring forward in this research and our study contributes to the existing literature. The results of our study imply that the provision of subsidies on fuels resulted in excessive use of self-transport which has an impact on climate change. However, in other cases, green subsidies do benefit society in general. High environmental awareness can be decisive in influencing green purchasing behaviour, resulting in high demand for green products.

Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable development, the manufacturer's product-line design gets wide attention. Nowadays, the traditional manufacturer that produces non-green products is considering whether to introduce upgraded green products. This paper studies the manufacturer's optimal product-line design considering the quality difference between non-green and green products. Besides, our model also investigates the difference in unit production cost, green research and development (R&D) investment, and market segmentation. The results show that, from the manufacturer's perspective, producing green products is a better choice when non-green products are of low quality. In addition, the retailer is always inclined to sell green products. Further, the consumers' preference for non-green and green products is divided. And the consumer surplus under different product-line designs is analysed. Finally, two contracts are proposed and compared to encourage the manufacturer to produce green products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon trading policy and consumer environmental awareness are increasingly important to manufacturers’ carbon emission reduction and pricing. To analyze their strategy selection of carbon emission reduction and pricing, this paper develops three game models, where two manufacturers could choose no cooperation (NC), only cooperation in carbon emission reduction (SC), or simultaneous cooperation in carbon emission reduction and pricing (CC). By solving these models and comparing their environmental R&D levels, net carbon emissions, and profits, the paper finds strategy selection for manufacturers and its conditions. Results show that from the view of the environmental R&D level and supply chain’s profit, NC and SC may be the optimal strategy and the second-best strategy, respectively. From the net carbon emission point of view, CC and SC should be the optimal strategy and the second-best strategy, respectively. As to manufacturers’ profits, CC should be the optimal strategy, and NC or SC should be the second-best strategy. From comprehensive views, none of these strategies could be the optimal strategy, but SC may be the second-best strategy. This paper contributes in three aspects. First, this paper designs three strategies of carbon emission reduction and pricing for two manufacturers. Second, this paper takes the initial carbon emission allowances of the government as one of decision variables. Finally, this paper investigates the effects of different strategies and finds strategy selections for manufacturers from a single view and comprehensive views.

Even though organic farming is perceived worldwide as the most eco-friendly agricultural method, its significantly lower yield compared to conventional farming poses a major challenge in ensuring food security for the ever-increasing world population. On the other hand, the adverse environmental impacts of conventional agriculture due to the uncontrolled use of key farm inputs like fertilizer and irrigation water cannot be overlooked. In this context, we develop a new eco-label to promote an efficient agricultural method that provides the right balance between yield and environmental impacts through the optimal use of these farm inputs. The proposed eco-label is applied to a game-theoretic model of a farmer-retailer supply chain under demand and yield uncertainties. We consider the demand as a function of the product's retail price, greenness, and quality; and model yield using a crop-response function. The analytical results derived help optimize the farm inputs, retail prices, and order quantity so that the stakeholders' profits are maximized. We also investigate the effects of yield information sharing in this supply chain and find that the stakeholders must share yield information when environmentally conscious consumers dominate the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering that both the manufacturer's production process and the transporter's freight process produce carbon emissions, this paper constructed a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a transporter, and a retailer. This article studies the cooperative carbon emission reduction among the supply chain members under the carbon cap-and-trade policy and consumer environmental awareness. We used the Stackelberg game to explore four scenarios as follows: (1) in the non-cooperative decision model, no cooperation takes place among all supply chain members; (2) in the local cooperation decision of the manufacturer and the transporter alliance model, the manufacturer and the transporter work together to make decisions reducing carbon emissions, but each member of the supply chain makes its own pricing decisions; (3) in the local cooperation decision of the retailer-transporter alliance model, there is no cooperation except that the retailer and the transporter cooperate with each other to determine the selling price of the product; and (4) in the overall-cooperative decision model, there is complete cooperation among the members of the supply chain, who collectively decide on carbon emission reduction and the selling price of the product. Then, using the backward induction method, we derived and compared the equilibrium solutions and the profits of the supply chain system. The results showed that the scenario of complete cooperation among all supply chain members had the best performance in carbon emission reduction, market equilibrium quantity, and the supply chain system's profit, but the selling price of the product was likely to be higher than other scenarios. Two contracts have been proposed to coordinate the supply chain system. The cost-sharing contract is effective but imperfect under limited constraints. The two-part tariff contract can realize perfect coordination of the supply chain. Finally, we obtained several interesting conclusions from the numerical example and provide managerial insights and policy implications from the analytical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rapid growth in carbon emissions from transport, reducing these emissions is becoming as important as reducing emissions from production. We took a transporter as a member of the supply chain system and constructed a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, transporter, and retailer. This study applies the Stackelberg game and Nash game to research the optimal carbon emission reductions, pricing, and social welfare when the government imposes a carbon tax on carbon emitters and consumers are environmentally conscious. The four scenarios were designed as follows: 1) non-cooperative decision-making (NN model), in which neither carbon emission reduction cooperation nor pricing cooperation takes place; 2) local-cooperative decision-making Ⅰ (CN model), in which only cooperation in the field of carbon emission reductions takes place; 3) local-cooperative decision-making Ⅱ (NC model), in which cooperation in the field of pricing without cooperation in the area of carbon emission reductions takes place; and 4) overall-cooperative decision-making (CC model), in which both cooperation in the field of carbon emission reductions and cooperation in the area of pricing take place. The results show that economic (as profit of the supply chain system), social (as pricing and social welfare), and environmental benefits (as the optimal carbon emission reductions) for the three-echelon supply chain will improve with the deepening of cooperation among the supply chain members. Carbon tax policies have different impacts on clean and polluting supply chains. High carbon tax can encourage clean supply chain to increase carbon emission reduction, but will lead to the reduction of carbon emission of polluting supply chain. A cross-shareholding contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal state of the overall cooperative decision. Finally, the paper provides suggestions on carbon emission reductions for enterprises and policymaking for the government.

This paper presents a mixed-integer non-linear programming model to design a green closed-loop supply chain comprising hybrid plants, hybrid collection centers, customer zones, secondary markets, and disposal centers. To ensure a smooth reverse flow, our model determines a return rate for each customer zone with respect to the consumers' environmental awareness and the optimal acquisition price offered for returned products. Considering the environmental awareness levels and optimal green levels, specific cost and price functions for green products are proposed. Further, government subsidy as a financial incentive for manufacturers is considered to make the model more realistic and challenging. The effectiveness of the proposed model is analyzed by an illustrative example generated based on an Iranian straw factory. Beneficial managerial insights are obtained by conducting several sensitivity analyses. Further, the illustrative example and several generated examples in all scales are assessed by Sine Cosine Crow Search Algorithm using an efficient solution representation based on the priority-based encoding. As there is no benchmark available in the related literature to validate the results of Sine Cosine Crow Search Algorithm and to evaluate its performance, Particle Swarm Optimization and Genetic Algorithm are utilized to solve the examples. Finally, the obtained results of different metaheuristic algorithms and the exact solution are compared in terms of the CPU time and the objective function value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The green supply chain (GSC) has become a major trend that advocates for the sustainability of supply chains. To seek optimal strategies for the GSC, the competition between green and nongreen supply chains (NGSCs), along with the impacts of government subsidies and tax policies and the green preferences of consumers, are discussed in this study. A pricing-strategy model of an NGSC and a GSC was conducted by considering the cross-price effects. The equilibrium strategies (the optimal green-technology level, the pricing, and the profits) were achieved and were comparatively analyzed with backward induction. For more in-depth research, a robust sensitivity analysis was conducted, and the Taguchi method was used to identify the main factors that affect the revenues of NGSCs and GSCs. The results show that the vertical collaboration between manufacturers and retailers can help to improve the greenness of products and bring more benefits to consumers. The government interventions have an effect, and when the government sets a premeditated threshold for subsidies and taxation, GSC members can earn more, and the green products obtain more competitiveness. The green preferences of consumers are the primarily conducive factor to the sustainability and profit increases of GSCs. However, the green-technology-investment cost will not have a significant influence on the equilibrium strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The construction industry accounts for over one third of excessive CO2 volume, so it is essential that this amount be curbed. Prefabricated construction has superior strengths in terms of both the environment and economy, but low carbon is not one such strength. Meanwhile, the increasing number of consumers with environmental awareness makes it necessary to investigate consumer preferences and behaviors. Therefore, we firstly built a prefabricated construction supply chain consisting of a prefabricated company (leader) and a manufacturer, using the Stackelberg model. To regulate and mitigate carbon emissions, this study investigated the implementation of a cap-and-trade policy. Consumer environmental consciousness was considered from preferences on improving the prefabricated rate and carbon reduction. This study provides decision-making suggestions, not only from a pricing point of view but also for green production, i.e., the prefabricated rate and carbon reduction. We find that consumer environmental consciousness and the cap-and-trade policy improve decision making. To effectively limit the manufacturer's emissions, we suggest governments set a cap below a certain threshold. However, under the policy, the prefabricated company has free-rider behaviors and gains greater profits as the leader, which results in an unfair profit distribution. Hence, for the sake of optimizing the supply chain's profits, the cost-sharing contract and the two-part tariff were discussed. Both contracts achieved Pareto improvement, while the two-part tariff contract realizes coordination and reaches the desired level under a centralized system. Numerical analysis also verified the theoretical feasibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As global warming has severely threatened the ecosystem and sustainable development of human beings, carbon trading scheme is introduced to mitigate global warming and consumer environmental awareness (CEA) is gradually enhanced. Government regulation and consumer supervision have required firms to seek efficient strategies of product rollover and emission abatement in order to sustain and increase market share. This paper constructs a two-period analytical model in the context of intertemporal carbon emission regulation to investigate how carbon emission regulations and CEA affect the optimal strategies of product rollover, emission abatement, and social welfare. The results reveal that without consumer supervision, the firm prefers to adopt dual product rollover strategy and the optimal product rollover strategy depends on costs and benefits when product recycling is considered. When CEA is high, welfare and emission abatement regulated by hybrid policy is lower than those regulated by carbon trading scheme. When CEA is low, emission abatement under hybrid policy is superior to those regulated by carbon trading scheme. These findings help provide implications for improving carbon emission management efficiency and prompting sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Tripartite game models consisting of government and a two-echelon cold chain under cap-and-trade regulations are developed. • Impact of cap-and-trade regulations and consumer environmental awareness on supplier's low carbon strategy is investigated. • Boundaries between purchasing carbon quotas and adopting carbon abatement technology are defined. • Key influencing factors of social welfare and carbon emissions are analyzed. • The most effective plan to improve social welfare and reduce carbon emission is put forward. Due to both carbon policy and consumer environmental awareness, the large amount of carbon emissions generated while keeping deteriorating products fresh has attracted attention. In particular, under international competition, both freshness and environmental friendliness have significant effects on the market demand for deteriorating products. Furthermore, considering harmonious economic and environmental development, many recent studies take social welfare as the optimization goal. However, due to the trade-offs between the freshness and environmental friendliness of deteriorating products, how should the government formulate a reasonable carbon policy to guide cold chain members to make optimal decisions on freshness-keeping efforts and carbon abatement to improve social welfare and reduce carbon emissions? Against this backdrop, in this study, considering cap-and-trade regulations and consumers' preference for low-carbon fresh products, we develop tripartite game models consisting of the government, one emission-dependent supplier and one retailer in a two-echelon cold chain system. Two models are developed to compare the optimal decisions under two scenarios: when the supplier purchases carbon quotas and when the supplier adopts carbon abatement technology. Conducting theoretical analysis and numerical experiments, we obtain the following main insights: (1) The adoption of carbon abatement technologies does not always create greater social welfare, and there is a boundary between the two scenarios. (2) Production costs and freshness-keeping costs have the greatest influence on social welfare and unit carbon emissions. (3) The government should implement a looser carbon policy for deteriorating products with higher price elasticity. (4) The most effective way to simultaneously improve social welfare and reduce total carbon emissions is to increase consumer environmental awareness and reduce the abatement cost exponent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite there are several contributions on the relationship between various aspects of consumer behavior and environmental awareness, further research is required to analyze consumer behavior in the domain of cigarette butts littering. The aim of this study is to examine the role of feared self and environmental awareness constructs as significant antecedents of consumer behavior, as well as the impact of congruity between feared self and environmental awareness. This study utilizes structural equation modeling (SEM). Specifically, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to test the construct measures of the structural model and path model analysis to test the hypotheses of the structural model. The hypothesized model was tested using primary data. The main findings are consistent with the hypothesized model and highlight a positive influence of feared self on cigarette butts littering behavior, whereas congruity of feared self and environmental awareness do not have an impact on cigarette butts littering behavior. These results may draw the attention of practitioners, academicians, and policy‐makers for environmentally responsible guidance as well as consumer awareness programs for sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many countries, products are divided into several grades according to their energy efficiencies by the government. It leads to the discontinuous market demand for the products with different governmental energy efficiency certifications and further influences the relevant strategies of firms. Considering both increasing consumer environmental awareness and strict governmental grading standard, this paper develops a Stackelberg differential game between a manufacturer and a retailer. The optimal pricing strategies and the energy efficiency efforts are studied, and the influences of discontinuous market demand on those optimal strategies are discussed. The results show that the governmental grading standard has an important boosting impact on the energy efficiency level of products. When the product's energy efficiency level is lower than the governmental standard, the manufacturer will make great efforts on energy efficiency improvement. It would be beneficial for both the manufacturer and the retailer to use penetration pricing strategy during this period. Once the governmental standard is met, the manufacturer will reduce his effort significantly. At this time, taking the skimming pricing strategy is beneficial for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Moreover, a higher governmental standard and a larger consumers' preference difference can motivate the manufacturer to work harder to improve energy efficiency. They also lead to a higher price after the product is certified as the high energy efficiency product by the government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China recently implemented a corporate average fuel consumption regulation and new-energy vehicle credit program (dual-credit system) to prompt the transition to new-energy vehicles. This study generalizes the dual-credit system (energy credit and green credit) and investigates its effects on the green technology investments (GTI) and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of three possible scenarios, Case O (conventional product only), Case B (both conventional and green products), and Case G (green product only). The obtained results show that the GTI made by manufacturers follow high threshold and low threshold. The generalized dual-credit system increases both thresholds and promotes the transition from Case O to Case B and Case B to Case G. The transition is sensitive to standard energy consumption per-unit (SECP), green credit quota (GCQ), and price of green credit (PGC). The generalized dual-credit system benefits the manufacturers who exceed the low threshold, vice versa, especially for whose conventional product with lower initial energy consumption per unit. The generalized dual-credit system contributes to GTI and environment effects in all cases. But, the impacts on GTI, environment effects, and profit differ in sensitivity to SECP, GCQ, and PGC in different cases. Numerical simulation is given and all the proofs are shown in appendix. • We examine the impact of generalized dual-credit system on green investment and pricing. • The system promotes more manufacturers to invest in green product and invest more. • Investment, environment effects and profit are affected by generalized dual-credit system. • Insights for generalized dual-credit system to spur green transition are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers initiating returns online may produce secondary packaging, while most of the packages are produced by plastics. The more products are returned, the more plastics are used. Existing research indicates that the plastic packages can contribute to the micro-plastics pollution of the environment. As consumer environmental awareness (CEA) improves, more and more consumers are willing to pay extra fees to change the materials of packages from plastics to others in order to protect the environment, prompting enterprises to adjust to their return policies. In this context, this paper takes environmental quality improvement effort and the environmental coefficient as decision variables, and compares the manufacturer’s optimal decisions under with and without return policy. Our results show as follows: (1) There is a positive correlation between CEA and environmental quality improvement effort and the environmental coefficient; that is, environmental quality improvement effort and the environmental coefficient increase with an increase in CEA; (2) When CEA is high (k≤τ≤d), there is a threshold for manufacturers to invest in environmental effort. However, when CEA is low (0≤τ≤k), regardless of the return policy the manufacturer implements, its profit increases with the promotion of CEA, and when the manufacturer allows consumer returns, the relationship is more obvious; (3) The manufacturer should adopt an appropriate return policy according to the changes in CEA. When CEA is low (0≤τ≤k), the manufacturer should adopt a without return policy; when CEA is high (k≤τ≤d), the manufacturer should adopt a full refund (r=p) return policy, which is the optimal profit, and increase investment in environmental protection. From the above conclusions, we suggest that the government should increase the publicity of environmental protection, consumers should establish the awareness of green consumption, and enterprises should increase investment in environmental quality improvement to achieve sustainable development.

Abstract This paper focuses on the impacts of consumer environmental awareness (CEA) and retailer's fairness concerns on environmental quality, wholesale price and retail price of the green product in a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain. The manufacturer produces one green product, and the green product has the environmental quality. This study compares three decision scenarios: decentralized model (Scenario1), retailer is fair-minded and incurs an unfavorable disutility (Scenario 2), retailer is fair-minded and incurs a favorable disutility (Scenario 3). Assume that the manufacturer is the leader, the retailer is the follower, we apply the backward method to solve the Stackelberg game and give the optimal solutions of the environmental qualities, wholesale prices and retail prices. Our analysis reveals that (1) retailer's fairness concerns will not change the environmental quality of the green product, and only affect the wholesale price and retail price; (2) retailer's power in the supply chain and the degree of the fairness concerns jointly determine whether the retailer benefits from the fairness concerns; (3) fairness concerns may change the trend of the retailer's profit with CEA when the retailer is concerned about favorable disutility. Highlights • The monopoly manufacturer produces one green product. • The environmental quality of the green product is considered. • The impacts of retailer's fairness concern and CEA on environmental quality and prices are studied. • The explicit solutions of optimal environmental qualities, wholesale prices and retail prices are given. • The prices and profits changes of the retailer and manufacturer between without and with fairness concerns are compared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper investigates the impact of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts offered by a retailer on emission reduction efforts and firms' profitability. To encourage the manufacturer (he) to participate in the low-carbon supply chain, the retailer (she) offers some incentive schemes, such as cost-sharing contract (CS), revenue-sharing contract (RS), both two contracts (RC) or neither of them (NC). Under such incentive schemes, this work develops a basic model to examine channel members' equilibrium decisions under a Stackelberg game approach. Extending from the basic model, this work further discusses the equilibrium solutions under Nash bargaining model, in which the retailer and the manufacturer bargain on a cost-sharing rate (CSB) or a revenue-sharing rate (RSB). Somewhat counterintuitively, the findings suggest the supply chain coordination and the range of sharing rate depend critically on parameters, such as the relative bargaining status (symmetric or asymmetric bargaining power) and consumer environmental awareness. For instance, Scenarios CS and RS can coordinate the supply chain, whereas Scenarios CSB and RSB do not work well. Further, the cost-sharing rate under Scenario CSB is not higher as that of previous studies, and Scenario RSB is nonexistence with asymmetric bargaining power. Graphical abstract Image 1092 Highlights • The sharing rate is not always larger than 50%. • Revenue-sharing contract outperforms cost-sharing contract. • Revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain. • Revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts with Bargaining do not work well. • The low-carbon supply chain is particularly suited for revenue-sharing contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether implementing carbon tax policy alters supply chain members' pricing decisions and social welfare. We also consider consumer environmental awareness (CEA), which is currently growing, and we focus on the impact of CEA, retail competitive intensity and other factors on the optimal carbon tax rate and social welfare. We address the issue from the point of view of a policy planner whose goal is to maximize social welfare. Additionally, we consider two different market scenarios: a bilateral monopoly situation and a scenario with multiple competing retailers. In terms of the impact on pricing, the retail price and wholesale price increase with the carbon tax rate in both scenarios. The market demand for the retailer that sells a more environmentally friendly product relative to other competing retailers will increase with the carbon tax rate in the scenario with competing retailers. Additionally, the government's carbon tax regulation at the optimal tax rate can effectively improve social welfare when carbon emissions per unit of product are large or the price of carbon dioxide is high in both scenarios, regardless of the extent of CEA. Further, when the competitive strength of an industry in the retail market is high, the government can also implement carbon tax regulation to reduce social welfare losses. Moreover, compared with the monopoly situation, the intuitive carbon tax rate is closer to the optimal carbon tax rate in the competitive situation, and thus, it will be better able to reduce social welfare losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates a green-product pricing problem by taking into account consumer environmental awareness (CEA) and non-green (regular) product reference. The pricing strategies under three scenarios are investigated: single-product pricing; dual-product competition; and asymmetric-information case. The analytical results show that differential pricing strategies should be adopted, facing consumers with differential purchase behaviors (i.e., differential levels of CEA and reference recognition). The green product’s pricing strategy is significantly affected by asymmetric information. In contrast to the case of symmetric information, the firm should adopt distinguished pricing strategies in consideration of its green production cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Multinational firms' adaptive or standard green product design strategy is studied. • Parallel importation may benefit a multinational firm and governments. • Adaptive green product design acts as a new tool to cope with parallel importation. • Competition intensity of multinational firms affects parallel importation's role. • Number of parallel importers affects parallel importation's role. This paper investigates whether a multinational firm should adapt or standardize its green product design (GPD) in different markets considering parallel importation and cross-market consumer environmental awareness (CEA) difference. We start with a basic case where a parallel importer may enter and generate some key findings. First, affected by standardization's advantage of cost-saving benefits, adaptation's advantage of handling market heterogeneity, and the parallel importer's role of connecting different markets, the multinational firm will standardize GPD in the absence of parallel importation, and adaptive GPD will become an alternative if a parallel importer enters. Second, the entry of the parallel importer will bring benefits rather than threats to the multinational firm when the multinational firm adopts adaptive GPD and the CEA gap is extremely large. Consequently, the multinational firm is recommended to utilize the tool of widening greenness difference to cope with parallel importation. Furthermore, we make extensions to consider the possible competition between multinational firms and the circumstance whereby multiple parallel importers emerge. Our results show that the multinational firm is recommended to differentiate its product categories, develop a cooperative relationship with its competitor, or encourage the existence of slight parallel importation so that it could benefit from parallel importation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Replacing traditional products with green products has become a key way to achieve decoupling between economic development and environmental pollution. As an incentive mechanism, subsidies can be provided by a government to facilitate the popularization and acceptance of green products. Subsidies play a significant role in encouraging the development of green products. We explored the proper optimal subsidy mechanism for green products from the angle of maximizing the net policy return, which cannot only encourage the development of green products but also do not aggravate financial burden for the government. In order to explore the optimal subsidy level for green products from the perspective of net policy benefit maximization, this paper established the optimal subsidy principal-agent models and a numerical example was presented to verify the effectiveness of the model we constructed. The results show that improving investors’ preference and eliminating asymmetric information contribute to reduce subsidy cost savings. Additionally, improving consumer environmental awareness, promoting the development and application of green technology, and reducing market risk reduce subsidy costs. This article provides policymakers with an effective subsidy scheme to accelerate the development of green products and achieve sustainable development goals.

This paper constructs a three-stage Stackelberg game model based on government, manufacturer and retailer, and comparatively analyse the optimal decisions of each participant, the transfer and distribution of carbon tax among different participants, and the impact of consumers' environmental awareness and carbon dioxide price on equilibrium decisions and social welfare when the retail market is in monopolization or competition. The results show that, in two supply chain structures, the optimal carbon tax rate increases with the increase of consumers' environmental consciousness; When consumer environment awareness or carbon dioxide price is high, carbon tax regulation can effectively improve social welfare. Even if the consumer environment awareness or carbon dioxide price is low, it is necessary for the government to impose carbon tax on manufacturers with high carbon emissions. When the optimal carbon tax rate is difficult to calculate, the intuitive tax rate can be used as a suboptimal choice for the government to implement a carbon tax regulation; and the greater the intensity of competition in the retail market, the more the intuitive tax rate closer to the optimal tax rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the green channel coordination issue within a two-stage supply chain (SC). The investigated SC sells a non-green traditional product and also plans for releasing a new substitutable green product beside the current traditional product. Demand for both products is a function of the retail price as well as products’ green quality and retailer’s sales efforts. Both retail price and sales effort level for the green product are decided by the retailer while the product green quality is the manufacturer’s decision variable. Three decision scenarios are modelled and compared: (1) decentralized scenario where each member decides independently based on own profit, (2) integrated scenario where there is a one decision maker in the system, and (3) collaborative scenario that aims to enhance the overall channel profit subject to Pareto improvement for each member. Closed-form expressions of optimal retail price, sales effort and green quality are derived for the first two scenarios, and a mathematical programming model is developed for the collaborative scenario. Our numerical investigations revealed that the proposed collaboration model is capable of enhancing the SC profit fairly close to the centralized model and also ensures higher profits for both channel members than the decentralized decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emission reduction has become a critical and urgent issue in marketing. We notice that some companies develop new products to exclusively solve the pollution emission from the existing polluting products. This paper aims to research the optimal bundling problem of a monopoly seller who offers a polluting product and the new green product when considering consumer environmental awareness. First, by comparing the maximum profit of bundling strategies, we reveal that bundling strategies always dominate the pure component (PC) strategy. More specifically, the pure bundling (PB) strategy dominates when the marginal costs are low and the green product performs well in emission reduction; otherwise, mixed bundling dominates. Second, by analyzing the net pollution emission of different strategies, we show that although bundling strategies benefit the seller economically, they may not be optimal environmentally when the green product is not effective. Numerical studies are constructed to show our findings intuitively. Further, this provides useful managerial insights to enterprises and government regulators. To help achieve emission reduction target, government regulators should implement emission regulations to regulate enterprises' behavior. Besides, the enterprise should be more cautious when the emission regulation exists or when the enterprise itself is also environmentally aware since more profit may also mean more pollution. • A bundling (pure bundling or mixed bundling) strategy can always benefit the seller economically. • The pure bundling strategy will dominate mixed bundling when marginal costs are low and pollution emission-reducing power of the green product is weak. • A bundling strategy may also harm the environment when the green product's PERP is weak. Government regulators should implement emission regulations to regulate firms' behavior. • We constructed numerical studies to check the robustness of our findings due to the complexity of the model framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With increasing consumers' awareness of eco-friendly products, Manufactures and Retailers are proactive to invest in green innovation. This paper analyzes a single manufacturer, single retailer supply chain where both participants are engaged in green innovation investment. Consumer demand is dependent on selling price and investment level of green innovation. We consider the effects of consumer environmental awareness, perception difficulty of green products, and degree of goods' necessity on decision making. According to the relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer, three noncoordinated game (including Manufacturer-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) and one coordinated supply chain structures are proposed. The pricing and investment level of green innovation are investigated under these four supply chain structures, respectively. A Retail Fixed Markup (RFM) policy is analyzed when channel members fail to achieve supply chain coordination. The effects of RFM on supply chain performance are evaluated. We numerically compare optimal solutions and profits under the coordination, the Manufacturer-Stackelberg, and the RFM supply chain structure and provide managerial insights for practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers initiating returns online may produce secondary packaging, while most of the packages are produced by plastics. The more products are returned, the more plastics are used. Existing research indicates that the plastic packages can contribute to the micro-plastics pollution of the environment. As consumer environmental awareness (CEA) improves, more and more consumers are willing to pay extra fees to change the materials of packages from plastics to others in order to protect the environment, prompting enterprises to adjust to their return policies. In this context, this paper takes environmental quality improvement effort and the environmental coefficient as decision variables, and compares the manufacturer's optimal decisions under with and without return policy. Our results show as follows: (1) There is a positive correlation between CEA and environmental quality improvement effort and the environmental coefficient; that is, environmental quality improvement effort and the environmental coefficient increase with an increase in CEA; (2) When CEA is high ( k ≤ τ ≤ d ), there is a threshold for manufacturers to invest in environmental effort. However, when CEA is low ( 0 ≤ τ ≤ k ), regardless of the return policy the manufacturer implements, its profit increases with the promotion of CEA, and when the manufacturer allows consumer returns, the relationship is more obvious; (3) The manufacturer should adopt an appropriate return policy according to the changes in CEA. When CEA is low ( 0 ≤ τ ≤ k ), the manufacturer should adopt a without return policy; when CEA is high ( k ≤ τ ≤ d ), the manufacturer should adopt a full refund ( r = p ) return policy, which is the optimal profit, and increase investment in environmental protection. From the above conclusions, we suggest that the government should increase the publicity of environmental protection, consumers should establish the awareness of green consumption, and enterprises should increase investment in environmental quality improvement to achieve sustainable development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Green Credit Policy (GCP) in South Korea is an environmentally friendly regulation that enables manufacturers to reduce pollution by cooperating with suppliers. The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of the GCP on manufacturers' efforts to reduce pollution in the supply chain. This study adopts an optimal control model that reflects the GCP's incentive scheme as well as consumers' environmental awareness. A numerical analysis is illustrated to demonstrate the applicability of our model. We find that manufacturers can create additional value by reducing their suppliers' pollution at the desirable levels. Furthermore, our finding suggests that manufacturers should strengthen their capability to reduce pollution to obtain more incentives under the GCP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]