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Care has increasingly been promoted as an element of successful management practice. However, an ethic of care is a normative theory that was initially developed in reference to intimate relationships, and it is unclear if it is an appropriate normative standard in business. The purpose of this review is to bridge the social scientific study of care with philosophical understandings of care and to provide a theoretical justification for care as a managerial value. We review the three different forms of care advanced by the ethics literature: caring relations, organizational care, and care as a virtue. We compare these forms of care to the management litertature. In doing so, we integrate what has previously been a scattered, yet growing, body of research on care. Our review of the literature reveals that care has increasingly been studied in management in relation to an ethic of care. Yet, many of the properties of care have also played a role in other established research domains (e.g., leadership). We discuss and critique the management and ethics literatures on care, paying attention to areas of agreement or disagreeement between the two. We go on to provide a normative justification of care as a value in business. Finally, we close by suggesting directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs are strongly linked, yet ultimately distinct. Unfortunately, the most common measure of free will beliefs, the free will subscale (FWS) of the Free Will and Determinism Plus, seems to confound free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs. Thus, the present research (1,700 participants across two studies) details the development of a 2-factor FWS – the FWS-II – that divides the FWS into a free will subscale and a moral responsibility subscale. The FWS-II showed good fit compared to standard fit thresholds and superior fit compared to the original FWS. The moral responsibility subscale was moderately correlated with general punitive attitudes and specific punitive assignments, even when controlling for the free will subscale. Conversely, the free will subscale was moderately correlated with conservativism and religiosity, even when controlling for the moral responsibility subscale. These results provide evidence that the FWS is better suited – psychometrically, theoretically, and practically – as a 2-factor measure of free will beliefs and moral responsibility beliefs than as a 1-factor measure of free will beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In A Treatise of Human Nature , Hume argues that morality pertains primarily to character, and that actions have moral content only to the extent that they signal good or bad character. I formalize his signalling theory of moral/immoral actions using simple game-theoretic models. Conditions exist under which there is a separating equilibrium in which actions do indeed credibly signal character, but conditions also exist in which there is only a pooling or semi-separating equilibrium. A tradeoff is identified between the signalling value of actions, and the consequentialist goal of incentivizing all character types to choose beneficial actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study explored how knowledge (Study 1) and inferences (Study 2) about religiosity influence impressions of morality depending on whether effort is exerted to reach a morally controversial decision. In Study 1, undergraduates judged a [religious/nonreligious] doctor who exerted [little/great] effort into their decision to euthanize a patient. Results indicated that when the doctor was nonreligious or exerted low effort, they were considered less moral compared to when they were religious or exerted high effort. In Study 2, Turk Prime participants evaluated a doctor who decided in favor or against euthanizing a patient, with the same effort manipulation as Study 1. Results indicated that the doctor who favored euthanasia was considered less religious than the doctor who did not. As in Study 1, greater morality was associated with the doctor who exerted greater effort, particularly when they favored euthanasia. When the doctor favored euthanasia, they were rated as more moral when their background was inferred to be more religious; however, the opposite pattern of results emerged when the doctor decided against euthanasia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is easy to put words on paper; it is harder to put them into practice. This is evidenced by the frequent discrepancy between a country’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and its actual climate policies. In this article, we examine whether such disharmony should be criticized. We first provide a taxonomy of types of disharmony. We then examine various problems with settling the case for a strong norm of harmonization by simply referring to the general principle that commitments ought to be kept. This opens the door to paying more attention to the long-term effects of such a norm on emission reductions. In conclusion, we call for nuance in expecting countries to harmonize their NDCs and national policies. While climate policy offers the perfect test case for this normative examination, many of our arguments could be adapted to other areas in which deviations between international commitments and domestic policies arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of rampant fake news and disinformation in today's press and social media, I provide a new consequentialist argument that regulations on the media pertaining to certain false verifiable empirical facts are warranted. This contention is based in part on a collection of pre-existing empirical findings that I newly piece together from political science and psychology demonstrating that a post-truth society is likely with current media. My position is then defended from several counters, such as that it violates deontological rights to free speech and to freedom of the press, that free speech leads to the acquisition of truth, and that government regulators can be biased and corrupt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In collective action problems, large numbers of contributions together produce a good outcome, but any one contribution often makes no difference. Many philosophers think that act consequentialism implies that individuals should not contribute in these cases, given that their contributions cannot be expected to affect the outcome. Nearly everyone has assumed that the relevant expected effects of an action are those effects that are counterfactually dependent on what a given agent does. This assumption is at the heart of causal decision theory. In contrast, evidential decision theory evaluates actions on the basis of whatever can be expected to happen, given that the agent performs some action, where this includes events that are simply correlated with the action. I show that causal and evidentialist versions of act consequentialism can diverge in collective action problems. Evidential decision theory can require us to do our part even when causal decision theory does not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political philosophers have recently debated what role social practices should play in normative theorising. Should our theories be practice-independent or practice-dependent? That is, can we formulate normative institutional principles independently of real-world practices or are such principles only ever relative to the practices they are meant to govern? Any first-order theory in political philosophy must contend with the methodological challenges coming out of this debate. In this article, I argue that consequentialism has a plausible account of how social practices should factor in normative political philosophy. I outline a version of consequentialism, Practice Consequentialism, that provides a plausible blueprint for integrating social practices in normative theorising. Second, I argue that Practice Consequentialism accounts well for the central arguments on both sides of the practice-dependence debate. Capturing arguments for practice-dependence, consequentialism brings out why real-world practices are central in formulating institutional principles. Conversely, capturing arguments for practice-independence, consequentialism offers a clear external normative perspective from which to evaluate practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the debate between ideal and non-ideal theory in political philosophy, with a focus on consequentialism as a powerful position that addresses objections raised against both approaches. It argues that consequentialism, which considers the consequences of actions, offers a comparative structure and takes into account real-world concerns. The author discusses how consequentialism can make comparative judgments without relying on a privileged model and provides a theoretical justification for evaluating institutional options in an unjust society. The article concludes that consequentialism offers a transparent and unified structure for addressing normative questions. Additionally, the given text provides a list of references and citations for further research on political philosophy, ethics, and long-termism. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Publizistik: Vierteljahreshefte für Kommunikationsforschung is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

"Benefit to the world" and "Heaven's intent" are not, as is often assumed, separate criteria for action in Mozi's 墨子 ethics; they are the same in extension but not intension. When Mozi speaks in terms of "Heaven's intent," it is to highlight the criterion's retrospective orientation and its scope; taking a cue from Heaven's reactions to past deeds, agents specify the scope of "the world" by reference to the past performance of persons regarding benefit to the world. This diverges from a principle that is often attributed to Mozi, of considering the benefit of all equally without regard for past performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence (AI) ethics is proposed as an emerging and interdisciplinary field concerned with addressing the ethical issues of AI, such as the issue of moral decision-making. The conflict between our intuitive moral judgments constitutes an inevitable obstacle to decision-making in AI ethics. This article outlines the Moral Relevance Approach, which could provide a considerable moral foundation for AI ethics. Taking moral relevance as the precondition of the consequentialist principles, the Moral Relevance Approach aims to plausibly consider individual moral claims. It is not only the common ethical target shaping our moral consensus but also the inherent moral ability connecting others with us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many proponents of behavioural public policy work within a broadly consequentialist framework. From this perspective, the ultimate aim of public policy is to maximise utility, happiness, welfare, the satisfaction of preferences, or similar; and the behavioural aspect of public policy aims to harness a knowledge of human psychology to make this maximisation more effective. In particular, behavioural insights may be crucial to help policy-makers 'save us from ourselves' by helping citizens avoid falling into non-rational choices, for example, through framing effects, failures of will-power, and so on. But an alternative reading of the psychological literature is that human thoughts and actions are not biased from a rational standard, but are simply systematically inconsistent. If so, then utility and similar notions are not well defined either for individuals or as an objective of public policy. I argue that a different, contractarian viewpoint is required: that the determination of public policy is continuous with the formation of agreements we make with each other at all scales, from momentary social interactions, to linguistic and social conventions, to collective decisions by groups and organisations. Behavioural factors do not over-ride, but can (among many other factors) inform, our collective decision-making process. The point of behavioural insights in public policy is primarily to inform and enrich public debate when deciding the rules by which we should like to live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr’s three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the moral tractability thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica (0103-3506) is the property of Revista Juridica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Early in 2022 the first pig to human cardiac xenotransplant was performed. The graft initially performed well, and rejection was well controlled. However, the graft failed, and the patient died 60 days after the procedure. The ethical issues relating to xenotransplantation include the risk/benefit to the individual, the risk of porcine-derived infectious agents crossing into humans, animal welfare and rights, issues of human and animal identity and concerns relating to fair allocation of organs and appropriate use of resources. These ethical issues are often addressed using emotional arguments, or through consequentialist or deontological lens. An alternative is to use approaches based on virtue ethics to understand the moral purpose (telos) of the research and the virtues (character traits) needed to be a good research clinician. In this review we will consider the virtues of justice, courage, temperance and practical wisdom, as well as the role of clinical curiosity, and their application to xenotransplantation. This provides an alternative approach for the clinical academic and others involved in the research to reflect on their practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of new technological tools for translating online has potential wide-reaching impacts for translators and the industry. However, very little research has so far systematically analysed the ethical dimension of such practices. To this end, this paper proposes an ethical framework to evaluate the consequences of translation platforms that use paid crowdsourcing on translators and clients. Based on the values that inform a good life, the paper proposes the use of multiple ethical principles: beneficence and non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice, to consider the different outcomes of the use of crowdsourcing platforms. Applying this framework to paid crowdsourcing platforms, the findings suggest that the translators' well-being and respect for their autonomy are undermined by platforms in several ways, while clients stand to gain from their use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dēnkard (Acts of the religion), written in Pahlavi, is a summary of 10th-century knowledge of the Mazdean religion and is described by Jean de Menasce on the title page of his translation as a ‘Mazdean encyclopedia.’ The Dēnkard VI (Book VI of the Dēnkard) is representative of late antique and early medieval Zoroastrian ethical ideas. This article analyzes Book VI of the Dēnkard based on modern moral philosophy and introduces it as a candidate for early consequentialism and capitalism. The first generation of Iranian studies scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries such as Buch, Darmesteter, and Menant were aware of these concepts and even explained some of them, but the next generation did not take them seriously. This article also analyzes paymān (the ‘right measure’), that is the ancient Iranian ‘golden mean,’ in Book VI of the Dēnkard and shows the similarities and differences between paymān and the Aristotelian ‘golden mean.’ Probably, due to the biblical tradition in the interpretation of ancient religious texts or the anti-utilitarianism and anti-capitalism atmosphere in the second half of the 20th century, many scholars like Shaked inclined to the view that paymān is the main ethical principle of the Dēnkard VI and neglected its consequentialist and capitalist concepts.

I have previously argued that human flourishing partly consists in the ability to exercise essential human capacities, many of which are non-distinctive and shared with other animals. The concept of flourishing is itself species-specific. Thus, the development of essential capacities (human and nonhuman) comprises a large part of the goods that we ought to promote. Problems about the definition of ‘essential’ are discussed, as are related issues about whether there are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of sortal universal terms. The relation of the exercise of essential capacities to basic needs is investigated, and the essential nature of the human capacity for meaningful work, which has been disputed by John White, is defended. Finally, some suggestions are offered about what the proponents of the capabilities approach might derive from that of essential capacities.

I argue that racial profiling gives minority groups reason to perceive a threat of violence and wrongful arrest when interacting with the criminal justice system, consequently leading them to engage in self-limiting conduct in order to avoid being profiled. As a result, they may ultimately exercise a de facto second-class citizenship status through a limited exercise of basic rights and access to public services. This would suggest, contra consequentialist defenders of the practice, that a public ban on profiling would serve to contain an important, but often overlooked source of racial injustice and that a thorough cost–benefit analysis should include these costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are a number of assumptions made in our accepted psychology of moral decision-making that consequentialism seems to violate:: value connectionism, pluralism and dispositionalism. But consequentialism violates them only on a utilitarian or similar theory of value, not on the rival sort of theory that is sketched here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws some bold conclusions from modest premises. My topic is an old one, the Neohumean view of practical rationality. First, I show that this view consists of two independent claims, instrumentalism and subjectivism. Most critics run these together. Instrumentalism is entailed by many theories beyond Neohumeanism, viz., by any theory that says rational actions maximize something. Second, I give a new argument against instrumentalism, using simple counterexamples. This argument systematically undermines consequentialism and rational choice theory, I show, using detailed examples of their many social science applications. There is no obvious fix. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Mohists may have been the first consequentialists on earth. Their most important principles are that right action is what benefits the world and that the underlying outlook for benefiting the world is inclusive care, whereby each person receives equal consideration. The early Mohists are clearly objective-list consequentialists, whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting the most basic goods. Stephens argues that the later Mohists shift to a preference-satisfaction consequentialism whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting what happens to please individual people. Stephens argues that while the direct texts are ambiguous between an objective-list interpretation and a preference-satisfaction interpretation, the latter better explains later Mohist engagement with opponents. I argue that the direct texts actually preclude Stephens' preference-satisfaction interpretation, which moreover has the later Mohists concede an implausible amount to their opponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral instruction in the Nigerian secondary school curriculum is intended to help students develop good moral behaviour. However, the prevalence of deviant and unethical behaviours among students in Nigerian secondary schools raises concerns about the effectiveness and viability of the country's moral instruction and curriculum. While this issue may be attributed to pedagogical dynamics in Nigeria, particularly in translating the curriculum into practice, the current study argues that the application of moral theories is essential in understanding the complexities of moral instruction in Nigerian secondary schools. This approach aims to uncover the underlying reasons for the interaction between students' moral conduct and the ethical principles taught in moral instruction. By conducting in-depth and critical data exploration, as well as drawing on Kant's categorical imperative, the current study advocates for the incorporation of normative moral theory into the existing curriculum. This will provide students with clear ethical guidelines to help them understand how their actions will impact their own interests and those of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Jurídica (0103-3506) is the property of Revista Juridica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Theology & Morality / Teologia I Moralmosc is the property of Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza (IH UAM) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There is, on a given moral view, an agent‐centered restriction against performing acts of a certain type if that view prohibits agents from performing an instance of that act‐type even to prevent two or more others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act‐type. The fact that commonsense morality includes agent‐centered restrictions is often seen as a decisive objection to act‐consequentialism. Despite this, I'll argue that agent‐centered restrictions are more plausibly accommodated within an act‐consequentialist framework than within the more standard side‐constraint framework. For I'll argue that when we combine agent‐relative act‐consequentialism with a Kantian theory of value, we arrive at a version of consequentialism—namely, Kantsequentialism—that has several advantages over the side‐constraint approach. What's more, I'll show that this version of consequentialism avoids the disadvantages that critics of consequentializing have presumed that such a theory must have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have previously argued that human flourishing partly consists in the ability to exercise essential human capacities, many of which are non-distinctive and shared with other animals. The concept of flourishing is itself species-specific. Thus, the development of essential capacities (human and nonhuman) comprises a large part of the goods that we ought to promote. Problems about the definition of 'essential' are discussed, as are related issues about whether there are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of sortal universal terms. The relation of the exercise of essential capacities to basic needs is investigated, and the essential nature of the human capacity for meaningful work, which has been disputed by John White, is defended. Finally, some suggestions are offered about what the proponents of the capabilities approach might derive from that of essential capacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dēnkard (Acts of the religion), written in Pahlavi, is a summary of 10th-century knowledge of the Mazdean religion and is described by Jean de Menasce on the title page of his translation as a 'Mazdean encyclopedia.' The Dēnkard VI (Book VI of the Dēnkard) is representative of late antique and early medieval Zoroastrian ethical ideas. This article analyzes Book VI of the Dēnkard based on modern moral philosophy and introduces it as a candidate for early consequentialism and capitalism. The first generation of Iranian studies scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries such as Buch, Darmesteter, and Menant were aware of these concepts and even explained some of them, but the next generation did not take them seriously. This article also analyzes paymān (the 'right measure'), that is the ancient Iranian 'golden mean,' in Book VI of the Dēnkard and shows the similarities and differences between paymān and the Aristotelian 'golden mean.' Probably, due to the biblical tradition in the interpretation of ancient religious texts or the anti-utilitarianism and anti-capitalism atmosphere in the second half of the 20th century, many scholars like Shaked inclined to the view that paymān is the main ethical principle of the Dēnkard VI and neglected its consequentialist and capitalist concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is not easy to find a fair balance between inappropriate speech on the one hand and the appearance of constraint and inaccessibility on the other. Also judges must deal with this difficult task. They must take care not to endanger values that are protected to secure the functionality of justice. This article deals with questions of why and how judges can fulfil this task and what might happen if they fail to do so. The article argues in favour of temperate speech using arguments from the fields of judicial ethics and normative ethics. It also offers examples of intemperate speech that might be dangerous to justice. Last but not least, the article mentions the relevance of judicial temperate speech for the concept of open justice thanks to which the judiciary might seek public confidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the frequent philosophical problems of legal ethics is the conflict between common and role morality. This situation is where a lawyer's actions are evaluated differently by these two sets of moral norms. The article seizes on this as a conflict between two conventional moralities that need to be resolved with the help of a justificatory morality and thus an appropriate theory of normative ethics. It offers as a possible response a variant of consequentialism that draws on utilitarianism and brings it closer to pragmatism. This approach seeks to preserve the traditional advantages of utilitarianism, which are minimalist and plausible normative assumptions, and an excellent ability to resolve moral conflicts. At the same time, it takes into account the complex nature of the world in which we live and our epistemic uncertainty, which brings it closer to pragmatism. The author confronts this theory with some existing approaches to resolving the conflict between the common and role morality and tries to show that it is at least as plausible as they are and should have a place among them. Finally, the article concludes with an analysis of the famous case of Alton Logan as its practical application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Zhejiang University: Science B is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)