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Several theoretical propositions suggest that changes in economic activity can explain the decision to form a cartel. The majority of the propositions claim that cartel formation is more likely in expansionary and less likely in contractionary phases of the business cycle. The propositions are re-examined theoretically and by using data on detected cartels for the European Union. In both cases, the results cannot confirm that more cartels are formed in any of the business cycle phases and that correlated economic growth rates create higher incentives to collude. Furthermore, it cannot be confirmed that more cartels form shortly after respectively the trough or the peak in the business cycle. The conclusion is that cartel formation is unaffected by changes in the business cycle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2023, the Swedish Competition Authority adopted a decision accepting commitments from Finnair to reverse a policy implemented with online travel agencies. Specifically, Finnair was preventing online travel agencies from marketing Finnair airfares at a discounted level (relative to the airfares offered by Finnair to the online travel agencies) to customers who were searching for Finnair tickets online, in particular on metasearch websites. This case is noteworthy for three reasons. First, this commitments decision has commercial and strategic implications for the sector across the European Union. Second, while conflicting legal arguments were raised, the economic assessment was quite unequivocal, pointing to the challenged conduct being very likely to generate anti-competitive effects. Third, the Swedish Competition Authority’s investigation overlapped with the entry into force of the 2022 European Commission’s Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and showed some potential ambiguity in its interpretation and application, which the investigation’s outcome has hopefully alleviated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the use of algorithms has become increasingly prominent in the digital market, such algorithms are often opaque and prone to risks of making biased decisions. Algorithms could also be used to harm competition, such as by facilitating cartels. Such developments make it necessary to examine the readiness of existing competition law to tackle cases involving algorithms. This paper focuses on analysing Indonesian competition law to address the following issues: (1) how current Indonesian competition law deals with algorithms-related cases; (2) which indicators could detect anti-competitive algorithms; and (3) which competition policy approach could be considered in Indonesia to tackle the problem resulted from the use of algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the media goods' dual economic and cultural role, merger and acquisition (M&A) assessments are complex and differ from M&As in other sectors. An additional layer of complexity is added to the assessment when various authorities are involved. An even more complicated matter is when the authorities have different remits. These authorities mostly comprise National Competition Authorities that enforce competition law, focused on economic considerations, and National Regulatory Authorities that enforce and oversee the application of media law, focused not only on setting rules and limitations on the media market but also on considering non-economic elements such as plurality. In certain countries, ministries and government authorities can intervene in these assessments. There have been discussions on the need for cooperation between authorities, however, mostly at the international level. Thus, little is known about the current cooperation procedures at the national level. The article proposes a typology of cooperation at the EU member states level and the United Kingdom and introduces the concept of the 'power pyramid' to represent the hierarchical relationships between authorities. Cooperation proves that competition policy and media-specific regulation are intertwined and are complementary. Furthermore, the article shows that having more than one authority assessing media M&As leads to media pluralism being more often explicitly one of the criteria used in the assessments, and thus providing a more holistic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses three routes for the formation of market-opening rules: competition enforcement, legislative rulemaking, and market investigation. Using examples and case studies related to facilitating market access in banking and payment systems, we illustrate essential features and limitations of the different modes of rulemaking. The interrelation between them is explored, emphasizing the merits of having them available in parallel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) Commission proposes to 'green up' its enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU to allow producers to collectively overcome so-called first mover disadvantages that would result from inefficient market regulation. The Commission's reboot focuses on the last three exemption conditions. First, the consumer benefit condition is customized to use collective consumer benefits to determine whether consumers receive a 'fair share' of the benefits established under the efficiency condition. Here, the Commission bypasses the Dutch proposition to also take account of non-consumer benefits when investigating whether consumers are compensated for anticompetitive harm. Second, the indispensability condition is tasked to filter out greenwashing. Third, the residual competition condition is trusted to allow private collective action insofar it does not eliminate competition on price and/or innovation. Discussing both EU and Dutch proposals, this article finds that greening up Article 101(3) brings competition policy outside the limiting principles that define objective and effective competition enforcement in terms of voluntary exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intensifying concerns about online platform firms’ rapid rise, expansion, and growing asymmetric power have attracted political scrutiny and undermined the legitimacy of a minimalist regulatory regime that is giving way to intense debate and increasingly interventionist governmental policies and enforcement actions. First, we view the rise of, and recent political responses to, the often-predatory power and manipulative conduct of platform firm in terms of a ‘Polanyian’ double movement in which the destabilising and destructive effects of unchecked corporate activities and market development eventually generates political and regulatory responses to constrain private power that threaten the social, political, and economic order. Second, incipient legal changes, most notably the EU’s proposed Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, indicate a shift in regulatory emphasis from competition (and antitrust) policy and law towards more intensive and encompassing forms of socio-economic regulation. Finally, these regulatory changes will likely vary in character and significance across political jurisdictions, and embody distinctive and possibly divergent developmental trajectories. The EU may have a first-mover advantage in regulating platform firms, but we are only at the very beginning of a protracted and conflictual transformational process.

Following the Snowden revelations, Cambridge Analytica, and a policy vacuum created by technological convergence and neoliberal reforms, policy efforts to articulate oversight of digital platform markets gathered policymaker support and public attention internationally. In the U.S., examined here as a case study of these international policy efforts, competition policy emerged as a prominent governance mechanism over digital platforms, resulting in the current antitrust scrutiny of tech giants like Google and Meta. Drawing on policy documents, fieldwork, and expert interviews, I trace how antitrust reform proposals, pitched as reclaiming democratic governance over private markets, came to dominate platform policy discussions. I examine how policy efforts to address platform power via competition grappled with non-competitive harms arising in digital markets, such as threats to user privacy and disinformation flows. Finally, I show how these debates began to converge on the contours of an emergent governance paradigm for digital platform oversight. I argue that this governance framework, which seeks to optimize market mechanisms to discipline platform markets, has significant limitations, notably in addressing issues associated with big data commodification and quantification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper estimates the impact of reforming competition authorities on perceived antitrust effectiveness using methods of causal inference. We study how 20 countries reformed their competition authorities in depth between 1995 and 2020, and what has been the outcome of such reforms in the perceived competition policy effectiveness by the business community compared with 18 control countries in a balanced panel. As the political economy literature warned, we find that reforms paradoxically have not always improved antitrust effectiveness. Some of the reforms approved stalled or backlashed as politicians opted for a Machiavelli option: undertaking "counter‐reforms" even in the name of an apparent but deceptive progressiveness and pro‐competition drive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital market regulations respond to technological changes and global dynamics, but also to how political actors shape markets. Focusing on the Digital Markets Act, this article explains the EU’s marketcraft as the result of a struggle in the policy field between political actors promoting competing economic ideas in a rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical context. We show that significant discursive and policy change in digital market governance has occurred because of shifting coalitions between three constellations of actors, which we call market-correctors, market-busters, and market-directors. Tracking the ongoing campaign to challenge Big Tech and define the meaning of digital sovereignty, we argue that market-directors have ushered in potentially comprehensive policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fairness is not foreign to competition law and fairness considerations are not new to it. However, the endemic uncertainty on its notion has traditionally made fairness unsuitable to act as a stand-alone applicable legal standard. Indeed, antitrust enforcers have usually been reluctant to engage with the unfairness of terms and conditions. Nonetheless, against the perceived undue corporate power and market concentration in the digital economy, fairness has recently gained center stage in the policy debate, especially in Europe where recent regulatory interventions have been declared to be aimed at promoting fairness in digital markets. Against this background, the article attempts to demonstrate that the vagueness and ambiguity associated with its meaning may make fairness particularly attractive to policy makers and that, accordingly, the revival of fairness risks being simply functional to grant them more discretion and room for intervention. JEL codes: K20, K21, L40, L50 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stricter competition regulation in digital markets is a growing trend in the Global North, with the Digital Markets Act in Europe being the poster child of a more interventionist approach. In this article we do not focus on the debate surrounding these European efforts (which has meritorious arguments on both sides in our view), but instead examine similar developments elsewhere in the world, namely in South Africa, India, China, and Brazil. With reference to recent enforcement activities in these countries (such as industry investigations, greater scrutiny of mergers and of individual firm conduct, and in some cases ex ante regulations targeted at specific categories of firms), we provide our views on the potential adverse consequences of seeking to replicate the European approach in instances where digital markets may be less mature. In particular, while it is generally understood that heavy-handed regulation can stifle innovation and chill competition, we argue that such risks are more acute in countries outside of Europe (and North America), which thus warrants more cautious regulation methods. This is especially the case where the policy objectives deviate from the traditional one of protecting competition rather than competitors, since such an approach runs the risk of promoting short term gains at the expense of long-term benefits, which may ultimately harm the very stakeholders that such regulation is designed to advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are well-documented episodes of prices remaining at supracompetitive levels even after a cartel was shut down by the competition authority. As long as market conditions remain reasonably stable, collusive prices may still be incentive compatible so the collusive equilibrium could continue after firms are no longer engaging in illicit communications. This situation poses a challenging dilemma: consumer harm persists because of past unlawful conduct but there is no apparent recourse. This paper offers a remedy in the form of coupons. As part of the penalty imposed by the competition authority, each cartel member is required to distribute coupons to its past purchasers. Contrary to their usual form, these coupons can only be used to buy from a firm's competitors. I show how this temporary intervention can help destabilize collusion and restore competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool to govern of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of so-called gatekeepers to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a legal and from an economic perspective. Notwithstanding a number of benefits, we identify several issues with the current proposal. When looking at the core provisions of the proposal from an economic perspective, a number of of contention arise: many of the provisions seem to be quite narrow in scope and it seems difficult to extrapolate more general rules from them; the economic harm of some of the provisions is both uncertain and in principle debatable; the alleged (self-executing; non self-executing) distinction between different types of obligations cannot be verified; and, in addition, Art. 5–7 DMA seem to contain three distinct regulatory instruments; last but not least, while the DMA seeks to control existing gatekeepers, the "tipping" of markets and the rise of further gatekeepers is not guaranteed by the proposed regulation, this in turn leads to a larger critical analysis of the gatekeeper as the DMA's norm addressee. While the goals and nature of the DMA have gained in clarity throughout the legislative process, its scope remains somewhat obtuse. On the one hand it seems set on regulating gatekeepers as they exist today, on the other, it also aims to bring about systemic change in the digital single market. How it expects to achieve the latter is not entirely clear. On closer examination, the DMA also contains a complex enforcement regime that not only depends on the compliance of gatekeepers but may also forestall the envisioned speed and efficacy of the instrumment. In this light and by critically looking at the nature of ex ante and ex post measures in broader competition policy, we conclude that a reform of the competition policy regime would better suit the overalls aims of reining in big tech in future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Directorate General for Competition at the European Commission enforces competition law in the areas of antitrust, merger control, and State aid. After providing a general presentation of the role of the Chief Competition Economist's team (CET), this article surveys some of the main developments at the Directorate General for Competition over 2022/2023. In particular, the article reviews the Commission antitrust investigation of Amazon marketplace and the Amazon "Buy Box", the expansion of manufacturing support with two recent frameworks for manufacturing aid, and the MOL/OMV merger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is critical to assess their impacts on individual markets, the digital sector, and the overall European economy. The European Commission (EC) released an Impact Assessment in support of the DMA that purports to evaluate it using cost/benefit analysis. An economic evaluation of the DMA should consider its full impacts on dynamic competition. The Impact Assessment neither assesses the DMA's impact on dynamic competition in the digital economy nor evaluates the impacts of specific DMA prohibitions and obligations. Instead, it considers benefits in general and largely ignores costs. We study its benefit assessments and find they are based on highly inappropriate methodologies and assumptions. A cost/benefit study using inappropriate methodologies and largely ignoring costs cannot provide a sound policy assessment. Instead of promoting dynamic competition between platforms, the DMA will likely reinforce existing market structures, ossify market boundaries, and stunt European innovation. The DMA is likely to chill R&D by encouraging free riding on the investments of others, which discourages making those investments. Avoiding harm to innovation is critical because innovation delivers large, positive spillover benefits, driving increases in productivity, employment, wages, and prosperity. The DMA prioritizes static over dynamic competition, with the potential to harm the European economy. Given this, the Impact Assessment does not demonstrate that the DMA will be beneficial overall, and its implementation must be carefully tailored to alleviate or lessen its potential to harm Europe's economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In literature, most studies on mergers focus purely on competition-related aspects; additional conditions that can apply are labelled non-competition goals or public interest considerations (PICs). The imposition of these conditions is garnering more attention from the competition authorities as a means to assist the struggling economy in South Africa. This paper reports the impact that various independent variables can have on the probability of certain public interest considerations being imposed on merger cases in South Africa with the use of a quantitative logit regression model. The study sample consists of 221 mergers between 2010 and 2019, and only includes cases with PICs as conditions to merge, based on all small, intermediate, and large mergers collected from Competition Commission and Tribunal newsletters, case files and company websites, as well as the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances. This research makes use of descriptive statistics and regression analysis from this unique database to analyse the data. The results indicate that for South Africa, the competition authorities focus on employment, supplier development fund programmes and Black economic empowerment conditions when considering which PIC to enforce on merger cases. The article contributes to the literature on competition policy and economics by adding to the minimal research already conducted and enhances our understanding of mergers with non-competition goals and the impact of these considerations in the South African merger framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition policy has been at the core of the European integration project from its very inception. The United Kingdom (UK) played a truly pivotal role in the development of European Union (EU) competition policy with the policy long presenting one of the best illustrations of Europeanisation. The public vote for Brexit in 2016 pushed the reset button for the UK's engagement with the EU and saw successive UK governments all pursuing a de-Europeanisation trajectory as part of their objective of 'taking back control'. State aid emerged as a contentious issue during the Brexit negotiations. The UK government hailed its new Subsidy Control Act (2023) as a clear departure from the EU state aid regime, but is this a case of de-Europeanisation or partial de-Europeanisation? This article argues that the UK has still not entirely broken free from EU's state aid regime and finds itself in a state of orbiting Europeanisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Teece asserts that competition policy is so outdated that it now significantly degrades the ability of Big Tech firms to bring socially beneficial innovations to market. He suggests that strategic management research is essential in the struggle to update such policies. We counter that none of these assertions are accurate, let alone backed by evidence. While the larger goal of improving laws and policies through scientific research is a worthy one, the specific focus on doing so to aid a set of powerful firms that have allegedly caused—directly or indirectly—great societal damage is quite unappealing. To balance his pro-Big Tech perspective, we provide logical and theory-based arguments and evidence that indicates Big Tech has often been bad for innovation and society while their regulation has been good, and that more oversight—specifically tailored to digital platforms—would be better. We then offer three alternative paths for us, as management scholars, to take that leverage our distinctive skills and that fulfill our ethical and professional mandates, in the pursuit of improving the strategic decisions and actions that policymakers and firms take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The sharp rise in electricity prices has led to a discussion on possible subsidies for companies in the form of an industrial power tariff. The subsidies should help companies remain internationally competitive and prevent them from relocating overseas. Although German electricity prices for (industrial) firms are around the European average due to many tax exemptions, they are significantly higher compared to other non-European countries. Simulations using price increases of different magnitudes show that only a small share of companies would face major price increases compared to their value added. Moreover, there is considerable heterogeneity between the sectors. For example, the industrial gases or aluminum production sectors would be much more affected than other sectors. Thus, a large-scale industrial electricity price subsidy does not seem to be very effective. Selective relief for certain sectors may be problematic under competition law and may need to be granted well beyond the temporary nature of the subsidy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the assessment of potential negative effects on innovation in horizontal mergers within the United States and the European Commission Merger Control. It explores the theoretical background and practice. First, the article draws principles from the literature review on propositions to assess innovation competition cases. Second, it presents official documents and literature on the case law to study the jurisdictions' experiences. In addition, selected case studies are analyzed, establishing connections to the theoretical principles and practice. The case studies include (1) Takeda/Shire (EC-2018), (2) AbbVie/Allergan (EC-2020), and (3) Sabre/Farelogix (DoJ-2019). The article concludes that there have been improvements, particularly in the assessment of overlaps in firms' capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a model where the managers of two firms decide about adopting a sustainable production technology (or product). It demonstrates under what conditions a firm experiences a first mover disadvantage from going green, which may potentially be overcome by a sustainability agreement serving as a device for equilibrium selection in a coordination game with multiple equilibria. If the technology adoption game is, however, a prisoner's dilemma, the sustainability agreement must be structured like a hardcore cartel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue marks the 25th anniversary of the introduction of a leniency program for antitrust in the EU and contains five original papers: Each paper examines the effects of design parameters of leniency programs on their performance. Before introducing each contribution separately, we put them in perspective by introducing readers to the existing theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature on corporate leniency programs for antitrust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Productivity growth has declined in Australia and other developed countries over the past two decades. It has been argued that reduced dynamism and the failure of competition at an economy‐wide level is to blame, leading to calls for broad competition policy reforms. In this paper we consider the theoretical and empirical evidence to support this "failure of competition" narrative. We find that the evidence, at best, is ambiguous. Competition failures in some areas support the need for reform, but the competition landscape across Australia is complex and there is no simple link between indicators of competition, such as concentration levels; indicators of reduced dynamism, such as falling business investment, and falling productivity growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Hilmer Review and National Competition Policy reforms were an important part of the 1990s productivity surge and have been estimated to have delivered a permanent 2.5 per cent lift in GDP. I outline the key elements of these reforms and identify seven lessons for modern competition reformers. In the 2020s, with the startup rate falling and market concentration rising, boosting competition is one way of increasing productivity and improving the dynamism of the Australian economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed Digital Markets Act has been under severe scrutiny in the past couple of years. While it received mostly positive feedback, there were numerous authors and scholars arguing that the new legislation does not provide anything useful or new. The common denominator of most of the analyses is that the Digital Markets Act is an ex-ante antitrust legislation and that the obligations tackle the (abusive) dominance of the gatekeepers to be designated. In this article, I try to deconstruct the requirements for determining whether an undertaking is a gatekeeper and to assess whether the proposal fits into a regulatory compliance type of legislation or ex-ante competition law. In addition to the analytical approach, I will take the example of the Intel and Microsoft cases and the intricacies that arose from them. I will further assess possible implications that the proposal might have for innovation and other aspects of the market.

This article studies a potential link between the middle-income trap and competition policy. It analyzes how a country's competition policy relates to the transition process from the middle-income stage to the high-income stage, and what features of competition policy are accompanying a countryʼs successful leap from the middle-income group of countries. We find that to avoid falling into the middle-income trap, a country should have an appropriate institutional environment, which includes rigorous adherence to the rule of law, high regulatory quality, and high government effectiveness. It seems necessary to introduce competition policy as early as possible for countries in the upper middle-income stage. The quality of competition law and the independence of the competition authority must be guaranteed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competition policy, Healthcare markets, Hospital monopolies, Provider consolidation, D42, D42, I13, K21, L4 I. HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AND THE GRADUAL EMERGENCE OF 1990s ANTITRUST POLICY Consolidation by healthcare providers began with an aggressive wave of hospital mergers in the 1990s. Keywords: Competition policy; Healthcare markets; Hospital monopolies; Provider consolidation; D42; I13; K21; L4 EN Competition policy Healthcare markets Hospital monopolies Provider consolidation D42 I13 K21 L4 265 271 7 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 Antitrust policy in the healthcare sector is perennially 10 years behind the industry. "Cross-market" mergers A third consolidation challenge emerging with greater frequency is the so-called "cross-market" hospital merger. [Extracted from the article]

In 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted unanimously to close an investigation of Google, despite agency staff concluding that the company had significantly harmed competition.[4] Massive mergers sailed through, including the Penguin and Random House deal, and the merger of American Airlines and US Airways. One was that, after decades of effective enforcement, Americans had stopped paying attention to monopoly and turned to other issues.[29] The second was that, by the 1980s, the Democratic Party had abandoned its commitment to small business, which had been a key part of the party's coalition since the New Deal.[30] This left a crucial constituency without a political home from which to organize a defence of America's anti-monopoly policies. Keywords: Antitrust; Competition policy; Democracy; Consumer welfare; Economic inequality; Monopoly; Small business; K21; L40; N00 EN Antitrust Competition policy Democracy Consumer welfare Economic inequality Monopoly Small business K21 L40 N00 236 241 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. INTRODUCTION It is an extraordinary time in antitrust. Antitrust, Competition policy, Democracy, Consumer welfare, Economic inequality, Monopoly, Small business, K21, L40, L40, N00. [Extracted from the article]

Keywords: Antitrust; FTC; Competition policy; K21; L40 EN Antitrust FTC Competition policy K21 L40 272 277 6 08/11/23 20230701 NES 230701 I. CONCEPTUALIZING AND OPTIMIZING CHANGE Institutional structure helps shape the nature of accountability.[1] Literature in economics,[2] political science,[3] finance,[4] and management[5] all utilize principal-agent models. The good news is that better alignment between agency leadership and staff (leadership needs to better listen to staff) and more respect for analytical tools can fix these problems. In the case of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, if Congress does not trust the Commission to listen to staff (we discuss below why that is a reasonable belief), then Congress has even less reason to trust the Commission. While many of the current leadership's most fervent supports have criticized antitrust policy as insufficiently accountable to the democratic process,[28] the FTC has assumed authority to make competition rules without explicit Congressional authorization (and indeed based on a broad reading of a case from the 1970s that certainly would not survive judicial scrutiny today).[29] Odder still is the selective textualism of the FTC. [Extracted from the article]

The development of an Antimonopoly Policy is important for the economic development of Georgia, as it helps to foster competition, protect consumer rights, and ensure fair business practices. Here are a few key reasons why the development of an Antimonopoly Policy is significant: promoting competition, protecting consumer rights, ensuring market efficiency, attracting investment and enhancing business environment. In conclusion, the development of an Antimonopoly Policy in Georgia is crucial for promoting competition, protecting consumer rights, ensuring market efficiency, attracting investment, and aligning with international standards. It provides a framework for fair business practices, stimulates economic development, and contributes to a healthy and competitive business environment. In the process of the research are used general scientific methods (systemic, structural, functional) and private methods (graphic and those of conformity). Official statistical data existing in the country as well as the data and evaluations officially published by international organizations are also used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators sometimes say that the elimination of impediments to trade—namely, market friction—tends to expand trade and foster competition. This casual assumption is known to be erroneous. Antitrust law recognizes that restraints of trade—which are forms of market friction—are often pro-competitive and frequently have both pro- and anticompetitive effects. Accordingly, antitrust law prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, but not all restraints of trade. Trust-busting advocates promote a different approach to market friction. They argue that the antitrust laws intend to maintain fragmented industries and favor small businesses. This approach, which has been embraced by the antitrust agencies in recent years, implies that high-friction markets are more competitive than low-friction markets. It is an expression of a phenomenon that can be called the " friction paradox ": the elimination of market friction is desirable until this goal is accomplished. Notable examples of the friction paradox include hostility toward new generations of market intermediaries, such as supermarkets, chain stores, department stores, big-box stores, digital platforms, and digital ecosystems. This article observes that antipathy for large intermediaries results in a willingness to sacrifice the core benefits of competition—low prices, convenience, efficiency, and innovation. It, therefore, argues that antitrust expressions of the friction paradox place competition policy at war with itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the conventional view competition law differs from regulation in that it is applied ex post, through proscriptions, and in a 'crime-tort' fashion. From this angle, when competition enforcers intervene ex ante, in a prophylactic manner, and employ prescriptive tools, they inappropriately transform competition law into 'regulatory antitrust'. The present study challenges this view arguing that modern competition law intervention has moved beyond the crimetort enforcement model and aspires to be 'responsive'. This means that modern enforcers intervene ex ante and ex post, use prescriptive and proscriptive tools, and impose restorative and prophylactic remedies to ensure that the law is applied effectively. The works of the Greek Competition Authority offer a case study to illustrate this point. This authority has been utilizing a plurality of tools and enforcement strategies to enhance compliance and deterrence, and apply the law responsively. However, enforcement that aspires to be responsive may create problems of over-enforcement or under-enforcement, be vulnerable to regulatory failures or undermine Rule-of-Law principles. For this reason, this study draws on responsive regulation theory to make fourteen recommendations on how to address these challenges and ensure truly responsive enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hu, Mizuno, and Song (Applied Economics Letters, 2021) compare the welfare effects of input price discrimination (IPD) and uniform input pricing (UIP) under passive partial ownership (PPO) where one downstream firm holds equity shares of its rival. This paper extends their setup to accommodate passive partial cross ownership (PCO) where each downstream firm holds equity shares of its rival. A common conclusion is that IPD improves welfare if the cost asymmetry is sufficiently low. Interestingly, this finding holds regardless of whether the more efficient firm is also the dominant partial shareholder. Indeed, it is found that the likelihood that IPD is welfare enhancing increases as firms become more asymmetric in terms of equity shares. However, the critical level of cost asymmetry differs under PPO and PCO, meaning that there are cases where IPD performs better in terms of social welfare under PCO but not under PPO, and vice versa. The main conclusion of this paper is that, compared to the PPO structure, PCO reduces the likelihood that IPD results in better welfare outcomes than UIP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Promoting contracted family doctor services is an important way to implement tiered diagnosis and treatment, and to safeguard people's health, as well as a cornerstone of achieving Health China 2030 goals. However, the development of this system is constrained by some problems, such as contracting a family doctor but making no appointments. Many countries have introduced competition mechanisms in the supply of contracted services in different degrees to enhance the quality of family doctor services. However, China is now lack of theoretical and empirical studies about introducing competition mechanisms inthe delivery of contracted family doctorservices. We reviewed the latest developments in theoretical and empirical studies involving the use of competitive mechanisms in the provision of contracted family doctor services, which will contribute to the study and implementation of family doctor system in China.

So far, the notion of food sovereignty has not claimed a place at the table of competition law. Although competition law developments in the last four decades have promoted the exclusive dominance of efficiency considerations, the next few years may bring a turning point through the recognition that in the long term economic efficiency also requires social and environmental sustainability, especially in a sector like agriculture. Although family farming has always been dominant in Europe, recent trends of concentration and consolidation in the agricultural and food supply chain as well as globalisation itself have shaken European agricultural producers who face several competition-related problems. This article aims to shed light on whether the theoretical framework of EU competition law and policy are appropriate for the notion of food sovereignty to join the discourse. In order to do so, the article presents the main tenets of ordoliberalism, the prevailing school of thought in EU competition policy, in particular the findings of those ordoliberal scholars who deal with the issues of agriculture. Moreover, the article aims to theorise sovereignty in food sovereignty, in parallel with bringing it into line with ordoliberalism, in order to explore whether the concept of social market economy, one of the key concepts of ordoliberalism explicitly followed by the EU, and in particular ordoliberal competition policy to be realised within the framework of the social market economy, is suitable to take into account food sovereignty’s core elements at least at a theoretical level. If it is, it may bring to the fore a viewpoint of EU competition policy which ensures appropriate protection for the agricultural sector to overcome the newly emerging anomalies faced by European agricultural producers as a consequence of globalising markets.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 981-992 | European Forum Insight of 23 December 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. A competition policy fit for the digital transition? The Commission's view. - II. The complementary role of competition law: a dynamic balance between rules and exceptions. - III. The degree of (de)centralisation of public enforcement to ensure the dynamic balance. - IV. Final considerations. | (Abstract) The European responses to the COVID-19 outbreak have triggered an ongoing review process of competition rules and enforcement procedure to support the Union's priorities. In this context, the European Commission published the Communication 'A Competition Policy Fit for New Challenges' with the aim of underlining the ability of competition law to facilitate the green and digital transitions, and to strengthen the resilience of the Single Market. This Insight reflects on the substantive and procedural challenges posed by the digital transition. Indeed, the complementary role of competition law to stimulate the achievement of the digital targets is characterised by two tensions, relating respectively to the interpretation and application of competition rules and to the degree of centralisation with regard to the enforcement mechanisms. In the author's view, EU competition law will offer dynamic substantive and procedural responses to the challenges of the digital transition.

Copyright of Informacion Comercial Espanola Revista de Economia is the property of S.G.E.E.I.P.C., Secretaria de Estado de Comercio, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Competition investigations start with market definition, which establishes the perimeter of the competitive analysis. In this paper, we focus on the definition of economic markets in the pharmaceutical industry, where the entry of generics in different therapeutic areas provides a sequence of quasi-natural experiments involving a significant competitive shock for the originator producer. We show how generic entry modifies price and non-price competitive constraints over time, generating market-wide effects. Paradoxically, generic entry may soften the competitive pressure for brands other than the originator. We obtain these results by econometrically estimating time-varying price elasticities. We then apply the logic of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to gauge the strength of competitive constraints under different market structures. Our results provide strong empirical support for an approach that defines relevant markets contingent on the theory of harm. We discuss the relevance of these findings in the context of ongoing cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains that when there is great uncertainty about which elements of knowledge must be combined to make an invention, the likelihood of invention increases markedly—by many orders of magnitude—when there are numerous diverse research organizations, rather than just a few. The paper examines the possibility that competition (antitrust) policy toward mergers would be improved if enforcement efforts placed more emphasis on protecting the diversity that is provided by numerous research rivals in a market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovation competition presents challenges for antitrust law and enforcement policy. Innovation has generated changes in the nature of competition as firms introduce new transaction techniques, product designs, and production processes. Innovation competition is driving the 'Business Revolution' in retail, wholesale, manufacturing, services, and financial technology. Transaction innovation in online platforms and multi-sided markets has raised antitrust concerns about anticompetitive conduct, vertical restraints, consumer privacy, and barriers to entrepreneurship. The article argues that although antitrust policy makers recognize the importance of innovation competition, they need to update their economic frameworks. Antitrust policy makers need to move beyond traditional analysis based on the twin frameworks of perfect competition and imperfect competition. The article provides an introduction to the emerging Economics of Technology & Innovation and examines some implications for antitrust policy. First, antitrust policy should shift its focus from price competition without technological change to address non-price aspects of innovation competition. Secondly, antitrust policy should apply economic analysis that recognizes the critical role of Intellectual Property and technology standards in innovation competition. Thirdly, antitrust policy toward horizontal and vertical mergers should consider developments in the economic analysis of innovation competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developing nations use contemporary competition laws based on international models for reasons ranging from achieving international legitimacy to achieving domestic economic objectives. Although passing such laws gives these nations competition regimes more legitimacy, doing so does not guarantee that their economic goals will be met unless the laws are also effectively implemented. Comparative legal scholarship suggests that effective enforcement requires, among other things, a positive link between the passed laws and the nation's pre-existing legal systems in light of development economics. The globalization of national competition laws, particularly the application of international soft law, is responsible for the existence of modern competition law. Secondly, the competition regimes in Pakistan and China face a number of long-term difficulties, many of which are the product of globalization, which must be addressed as soon as possible. In order to examine the aims and objectives, this study employs qualitative data analysis. The results of this research suggest that for both nations to successfully implement competition law, innovation and unconventionality are required. Although the goal of competition law is to prevent anti-competitive activities and practices by promoting fair and open market competition, this goal is achieved through protecting consumers from businesses' use of unfair business practices. Because of this, the act encourages the formation of agreements that limit and restrict market dominance. In addition, the law specifies how investigations, acquisitions, mergers, penalties, leniency, and other aspects of law enforcement should be handled. As a result, this law can be seen as extremely important for regulating firms while maintaining consumer and producer welfare. It eventually supports economic growth and social justice. As a result, Voluntary adherence to competition law, rules, and regulations is essential since doing so would significantly lower the societal costs of enforcing the law.

In this paper, I will analyze the state aid granted in the member countries for the recovery of accommodation and food services, severely affected by the pandemic, coming to the conclusion that in Romania the measures were applied later than in other countries. Thus, through the "HoReCa Scheme", the beneficiary companies in Romania have received state aid recently, after almost 2 years of deep crisis. In the meantime, more than a third of companies have gone bankrupt. Starting from the presentation of state aid in European legislation and the need for it to support economies, I will then draw attention to the major impact of the pandemic on the HORECA sector at European level.