Search

The recent epistemological turn in populism studies has produced many valuable insights pertaining to populist knowledge practices, conspiracy theories, information bubbles, and cognitive biases. However, various elements of populist epistemology are still studied separately, and there are no common theoretical assumptions that would arrange them into a comprehensive epistemic theory of populism. Thus, apart from presenting a preliminary mapping of recent changes in the field, the article proposes a basic theoretical framework for an epistemic approach to studying populism by conceptualising populism as a set of epistemic interventions: discursive and non-discursive practices that construe the people as a political subject and result in the emergence of a populist epistemic community. The article discusses how the latter concept may help to link discursive, performative, communicative, and cognitive elements of populism, along with describing key features of populist epistemic communities and indicating possible directions for future research on populist epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conspiratorial thinking has been with humanity for a long time but has recently grown as a source of societal concern and as a subject of research in the cognitive and social sciences. We propose a three‐tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. At the level of cognitive processes, we identify explanatory coherence and faulty belief updating as critical ideas. At the level of the community of knowledge, we explore how conspiracy communities facilitate false belief by promoting a contagious sense of understanding, and how community norms catalyze the biased assimilation of evidence. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. Rather than treating conspiracy belief as pathological, we take the perspective that is an extreme outcome of common cognitive processes. We propose a three‐tiered framework for the study of conspiracy theories: (1) cognitive processes, (2) the individual, and (3) social processes and communities of knowledge. We review recent research on conspiracy theories and explain how conspiratorial thinking emerges from the interaction of individual and group processes. As a case study, we describe observations the first author made while attending the Flat Earth International Conference, a meeting of conspiracy theorists who believe the Earth is flat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The community-of-knowledge framework explains the extraordinary success of the human species, despite individual members' demonstrably shallow understanding of many topics, by appealing to outsourcing. People follow the cues of members of their community because understanding of phenomena is generally distributed across the group. Typically, communities do possess the relevant knowledge, but it is possible in principle for communities to send cues despite lacking knowledge—a weakness in the system's design. COVID-19 in the United States offered a natural experiment in collective-knowledge development because a novel phenomenon arrived at a moment of intense division in political partisanship. We review evidence from the pandemic showing that the thought leaders of the two partisan groups sent radically different messages about COVID, which were, in turn, reinforced by close community members (family, friends, etc.). We show that although actual understanding of the individual plays a role in a key COVID-mitigation behavior (vaccination), it plays a smaller role than perceived understanding of thought leaders and beliefs about COVID-related behaviors of close community members. We discuss implications for theory and practice when all communities are in the same epistemic circumstance—relying on the testimony of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study shows that exposure to topic-related but irrelevant information enhances both estimates of peer knowledge and our own sense of knowledge. In Experiment 1, participants were more confident in their answers to general knowledge questions and gave higher estimates of peer knowledge when such questions were accompanied by short paragraphs containing topic-related yet nondiagnostic information than when they were not. The inflated peer knowledge estimates were independent of the classic curse of knowledge. Experiments 2, 3, 5, and 6 demonstrated that irrelevant information biases knowledge estimation via its semantic relatedness to the test questions; response latencies were measured in Experiments 5 and 6 to examine the possible role of retrieval fluency in the semantic relatedness effect. Experiment 4 attributed the bias to information content (e.g., "it is generally known that keratin is responsible"), not comments on knowledge popularity (e.g., "what is responsible is generally known"). Importantly, the effect of irrelevant information on estimates of peer knowledgewas fully mediated by confidence in own knowledge in Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5. Experiment 6 manipulated retrieval fluency and failed to find conclusive evidence for its involvement in the semantic relatedness effect. We conclude that irrelevant information boosts peer knowledge estimation through its semantic relatedness to the problem at hand, and the effect is mostly explained by a corresponding increase in the individual's own sense of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We tested an implication of the community of knowledgehypothesis, that people fail to distinguish their own knowledge fromother people’s knowledge in a collectivist society (China) as they doin individualistic societies like the United States. As predicted,despite the absence of any actual explanatory information, peoplerated their own understanding of novel natural and economicphenomena as higher when they were told that experts understoodthe phenomena than when they were told that experts did not yetunderstand them. This suggests that the community of knowledgeeffect may hold across cultures.

The division of linguistic labour (DLL), initially theorized by philosophers, has gained the attention of cognitive scientists in the last decade. Contrary to some controversial philosophical accounts of DLL, we propose that it is an extended mind strategy of offloading conceptual understanding onto other people. In this article, we empirically explore this proposal by providing an exploratory experimental paradigm to search for the mechanisms underwriting DLL and how they may work in practice. We developed a between-subjects experiment in which participants had to categorize two pairs of highly confusable dog breeds after receiving categorization training on just one pair of breeds. In the treatment group, participants were grouped in dyads and were allowed to interact with each other by means of the labels of these four dog breeds. In their queries to trained 'experts', novices frequently used labels to refer to breeds that they could not identify themselves. Experts were highly responsive to their paired novices' queries, and the rates of querying for the two members within a dyad were positively correlated. Independent categorization failure and offloading categorization success lead to subsequent increases in querying by novices, indicating adaptive use of offloading. Self-reports of breed knowledge were higher for experts within a dyad compared to isolated experts. This article is part of the theme issue 'Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A "community of knowledge" of representatives of the housing sector in the Netherlands investigated the impact of the behaviour of residents in sustainable housing, both newly constructed and renovated stock. For this, grey scientific data were used, i.e., data and reports from non-university agencies reflecting research commissioned by civil society NGOs and commercial enterprises. The aim was to find perspectives for action (practical "rules of thumb") to increase the impact of sustainable housing on CO2 reduction and facilitate the implementation of the Dutch national sustainability program. First, a conceptual framework and research model were created to generate the relevant research questions for the sustainable construction sector. An innovative research approach was used where data from academic non-university researchers were enriched by university academic researchers. Experiences with the methodology used are: (a) It implicitly places the many factors that influence sustainable resident behaviour in context; and (b) it makes clear that data from such research can complement university research with useful data from practice, data that are scientifically difficult to use because they are mostly derived from stand-alone case studies. The perspectives for action that were generated are: (a) Sustainable technologies must add new useful functionalities for acceptance; (b) sustainable supply must be tailor-made because households differ and tenants behave differently from homeowners; (c) decision-making about sustainable investments is not only based on financial factors; (d) residents are reluctant to become involved, so it is important that (e) the people representing contractors should be reliable; and (f) people want personalised plans and on-time delivery. Finally, the collected reports turned out to be focused on practice and therefore provided less theoretical information about the rebound effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A “community of knowledge” of representatives of the housing sector in the Netherlands investigated the impact of the behaviour of residents in sustainable housing, both newly constructed and renovated stock. For this, grey scientific data were used, i.e., data and reports from non-university agencies reflecting research commissioned by civil society NGOs and commercial enterprises. The aim was to find perspectives for action (practical “rules of thumb”) to increase the impact of sustainable housing on CO2 reduction and facilitate the implementation of the Dutch national sustainability program. First, a conceptual framework and research model were created to generate the relevant research questions for the sustainable construction sector. An innovative research approach was used where data from academic non-university researchers were enriched by university academic researchers. Experiences with the methodology used are: (a) It implicitly places the many factors that influence sustainable resident behaviour in context; and (b) it makes clear that data from such research can complement university research with useful data from practice, data that are scientifically difficult to use because they are mostly derived from stand-alone case studies. The perspectives for action that were generated are: (a) Sustainable technologies must add new useful functionalities for acceptance; (b) sustainable supply must be tailor-made because households differ and tenants behave differently from homeowners; (c) decision-making about sustainable investments is not only based on financial factors; (d) residents are reluctant to become involved, so it is important that (e) the people representing contractors should be reliable; and (f) people want personalised plans and on-time delivery. Finally, the collected reports turned out to be focused on practice and therefore provided less theoretical information about the rebound effect.

My first 30‐odd years of research in cognitive science has been driven by an attempt to balance two facts about human thought that seem incompatible and two corresponding ways of understanding information processing. The facts are that, on one hand, human memories serve as sophisticated pattern recognition devices with great flexibility and an ability to generalize and predict as long as circumstances remain sufficiently familiar. On the other hand, we are capable of deploying an enormous variety of representational schemes that map closely onto articulable structure in the world and that support explanation even in unfamiliar circumstances. The contrasting ways of modeling such processes involve, first, more and more sophisticated associative models that capture progressively higher‐order statistical structure and, second, more powerful representational languages for other sorts of structure, especially compositional and causal structure. My efforts to rectify these forces have taken me from the study of memory to induction and category knowledge to causal reasoning. In the process, I have consistently appealed to dual systems of thinking. I have come to realize that a key reason for our success as cognizers is that we rely on others for most of our information processing needs; we live in a community of knowledge. We make use of others both intuitively—by outsourcing much of our thinking without knowing we are doing it—and by deliberating with others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive neuroscience seeks to discover the biological foundations of the human mind. One goal is to explain how mental operations are generated by the information processing architecture of the human brain. Our aim is to assess whether this is a well-defined objective. Our contention will be that it is not because the information processing of any given individual is not contained entirely within that individual’s brain. Rather, it typically includes components situated in the heads of others, in addition to being distributed across parts of the individual’s body and physical environment. Our focus here will be on cognition distributed across individuals, or on what we call the “community of knowledge,” the challenge that poses for reduction of cognition to neurobiology and the contribution of cognitive neuroscience to the study of communal processes.

Cognitive neuroscience seeks to discover the biological foundations of the human mind. One goal is to explain how mental operations are generated by the information processing architecture of the human brain. Our aim is to assess whether this is a well-defined objective. Our contention will be that it is not because the information processing of any given individual is not contained entirely within that individual's brain. Rather, it typically includes components situated in the heads of others, in addition to being distributed across parts of the individual's body and physical environment. Our focus here will be on cognition distributed across individuals, or on what we call the "community of knowledge," the challenge that poses for reduction of cognition to neurobiology and the contribution of cognitive neuroscience to the study of communal processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an analysis of the role of human smuggling practices and of the transnational social relations of Eritrean refugees exiting and transitioning through Ethiopia. Based on two years of multisited ethnographic fieldwork, I explore how smugglers, aspiring migrants, and former migrants, settled en route and in diasporic spaces, try to minimize the risk of violence through communities of support and knowhow. In so doing, I argue that smuggling is a socially embedded collective practice that strives to facilitate safe exit and transitions of Eritrean refugees despite the criminalization of migration, the militarization of borders, and the potential and existing criminal activity along Eritrean, Sudanese, and Ethiopian migratory corridors. The facilitation of irregular transits by migrants themselves reproduces a collective system of migratory knowledge that aims to bring refugees to safety—a community of knowledge—in which smuggling emerges as a system of refugee protection from below. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contains critical reflections of a multidisciplinary research group studying the human and technological dynamics around some newly offered electronic services in a specific rural area of Finland. For their research, the group adopted ethnography. On facing the challenges of doing ethnographic research in a multidisciplinary setting, the group evolved its own breed of research practice based on multiple forms of triangulation. This implied the use of multiple data sources, methods, theories, and researchers, in different combinations. One of the outcomes of the work is a model for collaborative research. It highlights, among others, the importance of creating a climate for collaboration within the research group and following a process of individual and collaborative writing to achieve the potential benefits of such research. The article also identifies a set of remaining challenges relevant to collaborative research.

This article was written in 2011, based on the research report presented to FGV/GVPesquisa em 2010, so before the accident at Comandante Ferraz Antarctic Station, on 02.25.2012. Our focus is a managerial model based on cooperation, represented by the Brazilian Antarctic Program (Proantar), on which we conducting an empirical research on the daily life of Brazilian researchers who work in Antarctica, searching to understanding how the teams organize their work, interact to different colleagues, institutions and nationalities, deal with isolating and so limited conditions of work. Based on these findings we expanded the scope of the study to conduct an organizational analysis which takes the Antarctic continent as an organization. Our key-question is: how might an organizational analysis of Antarctic Program contribute to the management of organizations based on knowledge and cooperation? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My first 30-odd years of research in cognitive science has been driven by an attempt to balance two facts about human thought that seem incompatible and two corresponding ways of understanding information processing. The facts are that, on one hand, human memories serve as sophisticated pattern recognition devices with great flexibility and an ability to generalize and predict as long as circumstances remain sufficiently familiar. On the other hand, we are capable of deploying an enormous variety of representational schemes that map closely onto articulable structure in the world and that support explanation even in unfamiliar circumstances. The contrasting ways of modeling such processes involve, first, more and more sophisticated associative models that capture progressively higher-order statistical structure and, second, more powerful representational languages for other sorts of structure, especially compositional and causal structure. My efforts to rectify these forces have taken me from the study of memory to induction and category knowledge to causal reasoning. In the process, I have consistently appealed to dual systems of thinking. I have come to realize that a key reason for our success as cognizers is that we rely on others for most of our information processing needs; we live in a community of knowledge. We make use of others both intuitively-by outsourcing much of our thinking without knowing we are doing it-and by deliberating with others., (© 2021 Cognitive Science Society LLC.)