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This is the first study of technical efficiencies of higher education institutions and the first study evaluating performance at faculty level in Turkey. The study also compares technical efficiencies of private and public institutions. Estimation shows low overall efficiency with high variations across the faculties of economics. The results also demonstrate that average efficiency of public institutions is higher if the quality of data is not considered. However, when qualities of the outputs are taken into account, average efficiencies of public and private institutions converge. (Contains 3 tables and 6 notes.)

Assessment shows that international publication performance for university economic departments in Turkey is rather poor, but publication performance for Turkish economists is similar to that of other economists worldwide.

In recent years, Turkey has witnessed a new form of corporate finance in which companies, commonly called 'Islamic', borrow directly from Lenders without using any financial intermediaries. Trust among Lenders and borrowers has initiated market exchange, secured deals and lowered transaction costs. This paper claims that the base of trust in direct financing for Islamic companies should be largely attributed to the self-interest of the parties rather than just to IsLam or 'shared values: Here we do not see an individual calculation of 'economic man', as argued by neo-classical economists, but individuals embedded in relations within social groups and sharing ethics of money-based relations. Second, we illustrate that self-interest based trust stems from the calculations of trusters using available information in the market about trustees. However, information asymmetry between borrowers and Lenders in favour of borrowers has been a source of deep instability and abuse. Finally, the paper shows how groups have used the rhetoric of Islamic economic revival to expand the scope of transactions while trust eroded in favour of abusers. The anonymity came with thousands of investors who eroded the strength of reciprocity, surveillance and retribution in trust-based relations. This case study also illustrates that Islamic societies seek new solutions within capitalist economic systems to maximise their gains and they do not wish to be destined to Live in poverty. Keywords: trust, Islamic companies, transactions costs, information asymmetries, JEL Classifications: A10, A14, O10, O14, G14, P14, P52, Z12 INTRODUCTION In recent years, Turkey has witnessed a new form of corporate finance in which companies, commonly called 'Islamic', borrow [...]

Since the late 1960s, alternative forms of capitalization have emerged in the absence of an effective capital markets regime in Turkey. We can see these alternative forms in the failed attempts to create Anatolian holding companies through the direct investment of small savings. This article shows how Anatolian holding companies became victims of poor institutional and regulatory regimes, and how the lack of institutions to promote impersonal trust in the economy in turn, permitted widespread abuses. We identify populist politics, lax oversight, and social norms that incorporated gambling as three interlinked reasons which hindered the genesis and development of viable capital market reform and regulatory institutions in Turkey. Key words--capital formation, financial markets, state regulation, Anatolian holding companies, Islamic finance, Turkey