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The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms' governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution's limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The paper presents a conception of firms' efficiency that breaks with the agency theory of the firm, which sees the efficiency of firms as no different in nature from that of markets. We argue that firms are efficient relative to markets, thanks to two kinds of social interaction, namely, interpersonal interactions and compliance with authority; these interactions take place among workers engaged in a collective productive venture and could not develop in markets. Two kinds of norm emerge from these interactions that create the rights and obligations needed for horizontal and vertical cooperation; the functioning of firms and their specific efficiency thus have a deontic basis. Just as shareholder‐oriented governance is normatively derived from agency theory's vision of the firm, which has succeeded in powerfully influencing corporate law and corporate governance since the 1980s, participatory governance is the governance mode that normatively derives from our understanding of the firm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of democratization of property relations has affected, first of all, the European area, and then the other parts of the world. Having been established with a clear economic and social content, without the ideological burden, the employees shareholding and participation have the conditions to expand, strengthen their power and become one of the important factors in the structure of the modern society. In our area, the process of the transformation of social ownership began with the employees shareholding. Company employees were given the right to buy internal shares under privileged conditions. That was the main form of transformation. There was trust in the company to initiate, organize and manage the process of transformation in its own interest. The funds obtained through the issuance of shares, selling a part of the company or the whole company, according to the express provisions of the law, belong to the company or its complex form. Later, already during 90s, ideological properties were unjustifiably attributed to the employees shareholding and participation, which led to their complete exclusion from the economic and legal system. By subsequent regulations, privatization was almost exclusively reduced to selling, thus excluding all other possible different forms of privatization. This approach lost the sight of the basic economic objectives of privatization: there was no acquiring of new capital or new investment cycle; there were neither new business entities capable of receiving and fertilizing the capital emerged, nor the privatization represented an incentive for dynamic development of economy and employment. Economic enterprises were extinguished, and unemployment increased. And now, in a much less favorable economic and social climate, it is reasonable to raise the issue of whether there are still conditions to engage the inner forces that would take upon themselves the responsibility for getting out of the crisis, by introducing the employees shareholding and privatization. A prerequisite for this is certainly the creation of a legal framework for the establishment and development of the employees shareholding and participation. This would simultaneously bring us closer to the legal system of the European Union and its member states, in which the employees shareholding and participation are widely established and legally regulated institutions.

Der Beitrag beleuchtet die Rolle der Mitbestimmung in der Ausnahmesituation der Pandemie. Anhand von exemplarischen Befunden aus drei Handlungsfeldern – der Entwicklung und Umsetzung von Maßnahmen zum Infektionsschutz, der Stabilisierung der Beschäftigung sowie der Verlagerung von Arbeit ins Homeoffice – wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob die Beteiligung am betrieblichen Krisenmanagement zu einer Stärkung oder Schwächung der Interessenvertretung führt. Die Befunde zeigen eine aktive und häufig auch als erfolgreich wahrgenommene Betriebsratsarbeit, sie zeigen aber auch erhebliche Branchenunterschiede, fortgesetzte Spaltungstendenzen und erweiterte Beteiligungsoptionen, denen die Verankerung in der Mitbestimmung fehlt. Dies deutet auf Pfadabhängigkeiten einer Mitbestimmung im Krisenmodus hin. This paper deals with the role of co-determination in the extraordinary situation of the pandemic. Presenting exemplary findings from three fields of action, i.e. development and implementation of measures for infection prevention, stabilization of employment, and relocation of work into the home office, the paper addresses the question whether participation in crisis management leads to a strengthening or weakening of the workersʼ interest representation. The empirical findings reveal an active role of the works councils which in most cases has been perceived as successful. On the other hand, there are also indications of significant differences according to branches, continued tendencies toward fragmentation, and extended participation options lacking anchoring in the codetermination norms and institutions. These results point to path dependencies of codetermination in the crisis mode. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Die Digitalisierung betrifft das Arbeitsrecht und die industriellen Beziehungen nicht nur durch die Veränderung von Arbeitsorganisation und Beschäftigungsformen, beispielsweise im Kontext von Crowdwork, sondern auch durch den Bedeutungsgewinn von Legal Technologies. Diese umfassen die standardisierte Bearbeitung von Rechtsangelegenheiten mittels Online-Tools, Rechtsgeneratoren und Legal Robots. Der Beitrag zielt auf eine Exploration der Formen und Folgen der Digitalisierung von Rechtsdienstleistungen im Arbeitsrecht für die industriellen Beziehungen. Auf Grundlage der Analyse prominenter Beispiele von Legal-Tech-Angeboten gibt er Einblicke in die Ausrichtung der Angebote und Anbieter und diskutiert mögliche Folgen für die etablierten Akteure der betrieblichen Mitbestimmung und der gewerkschaftlichen Interessenvertretung. Unsere übergreifende These lautet, dass sich aus dem Möglichkeitsraum der digitalen Rechtsanwendung und -durchsetzung sowohl neue Handlungsspielräume als auch Gefährdungen für die Akteure der kollektiven Interessenvertretung in den industriellen Beziehungen ergeben, die daher gut beraten wären, die Entwicklung der Legal Technologies aktiv mitzugestalten. The impact of digitalisation on labour law and industrial relations is not restricted to new forms of work organisation and employment such as crowd working. Digitalisation also appears in the form of legal technology providers who standardise the processing of legal cases with the help of online tools and legal robots. This paper aims at an exploration of forms and ramifications of the expansion of legal technologies in labour law for the actors and institutions of the German industrial relations system. On the basis of an analysis of paradigmatic cases of legal technology providers in individual and collective labour law, we suggest that new developments of the digitalisation in labour law result in new opportunities, but also challenges for actors of interest representation, and that trade unions and works councils should take an active role in this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Industrielle Beziehungen is the property of Rainer Hampp Verlag and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The quality of democracy in our economy depends on the governance of capital, but Europeans are still deprived of real voice over their retirement money: the single biggest source of capital in the 21st century. This paper outlines three major problems facing EU pensions: precarious retirement, escalating inequality, and mounting climate damage. These problems start with the places where we work, the institutions that control our retirement savings, and the votes on shares that come with them. The central argument is that pensions will only be sustainable once they are democratically, prudently, and loyally governed. First, member states have wide experience with co-determination in capital funds, which can inform the basis of minimum standards in EU law for 'pension fund democracy'. Second, a growing number of investment rules draw upon Member States' fiduciary duties and standards for prudence or care; but, these do not yet codify the requirement that beneficiaries' environmental, social, and governance preferences are followed. Third, votes on shares - bought with pension fund assets - are still being cast by banks and asset managers who manage 'other people's money'. This is a serious problem because banks and asset managers have interests that systematically conflict with the ultimate investors: they vote in companies on other people's money and, at the same time, sell financial products (e.g., pensions) to those companies. The problems are soluble with careful amendments to existing policy that ensure elected representatives of pension beneficiaries are the sole determinants of voting policies, with prudence and no conflicts of interest. A draft EU Directive, based upon emerging best practice, is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German dual system of labour relations is at a crossroads. The two cornerstones of the system, collective bargaining at the industry level and codetermination of works councils in companies and establishments, are eroding. Only one third of the workforce is now covered by both institutions. In this situation, trade unions have developed new strategies for revitalisation, including new strategies regarding derogations from collective bargaining agreements, new approaches to organising, and new projects to activate works councils. As a result, the traditional boundaries between union action at the establishment and industry levels, traditionally characterised by a strict separation of roles between works councils and trade unions, are dissolving. The trade unions are now developing active strategies at the establishment level with the aim of strengthening their position in the companies, and strengthening the capacity of works councils to act. At the same time, the importance of works councils as actors in collective bargaining is increasing. This new interplay of actors and levels seems to be an important precondition for the revitalisation of German industrial relations, even if it does not mean that all problems will be solved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the representation of Turkey-origin immigrant workers in trade unions and works councils in the Ruhr region (Germany). Based on a field study in the Ruhr including surveys, in-depth interviews and focus groups between November 2015 and January 2016, this study aims to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of immigrant–native/citizen relations. The article demonstrates the importance of trade unions and works councils in the integration of immigrants and stresses the adverse outcomes of trade unions' persistence to maintain their 'German, white and male' character. It also discusses how the internal polarisation among immigrants from Turkey affects workplace level relations. Based on the experiences of Turkey-origin immigrant workers, whose history of immigration to Western Europe spans nearly 60 years, the research focuses on the role of social organisations for the representation and participation of immigrants within the democratic system alongside natives/citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically investigates the association between codetermination on the audit committee (AC) and audit quality. Using a sample of 655 firm‐year observations related to German CDAX companies, our results indicate that the presence of employee representatives on the AC is negatively associated with audit quality. This negative association can also be observed for the percentage of employee representatives serving on the AC. However, our analyses show that the mentioned findings turn insignificant when employee representatives have accounting expertise. In addition, the type of employee representatives seems to influence audit quality differently: our findings turn insignificant for employee representatives who are classified as company outsiders and, thus, expected to be more independent. These findings highlight the importance of accounting expertise and independence for AC members' monitoring effectiveness. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that analyses the impact of codetermination on the AC on audit quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this comparative case study is to understand codetermination in two family firms. Thereby, this study aims at exploring the role of employee-representatives in two non-listed family businesses. Empirically, this study draws on an interpretive case study of two family businesses. Its findings extend earlier research, by exploring and introducing the phenomenon of codetermination in the family business literature. Codetermination is explored with the perspective of paternalism as analytical lens. Theoretically, the study draws on the control-collaboration paradox which helps understanding the phenomenon of codetermination. The study reveals different types of codetermination, i.e., the works council and the board of directors. The implications of these types are highlighted and discussed. Findings highlight the need for professional governance structures in order to facilitate cooperation between family owners, the management, and employee representatives. Professional governance allows handling the paternalistic ideological underpinnings which can otherwise prevent continued firm success, leading to unsolved conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Workplace democracy is often defined, and has recently been defended, as a form of intra-firm governance in which workers have control rights over management with no ownership requirement on their part. Using the normative tools of republican political theory, the paper examines bargaining power disparities and moral hazard problems resulting from the allocation of control rights and ownership to different groups within democratic firms, with a particular reference to the European codetermination system. With various qualifications related to potentially mitigating factors, such as workforce and shareholder composition or risk aversion and reallocation, the paper contends that forms of workplace democracy in which workers control and own the firm, such as cooperativism, are preferable to other forms, such as codetermination, in which ownership and control rights are formally separated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Balkan & Near Eastern Journal of Social Sciences (BNEJSS) is the property of Balkan & Near Eastern Journal of Social Sciences (BNEJSS) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Members of company boards in Scandinavia are legally obliged to act in accordance with the interests of the company. How to interpret this obligation has been on the agenda ever since the employees were given the right to elect their own board members in the early 1970s. This article, based on data from a European survey among board-level employee representatives (BLERsi), compares Swedish and Norwegian BLERs and asks whether the conflict between the company's interests and the employees' interests (still) constitutes a predicament? The analysis indicates that this alleged conflict belongs to the initial debate and that it is less relevant to the current BLERs. The differing election principles in Sweden (BLERs are appointed by the local trade unions) and Norway (BLERs are elected by all the employees in the company) do not alter this conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay makes the case for combining the study of official integrity with consideration of governance integrity based on democratic values. Our focus is on the relatively unexplored administrative mechanisms used by public and private organizations to ensure appropriate workplace conduct. We call these mechanisms, ethics management strategies (EMS). We emphasize the importance of understanding the strategies used by market and state organizations to render account within a given organization and between that organization and the larger society. Our particular focus is on the degree to which a given EMS includes voice and participation by subadministrative organizational members in the identification and enforcement of ethical standards that are used to guide behavior within the organization and between the organization and the larger society. Put differently, we are interested in the degree of ethical co-determination in governance institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether parity codetermination at German supervisory boards improves labor investment efficiency at firm level. We focus on labor, as it is an important production factor. Labor investment decisions are not easily reversible in the short term, given that hiring and firing costs are usually quite high due to labor regulation in Germany. As labor representatives are legally entitled to 50% voting rights at the supervisory board level (parity codetermination), we expect them to contribute insider knowledge to the supervisory board. As they have access to internal documents, we also expect them to reduce information asymmetry and potential agency conflicts between management on the one hand and outsiders such as investors or capital suppliers on the other. Both smaller information asymmetries and reduced agency conflicts, in turn, ought to increase a firm's labor investment efficiency. Labor investment proxies for deviations from a firm's optimal level of investment in labor in the form of over- and underinvestment, defined as hiring fewer employees than required to run profitable projects (underhiring) or retaining employees who are occupied with non-profitable projects (overhiring). We measure labor investment efficiency using such a net hiring optimum for a sample of German listed firms between 1995 and 2015. The results indicate that parity codetermination causes a lower deviation from the net hiring optimum. Our results are interesting for various stakeholders, especially for policymakers, managers, shareholders and employees who may not be aware of the importance of codetermination for firm efficiency, as well as for firms that are considering circumventing German legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are 'network depending' and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the relationship between board-level codetermination and corporate social responsibility in German companies, engaging with two distinct literatures. Most quantitative studies of codetermination focus on its economic impact, with little attention to other outcomes. Studies of corporate social responsibility rarely consider the role of worker representatives. Our new measure of the strength of codetermination, the Mitbestimmungsindex (MB-ix), shows a positive relationship with 'substantive' policies such as the adoption of targets for reducing pollution, but not with 'symbolic' policies, such as membership of the UN Global Compact. We therefore shed new light on the role of codetermination and provide a more differentiated view of the spread of what has been termed 'explicit' corporate social responsibility in Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wind turbines have been used by many groups of humans for many centuries. Wind turbines have allowed groups of humans to perform many different tasks in the past (grinding grain, pumping water, etc.). However, only a century and a half ago, they began to be used to convert the energy captured from wind into electric energy. Moreover, only approximately twenty-five years ago, we started to introduce on a massive scale the energy generated from wind turbines into the electric networks of most developed countries in the world for regular consumption. According to 2017 statistics, approximately 12 percent of the electric energy consumed in the EU is produced by wind turbines. Despite the fact that wind turbines generally appear quite similar externally--i.e., a three-blade structure, a nacelle, a tower, etc.--if we carefully examine the electric technology used within them, we find quite a wide range of technologies for energy conversion, which is a key issue in wind turbine technology. Hence, this paper adopts a dialectic perspective towards analyzing and understanding why several electric technologies coexist in wind turbine technology. We explain the specific factors that have influenced different wind turbine manufacturers to adopt different electric technologies across the last twenty-five years. We show how their actions and the technological directions that have followed have been mutually codetermined, resulting in a technological evolution that has produced today's wind turbine variety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Industrielle Beziehungen is the property of Rainer Hampp Verlag and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)