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The world depends on the Suez Canal for ocean trade, and the United States maintains a presence in the Red Sea region to ensure open waters around the Cape of Hope. During Yemen's ongoing civil war, the Houthi movement has targeted the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, including U.S. Navy ships. This thesis explores whether the threat to the U.S. Navy and partners has increased and whether, as a result, CENTCOM's strategy needs to change to protect U.S. interests. The thesis examines U.S. grand strategy, CENTCOM strategy, the rise of the Houthi movement and its support from Iran, and the attacks on U.S. and partner ships. As the humanitarian crisis in Yemen worsens, this thesis finds that the maritime threat has also increased, creating a threat to both U.S. interests and global trade. U.S. leadership must consider a revised response., http://archive.org/details/insurgencyinyeme1094561208, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This is a critical time for U.S. efforts in the war in Afghanistan. In his 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama announced that the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan would draw down by an additional 34,000 troops, to about 33,000, by February 2014, and that by the end of 2014 our war in Afghanistan will be over. Further decision-making regarding the U.S. force presence in Afghanistan, including after the end of NATO s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission at the end of 2014, is expected later this year. Yet while troop levels tend to steal the headlines, far more fundamentally at stake is what it would take to ensure the long-term protection of U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Arguably, the United States may have a number of different interests at stake in the region: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremists; preventing nuclear proliferation; preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states; standing up for American values, including basic human rights and the protection of women; and preserving the United States ability to exercise leadership on the world stage. At issue is the relative priority of these interests, what it would take in practice to ensure that they are protected, and their relative importance compared to other compelling security concerns around the globe. U.S. efforts in Afghanistan include an array of activities: prosecuting the fight on the ground, in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to counter the insurgency; supporting Afghanistan s political process, including the presidential elections scheduled to be held in April 2014; providing assistance to help Afghans craft and grow a viable economy; and facilitating Afghan-led efforts to achieve a high-level political settlement with the Taliban., CRS Report for Congress.

U.S. military doctrine defines operational art within the domain of conventional warfare. This monograph evolves the conventional understanding of operational art into the domain of irregular warfare. Al Qaeda in Iraq, as led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, orchestrated seemingly disjointed attacks against random targets from 2004 to 2006. This monograph determines that Zarqawi employed a unique form of operational art through deliberately planned and synchronized attacks to achieve a specific aim. The monograph derives the irregular warfare operational art definition and appropriate characteristics from an analysis of authoritative authors' works and published military doctrine on conventional operational art. The derived characteristics are used to evaluate the strategic, operational, and tactical influences of Zarqawi's organization, plans, and tactics. This examination illustrates how the leader of a terrorist organization sought to synchronize operations in time, space, and purpose to combat a superior force and achieve a strategic aim. The monograph concludes that Zarqawi did employ a form of operational art against U.S. forces, Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and the Iraqi population from 2004 to 2006., The original document contains color images.

Coalitions are the norm in today's global theatre of operations with future operations regularly consisting of multiple branches of military service, government and non-government agencies, and nations. Several decades of research have led to the identification of dimensions of culture that shape behaviour in both civilian and military settings. Depending upon the situation that a coalition team encounters, any cultural perspective could be useful. Needed are models, methods, and tools that support rapid development of effective teams comprised of individuals that: a) Understand their own culturally based biases and predisposition to action; b) Recognize the need to adapt to cultural diversity; c) Understand how to adapt; and importantly d) Choose to adapt. To address these requirements, an international team of military research scientists collaborated to study operational-level military teamwork. Field data were collected via questionnaires, observation, and semistructured interviews on the impact of culture, organization, language, and other individual and group difference on teamwork at two Command Post Exercises in Italy and Portugal and at Allied Command Transformation HQ in USA. National resources were utilized in a complex, multinational, distributed team laboratory experiment investigating information sharing, situation awareness, and performance on multinational teams. Findings from these activities are reported., Findings of Task Group HFM-138. The original document contains color images.

For at least 50 years, many American politicians, scholars, and observers of European affairs have complained about perceived inequitable burdensharing in NATO. If only the United States would withdraw its military forces from Europe, our European allies would pick up the slack and start paying more for their own defense. The decision to station U.S. forces in Europe during peacetime was in substance and style a major commitment to European defense. By the Vietnam era though, as American commitments in Southeast Asia grew significantly, in part at the expense of commitments in Europe, many in the United States became critical of Europe's perceived unwillingness to shoulder more of the defense burden in Europe. Since then, similar burdensharing complaints have been lodged against America's closest allies, with most arguing that the United States ought to use the withdrawal of its forward-based forces as a political tool to compel greater defense spending on the part of European NATO members. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the American military presence in Europe has dramatically downsized, from a high point of over a quarter-million Soldiers down to roughly 42,000 today. Ironically though, European defense spending has actually fallen for the most part during the same period. The author argues that the primary purpose of U.S. forces in Europe today is to build interoperability and military capability within and among America's most capable and most likely future coalition partners through security cooperation activities like exercises and training events. This shift in purpose means that U.S. force presence in Europe is no longer a useful tool in extracting a greater commitment to increased defense spending on the part of America's European allies. Nonetheless, through security cooperation, America's forward-based military forces in Europe play a critical role today in shaping the capabilities of allied military forces.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the effect that military interventions have on the outcome of an internal conflict. The monograph employs quantitative analysis to examine interventions on the side of the government by unitary actors and coalitions. Additionally, qualitative analysis in the form of case studies was performed on United Nations Operations in the Congo in 1960-1965 and the United Nations Protection Force mission to Bosnia in 1991-1995. The statistical analysis shows that intervention on the side of the government during stability operations has no effect on the outcome of the conflict. This lack of effect holds for unilateral and multinational interventions. The case studies highlight how various factors, to include a lack of resources, command and control deficiencies, and differing views on the role of force, affect operational effectiveness., The original document contains color images.

This monograph asserts that an officer professional development model that emphasizes postgraduate education and broadening assignments best prepares officers for service in multinational organizations. A review of the literature shows that existing research primarily focuses on officer development for service in the U.S. joint arena or for service as a strategic leader, and not so much for service in multinational organizations. A brief synopsis of the history of officer professional development, beginning with the developments that occurred following the Spanish-American War and concluding with the official Army boards that followed World War II, establishes the ever-changing environment that is U.S. officer development. This is an important section because it establishes a baseline understanding of officer development in the 20th century, and it provides background perspective concerning the careers of the officers discussed in the case studies that follow. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) is the senior U.S. military officer serving in NATO and represents what multinational service should ideally resemble. To provide the evidence needed to support the monograph's thesis, the careers of several successful officers were examined. The data generated by considering how the variables of education, developmental assignments, executive-level assignments, and relationships prepared them for multinational service enabled a subjective assessment of their careers and the elements that shaped them. Lastly, a comparison of the officers made it possible to make recommendations as to which variables best prepared them for service as SACEUR, and therefore for service in a multinational organization. The conclusion provides a brief assessment of the U.S. Army's professional development methodology for the 21st century with recommendations on how to improve it so that future generations of officers are best prepared for service in multinational organizations., The original document contains color images.

The Cultural Geography (CG) Model is a low-resolution, agent-based discrete event social simulation tailored to specific operational environments. It is based on doctrine and social theory that are designed to represent the behavioral response of civilian populations in conflict environments. The current version of the CG Model does not represent key leader engagements (KLEs), which are activities between coalition military forces and host nation civilian personnel as means of obtaining information, influencing behavior, and building an indigenous base of support for coalition and government objectives. These capabilities are needed for additional tactical-level representation of the operational environment. This research develops a simulation model using Simkit to explore the feasibility of modeling KLEs using discrete event simulation. A total of 32 dynamic input factors are varied using a 512-design point design. Second-order regression metamodels and partition tree models are developed for simulation model output responses that track numbers of engagements, numbers of times knowledge is provided, numbers of campaigns, and numbers of captures and kills. These analytical models are used to verify the proper execution of the simulation model. Summary statistics are analyzed to gain further insights about the simulation model's behavior.

Current U.S. military strategy and the global security environment make coalition warfare and multinational operations fundamental features of the U.S. national security strategy. Coalitions provide a broad base of technological, operational, and logistical support for military operations and ease the U.S. financial and manpower burdens associated with meeting military goals and objectives. U.S. strategic guidance confirms that coalitions and relationships with international partners are high priorities for the nation and the Department of Defense. The 2010 National Security Strategy recognized that alliances and multinational operations are force multipliers. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance reiterates the DoD s preference for conducting operations with allied and coalition forces whenever possible.

Presented at the 2011 Military Health System Conference, held on January 24-27, 2011, in National Harbor, MD.

Decision makers in command and intelligence centers need better methods of dealing with deceptive information before it influences and degrades the outcome of command decisions. Deception poses unique threats to coalitions that are less likely to occur with individual forces. The organization of this paper is as follows: Section II outlines an ontology of deception; Section III describes deception theory and presents common deception themes; Section IV explores cognition and the use of heuristics; Section V describes a high-level deception-detection model called the Preparation, Deception, and Reaction (PDR) model; Section VI presents some observations and hypotheses; Section VII discusses the importance of deception detection in coalition command and intelligence centers, and provides some examples of practical use of the PDR model; Section VIII discusses group bias and detection challenges; Section IX considers deception detection with regard to group membership; Section X describes the larger infrastructure necessary to support the use of the PDR model, specifically an open-systems environment supported by a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA); and Section XI suggests directions for future research in this area. The presentation includes briefing charts., Presented at the International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS 2011) (16th) held in Quebec City, Canada, on 21-23 June 2011. Published in the Proceedings of the 16th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, June 2011.

A central question in intrastate conflicts is how insurgents are able to mobilize supporters to participate in violent and risky activities. A common explanation is that violence committed by counterinsurgent forces mobilizes certain segments of the population through a range of mechanisms. We study the effects of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan to quantify the effect of such casualties on subsequent insurgent violence. By comparing uniquely detailed micro-data along temporal, spatial, and gender dimensions we can distinguish short-run information and capacity effects from the longer run propaganda and revenge effects. In Afghanistan we find strong evidence that local exposure to civilian casualties caused by international forces leads to increased insurgent violence over the long-run, what we term the revenge effect. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average-sized district in the following 6 weeks and lead to increased violence over the next 6 months. There is no evidence that out-of-area events (e.g., errant air strikes) lead to increased violence, nor is there evidence of short-run effects, thus ruling out the propaganda, information, and capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting that the constraints on insurgent production of violence may be quite conflict-specific. Our results imply that minimizing harm to civilians may indeed help counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan to reduce insurgent recruitment.

It is the frequent experience of coalition forces in southern Afghanistan that security precedes development. Nonetheless, the debate between security and development has become akin to the chicken or the egg debate. It is time to unscramble this puzzle. Persistent security must be established before development can begin. Insightful strategists understand that while some stratagems are timeless, others are not. Some apply to all situations; some do not. In the case of southern Afghanistan, where there are areas with substantial numbers of enemy fighters ideologically determined to return the Taliban to power, it will take far more than the promise of development projects to effect their return to civil society and their reconciliation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The following process advocates persistent security, followed by stabilization, followed by development. However, while persistent security precedes development, a good counterinsurgent plans for development and all other lines of operations throughout the process. Furthermore, development can actually improve security, but this happens only if persistent security is first established., Published in Military Review, p67-75, Jul-Aug 2010.

Leadership training of the military commanders of today is outdated and in need of rejuvenation. The training concentrates on the issues associated with commanding troops from one's own country or state. The problem has arisen that, for the near future, fighting will be with a coalition of like-minded forces. Command of a coalition requires additional personal traits that are neither well-understood nor developed routinely in commanders today. A comparative analysis of three historical coalition commands identified three required traits. First, the ability to understand the differences among partners in a coalition. Second, the ability to communicate intentions, concepts, and requirements effectively. And third, the ability of a commander to think critically about information presented to him or her. The development of these personal traits will enhance Commanders' ability to conduct coalition operations successfully. The development process should begin with junior officers., The original document contains color images.

In recent years the contemporary operational environment (COE) has increasingly included multinational operations, which have fault lines in understanding and visualizing the common operational picture (COP). Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) must be properly planned, released, and executed for multinational operations to be effective. This requires effective stewardship of GEOINT, wherein all participants are charged with the responsibility to properly develop, utilize, and safeguard GEOINT -- including its people, property, and financial assets -- to maximize its effectiveness for GEOINT cells and commanders. GEOINT stewardship is not tied to a specific systems architecture. The GEOINT cell is therefore able to adjust to the evolving character of conflict to better frame the problem. GEOINT stewardship enables users to apply critical and creative visualization to situational understanding, and provide context and orientation to solve ill-structured problems. The GEOINT cell must train and exercise this stewardship through a shared vision that will enhance its capability to effectively address multinational GEOINT requirements, focus internal and external research and development efforts, pursue economies in acquisition, and develop approaches to improve information sharing. The primary research question for this thesis is as follows: How can geospatial intelligence for multinational operations be made more effective? To address the primary research question, the following secondary questions must be answered: (1) How does GEOINT support decision makers in the contemporary operational environment?, (2) What are the capabilities and limitations of GEOINT cells in providing understanding and visualization of the common operational picture?, and (3) Is GEOINT cell stewardship understood and practiced in multinational operations?

Lessons learned from numerous recent humanitarian relief operations emphasized the need for a multinational operational level logistics guide which describes how the military synchronizes planning and execution of logistics within a civilian led comprehensive approach. In Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5) the Logistics Focus Area sought to develop such a guide, which would clearly describe the environment, and possible supporting processes, organizations and tools in which military logisticians may find themselves while participating in future operations.

The Problem Statement for this briefing addresses the following issues: *Information about Enemy Courses of Action (ECOAs) must be shared by coalition forces. *Potentially, a shared representational language for describing ECOAs is needed that can be used with C4 systems. *The standard exchange language for sharing such information among NATO forces today is the Joint Command, Control, and Consultation Information Exchange Data Mode (JC3IEDM). *In this paper we explore the formal representational requirements for describing ECOAs and evaluate the effectiveness of JC3IEDM for this purpose. *In previous work, we have automatically translated JC3IEDM into OWL (a computationally tractable W3C logical representation that supports ontological reasoning). Aim is to investigate potential for reasoning about ECOAs automatically in C4 systems. Associated with each ECOA, there is (are): *Situation template which normally consists of a Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay, depicting the operational environment, together with a doctrinal template or model that shows how the enemy would be expected to act in that environment. *Time Phase Lines (TPLs) are placed on the situation template to depict the expected progress of enemy force movements (such as D+1, D+2, etc.). *A Situation Matrix that depicts the expected progress of enemy activity across time in a spreadsheet format may also be used, especially in land-centric operations. *An ECOA Narrative Description accompanies the situation template and usually addresses the earliest time the ECOA could be executed, location of the main effort, supporting operations, time, and phase lines. *Decision Points: critical decisions that the enemy commander must make during implementation of the ECOA are described in terms of their location and space as decision points. *High Value Target list. Normally at least three ECOAs are briefed: two most likely ECOAs and one most dangerous., Presented at the ICCRTS '09, International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (14th) held in Washington, DC on 15-17 Jun 2009. The original document contains color images.

Communications, electronics, and sensor systems aboard U.S. naval ships and submarines must operate effectively in order to support the execution of military missions and operations. Whether operating alone or with coalition forces, the Navy must be prepared to execute its missions anywhere in the world and under any condition. We must also be prepared to operate effectively throughout the entire frequency spectrum. As such, the Navy's systems must operate and interoperate safely and effectively without interfering with or degrading the system performance of other systems aboard ship. It is also necessary that U.S. systems do not impact, or be impacted by, other coalition or adversary systems operating in the same electromagnetic environment. This issue of The Leading Edge, sponsored by the NAVSEA Warfare Centers, is dedicated to the critically important area of electromagnetic environmental effects, otherwise referred to as E3. It is an area that touches all naval operations -- afloat and ashore, and all spectrums of conflict. So, whether the Navy's actions involve combating traditional adversaries, countering terrorism, thwarting pirates, responding to natural disasters, or supporting humanitarian operations, the Navy's systems must operate effectively and reliably in the electromagnetic environment in order for its missions to succeed. Ensuring that the Navy's missions succeed underlies one of the NAVSEA Warfare Centers' most important roles., Published in LeadingEdge, v7 i1, 2009.

The increasingly complex environment of the 21st century demands unprecedented knowledge, skills and abilities for people from all walks of life. One powerful solution that blends the science of learning with the technological advances of computing is Virtual Environments. In the United States alone, the Department of Defense has invested billions of dollars over the past decade to make this field and its developments as effective as possible. This 3-volume work provides comprehensive coverage of the many different domains that must be integrated for Virtual Environments to fully provide effective training and education. Vol 3, Chapter 36, discusses a vision for the future which emphasizes the capabilities of operators, not simply the hardware that confines them. Future Air Force training will be driven by expected operational requirements involving personnel extensively connection to their weapons systems, other operators, and coalition forces in a global environment. The authors discuss live, virtual, and constructive entities., Published in The PSI Handbook of Virtual Environments for Training and Education: Developments for the Military and Beyond, v3, n36, p392-398: Integrated Systems, Training, Evaluations, and Future Directions, Chapter 36, Future Air Force Training

The United States and its coalition partners commenced combat operations in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility in October 2001 with the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom. Today, well into the seventh year of operations, over 180,000 U.S. and 39,000 coalition troops from 68 nations remain engaged in security and stability operations as participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) in Iraq, Operation Enduring Freedom, the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. This multinational contingent is the primary instrument USCENTCOM uses to carry out its stated mission of working with national and international partners to promote development and cooperation among nations, respond to crises, and deter or defeat state and transnational aggression in order to establish regional security and stability., Published in Joint Force Quartertly (JFQ), n50 p92-97, 3rd quarter 2008.

Military and humanitarian missions increasingly involve forces allied in a coalition. Real-time information exchange is indisputably a critical aspect required for the success of these missions. The rising challenge is the selection and control of the content shared with coalition partners. Which coalition partner needs to be included in operational information? How is it assured that in a changing situation all affected partners are alerted? Currently, this management of information exchange is accomplished by Information Management Officers (IMO), who manually sift through all incoming operational data. The information base, however, has increased over time to the point that the IMO is being overloaded. The Coalition Secure Management and Operations System (COSMOS) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) was designed to help assist in the process of managing coalition information exchange and interoperability. Through the use of an ontology driven architecture, COSMOS is able to represent operational data with meaningful relationships and thus allows intelligent, autonomous software agents to reason about the needs of information exchange and assist the IMO in the decision making process. This information sharing is accomplished through the use of role-based Information Exchange Requirements (IER) which are individually assigned by the IMO and are specific to the roles played by each coalition member within the context of the overall mission. Agents, intelligent expert system software modules, are utilized to assist in the process of managing IER assignment and the assessment of information against the criteria which formalize the IER definition. It is through this process that information exchange is targeted to the coalition force components that have a specific requirement for information pertaining to their assigned roles., The content of this paper was written under the auspices of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) for the Coalition Secure Management and Operations (COSMOS). Presented at AFCEA-GMU C4I Center Symposium: "Critical Issues In C4I" at George Mason University, Fairfax, VA on 20-21 May 2008. The original document contains color images.

Totalitarian Islamist Groups have determined that the United States' center of gravity is the international political will of allied nations, and they have created a strategy to attack it. The 2004 bombings in Madrid, Spain marked a milestone in totalitarian Islamist strategy. This attack, which occurred days before a pivotal election between parties for and against participation in the Iraqi War, resulted in a surprising victory for the anti-war party and a hasty departure of Spanish forces. This single incident also sparked the withdrawal of military forces from three other countries. The terrorists' strategy of breaking apart a U.S.-led coalition does more than remove allied military forces; it attacks directly at the United States' center of gravity in foreign operations: international political will. The success of this strategy, and its effects on the cohesiveness of U.S.-led coalitions against totalitarian Islamists, was a serious blow to the moral legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy. The Madrid bombings and other examples of threats and coercion against U.S. allies calls into question the strategic value the United States places on coalition maintenance. Although the totalitarian Islamists have found success in their strategy of weakening U.S.-led coalitions, their efforts have been equally unsuccessful in breaking allied will. Overall, totalitarian Islamist Groups have enjoyed mixed success in removing U.S.-allies from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The United States has invested tremendous effort to improve its method for conducting security, stability, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. However, it is clear that several shortfalls still exist particularly in coalition actions. Current operations have proven that this is especially the case when the overall command structure resides in a multinational governing body, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper describes how the United States arrived at its current strategy with respect to SSTR operations within a multinational construct, followed by a discussion of current theater-strategic and operational level initiatives, including programs resident in the geographic combatant commands. Next, the analysis will describe the evolution and current application of NATO's comprehensive approach to operations, with a focus on notable limitations in Afghanistan and an assessment of the potential way ahead. Finally, this paper will offer recommendations to improve future operations in a multinational setting and suggest how to influence multinational operations not led by the United States, specifically the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan.

In the last five years, the United States invaded two countries and overthrew two ruling parties. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the so-called end of major combat operations came swiftly and decisively. In their wakes emerged resistances far more resolute than predicted, forcing coalition military commanders to shift from a conventional warfare doctrine to one better suited for fighting long wars against asymmetric enemies with extremist ideologies. But while religious extremism may typify the average insurgent, the biggest threat to American policy is not posed by the jihadist, who in most cases, lacks the ability to organize, effectively train and recruit forces (other than suicide bombers), and has no long-term strategy for generating resources, garnering public support, or achieving realistic strategic goals. The real hazard to American objectives in Southwest Asia comes from armed and active militias who, unlike most insurgents, have served as career soldiers, seized the support of their populace, and, in many cases, infiltrated national government institutions. Though a form of resistance, militiamen are far different in nature than insurgents or terrorists. In the long-term, militias are most damaging because they weaken government influence by providing unofficial (and effective) security in localized areas using illegal methods. Due to the support they receive from their constituents and the resultant political power they wield, militias can only be neutralized through state-sponsored Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives. By understanding the similarities and differences between militias and insurgents, noting the potential positives and negatives associated with militias, and applying lessons-learned from DDR-type programs recently employed in Afghanistan and Iraq, coalition forces can develop an effective counterstrategy for Iraq s militias., Published in the Journal of Paramaters, p55-71, May 2007.

Despite a considerable effort since Operation Desert Storm, the Services have yet to reduce the likelihood of mistargeting--the engagement of friendly forces and noncombatants by friendly fire. Mistargeting has always occurred but has historically received little scrutiny. The numbers of mistargeting casualties have gone down dramatically since World War II, but the rate has gone up. When tactical mistargeting occurs today, the effects can be enormous, particularly given modern global media. There are thousands of U.S. military entities that potentially require Combat identification (CID) as well as coalition partners and neutrals. CID of aircraft and ships has historically received proportionally more attention compared to ground units, which suffer the greatest cost of mistargeting. Despite impressive technological advances, there is currently no universal system for positive identification of friendly forces or hostile targets. U.S. and coalition forces are increasingly reliant on the accuracy of information to locate and positively identify targets. Aircraft are more dependent on external sources for precise targeting data, and weapons are increasingly being dropped "on coordinates" provided by off-board sensors and sources, increasing the risk of mistargeting. Modern precision weapon capabilities have outpaced the military's ability to differentiate positively between friend, neutral, and foe, and to locate desired targets precisely. A serious, long-term, joint approach to enabling aircrews to distinguish the enemy from friends and noncombatants is possible and must be pursued., The original document contains color images.

This assessment updates the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq entitled, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead; it has been prepared at the direction of the Director of National Intelligence in response to a request from the National Security Council. It provides the Intelligence Community's analysis of the status of the critical factors identified in the January Estimate that are driving Iraq's security and political trajectory. Using the January Estimate as a baseline, this update examines the prospects for progress on the security and national reconciliation fronts over the next six to 12 months. Analytic Caution: Driven largely by the accelerating pace of tribal engagement and the increasing tempo of Coalition operations, developments in Iraq are unfolding more rapidly and with greater complexity today than when we completed our January NIE. Regional variations in security and political circumstances are great and becoming increasingly more distinct, for example, intra-Shia violence in southern Iraq is very different from patterns of violence elsewhere. The intelligence assessments contained in this NIE largely focus on only a short period of the Iraqi conflict--the last six months--and in circumscribed areas--primarily the central provinces, which contain the center of gravity for Iraq's security prospects and in which we have a greater Coalition presence and therefore more information. The unfolding pace and scope of security and political realities in Iraq, combined with our necessarily limited focus of analysis, contain risks: our uncertainties are greater, and our future projections subject to greater chances of error.

Research brief summarizes an analysis of information derived from interviews with former senior Iraqi officials to determine factors contributing to the rapid collapse of Iraqi resistance to the Coalition invasion of Iraq in March and April 2003., Research Brief.

One of the tools available to the counterinsurgent when devising a campaign is the interdiction of the insurgent's movement of men, materiel, and money at the border. This thesis examines three case studies of border interdiction in insurgency: the French in Algeria from 1954 to 1962, the Rhodesian experience from 1965 to 1980, and the current Coalition experience in Iraq. In 1956, to counter insurgent infiltration of fighters and weapons, the French built the Morice Line, a barricade system built around an electronically charged fence. The Morice Line was remarkably effective in stopping insurgent infiltration. While the Rhodesians attempted similar border fortifications, they lacked the resources to successfully employ them. Instead, they found that employing highly mobile teams to track and kill insurgents was a more successful tactic, given their resource constraints. The U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq, after a slow start, employed small advisory teams to support Iraqi Security Forces working from border forts to secure Iraq's borders. The three case studies show that border interdiction is a relatively inexpensive component of a counterinsurgency campaign, but that it can be a vital component of that campaign if the counterinsurgent interdicts the right target (e.g., manpower, weapons, or funding)., The original document contains color images.

For over two years, the U.S. armed forces have focused on seeking ways to counter insurgent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Less attention has been paid to countering the mobilization process that produces the seemingly unending line of insurgents willing to (1) become suicide bomber (walking IEDs or WIEDs), (2) prepare the IEDs, and (3) fight street battles. The insurgents use the Internet's "cyber mobilization" potential to fuel and supply this line of volunteers. They have been particularly successful in recruiting volunteers from other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This success has forced coalition forces to continually react to the environment instead of controlling it., Published as a chapter in a three volume set, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, v1, p358-379, 30 Jun 2007.

"Shaping," in traditional U.S. military parlance, refers to battlefield activities designed to constrain adversary force options or increase friendly force options. Recent analysis of field requirements and joint urban doctrine has expanded the concept of shaping to include influencing resident populations in military operational theaters. These populations constitute a significant component of stability operations, particularly through their decision to support friendly force objectives or those of the adversary. Virtually every action, message, and decision of a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population: how coalition personnel treat civilians during cordon-and-search operations, the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment, and the treatment of detainees. Given the inherent difficulty in unifying coalition messages across disparate organizations and over time, shaping efforts must be designed, war-gamed, and conducted as a campaign. The goal of such a shaping campaign is to foster positive attitudes among the populace toward U.S. and allied forces. These attitudes help decrease anti-coalition behaviors and motivate the population to act in ways that facilitate friendly force operational objectives and the attainment of desired end states. This study considered how the United States and its coalition partners can shape indigenous attitudes and behavior during stability operations via the character of those operations and the behavior of coalition forces and those responsible for communication. While successes have been achieved in this regard, U.S. forces stand to benefit from the application of select, proven commercial marketing techniques. The authors consider successes and missteps from the marketing and advertising industries and how lessons from those events might assist the U.S. military. They also present recommendations based on observations and insights from previous operations, including ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan., ISBN 978-0-8330-4156-2

On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq. Since then, hostilities and death tolls continue to rise. Tensions between the once dominant Sunni minority and Shia majority also continue to escalate. This report lists significant recent events in Iraq. Sources include, but are not limited, to White House press releases, the U.S. Department of State, U.N. Secretary-General's statements, and major news stories. For analysis and further review of the current situation, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman. This report will be updated regularly., The original document contains color images. Congressional Report for Congress.

In November 2005, thirty one months after the end of major combat operations, the National Security Council published its National Strategy for Victory in Iraq outlining the United States broad strategy for assisting the Iraqi people to defeat the terrorists and build an inclusive democratic state. Although reconstruction efforts and financial investment on the political, security and economic tracks began well before the release of this document, our coalition continues to face significant challenges in improving Iraqi governance, infrastructure, public services, and security forces, even today. Recently, many civilian and military leaders have openly acknowledged a lack of synchronization in our Operation Iraqi Freedom Phase IV planning. Given these valid critiques of our efforts to-date, the purpose of this essay is to outline a way ahead for improving our future reconstruction efforts. This project will examine several means coalition forces are currently employing in Iraq to gain momentum in the reconstruction portion of our Clear-Hold-Build strategy. Research will identify disconnects between the ends, ways, and means of our national strategy, and recommendations will be outlined to adjust our current resources to improve the likelihood of achieving success in our reconstruction efforts.