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Since 2016, the EU has widely been considered to be in a state of 'polycrisis', where simultaneous, mutually reinforcing challenges threaten the Union's cohesion and legitimacy. Such polycrises may fracture Europe's political space, creating cross-cutting 'polycleavages' that polarise member states and their citizens asymmetrically, thereby constraining the EU's capacity to forge effective compromises on key policy issues. In so doing, they exacerbate the risk of the EU's falling into a multi-level 'politics trap', where negative politicisation of European issues inhibits national leaders from agreeing ambitious solutions in intergovernmental negotiations, while the ensuing deadlock in turn saps the Union's output-based legitimacy and fuels a Eurosceptic 'constraining dissensus'. In this introductory article, we develop an analytical framework elaborating the concepts of polycrises, polycleavages, and politics traps, which we then use to present and interpret the main findings of the contributions to this collection, focused on the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most important takeaway from the contributions to this collection is that – consistent with our framework – the EU has clearly proved more resilient to the potential negative consequences of politicisation than many commentators had expected at the beginning of this long polycrisis decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we conceptualise politicised integration at the global level? Functionalism and neo-functionalism are de-politicised, technocratic theories of integration dispensing with ideology and contestation, while post-functionalist approaches address politicisation but not supra-national integration. Drawing on comparative macro-historical theories, this article suggests a conceptualisation of politicised integration that extends exit–voice and political structuring models used at national and European levels to global integration. The replacement of territorial divisions with cleavages cutting across world regions – core–periphery and North–South divisions, civilisations and 'multiple modernities' – creates the conditions for cross-territorial dimensions of contestation, along which cross-regional membership groups link, coordinate and form bonds of solidarity. The de-territorialisation of global cleavages and the regional convergence it brings about, provide the social bases for mass politics rather than elitist policy integration. The conceptualisation of integration is political rather than technocratic, and one in which collective decision making is a matter of pluralist contestation rather than problem-solving expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the special issue recalls the alarm raised in EU capitals and Brussels after the UK's in-out referendum delivered a Leave vote in June 2016. The fear was of a domino effect and the further fragmentation of an already divided EU. Seven years later, it is clear that there was rapid attrition of Eurosceptic triumphalism, and the EU-27 showed remarkable unity. This required a sustained collective effort to contain a membership crisis and maintain the EU polity. Yet, the issue contributors challenge the notion that the alarm was unfounded and explain why this counter-factual did not materialise, even though potential for future membership crises of different sorts was revealed. Theoretically, this supports an understanding of the EU as a polity that is fragile, yet able to assert porous borders, exercise authority over a diverse membership, and mobilise a modicum of loyalty when the entire integration regime is under threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how political challengers articulate new political divides in European political party systems and with what implications for representative democracy. Focusing on the case of France and the discourse and practices of Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen, the paper identifies three strategies these actors have used to articulate a new political division beyond Left and Right: the discursive rejection of traditional Left/Right politics, the combination of elements from across the Left/Right divide and the identification of each other as opposite sides on a new cleavage. Our analysis also suggests that rather than addressing the democratic pathologies associated with the traditional Left/Right party system, this new divide has largely contributed to deepen them. Specifically, the new dichotomy carries risks in terms of representative deficits, electoral demobilisation and the further legitimation of illiberal politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which classes vote for radical-left parties (RLPs) in Western Europe? Previous research indicates that RLPs are strong among production workers and socio-cultural professionals, though not necessarily among both at the same time. Starting from the observation that these two classes take opposite stances on cultural issues, we trace variation in class voting back to RLPs' positions on the cultural dimension. Combining voter-level data from the European Social Survey (2002–2018) with information on the positions of 23 RLPs from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we report robust evidence of a libertarian versus authoritarian class trade-off: RLPs with less libertarian positions receive relatively less support from socio-cultural professionals and relatively more support from production workers. These findings add to evidence that class voting varies with party positions. Ours is the first study to demonstrate this for RLPs, showing how, in the early 21st century, cultural positions matter for class voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While scholars have relied on societal cleavages to explain the origins and evolution of party systems in Western democracies, drawing that link in Latin America and the Caribbean has been more challenging. Guyana is an exception to the norm. Its party system has aligned ethnically since independence in the 1960s. The People's National Congress mostly appeals to the Afro-Guyanese, and the People's Progressive Party largely draws support from the Indo-Guyanese. However, in recent decades, the country has experienced relevant demographic shifts that force a reconsideration of the predominance of ethno-racial traits as fuelling inter-party competition. We use the AmericasBarometer to examine the individual-level ethno-racial, ethno-religious, and ideological correlates of partisanship from 2010 to 2016. The results indicate that ethno-racial divisions have lost salience as ethno-religious features have become a more prevalent source of partisan attachments. We conclude that the correlates of partisanship in Guyana mirror its broader socio-demographic transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most significant changes in West European politics in the past 40 years is the emergence of the new cultural divide. However, there is substantial variation in how the issues comprising this new divide have manifested themselves in party systems. This raises the question of what mechanisms bring these issues into established party systems. The literature has so far focused on new political parties and critical junctures. This article argues that the left-right structure is a key condition for the integration of new political issues into party competition. Rather than seeing their integration as a matter of the emergence of a new, second conflict, it argues that new issues become central to party competition if the existing conflict structure presents established mainstream parties with vote-seeking or coalition-building incentives to focus on them. The article uses Ireland as a 'negative case study' to develop the argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party–group relations are today characterized by various forms of alignments. These include the persistence of traditional class alignments, the realignment of economic groups due to identity politics and alignments of groups at the centre of identity politics. This study analyses the group-based messaging of parties in relation to these three groups. We argue that, contrary to the catch-all party thesis, positive and negative group appeals of parties are (still) structured by parties' support among social groups and by groups either liked or disliked by their voters. Our argument is tested through a content analysis of election materials in Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, combined with survey data. The results indicate that group appeals are indeed shaped by electoral support among social groups and attitudes towards them. Results also suggest that the former effect is present for traditionally aligned economic and identity politics groups, but not for realigned economic groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses party positions on gender equality policies in Germany. While these policies have been intensively studied in various national contexts and for different parties, less is known to what extent these positions are explained by socio-cultural or socio-economic cleavages. Based on an original party expert survey, conducted in Germany in 2021, we demonstrate that the political space in Germany on gender equality policies is strongly structured along the GAL-TAN divide. We also show that the positions of moderate TAN parties differ most strongly regarding LGBTQI issues whilst GAL parties equally support women -related and LGBTQI-related issues. The Green party and the right-wing party AfD occupy the most consistent and salient but also outermost positions in the political space. Our study makes a substantial contribution to the analysis of gender equality policies and offers a systematic analysis of party positions in the realm of the cultural GAL-TAN cleavage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Parliamentary elections in 2020 brought new political parties in Croatia, but this now encompassed the whole political spectrum. Using survey data, the article aims to identify sources of electoral support for new parties and how they relate to traditional political cleavages. The article finds that voters of the new parties differ from voters of the old parties primarily in how they perceive politics, and are also younger. At the same time, voters of the new parties on the left and the right are very similar to voters of the old left and right parties, respectively, pointing to still dominant role of the cleavages based on relation to history, religion and tradition. In the second step, the analysis also includes non-voters and finds that voters of the new parties and abstainers are similar in how they see politics, but abstainers feel much less confident about their ability to influence political events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study addresses the longstanding instability of the Georgian party-political scene, which has significantly shaped the nation's electoral dynamics. This instability primarily arises from the organization of parties centered around the popularity of their leaders. Starting with Gamsakhurdia and further strengthened by Shevardnadze and Saakashvili, this trend has begun to wane in the last decade. The consequences of this unstable system, established in the 1990s, are still evident, with Georgian elections often swayed by economic-populist projects led by charismatic leaders. Focusing specifically on Javakheti, this research examines how the Armenian minority's loyalty to the ruling party can be attributed to the party's charismatic leadership and connections with elites in Tbilisi. However, election results indicate a declining support for the ruling party in this region, reflecting a shift in political culture. The study explores the internal structure of voting behavior in Javakheti and highlights the influence of ethnic differences on political preferences. The conclusions drawn provide insights into the social control exercised by patrons, the dynamics of group versus individual rational choice, the impact of ethnic homogeneity and settlement concentration, the spatial influence on politics, and the legal framework governing the political mobilization of the ethnic minority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The politics of representation has become increasingly complex in recent years. Amid weakening traditional political cleavages, the emergence of new political divides and mounting anti‐elitism that have helped the rise of radical populist parties, voters face significant cross‐pressures when casting their ballots. Despite a wealth of studies on the role of issue preferences in voting behaviour, there are still many unknowns when it comes to understanding how voters trade off competing issue preferences against each other. Studying issue trade‐offs is also important against the backdrop of the well‐documented preferences of radical left and right voters for redistribution and restrictive immigration policies, respectively. To investigate the strength of issue preferences among radical left, radical right and mainstream party voters and the willingness to compromise on their most important issues, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with 2,000 participants in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The voting scenario in the experiment featured proposals on salient political issues and different (non)populist stances on political representation. The results from the cross‐country study, as well as a large replication study with a sample of 4,000 German respondents, show that voters of radical right parties are willing to accept large trade‐offs regarding their other issue preferences as long as their preference for restrictive immigration policies is fulfilled. Differently, radical left, Green and mainstream party voters have a more variegated range of issue preferences, some of them so strong that they are not traded off for their preferred redistribution and European Union integration positions, respectively. The findings shed light on trade‐offs related to emerging issues such as climate change and the distinct logics behind support for radical parties. They also have implications for the electoral prospects of mainstream and radical parties when trying to reposition themselves in the diversifying issue space of contemporary democracies. As such, understanding how voters navigate issue cross‐pressures helps to explain the broader dynamics that are (re)configuring political conflict and voting behaviour in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the problem of discursive (re)production of social cleavages in the politics of divided societies. Through the discourse analysis of communication of a wide variety of political parties, politicians, and actors during the 2019 parliamentary election in Ukraine, we supplement and clarify the theory of cleavages in its application to Ukraine and similar societies with deep division and armed conflict. The results show that cleavages are (re)produced in different ways in the discourses during the 2019 Ukrainian parliamentary elections. The sharp cleavages are articulated in a simplified form, while the fundamental cleavages are masked by discursive means, which, overall, blocks the overcoming of fundamental cleavages. Our results indicate that it is necessary to supplement the theory of cleavages with discursive components of separation and distinguishing between instrumental and fundamental cleavages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why were Christian democratic unions (CDUs) among workers and farmers more proactive in some Western European states than in others? Marxist theories explain union activity by industrialization. However, CDUs were not the most active in the late 19th century in rapidly industrializing states, e.g., Italy and Germany. Using social identity theory and Lipset’s Rokkan’s cleavage theory, this paper conducts process tracing on the German, French, Italian, Dutch, and Belgian cases to test the following argument: CDUs were more likely to develop in states where anticlerical attacks unleashed a center-periphery conflict. CDUs are less likely to expand in states where anticlerical attacks precipitated a church-state conflict. The presence of a Catholic minority moderated this relationship. In the Protestant-dominant states, Catholicism allowed for mobilizing individuals and maintaining cohesion. The Lutheran states’ hostility toward Catholic activism and the regional concentration of the minority accentuated this denominational difference, which catalyzed CDU development.

To explain political divisions within British society, the current scholarship highlights the importance of the 'winners' and 'left‐behind' of political economic transformations. Yet, the impact of widespread absolute intergenerational social mobility in the past half century, which resulted in socio‐economic gains or losses for many, has not been systematically addressed. Our paper assesses how intergenerationally mobile voters' positions in the Brexit referendum differ from their non‐mobile counterparts. We differentiate between the effects of social origins, social mobility and destination position. To do so, we model data from Understanding Society with a diagonal reference model. We show that origins are nearly as important as current socio‐economic positions for predicting the probability of voting to 'leave' or 'remain' in the Brexit referendum. We find that a first‐generation graduate would be up to 10 percentage points less likely to vote 'Remain' than a graduate whose parents also went to university. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As European integration has become politicised over the last several decades, scholars have paid keen attention to the role of identity in shaping political conflicts and contestation in Europe. This article investigates the microfoundation of the political divide over European integration by building on and extending theories of social identity and recent studies on affective polarisation. Large-scale survey experiment data from 25 European Union member states are analysed to explore the extent of divides over European integration. This analysis shows a statistically significant and substantively large magnitude of the divide based on European identity. Moreover, results show that this divide over European integration deserves particular attention as it is largely driven by out-group animosity, rather than in-group favouritism. Lastly, results show that electoral context, such as electoral salience, involvement in elections, elite polarisation, and the strength of Eurosceptic parties, influences the intensity of the European divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Polarisation over cultural issues and the emergence of radical, often populist, challenger parties indicate a fundamental restructuring of political conflict in Western Europe. The emerging divide crosscuts and, in part, reshapes older cleavages. This special issue introduction highlights how the transformation of cleavage structures relates to the dynamics of polarisation and political participation. The contributions to the special issue innovate in two ways. First, they adapt concepts and measures of ideological and affective polarisation to the context of Europe's multi-party and multi-dimensional party competition. Second, they emphasise electoral and protest politics, examining how ideological and affective polarisation shape electoral and non-electoral participation. Apart from introducing the contributions, the introduction combines different datasets – the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the European Social Survey – to sketch an empirical picture of differentiated polarisation with types of polarisation only weakly associated cross-arena, cross-nationally and over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article demonstrates that deindustrialization increases ethnonational mobilization. We maintain that levels of mobilization of ethnonational movements are to an important extent a residual to the class cleavage, that is, to the degree the class conflict dominates political competition. Since in the context of Western Europe industrialism is the main force behind the class cleavage, deindustrialization weakens this cleavage and allows instead for mobilization along ethnonational divisions. In order to empirically test our argument, we analyze levels of electoral mobilization of ethnonational party blocs among 15 Western European minorities between 1918 and 2018. Our analysis clearly reveals that levels of industrialization are negatively related to ethnonational mobilization. However, this is only true for regions with historically high levels of industrialization and if the ethnonational movement is unified. The article contributes to the comparative literature on the electoral performance of ethnonational parties and the literature on deindustrialization and nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A burgeoning literature documents the emergence of a new globalization cleavage in Western Europe, centered around the issues of immigration and European integration. We investigate to what extent the globalization cleavage has crystallized by studying the alignment of preferences regarding open borders, their connection to more fundamental elements in the normative component of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, and the extent to which this links up to the organizational component through party choice. To do this, we use innovative items tapping into political priorities, values, understandings of democracy, and virtues in a cross-sectional comparative survey in Norway and the UK. We find that the globalization cleavage is significantly more developed in the UK than in Norway but lacks a solidified normative component in both. This implies that considerable opportunities remain for ideological entrepreneurs to either fortify or dilute this cleavage, even in the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The kinematic characteristics of faults included in the structure of the active Katun Fault in Gorny Altai have been determined by methods of structural–paragenetic and cataclastic analysis of disjunctives (faults). It is proven that the Katun Fault is a strike-slip fault developing in different areas under transpressive or transtensional conditions. The most recent grabens along the Katun fault were formed under conditions of strike-slip displacements and locally manifested horizontal extension or extension with shear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social solidarity is the conscious and voluntary affinity between human beings that instills in them a sense of guaranteed mutual assistance. Israeli society has long been characterized as having a high level of national solidarity, especially in times of crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 put this notion to the test. The lack of agreement about fundamental norms of civil society in general and the nature of Israeli democracy in particular questioned the interdependence of its communities. This study examines the pandemic's effect on the sense of social solidarity in Israel. Using a quantitative approach and a representative sample of the adult population, the results show that the pandemic did affect the sense of solidarity. Moreover, taking into account long-standing religious and ideological cleavages in Israel, the pandemic exacerbated existing divisions among different groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, academic literature has stressed the declining importance of social class and religion as determinants of vote. In particular, many scholars have found that the working-class vote is no longer mostly addressed to socialist parties, whereas religious people still massively support confessional and conservative parties. This article explores the actual resilience of the two cleavages with particular attention to the relationship between religion and socialist parties. Our analysis, based on European Social Survey (ESS) data covering 13 West European countries in the period 2002–2014, proves that 'a-religiosity' – negative attitudes towards religion – has overcome social class as the determinant of a socialist vote, thanks to the emergence of a divisive ethical–moral agenda. This process is more visible in those countries where the Church and religious associations play an active role in the political arena and the ethical–moral issues have been politicized, as in Catholic and multi-faith countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Las elecciones presidenciales de México en 2018 produjeron la victoria inédita de un candidato ubicado a la izquierda del espectro ideológico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Dicho triunfo modificó la configuración del sistema de partidos con la entrada de una nueva fuerza política al gobierno, Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena). En este contexto, la investigación tiene como objetivo evaluar si este proceso electoral crítico de realineamiento electoral se relaciona con la activación de un clivaje étnico en la competencia electoral mexicana. Lo anterior se realiza con base en datos de encuesta destacando la autoadscripción étnica como variable independiente. El presente trabajo identifica aquellas dimensiones utilizadas en los estudios de comportamiento electoral, aportando evidencia sobre cómo la división política de carácter étnico forma parte de los factores estructurales para explicar el voto. Los principales resultados indican que, en estas elecciones, los votantes, autoidentificados como indígenas y mulatos, sufragaron significativamente más por el candidato ganador; mientras que aquellos autoidentificados como blancos dirigieron su voto predominantemente a los perdedores. Más que confirmar la hipotética existencia de un voto indígena, los resultados sugieren la activación de un voto étnico y regional, sumado al efecto de las posiciones ideológicas y los rendimientos del sistema político durante estas elecciones. / The presidential elections of 2018 in Mexico resulted in the victory of leftwing candidate Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador. This outcome changed the political landscape of the country with the rise of a new political force, the National Regeneration Movement (or Morena, in Spanish). This article explores whether or not this change is related to the political activation of an ethnic rift in the Mexican electoral process. It relies on databases and surveys which include ethnic self-identification as an independent variable. The article points several elements which are commonly used in electoral behavior research, and offers evidence which shows that political divisions of an ethnic character can partially explain voting patterns. We find that, during these elections, voters who self-identified as indigenous and mulattoes proportionally voted more for the winning candidate, while those who self-identified as white voted for others. Rather than proving the existence of a so called indigenous vote, these results point suggest the rise of ethnic and regional voting trends, along the effects of ideological positions and the pay-offs of the political structure.

Many Western countries have seen a pluralization and polarization of the political landscape in recent years. The resulting increase in diversity of political positions poses challenges to media that aim at providing citizens with orientation. Using Germany, Austria, and Switzerland as examples, the article analyzes how parties present themselves in the respective national parliament and how domestic media relay these utterances. The parties’ positions are examined via value frames that reflect three central cleavages of Western societies. The results show that parties express different combinations of posi-tions on these cleavages. Especially the cleavage related to globali-zation is clearly polarized, with right-wing populist parties at one end, conservative parties in a moderate place, and left-liberal parties at the other pole of the cleavage. Media reflect the parties’ positions mostly similarly to their own utterances in parliament. However, the right-wing populist parties are depicted in an even more polarized way compared to how they position themselves. The media thus fulfill their orientation function to different degrees across the party spectrum.

We examine the rise and mobilizational dynamics of social democracy, employing data reported by the Swedish authorities on the distribution of voting eligibility, turnout and partisan vote in local elections during the 1910s at a high level of disaggregation (by narrow income segments and administrative units). In line with the existing literature, we show that electoral socialism depended on both the extension of the suffrage to its 'natural' electorate, that is, the urban working class, and the organizational capacity of trade unions and other civic associations. In addition, we show that socialist support was not uniform within the working class – even for a highly homogeneous society. Instead, the social-democratic vote was initially stronger among low- to middle-income workers, only expanding to poor voters later in time. We complement our local data with an interwar panel analysis of socialist vote and post-war survey data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Relações Internacionais is the property of Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Electoral volatility is understood in the literature as a sign of political instability, weakening social cohesion and the declining influences of existing political parties which threatens the healthy functioning of representative democracy. In this paper, using the Pedersen Index we measure electoral volatility in Hungary at the settlement level between the last three parliamentary elections (2010, 2014 and 2018), with special attention to the geographical aspects of the phenomenon. According to our preliminary assumptions those social groups switch their votes frequently who are marginalised, therefore, the level of volatility may reflect peripheriality. Our results show that high volatility can be detected in the two opposite sides of the settlement hierarchy in Hungary: in bigger cities and smaller villages, but for very different reasons. This study gives evidence that electoral volatility can also be considered as a possible indicator in the delimitation and classification of peripheral areas and settlements. The paper aimed to contribute to the understanding of cleavage formation at the regional level by adding a spatial perspective while connecting the socioeconomic profile of the voting population and electoral volatility.

Repas végétariens, confessionnels, d’origine locale et/ou biologique, tarifs modulés, inscription des enfants de chômeurs… Les questions associées à la restauration scolaire sont devenues des enjeux de discorde accompagnant la politisation plus générale des questions d’alimentation depuis la fin des années 1990. Cet article étudie les formes de la politisation des cantines scolaires, autour de deux hypothèses principales. Premièrement, les enjeux de restauration scolaire seraient devenus plus visibles et plus conflictuels à l’échelle nationale parce qu’ils s’inscrivent dans les deux nouveaux clivages qui se sont développés au sein des systèmes politiques d’Europe de l’Ouest, entre identité et cosmopolitisme d’une part, et entre écologie et productivisme de l’autre. Deuxièmement, l’autonomie et la diversité des acteurs locaux dans la mise en oeuvre expliqueraient l’influence limitée et différenciée de cette politisation partisane nationale sur le débat public concernant la restauration scolaire à l’échelle locale. Pour confirmer ces hypothèses, nous analysons de manière quantitative (classification) et qualitative deux corpus de plus de 10 000 articles de presse consacrés à ce sujet, qui permettent de distinguer entre les arènes de politisation nationale et régionale; nous nous appuyons aussi sur cinq études de cas dans des communes rurales des deux départements, à partir de matériaux d’entretiens et d’observation. Ces données confirment l’hypothèse d’une politisation nationale passant par une augmentation de la visibilité et du conflit, ainsi que l’association aux nouveaux clivages, mais indiquent que les effets de cette politisation restent limités et différenciés à l’échelle locale.