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8 results on '"civil defense forces"'

1. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM AND PRO-GOVERNMENT MILITIAS: CASES FROM COLOMBIA AND PERU

Author

Darnton, Christopher N., Johnson, Thomas H., National Security Affairs (NSA), Althouse, Rachel M., Darnton, Christopher N., Johnson, Thomas H., National Security Affairs (NSA), and Althouse, Rachel M.

Abstract

States (principals) frequently employ pro-government militias (agents) in low intensity conflicts with mixed results. In some cases, principal and agent interests diverge or the principal loses control over its agent, which devolves into an autonomous terrorist, warlord, or criminal organization. Looking at historical cases of Latin American pro-government militias from Colombia (Self-Defense groups, Convivirs, and Hometown Soldiers) and Peru (Rondas Campesinas), I examined the principal-agent problem in the context of state-sponsored, pro-government militias and answered the following question: How do sponsor states succeed or fail in maintaining positive control and influence over pro-government militias? States fail when they grant too much autonomy and firepower to militias and succeed when they limit militias’ autonomy by subjecting them to a tailored combination of control mechanisms: monitoring, screening, sanctions, and rewards. Cases from Colombia and Peru demonstrate that the best way to control militias and employ them in counterinsurgency is by incorporating them as legitimate auxiliaries of the armed forces. Incorporation of a militia into the armed forces greatly reduces the principal-agent problem, the associated risk of diverging interests and objectives, and the future pain of demobilization. Arming militias with restricted use weapons, outsourcing their financing to private benefactors, and granting them too much autonomy is a recipe for disaster., http://archive.org/details/theprincipalagen1094559551, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Published
2018

2. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM AND PRO-GOVERNMENT MILITIAS: CASES FROM COLOMBIA AND PERU

Author

Althouse, Rachel M., Darnton, Christopher N., Johnson, Thomas H., and National Security Affairs (NSA)

Subjects
militias, autodéfenses, Low Intensity Conflict, incentives, vigilantism, civil defense forces, Colombia, principal agent problem, para-states, paramilitaries, Rondas Campesinas, civil wars, Peru, death squads, non-state actors, civil-defense committees, ungoverned spaces, weak states, agency dilemma, delegation, pro-government militias, guerrillas, counterinsurgency, Cold War, para-institutional, Convivir, self-defense forces, Latin America, auxiliary forces, warlords
Abstract

States (principals) frequently employ pro-government militias (agents) in low intensity conflicts with mixed results. In some cases, principal and agent interests diverge or the principal loses control over its agent, which devolves into an autonomous terrorist, warlord, or criminal organization. Looking at historical cases of Latin American pro-government militias from Colombia (Self-Defense groups, Convivirs, and Hometown Soldiers) and Peru (Rondas Campesinas), I examined the principal-agent problem in the context of state-sponsored, pro-government militias and answered the following question: How do sponsor states succeed or fail in maintaining positive control and influence over pro-government militias? States fail when they grant too much autonomy and firepower to militias and succeed when they limit militias’ autonomy by subjecting them to a tailored combination of control mechanisms: monitoring, screening, sanctions, and rewards. Cases from Colombia and Peru demonstrate that the best way to control militias and employ them in counterinsurgency is by incorporating them as legitimate auxiliaries of the armed forces. Incorporation of a militia into the armed forces greatly reduces the principal-agent problem, the associated risk of diverging interests and objectives, and the future pain of demobilization. Arming militias with restricted use weapons, outsourcing their financing to private benefactors, and granting them too much autonomy is a recipe for disaster. http://archive.org/details/theprincipalagen1094559551 Lieutenant, United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Published
2018

3. Civilinės saugos vaidmuo užtikrinant visuomenės saugumą: Kėdainių rajono savivaldybės atvejis

Author

Sutkus, Gerardas and Ažubalis, Algirdas Povilas

Subjects
Kėdainiai city, civilinės saugos organizavimas, role of civil protection, Civilinė sauga, Kėdainių rajonas, civil defense forces, civilinės saugos optimizavimas, Civil protection
Abstract

2014–2015 metais iš esmės pasikeitė viso pasaulio saugumo supratimas. Kylantys radikalūs judėjimai, suaktyvėjusi teroristų veikla, tiesiogiai neįvardytų imperialistinių siekių vedama Rusija, gamtiniai kataklizmai, sparčiai technologiškai tobulėjanti pramonė, epidemijos, globalizacija ir iš jos kylantys padariniai kelia nerimą ne tik Europai, bet ir visam pasauliui. Lietuvos geografinė padėtis suteikia apsaugą nuo daugelio neigiamų veiksnių, čia nepalanki situacija plėtotis radikaliems judėjimams ir aktyviai veikti teroristinėms organizacijoms, čia nėra žemės drebėjimų, cunamių ar ugnikalnių išsiveržimų, čia nekyla nevaldomos epidemijos ar kitos gaivališkos nelaimės, bet tai tikrai nereiškia, kad gyvename visiškai saugiai. Pasirinkta magistro darbo tema yra aktuali tuo, kad civilinės saugos (toliau – CS) subjektų sklandi ir profesionali veikla išgelbėtų daugelį civilių gyventojų gyvybių ir sumažintų jų kančias susidarius ekstremaliai situacijai, paskelbus karo padėtį ar net okupavus šalį ar dalį šalies. Kėdainių miestas pasirinktas dėl kylančių grėsmių įvairovės. Kėdainių neaplenkia potvyniai, yra stambi chemijos pramonės gamykla „Lifosa“, išvystytas geležinkelių ir kelių tinklas, yra didelių kuro saugyklų, eina magistralinis dujotiekis. Tyrimo problema – CS organizavimas savivaldybėse neužtikrina adekvačios reakcijos į kylančias grėsmes Lietuvos Respublikos nacionaliniam saugumui. Tyrimo objektas – CS veiklos savivaldybėse optimizavimas. Tyrimo tikslas – išanalizuoti ir pateikti siūlymus dėl CS veiklos savivaldybėse organizavimo optimizavimo atsižvelgiant į grėsmes nacionaliniam saugumui pagal Kėdainių rajono savivaldybės modelį. Tyrimo uždaviniai: išanalizuoti savivaldybių ekstremalių situacijų planus ir nustatyti grėsmes ir grėsmių prevenciją, išanalizuoti Kėdainių rajono savivaldybės CS pasirengimą, Lietuvos kariuomenės bendradarbiavimo su civilinėmis institucijomis pamokas, išmoktas bendrų mokymų metu, pateikti siūlymus, kaip optimizuoti CS organizavimą savivaldybėse. Tyrimo metodai: literatūros ir archyvinių šaltinių analizė, interviu, ekspertų nuomonių pasitelkimas. Šie tyrimo metodai pasirinkti atsižvelgiant į tai, kad po 2010 metų CS reorganizavimo ši tema nebuvo plačiai nagrinėjama. Ji mažai nagrinėta mokslininkų, parengta nedaug mokslinių straipsnių ir analizių. Magistrinį darbą sudaro keturi skyriai: pirmame nagrinėjama CS organizavimas, antrame skyriuje Ekstremaliųjų situacijų valdymo planas (toliau – ESVP), trečias skyrius skirtas Lietuvos kariuomenės bendradarbiavimui su CS subjektais ir ketvirtame skyriuje, pasitelkiant ekspertus, analizuojamas poreikis optimizuoti CS organizavimą. Išvadose siūloma optimizuoti CS organizavimą savivaldybės lygiu. Darbe yra 4 skyriai, 9 paveikslai, 5 lentelės, 1 priedas, literatūros ir šaltinių sąraše: 73 dokumentai, 16 knygų ir straipsnių, 11 internetinių šaltinių., In 2014-2015 the worlds understanding of security changed essentially. The rising of radical movements, terrorist attacks getting more active, Russia led by unnamed imperial forces, natural disasters, rapidly technologically developing industries, epidemic, globalization and its consequences are causing trouble not only to Europe, but also to the rest of the world. Lithuania’s geographical position provides protection against many of the following negative factors. Its location and political situation is not favorable for radical movements and terrorist organization to come forward. There is no earthquake, tsunamis or volcanic eruptions, no uncontrollable epidemic or other natural disasters. But it certainly doesn’t mean that we live in complete security. The chosen topic of master degrees is important because the professional and smooth work of civil defense forces ensures the saving of many lives of civilians and reduces their suffering in case of emergency arising from declared state of war or occupation of the whole country or part of the country. Kėdainiai city was chosen because of arising different threats to national security. The city is not safe from flooding; there is a huge chemical plant “Lifosa”, well developed rail and road network, large full storage, the main gas pipeline passes through. The problem of the research – the organization of civil defense in municipalities does not ensure an adequate reaction towards rising threats to the national security of Republic of Lithuania. The object of research – optimization of civil defense activities in municipalities. The aim of research – to analyze and offer optimized organizing of civil defense in municipality action considering threats to national security according to the model of Kėdainiai district municipality. The objective of the study is to analyze the action of municipality in case of emergency and determine threats and the prevention of threats, to study the preparation to take action in case of emergency. To analyze as well Lithuanian military cooperation with civil authorities and the conclusion made from mutual training. Research methods: analysis of literary and archival sources, interviews, expert opinion. These methods were chosen considering that after 2010 the topic of civil defense reorganization has not been widely studied. There were no scientific articles, research and analysis. Master work consist of four section: the first consist of civil defense organization, the second – of emergency plan, the third – intended to Lithuania military cooperation with civil defense parties and the fourth – the need to optimize the organization of civil ddefense through experts. The conclusion is to optimize civil defense organization at the municipal level. The paper consist of 4 chapters, 9 pictures, 5 tables, 1 appendix, literature and other sources: 73 documents, 16 books and articles, 11 online articles.

Published
2016

4. Managing Militias: Recruitment, Discipline, and Governance among Counterinsurgent Militias in Sierra Leone

Subjects
Change over time, militias, adverse selection, political violence, non-state armed groups, Criminology, rebellion, drugs, Sierra Leone, Sierra leone, civilian victimization, violence, Racketeering, Political science, media_common.cataloged_instance, agency theory, armed groups, media_common, Tamaboro, insurgency, Kamajor, counterinsurgency, diamonds, Oral history, civil-military relations, recruitment, Donso, Africa, Survey data collection, Civil Defense Forces
Abstract

Why do non-state armed organizations change over time? Why do some armed groups retain high levels of discipline and cooperative relationships with civilians, while other groups degenerate into racketeering and rogue banditry? This dissertation uses micro-comparative evidence to identify the mechanisms of organizational durability and change within three counter-insurgent militias that operated in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002. Newly gathered oral history and survey data from interviews with over 150 former militia members reveal that militia recruitment processes are essential in managing community-level conflicts, and are thus highly predictive of the long-term trajectories of armed organizations that draw recruits from local communities. Critical questions about how militia members are recruited have profound consequences – manifested in the varying levels of success of attempts to monitor and control existing militia members, and to extract key resources from civilian populations. My fine-grained examination of civil militias in Sierra Leone suggests important revisions to, and extensions of, existing theories of recruitment in armed groups and theories of civilian victimization during civil wars.

Published
2014
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5. Civil Defense Forces in Counterinsurgency: An Analysis of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group in Vietnam

Author

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, Carr, Darrell W, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, and Carr, Darrell W

Abstract

This thesis examines the effect of civil defense forces on a counterinsurgency campaign through a study of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group in the Republic of Vietnam. The thesis challenges a common U.S. Army viewpoint on counterinsurgency that conventional combat power, training a host nation's national security forces, and expenditures on large civil reconstruction projects are the Army's main contributions to counterinsurgency operations. The thesis is a chronological study that outlines the U.S. Army's major successes and failures in the refinement of counterinsurgency doctrine. The study uses two major research strategies: (1) qualitative analysis of counterinsurgency theory and U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1960s, and (2) a chronological study of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group. Further, operations are evaluated using the four major principles of counterinsurgency: unity of effort, securing the population, isolating the insurgent from sources of support, and winning the support of the population. After examining counterinsurgency theory, doctrine, and operations in the Republic of Vietnam, the study reveals that civil defense forces are decisive in defeating an insurgency when properly balanced with conventional combat power. Additionally, a civil defense force assists in regaining area control, denial of support to the insurgents, and the restoration of government authority to an area., The original document contains color images.

Published
2012

6. How Insurgencies End

Author

RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA, Connable, Ben, Libicki, Martin C., RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA, Connable, Ben, and Libicki, Martin C.

Abstract

Insurgencies have dominated the focus of the U.S. military for the past seven years, but they have a much longer history than that and are likely to figure prominently in future U.S. military operations. Thus, the general characteristics of insurgencies and, more important, how they end are of great interest to U.S. policy makers. This study constitutes the unclassified portion of a two-part study that examines insurgencies in great detail. The methodological approach had two components. One was a review of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) literature. The second was a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 89 insurgency case studies. The quantitative research revealed some useful insights into the relative success or failure of various methods employed by each side as they apply to insurgency endings. Among the key findings are the following: Modern insurgencies last approximately 10 years, and the government's chances of winning may increase slightly over time; Withdrawal of state sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat; Inconsistent or impartial support to either side generally presages defeat; and Anocracies (pseudodemocracies) do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing. Other findings are as follows: Insurgencies with more than two clear parties involved have longer, more-violent, and more-complex endings; Over the long run, governments tend to win more often than not; Governments benefit from direct support but tend to lose more frequently when provided indirect support; Unified hierarchies do better at insurgency than do fragmented networks; Insurgencies rarely succeed in middle-income and urbanized countries; Those insurgent groups that were able to restrict their use of terrorism by minimizing civilian casualties were more likely to win than those that did not; Weak insurgents can win; and Sanctuary is vital to insurgencies., ISBN 978-0-8330-4952-0.

Published
2010

7. Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State

Author

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST, Woods, Larry J., Reese, Timothy R., ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST, Woods, Larry J., and Reese, Timothy R.

Abstract

This study by Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese analyzes the massive turmoil afflicting the nation of Sierra Leone, 1993-2002, and the efforts by a variety of outside forces to bring lasting stability to that small country. The taxonomy of intervention ranged from private mercenary armies, through the Economic Community of West African States, to the United Nations and the United Kingdom. In every case, those who intervened encountered a common set of difficulties that had to be overcome. Unsurprisingly, they also discovered challenges unique to their own organizations and political circumstances. Serving soldiers can often profit vicariously from the mistakes of others as recounted in detailed case studies of historical events. This cogent analysis of recent interventions in Sierra Leone represents a cautionary tale that political leaders and military planners contemplating intervention in Africa ignore at their peril. Chapter 1 provides a brief historical overview of Sierra Leone from its pre-colonial origins through 1992 and the start of a decade of civil war. Chapter 2 examines the years 1993 to 1997 during which the private military organization Executive Outcomes was called in by the Sierra Leone government in an attempt to restore order and stability. Chapter 3 looks at Sierra Leone after 1997 when it again descended into chaos and analyzes the military intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military arm, led by its largest member, Nigeria. Chapter 4 reviews the international intervention led the by the United Nations and Great Britain between 1999 and 2002. Finally, Chapter 5 provides some conclusions and insights., ISBN-13: 978-0-9801236-4-7. ISBN-10: 0-9801236-4-X. The Long War Series.

Published
2008

8. The Shining Path: The Successful Blending of Mao and Mariategui in Peru

Author

ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, Graves, William G, ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, and Graves, William G

Abstract

This study analyzes the Peruvian Maoist Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) movement to discover an explanation for its survival and growth in power. The nature of the insurgency, to include the movement's goals, forms of warfare, ideology, strategy, organization and unity, popular support, and external support are analyzed within the context of the Peruvian environment and the government response. The author concludes that the Shining Path's survival and growth in power results from the movement's superior strategy, its organizational capability, and the government's response. The Shining Path has adapted Maoism to Peru's current realities. Its strategy, although controversial for its use of terrorism and sabotage of Peru's economic infrastructure, has proven successful to date. Most importantly, it has a cohesive organization that is remarkably adaptable. The Shining Path's external support network aids in politically isolating the Peruvian government internationally and provides significant funding from coca cultivation. The government's failure to recognize the nature of the insurgency, its seeking of a primarily military solution to the insurgency, and the brutal repression it has imposed has contributed to the Shining Path's success. Shining Path, Sendero Luminoso, Peru, insurgency, civil defense forces, Abimael Guzman, Luis Arce Borge, Ayacucho, coca, Maoism drug trafficking, Upper Huallaga Valley, Fujimori, rondas.

Published
1992

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