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The Polyvagal Theory (PVT) of the US-American neuroscientist Stephen W. Porges can mean much more to therapists than just another narrative for addressing the mind-bodyproblem. Its impact on philosophy and science since the 17th century can hardly be underestimated, right up to the question of whether terms such as »psychic« or »mental« should still be used. This article attempts to contextualize Porges’ theory in a larger framework, in philosophical, neuroscientific and therapeutic implications of PVT. A categorization of three central concepts (neuroception, co-regulation and social engagement system) leads to the further discussed question of what (co-regulatory) »language« we can speak together in therapy to encounter and to heal each other. A short epilogue addresses the criticism of PVT before concluding by highlighting the chances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study approaches the three world thesis (TWT), by Karl Popper. The TWT as pluralist and interactionist opposes to monism and some dualist conceptions. We also intend to focus on Jürgen Habermas critique when he tries to apply the TWT and W3 (World 3) to obtain a justification of the theory of action for sociology. In his critique, Habermas neglects many of the clear objectives of the TWT and the W3 described by Popper, specially when he does not consider the TWT a metaphysical thesis and an answer to the body-mind problem.

Near-death experiences (NDEs) are profound psychic experiences commonly occurring in life-threatening conditions. They include feeling a sense of peace, of seeing a bright light, encountering deceased relatives or religious figures, and of transcending space and time. To explain them, it has been suggested that they stem from brain disorders and/or psychological reactions to approaching death, a sort of wishful thinking in response to the perceived threat.This is a report on a case with most of the features typical of NDEs except that it occurred entirely without any life-threatening conditions. This evidence is theoretically incompatible with either of the above hypotheses, suggesting that a broader interpretation of the phenomenon is needed.

The dynamics of both the General Factor of Personality and the personality biological indicators, as a consequence of a stimulus, can be described with a short-term dynamic model (the response model). The invariance of the response model at both levels of description (psychological and biological) leads to deduce the bridge model with which psychological and biological levels of description can be related. The bridge model is the key tool to deal with the body-mind problem. An application case is presented setting up an experimental design with two subjects. The General Factor of Personality, c-fos and glutamate dynamics are evaluated as a consequence of a methylphenidate dose intake. The response and bridge models are validated with the outcomes of the application case. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science exists to refute dogmas; nevertheless, dogmas may be introduced when undemonstrated scientific axioms lead us to reject facts incompatible with them.Several studies have proposed psychobiological interpretations of near-death experiences (NDEs), claiming that NDEs are a byproduct of brain functions gone awry; however, relevant facts incompatible with the ruling physicalist and reductionist stance have been often neglected. The awkward transcendent look of NDEs has deep epistemological implications, which call for: a) keeping a rigorously neutral position, neither accepting nor refusing anything a priori; and b) distinguishing facts from speculations and fallacies. Most available psychobiological interpretations remain so far speculations to be demonstrated, while brain disorders and/or drug administration in critical patients yield a well-known delirium in intensive care and anesthesia, the phenomenology of which is different from NDEs. Facts can be only true or false, never paranormal. In this sense, they cannot be refused a priori even when they appear implausible with respect to our current knowledge: any other stance implies the risk of turning knowledge into dogma and the adopted paradigm into a sort of theology.

Science exists to refute dogmas; nevertheless, dogmas may be introduced when undemonstrated scientific axioms lead us to reject facts incompatible with them. Several studies have proposed psychobiological interpretations of near-death experiences (NDEs), claiming that NDEs are a mere byproduct of brain functions gone awry; however, relevant facts incompatible with the ruling physicalist and reductionist stance have been often neglected. The awkward transcendent look of NDEs has deep epistemological implications, which call for: (a) keeping a rigorously neutral position, neither accepting nor refusing anything a priori; and (b) distinguishing facts from speculations and fallacies. Most available psychobiological interpretations remain so far speculations to be demonstrated, while brain disorders and/or drug administration in critical patients yield a well-known delirium in intensive care and anesthesia, the phenomenology of which is different from NDEs. Facts can be only true or false, never paranormal. In this sense, they cannot be refused a priori even when they appear implausible with respect to our current knowledge: any other stance implies the risk of turning knowledge into dogma and the adopted paradigm into a sort of theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author explores some unexpected ramifications of Seel's paper. Pereda considers what he believes may be reconstructed in Seel as an argument for the existence of free minds. He shapes this reconstruction in a somewhat extravagant way and strongly departing from Seel's text, taking Moore's external world argument as a model (I). Then he briefly considers the form of both arguments (II), to later take up again the concepts of deliberation and reason that Seel employs (III). Finally, Pereda returns to ask in what sense Moore's and Seel's arguments may be defended (IV) and what consequences this would have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The body-mind problem invites scientific study, since mental events are repeated and repeatable and invite testable explanations. They seemed troublesome because of the classical theory of substance that failed to solve its own central problems. These are soluble with the aid of the theory of the laws of nature, particularly in its emergentist version [Bunge, M., 1980. The Body-mind Problem, Pergamon, Oxford] that invites refutable explanations [Popper, K.R., 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London]. The view of mental properties as emergent is a modification of the two chief classical views, materialism and dualism. As this view invites testable explanations of events of the inner world, it is better than the quasi-behaviorist view of self-awareness as computer-style self-monitoring [Minsky, M., Laske, O., 1992. A conversation with Marvin Minsky. AI Magazine 13 (3), 31–45]. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Near-death experiences (NDEs) are profound psychic experiences commonly occurring in life-threatening conditions. They include feeling a sense of peace, of seeing a bright light, encountering deceased relatives or religious figures, and of transcending space and time. To explain them, it has been suggested that they stem from brain disorders and/or psychological reactions to approaching death, a sort of wishful thinking in response to the perceived threat. This is a report on a case with most of the features typical of NDEs except that it occurred entirely without any life-threatening conditions. This evidence is theoretically incompatible with either of the above hypotheses, suggesting that a broader interpretation of the phenomenon is needed.