Search

A memoir of my experiences as a faculty member in the School of Informarion, 1976-2023.

George Berkeley's (1685–1753) condemnation of freethinking arose from the social, political, and, above all, moral repercussions that he believed this heterogeneous group was bringing about in British society. In the first part of this paper, I set out the challenges posed by the freethinking movement, drawing extensively on Berkeley's Alciphron. In the second part, I address both the reasons behind his aversion to freethinking and his response, which involved advocating for the union of Church and state and while rejecting secular governance. This analysis relies primarily on lesser-known works from Berkeley's socio-political writings. The paper argues that Berkeley's opposition to freethinkers was driven by his concern for the public good and his belief that the Christian religion, particularly in its Anglican tradition, was the most effective means to achieve it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A short summary of the women faculty:  Ruth Tringham, Margaret (Meg) Conkey, Rosemary Joyce, Christine Hastorf, Laurie Wilkie, Junko Habu, Sabrina Agarwal, Kim Shelton,

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The 'History of Astronomy' is fundamental to understanding Smith's epistemology. The most problematic issue of this text is that Smith intended to analyse the history of astronomy according not to the principles of 'truth' that they embodied, but in terms of their logical coherence. However, he was also influenced by Newton's realism. My thesis is that Smith had no doubts that external reality exists, but believed that it is necessarily filtered by our perceptions and our scientific beliefs. Perceptions and theories do not reflect objective reality as such but reconstruct it according to the procedures and constraints that characterise them. Two generally neglected Smithian sources, Copernicus and Berkeley and 'Of the External Senses' seem to legitimize this interpretation. At first sight, Fontenelle used the same arguments of Berkeley and Smith, but the difference is that Fontenelle was convinced that astronomical science is characterised by progress toward truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I graduated as a geography major from the University of California, Berkeley (1951–1953). After two years in the Navy, I came back as a graduate student, did not do well, and spent the next year traveling in South America and Nicaragua. Returning, I wrote my master’s thesis on the pine forests in highland Nicaragua. After a year working in Washington, D.C., I returned to Berkeley in 1959. I did research in Bolivian Amazonia for my PhD, completed in 1963. Carl Sauer was my inspiration, but Jim Parsons was my mentor. I was hired by the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where I remained for thirty years. I was in and out of Berkeley Geography from 1951 until 1963, dropping out several times and then reentering. I became a geographer at Berkeley over seventy years ago, and I have continued relationships with Berkeley Geography since then. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of Berkeley's best-known arguments for the view that there are no material objects is the so-called Master Argument. There are several good critical discussions of it. That invites the question: is there anything new to say? Well, it will be argued, there are a few things to say. First, although refutations by logical analogy have been advanced against the Master Argument, the strongest such refutation, one which demonstrates its incoherence, has not been. It is here. Second, there are few formal reconstructions of the Master Argument – the great majority of discussions treat it discursively – but a formal reconstruction, and one not found elsewhere, is offered here. Third, the formal reconstruction makes possible identification of the essential mistake of the argument. That mistake is equivocation. The common complaint that Berkeley illicitly introduces the act of conceiving into the content of the concept conceived is not quite correct; but to the extent that it is correct, it's explicable in terms of an underlying equivocation. Fourth, the article presupposes no acquaintance with Berkeley's work and is written in a conversational, easy-to-read style. Given that Berkeley himself wrote in a similar style, he could at least agree that the fourth point is a merit of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay historicizes the Shakespeare curriculum at UC Berkeley’s English department over the last one hundred years. An elite research university in the United States, UC Berkeley’s extensive course offerings have expanded due to changes in undergraduate education and external cultural shifts. With a growing number of courses on sexuality, race, gender, etc., that became part of the purview of an English department, the teaching of Shakespeare expanded as well. I demonstrate how the emphasis on Shakespeare in the U.S. undergraduate curriculum shifts over time from one form of recognition—an acknowledgement of his value or worth—to a recognition of identifying with his work based on prior experience. Distinguishing between courses that combine “Shakespeare and” and those that combine “Literature and,” I expose the consequences each has for the canonicity of both Shakespeare and subject fields with which his works are placed in conversation, explicitly and implicitly. I argue that the expansion of Shakespeare in the American undergraduate curriculum coincides with and depends on the compression of key aspects of interpretation that pose challenges for the new knowledges it seeks to create. I illuminate how an expanded Shakespeare curriculum saw a compression of Shakespeare into metonymic mythic status, which has implications for the teaching of literature from various identity and cultural groups. I demonstrate how the origins of an expansive undergraduate Shakespeare curriculum in the United States positions Shakespeare as the interlocutor for a wide range of topics.

O artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as críticas formuladas pelo filósofo George Berkeley à filosofia natural moderna, em especial à física de Isaac Newton. Tais críticas aparecem primeiramente em seu tratado epistemológico-metafísico sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano, e depois em uma obra totalmente dedicada à questão da natureza do movimento e de sua comunicação. A partir da leitura dos argumentos de Berkeley contra Newton, é possível demonstrar que o filósofo adota uma posição antirrealista com relação à física que é diretamente derivada de suas teses metafísicas imaterialistas. Dado que ele afirma que na realidade só há espíritos e suas ideias, a causa última das regularidades naturais é a vontade do espírito divino, e não uma suposta natureza intrínseca dos corpos. A filosofia natural, portanto, estará limitada ao uso de hipóteses matemáticas para identificar as regularidades naturais, contudo sem pretensões de determinar as causas reais dos fenômenos. Assim, as leis mecânicas têm seus limites epistêmicos determinados por um saber superior, a metafísica.