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This article develops and explores 'landtimescaping' as an a/r/tographic practice that can help us as humans to expand and (re-)create our relationships to the Land. Through a/r/tographic fieldwork in Rossedalen, a valley situated in Southern Norway close to the city of Arendal, the authors experiment over time with different ways of being-with the Land. The aim is to contribute to art, research and education as worlding practices that facilitate diverse ways of sensing, relating and acting with other-than-human forms of being. By relating to Karen Barad's theories of spacetimemattering, the verb 'landtimescaping' is coined to generate new knowledge through specific embodied practices, such as walks with locals and repeated visits to a certain spot. More specifically, three 'landtimescapings' are brought to life by intertwining different textual-visual approaches: Landtimescaping #1 -The neglected forest. Circles and cycles, Landtimescaping #2 - Deforestation. Life interrupted. Life to (be)come, and Landtimescaping #3 - The Quarry. Swallowing an event. In the final part of the article, the potentialities of landtimescaping for the practices of art, research, and education are discussed in order to open for a (re-)orientation of these separate forms of knowing towards entangled, fluid and open ways of existing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we understand the phenomena of loss and mourning in the Heideggerian framework? There is no established interpretation of Heidegger that gives an elaborate account of the phenomena of loss and mourning, let alone gauges its importance for our understanding and assessment of authentic existence in Heidegger. This paper attempts to do both. First, I give a detailed exposition of Heidegger's analysis of the phenomena of mourning and loss and show that Heidegger's analysis of mourning in his early and late work is strikingly in line with his collectivist understanding of Being-with. This demonstrates, contrary to what some of his proponents argue, that Heidegger does not follow the kind of dynamic understanding of Being-with that places the other within fine-grained spaces of possibility. Second, with reference to Heidegger's existential philosophy, I construct a phenomenology of mourning and grief. Though Heidegger himself fails to explain the relationships in which one mourns after a close other, we can develop a unique phenomenology of mourning with reference to Heidegger, which shows that each loss is singular and can be equiprimordial with one's own death in opening one to the possibility of an authentic existence. In this new understanding of authenticity, loss is regarded as a powerful force, akin to death, in leading one toward their self-owned existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'British values' have recently been invoked by the Right in Britain – both in the Conservative Party and outside by the Reform Party led by the Right insurgent and public school educated (Dulwich College) 'man of the people' Nigel Farage. Such values are directed at communities of colour, as well as those communities that stand apart from the logic of 'phallologentricism'. Factions of the secular Left too have engaged in an iteration of 'culture wars' by targeting Jewish communities who may not share Hamas's desire to eradicate Israel in favour of a monistic Palestinian State. At the heart of these contested cultural terrains is an overarching issue: namely, the question of the universal, and how the universal informs the States' politics of representation (the "General Will", the "nation", "citizen" etc...). Derrida reminds us that "the social" – let alone the State and the polity it brings to life – can never be reduced to a single meaning, that the nature of community will always be subject to contestation contra the telos of monism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main problem in making sense of Mitsein as an aspect of Dasein in Being and Time concerns the sense in which individual Dasein is an ‘I’, given that it can be either an ‘anyone-self’ or an ‘authentic self’. Though it is clear that the anyone-self relates directly to das Man, the relation of the authentic self to others is debatable. In this paper, I reexamine the relations between self and others by making sense of the referent of each mode of selfhood, with special attention to the problem of explaining the relations between the two. The problem, I claim, can be solved by bringing into relief a certain conception of mereology (theory of parthood relations) that underlies Heidegger’s arguments. As I will demonstrate, Heidegger uses a mereological terminology that appropriates Husserl’s logic of parts and wholes from the Logical Investigations. In view of this, I suggest understanding individual Dasein, both qua anyone-self and qua authentic self, as a moment, i.e. a dependent part of an open-ended whole. The apparent gap between anyone-self and authentic self can be better understood as a shift of focus between two different aspects of being the same type of dependent part of a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, we aim to show that African ways of being with each other can help develop a concept of the human being that reflects our experience better. African modes of communal living and related humanist theories will be brought in to show how being from body to body is lived concretely. Parenting comes in to show the advantages of African forms of living as it spans across generations. Yet in order to learn from these perspectives, the colonial heritage in Western concepts of the self needs to be considered. Frantz Fanon's decolonial thought which Judith Butler utilises to highlight the significance of social bonds for the subject opens up more relational ways of conceptualising our place in the world. The bodily dimension of the relational self will be explored by way of the phenomenological concept of intercorporeality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates musical relationships in the case of the early mother-infant dyadic interactions. To accomplish this task, it is first needed to come back to some important authors from the tradition of both phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The theories of Husserl, Schutz and Taipale will prove themselves to be useful. Secondly, I shall deepen the investigation of the early mother-infant interactions through the prism of theories coming from Winnicott, Stern and Thomas Fuchs. My main task will be to demonstrate that these early interactions have a musical quality, similar to Colwyn Trevarthen's thematization of communicative musicality. To prove my point, I have to first establish the features that make these early interactions be musical-like. Winnicott's potential space and the example of babbling will follow my argumentation. I will also stress on the importance of the face-to-face interaction through affect attunement and mutual tuning-in. All these interactions are modes of being-with-another (Stern). An example will be found throughout this paper, namely a specific mode of being-with-another, which was called by Winnicott the primary maternal preoccupation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a brief review of different definitions and types of loneliness I offer an analysis of the concept of existential loneliness and its philosophical background. In contrast to the interpersonal aspects of other types of loneliness, existential loneliness has been characterized as an intrapersonal default state of incommunicability or profound aloneness, part of or based on a fundamental ontological or transcendental structure in human existence. There are both conceptual and practical issues with the notion of existential loneliness, with implications for psychotherapy. I offer a critical approach, and argue that there is no good philosophical basis for this conception of existential loneliness, and that although loneliness can be existential in some respect, it typically manifests itself in interpersonal contexts, and should not be considered a fundamental ontological structure of human existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aims and Objectives: To explore the notion of Being‐with and authentic discourse for people making decisions about major amputation. Background: Chronic limb‐threatening ischaemia is a devastating disease with a high burden of pain and complex wounds. Patients may deteriorate suddenly after multiple revascularisation procedures and, amputation is offered when further reperfusion is considered futile. Delayed decisions about amputation have negative consequences for patients, families and health systems, yet little attention is given to training clinicians for the sophisticated communication required. Clinicians need to engage in authentic discourse about amputation to create shared meaning and facilitate decision‐making. Design: Qualitative study using hermeneutic Heideggerian phenomenology. Methods: Twelve patients offered major amputation, and 13 family participants from three vascular units in Australia engaged in 42 semi‐structured interviews, representing 19 cases of chronic limb‐threatening ischaemia. Hermeneutic phenomenology using the Heideggerian tenet of Being‐with as an analytic framework, a philosophically based understanding of Being‐with and Discourse related to treatment discussions and decisions was derived. The research was reported in accordance with the COREQ checklist. Findings Effective discourse between the person and family was hampered by changed circumstances of Being‐with, characterised by guilt, and a retreat from discourse through deficient discourse and filtering information. Clinician Being‐with was hampered by discourse that was deficient, poorly delivered, discordant and disconnected through a lack of empathetic listening. There were also examples of enhanced clinician Being‐with that made room for more constructive discourse and more timely decisions about amputation. Conclusions: Heidegger's construct of Being‐with provides a useful framework to reveal the role of authentic discourse in improving patient and family experience and decisions about treatment. No Patient or Public Contribution: This study did not engage consumers other than as patient and carer participants. Relevance to Clinical Practice: Decisions about amputation are often difficult for patients or family members who may be substitute decision‐makers. A better understanding of the experience may assist clinicians in their interactions with patients and families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle famously defined the human being as ζῶον λόγον ἔχονς (a living thing with logos). Heidegger and Arendt both questioned the interpretation of animal rationale (rational animal). Tracing back to ancient Greek thoughts, they both regarded the original meaning of λόγος as speech and illustrated the relationship between speech and human existence. Heidegger elucidated the disclosing nature of speech and distinguished between authentic and inauthentic forms of speech. Heidegger emphatically examined inauthentic everyday speech, while Arendt was more concerned with exploring an authentic form of public discourse. This paper explains the connection and distinction between Heidegger's and Arendt's views on speech. It argues that Arendt develops Heidegger's notion of speech by expositing an authentic and active public speech. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author analyzes the deconstruction of the community carried out by Jean-Luc Nancy. For Nancy, the aim of the community has been historically accomplished by its self-destruction in the "work of death" of totalitarianism. This does not lead him to renounce the notion of community, like Derrida, but to highlight its paradoxical (im-)possibility. This is why Nancy proposes the concept of a "community without community" which would retain only the cum of the communitas , the with of being-with or being in-common. The author shows that this approach is subject to aporias. Indeed, Nancy wants to base being-with on an ontology of bodily touch. As he considers touching as distancing, displacement, he fails to understand the cum , that is to say the possibility of constituting a community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to be human? This question has made a meteoric career for itself, becoming a focal point of almost every thread of the transhumanist debate. Significant as it is, the question eludes any definitive answer, since it directly engenders an array of related queries. This Special Issue questions our notions of the human being, human subjectivity, superiority and uniqueness, which tend to be underpinned by simplistic and simplifying dichotomies entrenched in western philosophy, science and art. Eclipsed by the hierarchical vision of the world and dualistic metaphysics, the concept of the nonhuman (regardless of its biological form or ontological status) has always been dependent on its paring element (the human) losing its own significance and independent status. By articulating the problems we face in understanding and defining the human and the nonhuman, this Special Issue offers an insight into the current transhumanist discourse. Crossing the boundaries of disciplines and definitions, the contributors propose an assemblage of methodological and conceptual scaffoldings to build on in this project. They seek new ways and analytical strategies to advance the notions of 'being one and many' and 'being-with', and in doing so, they envision a new world where forging relations and co-existence with nonhuman agents lie at the core of human experience. The editorial gives some insight into the studies and concepts of this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting with a recall of the overwhelming feeling, voiced by many thinkers, that the post-WWII era brought about the 'sense of an ending' of history as Mitsein (being-in-common), the essay explores the renewed necessity to re-learn to be together in the wake of the worst modern pandemic by appealing to Jean-Luc Nancy's imagination of a community without community. Nancy's plea for a singular togetherness will be re-examined in relation to his view that COVID-19 makes us equal and 'communizes' us, including in our respective isolations, which we attempt to re-interpret within the critical framework, in memory studies, of what James E. Young called 'collected memory'. Inflecting Maurice Halbwachs's original 'collective memory' to allow for the many discrete, fragmented memories of disparate individuals united in common moments of remembrance, 'collected memory' will be seen as a hyphenated process of 're-membering', a poetic piecing together of disjointed, scattered members and isolated communities gathered in virtual unison through their respective losses. This research is supported by The Program for Professor of Special Appointment (Eastern Scholar) at Shanghai Institutions of Higher Learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is a poetic reflection on how the history and practice of Khayal, an improvisatory North Indian vocal form, provides lessons on being-with an Other. This submission is a form of ficto-critique and is based on the author's musical practice, revived via online lessons during the pandemic.

By taking as background a few examples from Japanese culture and society, as well as an ethnographic insight, this article reconsiders the way anthropology usually deals with and talks about issues regarding cultural differences in human relations. These issues, which start from the fact that different cultures articulate human relations in different ways, have as one of their main theoretical outcomes the analysis around the categories of "self" or "person." However, within this move lies something akin to a "gestalt misconception" that reduces a shared moral understanding (human relations) to an analysis of conceptual categories and their cognitive, psychological, subjective (or other) processes. Alternatively, the article proposes a more dialogical approach informed by Gadamer's idea of "dialog" and "fusion of horizons," where one aims to learn from other cultures and not about them. As a result, some reflections of a philosophical, moral, and practical character are presented, leaving theoretical formulations about the "Japanese self" out of the equation. This article's general purpose is not an exploration of "Japaneseness," but rather a probe into the possibilities of Being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Derrida contends that the subject defines itself as the supreme ruler by establishing the laws of its home (oikos), thus of its economy (oikos-nomos). This formulation would explain the foundations of the community when it is established around the model of brotherhood. The animal, Derrida argues, since it challenges all the autobiographic projects of the subject, is an outlaw; it transcends the economy. Its arrival stirs a passion in the human being because it narrows down the abysmal distance between them prescribed by this economy. The “Passion for Animal” is a question of ‘passive nudity’ in the face of the singularity of the Other. Therefore, a fair relationship grounded on the singularity of being becomes possible, based not on the principle of metaphysical fraternity but only as a ‘groundless friendship’ evinced by proper noun, mourning, and an insuperable distance. Here lies the promise of the democracy to come.

It is hard to imagine human beings without animals: they surround them incessantly. Be it the pets in their own homes, the farm animals in the fields, the birds in the sky, or the insects in the gardens. Human beings cannot be without animals. It may therefore not be surprising that the Qurʾān, as a message addressed to human beings, also refers to animals: dozens of different animals are mentioned in the Qurʾān. Thus, we find the narration of the ant who speaks (Q 27:17–19), the hoopoe who gives advice (Q 27:20–26), and even the raven who taught Qābīl a lesson (Q 5:31). The Qurʾān is full of such narratives that break with traditional images of animals by turning them into supposed aides, giving them voices, and even portraying them as creatures capable of praise , living in communities. God Himself seems to interact with animals in the Qurʾān, even allowing them to become actors in interactions with the Prophets. But how can these narratives be understood? What added value can they offer to the question of the ethically appropriate and just treatment of animals? To answer these questions, this article intends to turn to selected Qurʾānic narratives about encounters between humans and animals by using a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach. For this purpose, this text will deal with the encounters between humans and animals to explore how an ethical coexistence of human beings and animals can be conceived on the basis of being-with (-each other). الخلاصة يصعب تخيل البشر بلا حيوانات؛ فهي تحيط دومًا بالإنسان. فهناك الحيوانات الأليفة في البيوت أو الماشية في المزارع أو الطيور في السماء أو الحشرات في الحدائق. والجنس البشري لا يستطيع العيش دون حيوانات. ولذلك لا غرابة في أن يشير القرآن، وهو رسالة موجهة للإنسان، إلى الحيوانات أيضا. وقد ورد ذكر عدد كبير من الحيوانات المختلفة في القرآن، فنجد مثلًا قصة النملة التي تنطق (النمل: 17–19)، والهدهد الذي ينصح (النمل: 20–26)، وحتى الغراب الذي لقّن قابيلَ درسًا (المائدة: 31). والقرآن غزير بمثل هذه القصص التي تخالف الصور النمطية للحيوانات، حيث يتم من خلالها تصوير الحيوانات على أنها قادرة على تقديم العَوْن ولها ملكة الكلام، بل ولها قدرة على التسبيح والعيش ضمن أمة من الأمم. كما نجد في القرآن الحديث عن التواصل بين الله تعالى وخلقه من الحيوان، حتى أنه جعل منها كائنات فاعلة في سياق تعاملها مع الأنبياء. لكن كيف يمكننا فهم هذه القصص وهذه السرديات؟ وما القيمة المضافة التي يمكن أن تقدمها في مسألة معاملة الحيوانات بشكل عادل ومقبول أخلاقيًا؟ وللإجابة على هذه الأسئلة، يتطرق هذا المقال إلى دراسة مجموعة مختارة من القصص القرآنية التي تسجل تواصلًا وتفاعلًا بين الإنسان والحيوان من خلال مقاربة ظواهرية (فِنومِنولوجية)-تأويلية. ولتحقيق هذا الهدف، تعالج هذه الدراسة عددًا من نماذج التواصل والتلاقي بين البشر والحيوانات بغية استكشاف تصور متماسك عما ينبغي أن يكون عليه التعايش الأخلاقي بين الإنسان والحيوان‪.‬ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of the Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies is the property of Journal of the Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Heideggerian philosophy is frequently chosen as a philosophical framing, and/or a hermeneutic analytical structure in qualitative nursing research. As Heideggerian philosophy is dense, there is merit in the development of scholarly resources that help to explain discrete Heideggerian concepts and to uncover their relevance to contemporary human experience. This paper uses a meta-synthesis methodology to pool and synthesise findings from 29 phenomenological research reports on Being-with in the nurse–patient relationship. We firstly considered and secured the most relevant Heideggerian elements to nurse–patient Being-with (Dasein-with, circumspection, solicitude, and discourse). Under these deductive codes, we then inductively developed sub-themes that seemed to explain the multifaceted nature of Being-with, through a secondary analysis and synthesis of published data from 417 patient, carer and nurse participants. Dasein-with was enhanced when nurses had first-hand experience with a phenomenon. Nurses moved between the inauthentic they-mode (task-orientated busyness, existential abandonment, rough handling and deficient modes of concern in potentially violent encounters), and the authentic self-mode (seeking connection [knowing], and openness [unknowing], which exposed their emotional vulnerability). Through circumspection (making room for, deseverance and directionality), technology and people were encountered environmentally feeding into nursing attention, assessment and communication. Nursing as a social arrangement (solicitude) was expressed through either leaping-in care (also perceived as 'power over') or leaping-ahead care (moving the patient towards independence). There was a place for both inauthentic (idle talk) and authentic discourse (including non-verbal and spiritual discourse) that nurses wove through the ontic everydayness of nursing tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fairtrade operates its global system through a homogenising but marketable set of standards. Combined with issues around how to include producers in governance, this has led to feelings of disconnection and disenfranchisement for the latter, which are impacting on Fairtrade's effectiveness and legitimacy. Through a focus on the South African wine industry, this paper argues that the Fairtrade community needs to be reinvigorated through dialogical communication, impactful participation and cultural synthesis to better enact responsibility across its systemic geographical and cultural distances. "Being‐with" its multiple stakeholders makes space for a more responsive, contextual and connected system. Drawing on the ideas of Paulo Freire, the paper concludes that a Fairtrade built on solidarity through a participatory and decentralised system would allow for discussions of the ideals and practices that are essential to negotiating, and not swallowing up, the shifting "we" of Fairtrade and more effectively balancing its local and global responsibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to interrogate the mode of relationality -- or Being-with Others -- that supports a responsible postcolonial thinking. The paper draws from both the Western and African philosophical traditions. Three modes of Being-with Others are identified at the hand of Martin Heidegger's and Jean-Luc Nancy's work, namely the exterior mode, in which we simply exist alongside one another; the interior mode, wherein our identities are assimilated by a historicallyconstituted community; and, the non-essentialised mode, wherein our identities are open to Others. The paper critically explores African Humanism and African Communitarian in order to demonstrate how -- in practice -- these views often lend support to the exterior mode and the interior mode respectively. As an alternative to these views, a reading of African philosophy that foregrounds the Political as first philosophy is given. It is demonstrated how this reading not only demands a non-essentialised mode of Being-with Others (which will be motivated as the preferred relational mode), but also leads to a view of postcoloniality that is premised on the inherent openness of being and community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There has been a significant increase in studies devoted to Søren Kierkegaard's Works of Love in contemporary Kierkegaard research. There are several good reasons why this is so. The single theme that dominates, though, is the relation between preferential love and neighborly love. Are they reconcilable or not? The present paper recasts this discussion by situating Works of Love in the trajectory of deconstructive readings of community from Jean-Luc Nancy and onwards. It is divided into three sections. It is first shown that a deconstructive take on preferential and neighborly love indicates how any community has a place for love as its condition of (im)possibility. The opening of this place is then located in the Christian love-commandment. Finally, the expanse of this place is found in the spreading-out of the promise of love. The paper is conceived as a step towards letting love find its place in the analytics of being-there—as the phenomenon which opens the "there" without losing its "with." The paper concludes with a postscript that points towards this broader context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the proposition that movement offers new insight into the relationship between human and non-human animals, a relationship that is important to understanding contemporary bio-political existence. It draws on a recent commemoration of transhumance, the seasonal movement of herds and herders, to analyse different conceptions of movement and their implications for the relationship between human and non-human animals. On this basis, the paper argues that current attempts to address the violence of the relationship by establishing the subjectivity of non-human animals are not the answer. It proposes instead that Nancy's rearticulation of existence as oscillating between the detachment of singularity and the attachments of multiplicity offers a more productive way of reconfiguring the relationship between human and non-human animals. This offers an understanding of the relationship as always already transforming, and in a manner that does not, at the same time, undermine the possibility of political action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explore Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of sense as a key ontological concept. This concept, as it appears mainly in his Sense of the World (1997b), opens the possibility of a more profound understanding of his thesis. The effort in this article will not be an attempt to draw a map or a line in Nancy's theory placing sense either as the starting point or as his central concept. Instead, it is an attempt to show that sense plays a significant role in Nancy's understanding of world and finitude, as it becomes evident is his recurrent concern with Wittgenstein's (1994) aphorism 6.41: that the sense of the world must stand outside the world. Nancy defines the world as a rapport of entities or existents to each other. So, the argument advanced here analyzes sense's centrality to Nancy's discussion on touch and the vital role touch has in the articulation between his comprehension of mitsein/être-avec and his elaboration of being as singular plural, in order to show that a focus on sense could bring forwards a relevant elucidation of Nancy's ontological argument and its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I respond to important questions raised by Gallagher and Jacobson (2012) in the field of cognitive science about face-to-face interactions in Heidegger's account of 'intersubjectivity' in Being and Time. They have criticized his account for a lack of attention to primary intersubjectivity, or immediate, face-to-face interactions; he favours, they argue, embodied interactions via objects. I argue that the same assumption underlies their argument as did earlier critiques of a lack of an account of the body in Heidegger (e.g. Sartre 1989; Krell 1992); namely that because the body is not explicitly discussed in Being and Time, embodiment, rather than stressing the immediacy of experience, is insufficiently acknowledged in his emphasis on 'being-in-the-world'. Through placing Gallagher and Jacobson's accounts of intersubjectivity and the body alongside Heidegger's accounts of Mitsein and Leib, this article shows Heidegger's radical position on the body as immersed in a holistic environment, and its reverberations on his account of intersubjectivity. I argue that Dasein's embodied engagement in the world is always one of immediacy and that the body of the other is perceived as 'tied into' its context, as well. In so doing, I offer an Heideggerian account of ecstatic involvement which moves away from the distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity toward an immediate engagement with objects and people always already 'tied into' a context; an account that, through the concept of Fürsorge, includes shifts of attention between objects and people that allow for the ethical distinctions Gallagher and Jacobson are looking for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper, I propose an existentialist-phenomenological model that conceives of mental illness through the terminology of Heidegger’s Being and Time. In particular, the concepts of (i) existentiality, (ii) disturbance and (iii) the relation between ‘being-with’ and ‘the one’, will be implemented in order to reconstruct the experience of mental illness. The proposed model understands mental illness as a disturbance of a person’s existentiality. More precisely, mental illness is conceptualized as the disturbance of a person’s existential structure, the process of which leads to a becoming explicit of the otherwise implicit dynamical structure that constitutes a person’s experience. In particular, the existential component of ‘being-with’ comes to play a central role in the disturbance of existentiality, thus, I will claim, that it enables a person’s structure of experience to be ‘open for normativity’. By adopting a pragmatist stance on Heideggerian phenomenology, the suggested model proves compatible with naturalist and normativist theories of mental illness while still offering a phenomenological description of the phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ekstasis: Revista de Hermenêutica e Fenomenologia is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Law & Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Societe (Cambridge University Press) is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article I argue that Levinas can be read as a critic, not just of Heideggerian being, but also of being-with. After pointing out that the publication of the Black Notebooks only makes this criticism more interesting to revisit, I first of all discuss passages from both earlier and later writings in which Levinas explicitly takes issue with Heidegger's claim that there is no self outside of a specific socio-historical community. I then explain how these criticisms are reflected in Levinas's own account, arguing that Levinasian subjectivity and alterity are precisely defined by their not belonging to a larger unity; to the extent that they partake in a multi-personal collectivity, this does not take the form of a traditional community. In the final section, I look into a different and seemingly opposing argument Levinas makes against Heidegger: on the basis of the latter's reflections on death, he argues that Dasein is anti-social rather than overly immersed in the socio-historical. Arguing that this rests on a misreading of Being and Time, I use this opportunity to raise questions about Levinas's interpretation of Heidegger and his 'otherwise than being-with' more generally, for Levinas's account runs into several problems as well. Yet as I will conclude, this in fact offers a valuable insight, not just for the present-day reception of Heidegger, but also for thinking community today. It indicates that a radical break with human situatedness does not automatically fare better than a firmly enrooted account of (co)existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses Celebrate and Demonstrate, a project proposing a political alliance between dancers with other workers in the form of rallying and marching together as a lens through which to examine the potential for somatic dance practices to participate in radical politics as they are enacted today. It considers the politics immanent in dance, specifically somatically informed dance, with reference to French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy's ontological foundation, being-with, suggesting that this is both the origin and process of the kind of politics recognized in philosopher Judith Butler's theory of performative assembly. It goes on to propose that, as the somatically trained dancers touch, listen to and engage the world with a particularly heightened sensitivity and openness to the potential for change, they are particularly well adapted to engage in such radical political manifestations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nosso objetivo é mostrar, a partir das obras Ser e Tempo e Seminários de Zollikon, a constituição ontológica do amor como a afinação (Stimmung) fundamental para a convivência da presença (Dasein). Nossa hipótese sustenta-se no pressuposto que a copertença do amor (abertura fundamental para o outro) e da liberdade (deixar-ser o outro) consiste em uma modificação do existencial da disposição e expressa a unidade e a circularidade ontológica do ser-no-mundo. Pretendemos mostrar ainda que a solicitude (a abertura do ser-com) é a condição de possibilidade para a constituição ontológico-existencial da afinação do amor. Centrados no texto Sobre a essência da verdade, nosso intuito é sublinhar que a liberdade é também uma modificação do existencial da disposição, ou seja, uma afinação, e enquanto tal é o fundamento ontológico para o desvelamento do modo próprio (eigentliche) de ser da presença. Nesta perspectiva, podemos afirmar que a afinação da liberdade precede e penetra a afinação do amor. Isto significa que a afinação do amor se funda na afinação da liberdade e que esta ressoa naquela, o que nos permite dizer que elas são co-originárias.The objective of the present paper is to show, using Being and time and Zollikon Seminars, the existential-ontological constitution of love as a mood (Stimmung) fundamental to the coexistence of Dasein. The hypothesis advanced here is that the co-pertinence of love (the fundamental disclosedness to the other) and of freedom (the letting-be of the other) consists in a modification of the existential of state-of-mind and expresses the unity and ontological circularity of Being-in-the-world. We intend also to show that solicitude (the disclosedness towards Being-with) is the condition of possibility for the existential-ontological constitution of the mood of love. Centered on the text On the Essence of Truth, our purpose is to emphasize that freedom is also a modification of the existential of state-of-mind or, one might say, mood, and as such it is the ontological ground for uncovering a proper (eigentliche) way of Being. In this way, we are able to affirm that the mood of freedom precedes and penetrates the mood of love. This means that the mood of love is founded in the mood of freedom and that it resonates in that mood, which permits us to say that they are co-originating.

Dipesh Chakrabarty's Provincializing Europe uses Martin Heidegger's Being-with to ground his defence of a decolonial historiography. In this essay I show that Heidegger's broader aims within Being and Time nullify Chakrabarty's hopes for recovering fragile political spaces. In contrast to Heidegger, I propose Hannah Arendt's writings on Jewish politics as an alternative for students of decolonisation. Arendt's focus on plurality and new beginnings complement Chakrabarty's critiques of historicism and political belonging in a way that more fully realises the broader ambitions of Provincializing Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This final comment provides, a theoretical framework on how to conceive the self as presented in the key-note paper 'Meaningfulness, volunteering and being moved. The event of wit(h)nessing'. This is deemed requisite to achieve a full understanding of how depth in meaningfulness comes about. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]