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This paper categorizes the three types of fires: strategic, operational, and tactical based on the effects they achieve in relation to the tactical battlespace. Strategic fire affects begin at the level of war spanning multiple operations, operational fires affect an in-progress campaign or major operation and the tactical level only affects the battle. Each level also is unique in the relative amount of time required for the effects to impact the battlefield: strategic the longest and tactical almost immediately. By carefully synchronizing the three types of fires in time and space, a synergistic effect is created at the tactical level of warfare that can be exploited by the operational commander. Specific examples are used to identify similar characteristics in each type of fire, concentrating primarily on the time required for the effect to manifest at the tactical level. Lastly, Operation OVERLORD is cited as a case example of how the effects of the three types of fires combined to provide synergy to Eisenhower, albeit unintentionally.

This monograph examines the relationship between battlefield synchronization and decision-making. Beginning with a review of rational analytical decision theory and Gary Klein's recognition primed decision theory, the monograph reviews the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) to determine if the MDMP and its resultant products are sufficient to achieve and maintain synchronization of the effects of distributed operations. In addition to the detailed review of the MDMP, this monograph considers the relationship between complexity, uncertainty, and synchronization. Klein's recognition primed decision-making (RPD) theory, based on extensive study of fire fighters, emergency medical service workers, and military commanders describes the intuitive manner which experienced people most frequently use to solve problems. RPD is a rapid process that foregoes extensive analysis to generate feasible solutions. When employing RPD techniques, decision-makers filter environmental cues and create a solution hypothesis using an analogy or a metaphor. This hypothesis is then tested using mental simulation to ensure it is acceptable. RPD is very effective when the decision-maker has substantial expertise in solving the type of problem at hand, however it is adversely affected by uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. RPD seeks satisfactory, rather than optimal, solutions. Rational analysis is a common alternative to RPD, seeking optimal solutions through deliberate, detailed analysis. Rational analysis provides the theoretical underpinnings of the MDMP. Rational analysis is a linear procedures used to solve complex, interdisciplinary problems that exceed the expertise of any single decision-maker. Rational analysis is a time consuming process because of the sequential nature of analysis and decision.

We performed this audit in response to a request from the Director, Joint Staff, to evaluate the management of the Joint Simulation System. The Joint Simulation System is a joint training, analysis, and evaluation software tool that will realistically represent the full range of military joint task force operations and provide a synthetic battlefield. The Joint Simulation System was designated an Acquisition Category ID program on December 16, 1999, and is projected to expend nearly $1.55 billion. This is the second audit report on the management of the Joint Simulation System. The first report addressed specific management concerns raised by the Director, Joint Staff. This report addresses the broader topic of overall financial and program management of the development and acquisition of the Joint Simulation System., Blank page in document.

Since the development of Industrial Age armies, the battlefield has increased in complexity and uncertainty. This is the result of tactical units dispersing on the battlefield for protection from increased weapon lethality and the need to sustain and maintain increasingly sophisticated and capable tactical units. Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S. Army began a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to integrate information technology into tactical units. The RMA integrates information technology (computer and communications) developed by the civilian sector to assist the tactical commander in his ability to command and control subordinate units in combat. The purpose of digitization is to use a technological method to maintain the Army s asymmetric advantage in command and control over other armies. This monograph asks the question: Can communication, automation and information technology (digitization) reduce the complexity and uncertainty for the commander and will it support his future decision-making? The monograph looks at technology as a reoccurring method used by military organizations to assist the commander in making timely decisions on the battlefield. The use of computers and communication networks to establish an information system (C4ISR) links the sensor to the decision-maker to the executor to make tactical units more efficient and effective on the battlefield. This monograph shows merit in the digitization of tactical units to reduce complexity and uncertainty in planning and executing tactical missions. The digital systems provide the commander, his subordinate commanders and staff the data and information to plan and execute in a more certain environment. The system providing the information allows the commander and his subordinates to concentrate on the analysis of the information instead of searching for data and displaying

The introduction of advanced technologies into the military, which is known as the "revolution in military affairs," is producing an opportunity for significant changes in the American military's paradigm for command and control. The future battlespace will require commanders to operate more efficiently and at a higher operations tempo, so that commanders will be able to use the advantages of dominant battlespace awareness to enhance what is known as "command-by intent." But the more likely outcome is a return to command-by-direction. A potential consequence of this change is that significant command functions will be made by machines that act, not as an assistant, but as the decision maker and executor which is known as the machine commander. However, the current U.S. military doctrine is inconsistent about the admissibility of such an entity, even though technological developments are on the threshold of delivering the components for constructing the first-generation machine commander. Furthermore, the same infrastructure that assists the traditional human commander creates a framework for using a machine commander. While resistance to this technology is expected, this is the proper time to examine the implications of a machine commander for military operations in the future., The original document contains color images.

The adoption of Information Operations as a Doctrine and the introduction of Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) in the U.S. Army have led to the creation of a new breed of warrior, skilled in the art of war and the science of technology. The integration of art and science is not new to the battlefield. The rapid pace of technological advancements defines today's battlefield. FA 30 Officers must become the operational integrators of the multiple disciplines that make up their area of responsibility. Each of these disciplines has become more automated and technical in recent years. Since the conflicts of tomorrow will not be fought alone, per JV 2010, we need to maximize the efforts of all the services in the development and delivery of this training. An integrated approach to training development will provide for better integration, more effective utilization of personnel and money, and produce increased synergy in training and execution. The training mechanisms, techniques, and delivery methods used should include synchronous and asynchronous methods. The objective is to maintain the skills of the officers in a continuously changing information environment while limiting the time they are removed from duty. Learning should be considered a life-long endeavor, not a requirement to be fulfilled

The Anti-armor Advanced Technology Demonstration (A2 ATD) is a series of Battlefield Distributed Simulation - Developmental (BDS-D) experiments focusing on A2 weapon systems evaluations. A2 ATD Experiments consist of a combination of one or more simulators coupled with modular semi-automated forces (MODSAF). Each combination requires Verification, Validation and Accreditation (VV & A) of: individual simulators, MODSAF, and the entire BDS-D simulation. Under the A2 ATD program, methodologies and tools have been designed and developed to assist in the VV&A process of individual simulators, MODSAF and the BDS-D simulation. This report outlines and describes the VV & A methodologies and tools developed and demonstrated for an individual simulator.

This report presents prototype methods for training and assessing selected command and control (C2) skills for future tactical commanders. The methods are designed to support training requirements for vehicle-based automated C2 systems and to overcome some of the current limitations in the training and assessment of tactical C2 skills. The C2 vignette method is designed to rapidly generate standardized, operationally based, C2 training and assessment exercises with a minimum of personnel resources. The situational awareness (SA) measures are designed for objective assessment of a tactical commander's ability to 'see the battlefield' and to support quantifying objectives for SA training programs. These prototype methods are provided as tools that can be adapted by training developers and analysts of future C2 systems at simulation-based training and assessment facilities

This morograph reviews how combat stress became recognized as a type of military impairment and how current Army doctrine addresses the first aid for this emotional wound. Secondly, an overview of combat stress is provided. This overview focuses on the individual, attempting to identify the sources of combat stress; the symptoms displayed by soldiers; methods of treatment; and techniques to control the effects of stress. This overview is then applied at the squad and vehicle crew level. How groups react to combat stress is discussed along with ways to counter its effects through reduction techniques, leadership and stability. Finally, conclusions are presented that attempt to chart a path in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel and leader development for stress management in future conflicts.

This thesis examines the validity of using miniature wargaming to study the American Civil War. The analysis specifically examines the miniature wargame rules, STARS*N*BARS III. The goal is to determine whether Civil War combat can be accurately simulated with miniature wargaming. The study first examines the simulation's rule mechanics to determine their historical soundness. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery combat are each examined in three sections: unit organization, maneuver, and firepower. Each section is subdivided into three areas for analysis: First, an overview of how the section is simulated; Second, an historical overview of the section; and, finally, a determination of historical accuracy. The rules are then applied in simulating two historical Civil War battles. The battle of New Market is gamed as a controlled reenactment the results of which are compared against the actual battle. The battle of Cedar Mountain is executed as a free-flowing wargame to evaluate historicity. The overall conclusion of the study is that, although not exact, acceptable accuracy can be achieved in simulating Civil War combat. Wargaming can be used to study history. In historical simulations, gaming and history complement each other in building a more complete understanding of the period's warfare.

The United States has possessed tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) since the early 1950's. Initially developed for deployment to Europe to offset the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's huge conventional superiority and to deter war, these weapons have never been used in combat. With the demise of the Cold War, a desire to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles, and the capability of sister services to employ TNW, if needed, the Army must decide whether it needs to retain its capability to employ TNW. Following a discussion of the evolution of TNW theory and a historical review of the Army's TNW capability, this monograph addresses whether or not the Army needs the capability to employ TNW in future war. The analysis suggests that the Army should relinquish its TNW capability because of a decreased threat from the Soviet Union, the availability of Air Force and Navy TNW to support a theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC), and to avoid redundant TNW capabilities in an era of fiscal constraints. Before the Army gives up its TNW capability, however, the Department of Defense must ensure that the Air Force and Navy can perform all TNW missions in support of a CINC.

A literature and market search of existing technology for the detection, identification, and quantification of microorganisms in water was conducted. Based upon the availability of technologies and their configurations, an assessment of the appropriate strategies to pursue for the near and long term development plans in development of the Rapid Field Bacteriology Test Kit was performed. Near term technologies to improve the Army's capability to detect microorganisms would appear to be essentially improvements in versatility and measurement of coliform indicator organisms. New chromogenic and fluorogenic indicator substances associated with new substrates appear to be best suited for test kit development either for quantitative membrane filter tests or presence/ absence and multiple fermentation tests. Test times, incubator requirements, and operator involvement appear to be similar to older technologies. Long term development would appear to favor such technologies as genetic probes with amplification of the hydridized nucleic acid materials of positive samples, and some immunological based systems such as enzyme linked, immuno-sorbent assays. In both cases, the major problems would appear to be sample preparation and development of signal strengths from the reactions which would allow the user to see results in 1 hour.

This monograph discusses how the field artillery should be organized and employed to provide close support to the heavy brigade on a mid to high intensity AirLand Battle-Future (ALBF) battlefield. The nature of the ALBF battlefield dictates that field artillery units will have to operate in a fast moving, nonlinear environment over long lines of supply while providing even more responsive support than currently necessary. Using the U.S. Army's armored field artillery battalions of World War II as an example, the monograph also considers current doctrine and emerging technologies in proposing possible solutions to the close support challenges of ALBF. Finally, the monograph notes that some changes to basic doctrine will be necessary if the field artillery is to successfully provide close fire support on the ALBF battlefield.

This bulletin is designed to discuss the Soviet antitank guided missile and to propose tactics and techniques that can be used to degrade its effectiveness. Before being able to counter a system, we must first know it. To this end, the SWATTER and SAGGER antitank guided missile systems are discussed in detail, by showing how they are employed, how they operate, how effective they are, how they are integrated into an offense or defense on the battlefield, and what strength and weaknesses they have. The countermeasures proposed are based on the combat results of Israeli techniques and a study of U.S. tactics vis-a-vis Soviet doctrine. Data in this bulletin is from Defense Intelligence Agency sources and from various official reports on the Yom Kippur War. Technical data on the SAGGER missile is derived from exploitation tests conducted by the U.S. Army Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama and, therefore, represents the system's capabilities under ideal conditions. Foreign sources state that under the normal stress of combat and faced by countermeasures, the SAGGER system's effectiveness is considerably reduced. Nonetheless, the system is capable of performing as shown, and technical improvements in SAGGER and other Soviet ATGMs are probable.

The U.S. Army recognizes WEATHER and TERRAIN as the two most important factors affecting the outcome on the modern battlefield. The AirLand Battlefield Environment (ALBE) Demonstration Program, a joint effort involving the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Army Materiel Command, is developing and demonstrating the software, sensors and methodology necessary to integrate a-priori and near-real-time environmental data into map products. These map products, or Tactical Decision Aids (TDAs), will provide the battlefield commander an increased capability to make tactical decisions and thereby defeat the enemy., This article is from 'Operational Decision Aids for Exploiting or Mitigating Electromagnetic Propagation Effects, AD-A215 917, p12-1 thru 12-4.