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This paper explores the intersection of poverty and recognition theory, grounded in Axel Honneth's framework, to offer a novel perspective on poverty as a multifaceted social phenomenon. It argues that poverty should be understood not only as a lack of material resources but also as a significant deficit in social recognition, encompassing respect and social esteem. By situating poverty within the institutionalized order of recognition, the paper highlights how poverty both stems from and contributes to a lack of recognition, leading to social exclusion, shame, and stigmatization. The theoretical approach is complemented by selected empirical studies that illustrate the lived experiences of poverty, emphasizing the emotional and psychological impacts that extend beyond material deprivation. While the paper advances the theoretical understanding of poverty, it also identifies gaps in the current research, particularly the need for more empirical studies to substantiate these claims. Future research could expand upon these insights through cross-cultural studies and empirical investigations that further explore the connection between recognition and poverty. This work lays the groundwork for a deeper exploration of poverty as a social phenomenon that transcends economic metrics, advocating for a more holistic approach to poverty research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analytical model of political ideologies offered in this article describes the connection between rising levels of distrust towards societal institutions in modern democracies and how such developments has challenged traditional and long-standing political parties in the Western world, such as the Danish political party Radikale Venstre [the Danish Social-Liberal Party]. Through use of a tripartite model of trust developed by Arman Teymouri Niknam during his interpretation of Mary Wollstonecraft's attitudes towards trust brought together with different aspects of Axel Honneth's social-philosophical framework, Teymouri Niknam and Leif Hemming Pedersen show how distrust may be able to act as a progressive tool in the creation of a more just, diverse and equal future and also how a virtuous and healthy form of democracy is an ideal that can be challenging to realise in practice. Teymouri Niknam and Hemming Pedersen are thus able to point to the ways in which a healthy democracy needs a balance of virtuous trust and distrust in order to achieve a good amount of both stability and progress, thus pointing to a difficult balancing act that many traditional political parties find themselves struggling with especially at this point in time in many contemporary democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article proposes to verify if it is possible to derive a theory of justice in Axel Honneth's thought. For this the question that guides this text is: how to normatively and socially ground a theory of justice in Axel Honneth's thought? The thesis to be defended is that it is possible to derive a theory of the experience of injustice from Honneth's thought, since his theoretical development allows us to identify experiences of non-recognition that lead to the development of social struggles. Therefore, we intend to show how there is a normative insufficiency in the philosopher's theory here analyzed. In order to achieve this objective, we propose to follow this path: we will star by making a brief resumption of Honneth's argumentative path, then we will to analyze the normative referrals proposed by the philosopher, to in the third moment think about justice as a relational greatness, at that moment bringing Rainer Forst's theory into the discussion. In the fourth moment we propose to think about the role of law in Honneth's thought. We will finalize with the presentation of our final considerations proposing that Honneth develops a theory of experiences of injustices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I present a critical reading of employee recognition programmes. I utilize an immanent approach, drawing on the same principles that it is claimed underpin such programmes, namely the desire of needful subjects for recognition in the form of self-respect and esteem, and an anticipation of the organizational relations that are themselves a prerequisite for such recognition. These principles are articulated through a reading of Axel Honneth's critical theory of intersubjective recognition as a necessary condition for what he refers to as fulfilled self-realization and social freedom. In doing so, I suggest that, rather than facilitating the conditions and benefits of intersubjective recognition, internal pathological tendencies towards reification, disrespect and compelled identification result in such programmes undermining the ontological conditions necessary for recognition to flourish, threatening both individual and organizational harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper explores the intersection of poverty and recognition theory, grounded in Axel Honneth’s framework, to offer a novel perspective on poverty as a multifaceted social phenomenon. It argues that poverty should be understood not only as a lack of material resources but also as a significant deficit in social recognition, encompassing respect and social esteem. By situating poverty within the institutionalized order of recognition, the paper highlights how poverty both stems from and contributes to a lack of recognition, leading to social exclusion, shame, and stigmatization. The theoretical approach is complemented by selected empirical studies that illustrate the lived experiences of poverty, emphasizing the emotional and psychological impacts that extend beyond material deprivation. While the paper advances the theoretical understanding of poverty, it also identifies gaps in the current research, particularly the need for more empirical studies to substantiate these claims. Future research could expand upon these insights through cross-cultural studies and empirical investigations that further explore the connection between recognition and poverty. This work lays the groundwork for a deeper exploration of poverty as a social phenomenon that transcends economic metrics, advocating for a more holistic approach to poverty research.

reseña del libro José Luis Moreno Pestaña y José Manuel Romero Cuevas (coords.). Recuperar el socialismo. Un debate con Axel Honneth. Madrid: Akal, 2022, 336 págs.

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Copyright of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales is the property of Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the summer of 2021, Axel Honneth was invited by the Centre for Social Critique Berlin to give the Walter Benjamin Lectures. The lectures have now been published in German under the title Der arbeitende Souverän (The Working Sovereign). In a conversation with the directors of the Centre for Social Critique, Rahel Jaeggi and Robin Celikates, Axel Honneth explains why he believes a political theory of labor is necessary, how the world of work has changed, and what opportunities and risks this entails for democratization processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Resumo Se é verdade que o pensamento político ocidental, em geral, tem conservado no anonimato o espaço doméstico e suas implicações público-políticas, mesmo depois das críticas feministas, também é verdade que este não parece ser o caso de Axel Honneth, pelo menos não em O direito da liberdade. Honneth se vale, neste livro, de um método todo próprio – a reconstrução normativa –, que lhe permite destilar critérios de justiça social diretamente das reivindicações normativas que se desenvolveram no interior de um conjunto multifacetado de esferas de ação, aí incluído o domínio das famílias. Neste artigo, procuro mostrar que um projeto normativo desse tipo não só promove a reflexão sobre as conexões entre justiça e famílias, como também suscita análises mais robustas e mais abrangentes sobre cenários nacionais específicos. Procuro ainda apresentar, por isso mesmo, alguns elementos para uma reconstrução normativa da esfera das famílias no Brasil, não sem chamar a atenção para o que parece um tanto negligenciado pelo próprio Honneth: as implicações muito desiguais da divisão sexual do trabalho para mulheres, homens e crianças. Procuro argumentar, por fim, que o programa honnethiano muito ganharia se também dialogasse com os estudos sobre divisão sexual do trabalho.

La entrevista al Prof. Dr. Axel Honneth del Instituto de Investigación Social de Fráncfort del Meno fue realizada por Nico Bobka y Sina Knoll para la Revista Soziologiemagazin el 21 de agosto de 2012 en Fráncfort, Alemania.

I argue that the problem of normative foundations is insoluble. I discuss how and why the apparent problem arose, particularly within the Frankfurt School. Then, I describe various theories of normative foundations and the criticisms that such theories have faced, such as ethno- and andro-centrism, imperialism, and the failure to fulfill their own aims. I make my main argument by way of an analogy: theories of knowledge have wrestled with the question of whether a "given"' could act as a certain foundation for knowledge. The conclusion is often that no given can function in that way, because the given, which supposedly does not require justification, is therefore necessarily unable to justify knowledge. For similar reasons, I argue, nothing can function as a normative foundation for a critical social theory, because any such normative foundation would have to both stand in no need of normative justification but also justify normative social criticism. I conclude by suggesting that more recent critical theory that does not focus on normative foundations can be understood as justifying their critique by appeal to what people do actually want, rather than what they should rationally want. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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El presente estudio propone la construcción de una aproximación al estado del arte sobre la Teoría del Reconocimiento, menosprecio moral y la educación ética y ciudadana en Colombia, procurando establecer los principales lineamientos conceptuales propuestos por Axel Honneth como principal representante contemporáneo de la Escuela de Frankfurt. Para este propósito se indagó en tesis de maestría y doctorado en bases de datos y repositorios universitarios que tuvieran como núcleo reflexivo educación ética y ciudadana, Axel Honneth, menosprecio y reconocimiento, desde los cuales estructuraron concepciones que nos acercan a los debates intelectuales que han girado en torno a sus génesis y su impacto en los contextos educativos colombianos. Estos estudios principalmente partieron de marcos metodológicos anclados en los supuestos cualitativos, desde la cuales viraron sus perspectivas en enfoques sociológicos, hermenéuticos e históricos.

Justice has been increasingly used as the main category in the discipline of political theory to investigate the normative foundation of public life and the legitimacy of political institutions, practices and processes recent years. The normative authority of political justice requires moral justification and groundwork for its connnection with the moral self. This article will discuss this problem of moral justification of political justice by focusing on John Rawls' distributive and Axel Honneth's recognitive theories of justice. Rawls' justice as fairness, which expresses the moral background culture of liberal-democratic societies as abstract, universal and formal principles through reinterpretating the model of social contract, is not specifically concerned with the constitution of moral self and how political subjects are normatively related themselves with an idea of justice. Honneth does indeed give special attention to this moral dimension of justice by linking justice with the ideas of the good and autonomy through the theory of recognition. However his cultural-institutional interpretation of the good and justice is burdened with its own particularity, parochialism and limits. The current article argues that the limits and tensions of both theories of justice originate in taking the autonomous self as the premise for their ideas on morality, justice and subjectivity. The article also argues that this premise of autonomous self should be overcome in order to understand the constitution of moral self and its significance for developing an idea of political justice as a normative and critical understanding of public and political life.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article establishes a dialogue between the philosopher Axel Honneth and the feminist scholars Silvia Federici and Nancy Fraser. The aim is to emphasize the limits of Honneth's philosophical reflections on the normative dimension of the family developed in Freedom's Right. First, I present his ideas on how a normative expectation of social freedom permeates familial relations. According to him, after women entered the labour market, a normative notion of symmetrical participation in the family was produced. I aim to defend here that, whether normative or not, this idea of family is not only limited but also false, since it does not consider the dilemmas of social reproduction whose consequences contradict social freedom. Next, I develop Federici's and Fraser's analyses of how families have always faced conflicts concerning the requirements of social reproduction and have produced diverse forms of subjugation that go against the very idea of the family as an unquestioned sphere of freedom. It is necessary to analyse how families produce new forms of subjugation to transform familial relations into truly possible ways of being socially free – and this requires making visible some figures who structure the family, such as nannies, friends and grandparents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article argues that Honneth's idea of reconstructive critique represents a type of immanent critique. Starting from the objection raised by Rahel Jaeggi, who considers the reconstructive critique to be a genre of internal criticism devoid of any transformative negativity, it seeks to show, on the contrary, that Honneth's notion of "surplus of validity" plays a role of transcendence within the historical reality, which could explain his understanding of reconstructive critique as immanent one. In the second part, the paper displays how Honneth applies this conception of critique to solve the division within Critical Theory, induced by Habermas's use of the idea of rational reconstruction, which would have split off the tasks of founding the normative criteria and discovering immanently elements for the social transformation. In the third part, the category of surplus of validity is investigated in its function of enlightening possibilities of transformation following an "universal-particular dialectic". In its final part, the paper addresses some conceptual difficulties in Honneth's attempt to clarify the systematic value and philosophical meaning of the surplus of validity within the framework of normative reconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes up Axel Honneth's suggestion that we, in the 21st century Western world, should revisit the Marxian idea of reification; unlike Honneth, however, this paper applies reification to the ways in which humans relate to non-human animals, particularly in the context of scientific experiments. Thinking about these practices through the lens of reification, the paper argues, yields a more helpful understanding of what is regarded as problematic in those practices than the standard animal rights approaches. The second part of the paper offers ways of overcoming reification that go beyond Honneth's idea of recognition by introducing Iris Murdoch's idea of attention. This proposed strategy makes the ethical relevance of reification more salient and makes it possible to counter reification through a practice such as attention which, unlike recognition, can be consciously established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Resumo O artigo procura explorar algumas das relações que atravessam dois dos campos da vida social investigados por Axel Honneth em O direito da liberdade: as famílias e o direito. Para tanto, lança mão da reconstrução normativa, que permite esboçar o desenvolvimento geral de esferas funcionalmente diferenciadas e observar as relações que intercorrem entre umas e outras a ponto de impactar a realização interna de suas promessas normativas. As famílias constituídas por lésbicas, gays, bissexuais, travestis e transexuais aparecem, aqui, como indicadores tanto da especialização como da democratização das relações familiares. Aparecem, também, como caso paradigmático das relações que intercorrem entre famílias e direito.

Proponho comparar e aproximar as fundamentações normativas para o socialismo de Axel Honneth e John Rawls. Parto, para tanto, de alguns traços da teoria de Honneth desenvolvidos em seu escrito sobre socialismo e dos próprios contrastes estabelecidos por ele frente ao projeto de Rawls. Destrincho a comparação em duas frentes: a primeira, tratando do conteúdo normativo das noções de liberdade de ambos os autores, a segunda, tratando do que Honneth e outros autores da tradição da teoria crítica chamam de base social ou imanente das teorias. Da primeira, concluo que o contraste estabelecido por Honneth entre o seu ideal de liberdade social e o ideal de liberdade encontrado na filosofia política de Rawls não encontra respaldo em uma análise acurada da proposta rawlsiana, e que a filosofia de Rawls também pode fornecer uma normatividade crítica para o Socialismo. Da segunda, concluo, a despeito da crítica de Honneth de que haveria uma deficiência ‘prático-política’ na filosofia de Rawls, que é possível encontrar na obra deste, de uma forma mais ou menos similar àquela do autor alemão, os três elementos que Honneth julga serem necessários para uma teoria crítica que não queira ser apenas uma crítica ‘puramente normativa’ da sociedade.

Dominant approaches to researching cleaners' experiences of invisibility and recognition have tended to focus on either the structural determinants of invisibility, such as outsourcing or 'dirty work' status, or the ways in which workers seek recognition as a strategy for managing taint. This article uses Honneth's concept of intersubjective recognition as a basis for bringing together structure- and agency-oriented approaches through a focus on the ways in which cleaners' recognition experiences arise from historically specific contexts that are both found and made by cleaners. The article illustrates the usefulness of Honneth's theory through a comparison of the intersubjective recognition experiences of Australian school cleaners working in different work paradigms in two historical periods, public service cleaners in the 1910s–1990s and outsourced cleaners in the 2000s–2020s. The case studies contribute new empirical findings concerning patterns of cleaner recognition across all three dimensions theorised by Honneth – love, rights and solidarity – and the significance of shared horizons of purpose between cleaners and other workplace actors for enabling intersubjective recognition. Theoretically, the paper advances the concept of 'dense' and 'sparse' intersubjective recognition landscapes as a lens for understanding the changing nature and sources of cleaner invisibility and recognition over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article retraces and discusses the philosophical itinerary of Axel Honneth, from the groundbreaking book Struggle for Recognition up to the recent essays Freedom's Right and The Idea of Socialism. In the first section, I examine Honneth's programmatic concept of social pathology in relation to Ernst Cassirer's idea of the secularisation of theodicy (i. e. the attribution of responsibility for human suffering to society) and to the enlightenment legacy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In the second section, after assessing Honneth's position in the tradition of critical theory, I analyse his philosophical views. I identify two different theoretical frameworks in Honneth's work: on the one hand, the theory of the struggle for recognition; on the other hand, the recent theory of social freedom. While the first is grounded in a formal and allegedly universal anthropology, the second draws on the Hegelian doctrine of the ethical life and develops a historicist and internalist model of reconstructive social criticism. Finally, in the third section, I critically address the "divinisation of the social" entailed in Honneth's project of social pathologies' critique, and argue that Honneth's trust in the normative power of intersubjectivity might be excessive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a Confucian account of recognition. In contrast to contemporary recognition discourse (inspired by the Hegelian account of recognition) which emphasizes equal and reciprocal recognition, Confucianism regards the virtuous agent as one who affords recognition to others without seeking recognition for themselves. There is reason to take seriously the Confucian alternative to contemporary recognition discourse. Critical scholars of colonialism have pointed out how the politics of recognition between colonizer and colonized perpetuates the structure of unequal recognition. The comparative perspective on recognition that Confucianism offers will highlight the problematic assumptions that, I argue, actively shape misrecognition in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will be dedicated to the developments of Axel Honneth, The struggle for recognition, Redistribution or recognition?, And The right to freedom, with the aim to approaching the consideration of it around social justice as recognition. Faced with critical readings that have sustained a displacement or abandonment of the centrality of the conflict in Honneth's work, giving greater importance to the institutional dimension, that is, a disregard for the concept of struggle for the purpose of greater interest in the institutionality of life social, here an alternative reading is proposed based on the idea of the coexistence of two times in Axel Honneth's theory: struggle and institutionalization constitute two equally important dimensions of Honneth's understanding of social justice.

Since the early modern period, the vast majority of philosophers who have written on contempt have understood it as a denial of respect. But there has been considerable disagreement about precisely what kind of respect we deny people when we contemn them. Contemporary philosophers who defend contempt as a morally appropriate attitude tend to understand it as a denial of what Stephen Darwall calls appraisal respect, while early modern writers, who all believe that contemning others constitutes a serious moral wrong, seem to understand it more as a denial of recognition respect. In this paper, I argue that neither of these understandings of contempt hits the mark and that we do better to conceptualize it as a denial of recognition in the sense articulated by Axel Honneth and by other critical theorists who have been influenced by his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ethical and political thinking of Axel Honneth—German philosopher and leading scholar in the third generation of Frankfurt School Critical Theorists—is considered an inclusive theory that accepts the other. Honneth attempts to present a theory that is neither too abstract so that no conception of "good life" can endure, nor is too thick and substantive, and thus exclusionary. He attempts to demonstrate a theory in the middle. However, his theory has also been subject to the criticism that it rests on an ideological and exclusionary basis. Nevertheless, most such criticisms have their root in the entanglement of the second and third spheres of recognition and thus accept Honneth’s distinction between private and public life, according to which the former contains an immanent and pre-political logic. As a result, except for a few feminist philosophers, criticisms of ideological recognition are confined to the second and third spheres, respectively the realm of human rights and societal solidarity. By contrast, this article explores the ideological predicaments of the first sphere of recognition—familial love— by rejecting the private-public distinction and advocating for broader love- based recognition. Eliminating this distinction will help Honneth's account of the first sphere of recognition to consider the asymmetrical power plays and ideological predicaments between family members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primarily developed within political philosophy, comprehensive theories of justice are often considered abstract and transcendental for sociological, political, or economic applications and thus, often require further conceptual and analytical clarifications. This need is apparent in recognition theory, a contemporary theory of justice pioneered by Axel Honneth. In it, he underlines the importance of recognition in intersubjective and mutual relations with significant others, legal institutions, and wider society, the denial of which leads to particular forms of injustice, conceptualised as moral injuries. To overcome the functional weakness inherent in recognition theory's relatively abstract nature, this article clarifies the distinction between its "space" and "object" of evaluation to advance its practical usefulness in assessing disadvantage. In doing so, it first examines the theory of recognition as well as the concept of moral injury and addresses issues researchers and practitioners need to be attentive to concerning the categorisation of the good, the promise of recognition, and the pressing problem of unwarranted claims. Having taken these clusters of concerns into account, this article identifies (1) deformative identity formation, (2) invisibilisation, and (3) stigmatization as morally injurious acts and proposes three dimensions of evaluation, namely physical integrity, moral accountability, and personal autonomy, upon which certain forms of injustices that disadvantaged individuals or groups experience can be assessed within the normative framework of the theory of recognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El propósito de este artículo es revisar algunos pasajes claves del andamiaje teórico de Emmanuel Renault para comprender la contribución de la psicología al proyecto de teoría crítica en su tradición frankfurtiana. Se explora la recepción que hace Renault de la obra temprana de Axel Honneth, y cómo esta es continuada por Renault desde un modelo de teoría social en un sentido amplio, de tipo dialógica y correctiva entre las disciplinas, que enfatiza la función fundamental de la producción de conocimiento sobre el mundo social para desarrollar la crítica social. Se analiza la manera en que ambos han recurrido a la psicología para sus desarrollos teóricos, en la teoría de la lucha por el reconocimiento, y las actualizaciones efectuadas por Renault, especialmente considerando uno de los destinos posibles de las experiencias sociales negativas: el sufrimiento social. Este complejo teórico es sintetizado en la articulación entre una concepción pragmática de la identidad y el psicoanálisis, para revisar luego cómo el psicoanálisis y algunas líneas y autores desde la psicología han significado para Honneth y Renault un apoyo para la formulación de sus respectivas teorías. Finalizamos con algunas reflexiones para nuestros contextos de injusticia.

AI systems have often been found to contain gender biases. As a result of these gender biases, AI routinely fails to adequately recognize the needs, rights, and accomplishments of women. In this article, we use Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition to argue that AI’s gender biases are not only an ethical problem because they can lead to discrimination, but also because they resemble forms of misrecognition that can hurt women’s self-development and self-worth. Furthermore, we argue that Honneth’s theory of recognition offers a fruitful framework for improving our understanding of the psychological and normative implications of gender bias in modern technologies. Moreover, our Honnethian analysis of gender bias in AI shows that the goal of responsible AI requires us to address these issues not only through technical interventions, but also through a change in how we grant and deny recognition to each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]