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(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 121-129 | European Forum Insight of 18 June 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Signature of international agreements: the (in)consistent practice. - III. Solving the indeterminacy of art. 218 TFEU. - iii.1. Scope, institutional balance and sincere cooperation. - iii.2 Signature of non-binding agreements. - IV. Case C-551-21: insights and commentaries. - iv.1. Understanding the arguments. - iv.2. The Court’s Findings. - V. Conclusions | (Abstract) The current Insight analyses the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Case C-551/21, which up-held the Commission's claim regarding its right to exercise the external act of treaty signature. The deci-sion sheds light on the signature procedure outlined in art. 218 TFEU and adds to previous cases, clari-fying the proper contours and roles of each institution in relation to the procedure set in the article. An initial observation of the practice appears to indicate the Permanent Representative of the country holding the Council's presidency as the responsible party to sign international agreements with third parties representing the Union. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals a lack of consistent and standardised practice. The judgment correctly recalibrates the institutional balance and is coherent with the reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, which sought to bring about an evolution of the principles of the Treaties without a formal amendment process.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 145-152 | European Forum Insight of 25 June 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The signature of international agreements into EU law and the emergence of a practice. - III. Breaking a taboo. - IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The European Union has always concluded international agreements with third countries and international organisations as an integral component of its external action. In contrast to its predecessors, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a uniform procedural framework for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in art. 218 TFEU with the aim of simplification and coherence between all EU external policies, including the CFSP. However, the act of signing international agreements has remained a grey area, shared between the Commission and the Council as a result of a well-established practice within EU institutional governance. On 9 April 2024, the European Court of Justice brought the Council back to a literal interpretation of the EU Treaties, removing any doubt about the role of the Commission in representing the EU externally and crystallising the legal authority of the sole Commission to sign agreements on behalf of the EU.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(1), 333-343 | European Forum Insight of 22 June 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The scope of art. 218 TFEU. - III. The internal procedure for the conclusion of international agreements by the CJEU. - IV. The different role of the institutions involved. - V. The peculiarity of some Hague Conventions on private international law. - VI. Council's internal voting rules. - VII. Conclusions. | (Abstract) Setting the general procedure to be followed for the conclusion of international agreements, art. 218 TFEU allocates the powers of the different institutions involved and - compared to the pre-Lisbon legal framework - strengthens the role of the European Parliament. It is therefore with respect to this provision that the status and prerogatives of the EU vis-à-vis third States must be analysed, as it frames the lifecycle of the international agreements and the rules the EU institutions are bound to follow in this regard. However, while its pattern seems suitable whenever the EU must conclude an international agreement which entails a positive expression of position, doubts arise as regards those conventions which foresee an accession, based on a non-objection mechanism. This Insight explores, in the light of the duty to practice mutual sincere cooperation stemming from art. 13 TEU, some practical disadvantages of its application and the controversial issue of the Council's internal voting rules.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2017 2(1), 303-309 | European Forum Insight of 9 April 2017 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The existence of an international agreement concluded between States. - III. Characteristics of international organizations and their effect on the EU-Turkey Statement: the competent organs. - IV. Changes in the acquis communautaire as evidence of the conclusion of an international agreement. - V. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) The EU-Turkey Statement has undergone multiple analyses regarding issues of human rights and refugee law. One of the most controversial matters among scholars is its nature as an international agreement. This insight will analyse the legal nature of this statement, on the basis of the international law of treaties, the law of international organizations and EU law, in order to conclude on the difficulties considering it as an international agreement.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(2), 751-758 | European Forum Insight of 4 May 2016 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The judgment of the Court and the opinion of the Advocate General. - II.1. Arguments of the parties. - II.2. The judgment of the Court: international tribunals as regular courts? - II.3. The opinion of Advocate General Sharpston. - III. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) The judgment in case C-73/14, Council v. Commission, forms part of the saga of inter-institutional disputes arising after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in the context of EU external representation. The Court in this case, in line with Advocate General Sharpston, excludes the applicability of Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU to the submission of statements by the EU before judicial bodies established by international agreements. In this case, the Court established the applicability of Art. 335 TFEU as a sufficient legal basis for the Commission to represent the EU in international judicial proceedings. Insofar as there were no policy-making choices in the submission of the statements for ITLOS advisory opinion in Case No 21, Art. 16, para. 1, TEU had been fully respected. This was also the case for Art. 13, para. 2, TEU and the duty of loyalty, insofar as the Commission had duly consulted the Council and taken the observations from the FISH and COMAR groups into account.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2016 1(1), 115-125 | European Forum Insight of 16 April 2016 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Decisions authorising the signature of non-binding agreements as acts "intended to produce legal effects". - III. Clarifying the respective scope of Arts 16 and 17 TEU. - IV. Concluding remarks. | (Abstract) The increasing tendency of the EU to resort to non-binding agreements in its external action raises the sensitive and still unclear question of the distribution of powers between EU institutions when adopting them. In light of the post-Lisbon provisions of primary law in the field of external action, this Insight attempts to clarify how to interpret Arts 16 and 17 TEU when demarcating the scope both of the external representation of the Union in the hands of the Commission, and that of the decision-making power of the Council, as regards the adoption by the Union of non-binding instruments. The Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in Case C-660/13 serves as the guiding thread of this analysis. In this Opinion, it is suggested that the Court of Justice annul the Commission's decision to authorise the signature of an addendum to the EU-Switzerland Memorandum of Understanding on a Swiss financial contribution to the new Member States of the EU, due to the breach of the principle of distribution of powers between institutions, enshrined in Art. 13, para. 2, TEU, insofar that the Commission signed this political agreement without the Council's prior authorisation.