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This article presents global trends in arms production, building on the most recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In 2022, despite Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and heightened tension around the world, arms production fell in real terms by 3.5 per cent to $597 billion. The decrease was mostly due to the performance of US companies – still plagued by the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic – and not offset by increases in other regions. Notwithstanding the global decrease, arms revenue was still 14 per cent higher than in 2015, the year in which SIPRI started including Chinese arms companies. Procurement plans for the replenishment of stockpiles and modernisation of military equipment deployed by states around the world are mostly not yet reflected in the revenue of the arms industry. In addition to the lengthy time lag between orders and deliveries, many companies have faced challenges in scaling up production. However, high order intakes suggest that arms revenue may rise significantly in the years ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relevance of this study is determined by the need to identify the consequences of the war for the economy and the prospects for the development of military-economic relations between Ukraine and other countries. The purpose of this study was to investigate the dynamics of the volume and structure of Ukraine’s foreign economic relations during the wartime period and to outline future ways of expanding Ukraine’s foreign activities. To fulfil this purpose, the following methods were used: statistical data analysis; comparison; graphical; and data generalisation. The main results obtained in this paper include the identification of the dynamics of volumes and goods that occupy a considerable part of Ukraine’s exports and imports after the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2014; analysis of the geographical structure of foreign trade and trends in trade with the European Union in 2013-2022; assessment of the commodity and geographical structure of exports and transfers of defence goods from Ukraine in 2014-2021; determining Ukraine’s share in the total volume of exports and imports of defence-related items, the main consumers of exported products, and tracking changes in this share over 2018-2022 compared to 2013-2017; analysis of defence imports in the first half of 2023; substantiation of the proposal to develop the production of defence items, namely drones and long-range missiles, which can be used both to increase the protection of Ukraine’s territory and to strengthen the country’s position in the international market for the export of weapons and equipment during and after the war. The results and conclusions are of practical importance for the Government of Ukraine in developing areas for the development of the country’s defence sector and military-economic relations with other countries

Among European arms producers, MBDA represents the most advanced example of industrial integration and cross-border specialisation, thanks to a unique model of French–British centres of competence. However, it constitutes an exception inside the European defence technological and industrial base. It is therefore relevant to analyse why MBDA was able to achieve such consolidation process from fragmented competences of the European missile industry and to merge once competing companies despite the lack of a unique regulatory framework at the European level. This article presents the main features of MBDA today. It analyses the consolidation process in the European missile industry that created MBDA. It underlines how cooperative programmes provided a critical impulse in favour of industrial consolidation and the specialisation of MBDA sites across Europe. It explains how technological and industrial assets were reshuffled across European borders. It focuses on exports as a key dimension for MBDA's model. Finally, it concludes by exploring the limits that result from the lack of a unified regulatory framework in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arms produced in Adjara and Guria have long been barely described in Russian studies of Cauсasian historical arms, although there are numerous items of Adjarian and Gurian production in private and museum collections. The region of Adjara and Guria (located in the southwestern part of Georgia on the eastern coast of the Black Sea) included a part of historical territory of Shavsheti Machakheli, Adjara, Lower and Upper Guria, eastern Lazistan (currently part of Georgia) and a part of modern Turkey. There are numerous traces of medieval iron production by smelting local ores in the region. By the second half of the XVIII century, arms production had already been at a sufficiently high level. In the XIX century, there was a dozen arms production centres which were reflected in toponyms and surnames. Produced arms were sold both in local and external markets. Later, arms production was reduced and then completely disappeared due to three reasons: radical reforms in Ottoman Empire; a phenomenon of Muhajirism; increasing import of foreign arms which practically destroyed domestic trade. The author examines the history of arms production in Adjara and Guria, analyses its specific features arising from local political and religious factors and lists production centres.

The article covers the issue of production and decoration of arms by Kabardian craftsmen in the XVIII century. The topic is determined by the fact that Circassians (also Cherkashenins, Cherkess) in Russian historical records of this period might have been a collective term for numerous representatives of Adyghe nation including Kabardians, Trans-Kuban and Black Sea Adyghe. Based on this probability, the author attempts to identify origins of craftsmen through analysis of written sources and documents. The article emphasizes the importance of economic factors in the study of arms production in the region and the population (i.e., its nationalities, class division, etc.) which used to create demand for arms. In this regard, closely relevant is the issue of temporary labor migration (i.e., otkhodnichestvo) of craftsmen which might indicate both competition and a lack of stable demand in local villages. Such craftsmen travelled to Russian fortress-cities which provided security for developing crafts and trade as well as stable demand created by locals, neighbouring people who visited these cities and merchants. In addition to existing literature on Russian-Caucasian relations, the author introduces new previously unpublished historical materials.

When it comes to states arming themselves, it has become axiomatic among scholars of comparative defence industries that go-it-alone production is no longer an option for most. The processes associated with defence-industrial globalization combined with the ever-rising costs of producing leading-edge weapons systems present huge disincentives for autarky in armaments. Against these strong headwinds, however, India has recently launched, as part of a broader, multi-sector initiative called Make in India, a renewed effort to achieve greater self-reliance in armaments production. This article first places India's recent defence indigenization efforts within wider discussions about states' armament strategies and trends in global arms production. Secondly, it contextualizes the drivers behind New Delhi's latest attempts to transform itself from leading arms importer to major producer (and significant exporter) against the backdrop of past efforts which have yielded little but disappointment. Third, it explicates the main facets of the current strategy for defence-industrial indigenization and gauges its chances for success. To preview the main findings, we argue that self-reliance in armaments via indigenous production will almost certainly continue to allude India because of systemic, structural and technological constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A number of mining operations sought Molybdenum at Black Range, near Bega, New South Wales, particularly around the time of the First World War. Their story and their remains today provide a local insight; into this aspect of Australian mining history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's lifting of its arms export ban through the Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology has opened up new strategic opportunities for its policy-makers to reinforce existing, and build new, security partnerships. Japan still retains the intent to sustain and develop an indigenous defense production base, now through international collaboration rather than mainly autonomous production, and the leverage this may provide to hedge within and outside the US-Japan alliance framework. However, this paper demonstrates that Japan's principal objective through international arms transfers is very much to use this as a mechanism to strengthen Japan's integration of capabilities into the US-Japan alliance and overall US ‘rebalance’ strategy in East Asia. Japan's main moves in developing an arms transfer strategy have either revolved around US-Japan bilateral projects, or cooperation with US allies and partners. Moreover, Japan's continuing deficiencies in military technology and experience of international collaboration on the government and private sector levels means that its arms transfer strategy remains quite limited in ambition and especially implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study analyzes the determinants of arms production in 15 countries using annual panel data from 1997 to 2002. The results suggest that real GDP per capita, military expenditures, arms exports, and arms imports are positively related to arms production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the 16th to the 18th centuries, the Danish-Norwegian state sponsored the development of military industry essentially capable of covering all needs of the army and navy. Most establishments continued into the 20th century. This industry was concentrated in Denmark, despite the generally more favourable industrial environment in Norway. The military industry was, however, tightly integrated with the military itself and thus located within reach of the main base in Copenhagen. Despite the importance of private management and, increasingly, private ownership, the industry existed as a spinoff, dependent on the expertise of officers as well as the custom of the army and navy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study analyses the performance of the productivity of the main industrial subsectors composing the security and defence technological and industrial base (SDTIB) in Spain from 1996 to 2009. Accordingly, we have used the non-parametric data envelopment analysis and bootstrapping techniques to compute Malmquist productivity indexes that allow us to split productivity growth into efficiency change and technical progress. The results obtained show productivity improvement in the SDTIB as a whole due mainly to advances in technology and to a lesser extent to the contribution of technical efficiency. The bootstrap approach yields further evidence, as for many cases, productivity growth or decline, is not statistically significant. This is the first time a study of this kind has been carried out on the production process of this sector in Spain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan has long stressed the concept of self-sufficiency in arms production and procurement, and in this respect has made considerable progress in expanding military research and development (R&D) efforts and in building up a local defense industry. At the same time, as the demands of high-tech warfare have escalated, the gaps and deficiencies in the island's homegrown defense industry have also increased and become more conspicuous. Consequently, over the past decade Taiwan has increasingly preferred foreign-particularly US-weapons systems in order to meet the island's critical self-defense requirements. There are obvious risks to Taipei becoming too reliant on foreign arms suppliers, particularly in terms of guaranteeing security of supply (ironically, the very insecurities that drove Taiwan to enter into arms manufacturing in the first place). The island, however, appears to have few viable alternatives, particularly in the face of a manifest Chinese military threat. At issue is whether Taiwan's increased dependencies on US. weapons systems might prompt Beijing to feel so threatened by apparently growing US.-Taiwanese military ties that China will be forced to react militarily This article argues that the current US.-Taiwanese arms-transfer relationship is not strong enough to constitute a major challenge to Chinese interests and would not prompt such an extreme reaction. Taiwan growing dependencies on US. weaponry does deal Taipei some interesting cards to play against Washington, however in particular by strengthening militarypolitical ties between the United States and Taiwan. At the same time, Taipei cannot count on a blank check from the United States in terms of arms sales, nor can the island's defense industry necessarily afford or absorb the weapons systems and military technologies Taipei craves. So long as Washington continues to exert reasonable self-restraint in arms and technology transfers to Taiwan, China will likely accept the status quo, despite public and vociferous protestations to the contrary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major determinants of third world military industrialization operate at the domestic, regional, and global levels. I summarize these and then examine their relative importance by analyzing time-series cross-section data for twelve arms producers from 1968 to 1990. Overall, there is considerable support for the various factors identified in the literature. However, my findings do highlight the importance of opportunity, perhaps more than willingness, as an explanation for changing levels of third tier arms production. Resolution of the tensions that drive regional militarization and the eruption of military conflict should have some positive effects on restraining the expansion of arms production capacity. But there also seems to be a certain inevitability to the process, a process that is limited primarily by states' resources, industrial capacities, and access to weapons-production technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses and presents the determinants and directions of Chinese acquisitions of weapons and weapons technology from abroad, focusing on major conventional weapons and their relevant technologies. Following a brief development of historical themes which continue to affect Chinese military‐related imports today, the study considers the principal contemporary domestic and international determinants which contribute to shaping Chinese arms import policies, and the type of foreign arms acquisitions likely to result from those policies. In analysing past and current security policies, weapons development policies, foreign weapons procurement policies, the study reaches four main conclusions. First, a wide range of problems — including prohibitive cost, political and bureaucratic infighting, absorptive capacities, managerial and administrative roadblocks, and supplier controls — stand in the way of a Chinese military modernization strategy based on foreign procurement. Second, with the exception of Sino‐Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, Chinese arms and arms technology acquisitions from abroad have consistently been relatively modest, sporadic, and problematic. Even in the case of current transfers from such suppliers as Israel and Russia, it is unclear the extent to which these countries are willing to part with significant amounts of top‐of‐the‐line systems and technologies. Third, the impact upon international security of the improvement of Chinese military capability through the acquisition of foreign weapons and technology is not likely to manifest itself in violent military disruptiveness, but rather in the nuanced and steady expansion of Chinese power and influence in parts of East Asia around China's periphery. Fourth, the military capabilities of China's arms clients will probably not be significantly improved through the acquisition of foreign weapons and weapons technologies by China. In sum, Chinese military modernization through arms and technology imports will continue to be a slow and painful process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]