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This essay analyzes on the nexus between arms control and religious tolerance during the French Wars of Religion. As part of the peace process, royal and provincial authorities attempted to implement arms control measures on French subjects irrespective of confessional allegiance during the 1560s, before arms control mutated into a tool of confessional hegemony from the 1570s onwards. To support this observation, the Valentinois-Diois region of southeastern France serves as the geographical focus for this analysis. Although authorities in the region could never remove all illicit weapons, they carried out royal legislation on arms control with vigor to promote peace. The situation changed as repeated warfare in the region, starting in 1567, prompted many communities to abandon measures of religious tolerance, including biconfessional arms control. Henceforth, arms prohibitions reflected local religious power dynamics, whereby only those of the majority confession could legally possess arms for local defense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With rising tensions between the United States on one side, and China and Russia on the other, the three countries have grown mutually accusatory about some testing activities they conduct to maintain and modernize their nuclear arsenals, with allegations made by the United States focusing on very low-yield fission experiments. In a world where trust in the nonproliferation regime is weakening and most bilateral arms control measures have been suspended, many experts fear that recriminations over very low-yield tests could spark a new escalation spiral to full-scale nuclear tests. Transparency measures could diffuse the suspicions around these tests and strengthen the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which is largely being complied with but still not legally in force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia is a strong supporter of global nuclear (and conventional) arms control and non-proliferation measures and has contributed significantly to their development; but it sees the world, strategically, through the eyes of a nuclear weapon state which, it believes, applies its nuclear deterrence doctrine also to the defence of Australia. It is thus effectively locked into what is essentially a nuclear weapon state’s view of the future that pays lip-service to nuclear disarmament as a distant ideal. Australian defence strategists routinely emphasise the importance of the US nuclear guarantee. Australia is though only likely to be attacked with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear war in which the United States is already engaged. The concept of extended nuclear deterrence thus assumes an essentially circular character by purporting to protect Australia from the nuclear threat that Australia’s alliance with its provider invites. Meanwhile, Australia is one of the few countries in its own region that have yet to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This paper argues that—US hostility to the Treaty notwithstanding—Australian membership of the TPNW would be consistent with its generally positive disarmament record and compatible with its alliance commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the international institutions in which negotiations have often taken place have been challenged by increased conflict among member states in the early 21st century. Multilateral international institutions function best when common interests are viewed as paramount by the state parties, because they allow the state parties to negotiate structures and processes that serve their shared interests and values. The paper analyzes the difficulties in managing international conflicts in the UN, osce, nato, and EU since 2000 due in part to the inability to achieve consensus within fractured and stalemated institutions. These problems have increasingly limited the role of these institutions in managing some of the most dangerous global conflicts, including on arms control and disarmament and managing the Russian war in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America's potential strategic disengagement from Europe is leading key European powers – in particular, France, the United Kingdom and Germany – to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in European security in the absence of extended US nuclear deterrence. Here leading French, British and German analysts offer anticipatory assessments of their countries' national perceptions, policies and preferences with respect to formulating a common European approach. They discuss, respectively, France's tentative overture to its European allies, Britain's willingness against broad constraints, and the tension between Germany's entrenched caution and its rising threat perceptions. While there are options that could produce a viable European nuclear deterrent, they would require a degree of national flexibility and European financial support that is currently difficult to imagine. This reality check should give European nuclear hawks pause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal war is a leading cause of death around the world. We argue for the inclusion of this topic in security studies and adapt a bargaining framework to shed light on why criminal groups fight or agree to peace. We propose that shocks to relative coercive capacity cause criminal war. This escalation in violent conflict proves more likely when criminal groups face greater difficulty negotiating: when they are more factionalized, less rooted in their territory, and in strategic rivalry with a greater number of rivals. Our empirical strategy leverages a critical, policy-relevant shock to access to weapons following an arms control repeal, and novel city block-level, monthly data on criminal organization traits, turf, and violence over ten years to understand how changes in coercive inputs upset the existing balance of power among criminal groups and shaped patterns of war and truce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions are adversarial conventional arms control agreements (CAC) in Europe successful or unsuccessful? This study aims to identify the conjunctural causes of conventional arms control success in Europe from the end of World War One to the present based on a dataset of 22 cases. It applies a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to assess arms control success and failure resulting from four conditions: great power rivalry, national limitations, demilitarisation and delegation. Few studies have attempted to determine if CAC agreements in Europe have been successful and determine possible explanations for their outcome. This study's results suggest that national limitations between great power rivals and the absence of delegation with great power rivalry are more likely to result in agreement failure. Delegation may be important for agreement success when great powers or buffer zones are involved. These findings offer insights for future CAC agreements in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The control of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) has been an emerging issue in international arms control in recent years. With the rapid development of AWS and the widespread militarization of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, there are an increasing number of potential risks that could eventually threaten all humankind. Despite AWS's advantages of military force enhancement, the legal and ethical risks, challenges, and implications for international security cannot be ignored. In the current international environment, strengthening legal regulation of the research and development (R&D) of AWS could be an effective way to mitigate the risks AWS poses. Despite the significance of the 11 Guiding Principles proposed by the 2019 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), the problems of overly broad provisions and lack of enforceability are also recognized. This paper further analyzes the legal review mechanism and accountability mechanism for the R&D of AWS. By elaborating on these two regulatory mechanisms, critical issues and challenges in the R&D of AWS are identified, and relevant recommendations are made with a view to compliance by States with international humanitarian law (IHL) in their activities to the R&D of AWS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zeitschrift für Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Against the backdrop of the rapid degradation and destruction of the international security architecture dating back to the Cold War, the problems of arms control in general and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular assume new significance. There is an increasing need to search for new multilateral forms of interstate cooperation in this area, which would make it possible to adapt the established models of arms control to the realities of the emerging polycentric world order. In this regard, the history of relations between the members of the military-political blocs during the Cold War could offer some valuable lessons. This article examines three cases related to the deliberations between NATO allies on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the preparation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Central Europe. The study shows that though the United States had the final say in developing solutions to arms control problems in all three cases, the positions of its NATO allies significantly affected both the course of the negotiation and the content of the agreements. The author concludes that one of the main lessons to be learnt from the discussions of 1963–1975 is what ignorance of the lessons from the past can lead to. Disregard for the experience of the interwar negotiations did not allow then to unleash the full potential of a multilateral inter-bloc dialogue on arms control. Now this lesson is becoming more relevant than ever before.

The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States has urged Washington to adopt new measures to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent against Russia and China in a deteriorating security environment. Any effort by the United States to match its two nuclear peers warhead for warhead, delivery system for delivery system, would be costly folly, potentially reprising the Cold War arms race. A qualitative rather than quantitative response may well be more effective. Developing nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles, though challenging, would improve Washington's ability to shape an opponent's decision calculus and reduce its capacity to pursue deterrence by denial. These systems would also enhance the United States' ability to hold at risk multiple high-value, well-defended targets and reinforce planners' confidence in retaliatory strikes. Finally, a qualitative focus would enable the US to argue more credibly for quantitative limitations at levels similar to or lower than those existing today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The prohibition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in South Africa is governed through the implementation of an integrated and robust non-proliferation and arms control policy, legislative and regulatory framework, which has been revised and improved over time to address global developments; scientific and technological developments; and advancement of the threat landscape in terms of illicit trafficking of restricted goods and technologies as well as terrorism. Nonetheless, deficiencies in the regulatory framework and legislation became apparent over the years, especially after the infiltration of the South African industry by the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network. Although some of these deficiencies have been addressed, others are more challenging and require further work to be concluded in order to improve regulatory processes and strengthen the non-proliferation system, and to ensure that the proliferation strategies of non-state actors can be combatted. It is also aimed at South Africa maintaining its image as a reliable and responsible supplier, recipient and end user of strategic goods and technologies, while contributing meaningfully to global efforts of disarmament and non-proliferation of WMDs as a responsible member of the international community, as an advocate for global disarmament, and as a leader in efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the legal modifications made to Law No. 17,798 on arms control in Chile. The reforms introduced by Laws No. 21,310, 21,412, 21,556, and 21,560 are highlighted, which prioritize the treatment of pyrotechnic devices and firearms. These reforms establish criminal law as the main control measure in this matter. Additionally, it is mentioned that the possession of firearms can be considered as a parameter for the imposition of the precautionary measure of preventive detention in cases of danger to the security of society. [Extracted from the article]

While rising geopolitical competition poses significant political challenges for future arms control negotiations, it also complicates national arms control verification by making on-site inspections unlikely. One way to verify future arms control agreements without on-site inspections would be to rely on counting rules verified by national technical intelligence. American policymakers should consider how they might combine on-site inspections and counting rules in future arms control agreements. By allowing each party to choose its verification modality, future arms control agreements could cater to different security preferences while also preserving areas of American military advantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the context of the current technology and policy climate to determine the favorability of a nationwide missile defense system that would protect the United States against a large-scale attack from a major power such as Russia or China. By studying the technology, including pertinent discussions of missile defenses and their relation to Russian and American security policy, this article establishes some analytical benchmarks for missile defenses and their probable impacts on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and politics. In short, missile defenses have utility, but they are not a panacea for defending the nation against ballistic missile attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politische Vierteljahresschrift is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This work assesses the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on modern warfare. AI has led to a new arms race, which has impacted military dynamics among the superpowers in the 21st century. The study aims to evaluate the propagation of AI-powered weapons from the vantage point of ethics, international humanitarian law, and arms control. Secondary data is engaged for this study, and the exploratory and descriptive research design is adopted alongside a thematic analysis for data synthesis. The theories of technological determinism and consequentialism are adopted to observe the effects of technological advancement on weaponry alongside the ethical consequences of these weapons to safeguard human rights in combat scenarios. The study discovered that AI has led to a new arms race among the superpowers, and there is a need to advocate for arms control measures to promote international peace and security. The intersection between AI and arms proliferation, as well as how it has affected peace and security dynamics, was also detailed. The work concludes by reasserting the need for substantive international humanitarian laws and arms control efforts for lethal and autonomous weapons.

"Grand Strategies of the Left: The Foreign Policy of Progressive Worldmaking" by Van Jackson is a book that aims to systematize and develop a program for left-wing international thought. Jackson argues for a progressive world-making approach that goes beyond traditional notions of security and focuses on equality, solidarity, democracy, and peace. The book categorizes left-wing international thought into three camps: progressive pragmatism, anti-hegemonism, and peacemaking. Jackson also discusses practical politics and proposes a foreign policy program that includes nuclear restraint, arms control, global public goods provision, and reforming international financial institutions. However, the book's focus on American foreign policy limits its applicability to non-American policymakers and left-wing activists worldwide. Overall, the book is a valuable contribution to the literature on American grand strategy and left-wing international thought. [Extracted from the article]

Would it be possible to monitor new missile arms limits in Europe in an environment of deep mistrust? We argue that so-called "active tags," attached to dual-capable missiles, could help states to monitor remotely defined geographical arms limits without having to rely on resource-intensive human inspections. Such a novel approach could build on already existing technologies. We clarify what technologies are available, which options states could choose from for setting up a remote monitoring scheme, and what the technical and political implications are. Verifying geographical arms limits through remote monitoring could not only help to avert a new arms race with Russia; the approach could also be applicable to other conflict regions and different weapon types. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. This edition features unique contributions from FAS Impact Fellow and international lawyer Jessica Rogers. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the topic of strategic arms control after the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026. We explore potential avenues for constructive engagement between the United States and Russia and consider how to optimally balance arms control options that are legally possible and politically feasible. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While prosecuting its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has relied heavily on nuclear threats, turning the war in Ukraine into a dangerous nuclear crisis with profound implications for the global nuclear order and its two constitutive systems of nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. These two interconnected systems, each aiming to manage nuclear possession and reduce the risk of nuclear use, are at once complimentary and contradictory. While tensions between these systems are not new, the war in Ukraine exacerbates them in unprecedented ways. The system of nuclear deterrence seems to be proving its worth by inducing restraint on Russia and NATO, while the system of restraint is undermined by demonstrating what happens to a country not protected by nuclear deterrence. The latter lesson is particularly vivid given Ukraine's decision to forgo a nuclear option in 1994 in exchange for security assurances from nuclear powers. Russia's use of nuclear threats as an enabler for escalation and the specter of Russian tactical nuclear use against Ukraine goes well beyond its declared nuclear doctrine. The outcome of the war in Ukraine thus has critical importance for deciding the value of nuclear weapons in global security architecture and for resolving the conundrum between the systems of deterrence and restraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear arsenals, known as New START, expires in less than four years, which is not much time to put into place a replacement arms control arrangement. With bilateral tensions soaring, particularly given Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Washington and Moscow must hold formal negotiations on a New START follow-on arrangement sooner rather than later, so as to prevent miscalculation or escalation – and ensure strategic stability between the world's two largest owners of nuclear weapons. The negotiations rely on strong political will from both sides, who will each bring to the table a different agenda requiring some concessions from the other. Divisive though the talks will inevitably be, the United States and Russia can reach agreement on crucial issues of concern, such as Russia's new nuclear weapon delivery systems unveiled in 2018 and 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly fifty years ago on 22 June 1973, US President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the US-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. This bilateral instrument established concrete rules of the road for reducing the risk of nuclear use by means of mutual restraint and dialogue. However, despite being the product of more than a year of intense negotiations between the White House and the Kremlin, one of the Agreement's primary architects, Henry Kissinger, later dismissed it as having 'achieved little that was positive'. This article examines why Nixon and Kissinger pursued this Agreement in the first place and the extent to which they accomplished their goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should states balance the benefits and risks of employing artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning in nuclear command and control systems? I will argue that it is only by placing developments in AI against the larger backdrop of the increasing prominence of a much wider set of strategic non-nuclear capabilities that this question can be adequately addressed. In order to do so, I will make the case for disaggregating the different risks that AI poses to stability as well as examine the specific ways in which it may instead be harnessed to restabilise nuclear-armed relationships. I will also identify a number of policy areas that ought to be prioritised by way of mitigating the risks and harnessing the opportunities identified in the article, including discussing the possibilities of both formal and informal arms control arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the effect of delegation to an agreement executor, such as an international organization (IO), on the success of conventional arms control (CAC) agreements in Europe? Arms control agreements have taken different approaches to delegation. The extent of state delegation to treaty executors has ranged from nonexistent to substantial. Previous studies have not looked at delegation as an independent variable of CAC agreement success. This article applies a sum score methodology assessing nine variables in a dataset of nineteen CAC agreements in Europe over the past 100 years. There is a low correlation between delegation and CAC agreement success, though the data suggests that third-party state and IO involvement are the most significant variables related to success. This article proposes that high delegation to an IO with third-party state participation will increase the likelihood that a future CAC agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia could succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role did conventional arms control (CAC) agreements failures play in Russia's decision to invade Ukraine? Using a process tracing and counterfactual mixed methodology analyzing Russia's invasion motivations, this article attempts to answer the question by assessing Russian strategic policies, proposals, and arms control agreements. These demonstrate that Russia, seeing its sense of "indivisible security" being violated, sought to adjust or establish new CAC agreements to address a growing conventional military imbalance between NATO and Russia. Having failed to establish a fixed and stable conventional military balance through CAC, and as Ukraine edged closer to NATO membership, Russia resorted to the use of force shortly after their December 2021 proposals were not accepted. The article concludes by suggesting that this case supports arms racing and arms-control related causes of war theories, and that dissonant perceptions of the actual or ideal military balance can lead to conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The successful closure of arms control negotiations today is conditional on the commitment of many more states than during the Cold War. The question of what determines states' positions on arms control has therefore become increasingly relevant. Multiple scholars have identified external security threats by other states as the key explanatory factor of opposition to arms control, but empirical evidence hereof is so far limited to a small set of cases. Against this backdrop, this article carries out a global examination of the effect of external threats in the form of interstate disputes and rivalries on state support for arms control. This analysis is facilitated by a novel measure of arms control support that combines United Nations General Assembly voting data with manual coding of 1,178 resolutions. Across a variety of model specifications, the results do not show any significant effect of external threats on support for arms control. This article argues that this means either that the two variables are not related at all, or that two opposing mechanisms cancel out each other: arms control not only entails costs, but also benefits for states that face external threats, as it limits both states involved in a rivalry or dispute. Either way, this study challenges the notion that there is a strictly negative relationship between external threats and arms control support and thus contributes to our understanding of arms control and foreign policy making in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses Russia's approach to strategic arms control with a particular focus on two central yet largely paradoxical principles: strategic stability and asymmetry. A rise in asymmetries in the capabilities of the United States and the Russian Federation, global shifts in power, and a proceeding deterioration of U.S.–Russia relations have marked the post-Cold War era, challenging traditional arms control regimes based on strategic stability understood in terms of parity in the nuclear arsenals of the two most potent nuclear powers. Somewhat counterintuitively, the developments in the military-technological sphere that undermine the very principle of parity concurrently incentivise Russia to invest in asymmetric solutions to counterbalance these tendencies and maintain strategic stability. By analysing the views of Russian military experts, the article takes a look at the INF Treaty, New START and hypersonic weapons to examine the past, present and future challenges to the U.S.–Russian arms control architecture. It arrives at the conclusion that Russia's home-grown solution to its security conundrum is a perplexing mix of a desire for strategic stability-cum-parity in strategic arms control and a pragmatic emphasis on asymmetries while it tries to preserve its position, which is symptomatic of the paradoxical nature of strategy itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2022, annual global military expenditure reached a record high of $2,240 billion. 1 Much of the recent increase in spending is directly linked to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which itself represents a failure of the global institutions that are meant to prevent and manage such conflicts. 2 Adedeji Ebo, Director and Deputy to the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, spoke to GJIA about the challenges facing multilateralism and how international arms control can adapt in response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A qualitative assessment of the conventional military balance between NATO and Russia may form a basis of any potential conventional arms control (CAC) agreement in Europe. Article discusses methods to assess force capability and military balances, and then suggests updates to the methods based on insights from recent conflicts, military capability trends and developments. The article offers a weighted static force analysis model to assess military balances, that can be used for CAC agreements, called the Quantitative Approach to Conventional Arms Control (QuACAC). This approach may help narrow areas of disagreement between negotiating parties, and provide a basis for CAC agreement adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the third review of the EU Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment (EU Common Position) well underway, there is a critical opportunity to align this document with international instruments that incorporate gender considerations in the arms trade. In light of this, the post examines the increasing integration of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) within arms trade legal frameworks and calls for the EU Common Position to explicitly reference gender beyond its already present human rights considerations.

This paper summarises the joint collaborative project between the Nautilus Institute, the Research Center for Nuclear Weapon Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA), the Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) and the Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) examining cases of nuclear weapons use in a conflict in Northeast Asia by devising and analysing plausible pathways that could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons, and quantitatively estimating the fatalities and health effects of nuclear weapons use. The paper also describes the final year analysis with contributing essays by international experts and recommendations for narrowing the space for nuclear use-case scenarios to arise in the first place through forms of mutual threat reduction (structural risk reduction) and managing within-scenario risks (situational risk reduction) more responsibly if they arise.

This second special issue on nuclear irreversibility shifts the focus from the conceptual to the empirical. It aims to explore how dynamics linked to irreversibility have played out in practice by examining arms control and disarmament efforts in South Africa, Kazakhstan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and US-Soviet/Russian contexts. This article begins by outlining new research and developments related to irreversibility in arms control and disarmament. It then reflects on the approach taken in developing empirical insights into the practice of irreversibility. Finally, the article reflects on some of the themes that emerge from the contributions made to this special issue.

The international landscape, particularly in Northeast Asia, is portrayed as volatile due to the presence of nuclear-armed states, territorial disputes, and escalating geopolitical tensions. Considering this reality, this paper delves into the political ramifications of potential nuclear use in the Northeast Asia. It scrutinizes conceivable power shifts, the evolving role of anti-nuclear groups, and the broader impact on security policies. The exploration extends to scenarios post-nuclear use, encompassing positive, negative, and complex outcomes. The paper concludes by offering recommendations to policymakers, underscoring the imperative of substantive dialogues on arms control and conflict resolution to avert catastrophic nuclear events. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted challenges posed by nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia and offers valuable insights for crafting a more secure global environment. Recent developments point towards a disconcerting unraveling of arms control structures and a growing threat to the nonproliferation regime. The paper underscores the dynamic evolution of nuclear deterrence, highlighting the strategic use of emerging technologies by states to reshape the balance of vulnerabilities.

The United States and Soviet Union/Russian Federation signed several arms control treaties that mandated reductions in their numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. These treaties outlined complex technical procedures that governed the process of eliminating weapons in excess of allowed numbers. The procedures often required the physical destruction of missiles and launchers, thus making it difficult for the parties to reverse the elimination of these weapons while the treaties remained in force. These complex procedures also helped the parties verify compliance, as both the elimination process and the reduction in numbers were required. However, most of the treaties allowed the parties to produce and deploy new weapons while the treaty was in force, as long as the numbers remained within the treaty limits. Moreover, the parties could add to their forces and reverse their reductions after the treaties lapsed. Thus, even if the treaty required irreversible procedures to implement the mandated reductions, the outcome would not necessarily remain irreversible forever. Both parties could restore capabilities if their security assessments changed. Thus, a political commitment to restrain nuclear programs may be more important in ensuring the long-term irreversibility of disarmament than the legal obligations and technical procedures codified in arms control agreements.