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This study investigates the relationship between corporate ethics and the information intermediation element of public companies' information environment. Drawing on the well-established virtue, deontological, and consequential ethical theories, we predict that higher corporate ethics standards have a positive effect on financial analysts' behavior and earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 5276 firm-year observations from 780 publicly listed US companies, multivariate regression analyses document a significant positive association between company's level of ethical commitment and analyst coverage and forecast accuracy. Furthermore, the results show that firms with fewer incidents of ethical misconduct are associated with higher analyst consensus. These findings hold across a battery of robustness tests and indicate that a firm's ethical commitment enhances its corporate information environment and allows financial analysts to play a more effective intermediary role in capital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether and how organizational climate (OC) in brokerage firms affects analyst turnover and performance. We find that firms with a lower‐rated OC have a higher likelihood of analyst turnover. Also, when analysts leave and switch brokerage firms, they are more likely to move to a firm with a higher‐rated OC and will deliver more accurate forecasts after switching firms. However, the performance improvements in better‐rated OC firms are significant only for the initial years of the analysts' employment in the new firms. We also show that OC‐related analyst turnover negatively affects the performance of incumbent analysts, especially for those non‐All‐Star incumbent analysts, while these adverse performance effects are also transitory and last for two years only. Thus, our findings indicate that OC only has a short‐lived effect on the behaviour of both leaving and remaining analysts, which challenges the long‐held assumption that investments in a positive OC will always be associated with lower employee turnover and higher individual performance. We explain our results as arising from the high levels of labour mobility within the brokerage industry and the transparency of analyst forecasts as a public performance measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IntroductionWhile crucial to ensuring the production of accurate and high-quality data—and to avoid erroneous conclusions—data quality control (QC) in environmental monitoring datasets is still poorly documented.MethodsWith a focus on annual inter-laboratory comparison (ILC) exercises performed in the context of the French coastal monitoring SOMLIT network, we share here a pragmatic approach to QC, which allows the calculation of systematic and random errors, measurement uncertainty, and individual performance. After an overview of the different QC actions applied to fulfill requirements for quality and competence, we report equipment, accommodation, design of the ILC exercises, and statistical methodology specially adapted to small environmental networks (

Asbestos fibre counting by phase-contrast microscope is subject to many sources of variation, including those dependent on the analyst. In this study, asbestos sample slides prepared with relocatable coverslips have been used for fibre counting among voluntary analysts to evaluate their proficiency. One slide of amosite and one of chrysotile were distributed to all the analysts, and three proficiency testing rounds were conducted for amosite and four for chrysotile. Each relocatable coverslip has a report in which are reported for each viewing field both the number of certified fibres (Verified Fibres) and a drawing representing the shape and position of the individual fibres. In the first round, the analysts were asked to report only the number of fibres counted in each of the predesignated fields of view. In the other rounds, subsequently developed, the analysts had to report the number and the position of the fibres for each field. The reported number of fibres and their position in each of the designed fields were evaluated against their respective verified fibres, to identify types of error. Discrepancies between reported fibres and verified fibres in each field of view have been used to evaluate the proficiency of the analysts. The discrepancies can be positive (D+) or negative (D−) depending on whether the analyst counts, for a specific field of view, more or less fibres compared to the verified fibres. The score is calculated using the following equation: Score = (1 − ∑D+ + ∑│D−│/VF) × 100. An analyst obtaining a score of ≥60, which corresponds to (∑ D + + ∑│ D −│)/VF ≤ 0.40, is proficient. The number of laboratories that participating in this study varied from 13 to 17 depending on the rounds. For amosite fibre counts, the results were generally good compared to a proficiency score of 60. The major error made by analysts was the counting of fibres shorter than 5 µm, where this error was of 62% of extra fibres and accounted for 8% over-estimation of amosite fibres. For chrysotile, a score of ≥50 has been used to consider an analyst as proficient. The results of chrysotile fibres showed that in the first round all analysts counted less than fifty per cent of the verified fibres. In the second round 10 analysts out of 13 reached a score of ≥50, 8 of 16 in the third and 10 of 12 in the fourth. For chrysotile fibres, the error relating to the counting of fibres shorter than 5 µm was of 56% of extra fibres, but the error that most influenced the results was the number of oversight-missing fibres. This type of error accounted for 97% of the missing fibres and for the 29% under-estimation of the chrysotile fibres. For amosite fibre counting, results of this study show an improvement of the analyst's performance. For the chrysotile fibre count, although there is a significant improvement in the comparison between some rounds, this is not continuous over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study how information sharing within an organization affects individual performance. We look at situations in which the same analyst, while working at the same broker, covers multiple mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in particular the acquirer prior to the M&A and the merged firm thereafter. We find that earnings forecasts for the merged firm are significantly more accurate when the analyst has a colleague (working at the same broker) covering the target prior to the M&A. This holds particularly true if acquirer analysts and target analysts reside in the same locale, if they are part of a smaller team, and if the target analyst is of higher quality. Our findings highlight the importance of information spillovers on individual performance in knowledge-based industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens to analysts' performance when security market reforms bring corporate transparency in emerging markets but the governance of market intermediaries (mainly stock brokers) is weak? Using analysts' recommendation and subsequent stock market returns from Pakistan, we find that analysts' performance deteriorated significantly after the corporate reforms. This declining trend continued even after the introduction of corporate governance code in 2002. Earlier evidence suggests that market intermediaries such as stock brokers were involved in pumping and dumping of stocks in Pakistan. One may attribute this decline in analysts' performance with the stock price manipulations by these brokers who bent the laws of supply and demand in their favour by injecting or withdrawing liquidity from the market. These actions may have diminished the informational content of the analysts' recommendations leading to the lower value of recommendations. We propose that the governance of the market intermediaries should be an issue of profound interest during the corporate reform process in the emerging markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compares the performance of sell-side equity analysts with and without a Chartered Financial Analyst® (CFA) designation. Using a large sample of forecasts, our tests indicate that CFA charterholders issue forecasts that are timelier than those of non-charterholders. The results for accuracy are mixed. We establish that while charterholders perform at statistically significant higher levels than non-charterholders in some tests, the economic significance of these differences is questionable. For a subsample of analysts, we find evidence that charterholders improve along the dimension of timeliness after they receive their CFA charter. This result provides support for a human-capital explanation in which charterholders improve their productivity during the CFA program. Finally, we show that the market reaction for smaller firms is stronger for charterholders than non-charterholders after controlling for timeliness, boldness, accuracy, and optimism. This result provides evidence consistent with "credentialism," a variant of signaling theory in which a professional's education level provides a signal about the professional's quality to his or her clients. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]