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The American electorate is increasingly affectively polarized. Partisans dislike members of the opposing party, even going so far as to discriminate against opposing partisans in nonpolitical domains. Given the potentially pernicious consequences of affective polarization, especially in nonpolitical settings, scholars have suggested facilitating contact between members of opposing parties as a means of reducing affective polarization. We test this approach in the context of a large introductory American government class comprised almost entirely of Democrats. Our pre-registered experiment randomly assigned recitation sections to treatment or control conditions, where the treatment was an hour-long discussion with a county chair from the Republican Party, and the control was an hour-long discussion with an attorney with no party connection. Partisan attitudes and evaluations were measured extensively at baseline, within a few days of the intervention, and two months later. We find no evidence that the treatment changed students' partisan evaluations. We conclude by considering theoretical avenues for future experiments that change the nature and extent of cross-party social interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization in the digital debate of the Spanish presidential election campaign (2023), following the sudden call of the Spanish president on July 23, was measured. Using transformers, topics were detected, and sentiment analysis techniques were applied in the political debate during the elections to measure the emotional valence of the debate. The topics that dominate most of the debate are Candidates (n1 = 17170) and Opposition (n3 = 15327). These topics also show the highest typical polarization deviances. Based on affective polarization, a polarization measure (JDJ) grounded in the fuzzy sets was applied. The topic activism has the highest polarization value, while the topic of voting has the lowest. This analysis highlights a dichotomy that defines the Spanish political reality: the positive image of conventional political participation in the face of the rejection of collective action processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization has become a worldwide phenomenon that impacts the ability to engage in meaningful dialogue and reflective consideration of different available courses of action. Social media use has been linked to phenomena such as homophily and echo chambers, which contribute to the polarization of attitudes and beliefs. At the same time, social media use has been tied to collective action. This study seeks to analyze the relationship between the political use of social media, affective polarization, and collective action. It proposes two models: the first evaluates the mediating effect of the SIMCA variables in the relationship between the political use of social media and collective action; the second proposes a pathway whereby the political use of social media and its impact on collective action is mediated first by affective polarization and subsequently by the SIMCA model variables. Using a sample of 659 Peruvian social media users ranging from 18 to 39 years old, the authors found that participative efficacy alone mediates the relationship between the political use of social media and collective action. Affective polarization by itself did not mediate this relationship. However, when considering participative efficacy, the findings indicate a pathway from political use of social media to collective action mediated by both affective polarization and participative efficacy. This article reflects on how the production of affective polarization in virtual spaces among like-minded individuals can impact participative efficacy, and subsequently collective action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars increasingly raise concerns about the alleged detrimental impact of affective polarization on citizens’ democratic attitudes. Yet, prior studies on the relationship between affective polarization and democratic support have yielded mixed results: Whereas some scholars report evidence that affective polarization erodes citizens’ support for democracy, others report null findings. In this research note, we posit that one relevant explanation for these mixed results is that the relationship between affective polarization and democratic support is not linear, but rather negatively curvilinear (i.e., an inverted U‐shape). Though extreme levels of affective polarization may harm citizens’ democratic commitments, a moderate amount of affective polarization can strengthen democratic support by heightening the political stakes and stimulating democratic involvement. Employing generalized additive modelling on data from the CNEP collected in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we show strong and robust support for this negatively curvilinear pattern. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the dynamics between affective polarization and democratic support, as well as for the recommended estimation strategies of future studies that aim to explore this relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent evidence suggests that cross-partisan conversation can reduce affective polarization. Yet, this evidence comes from experiments that dampen the contentious features of political environments like elections. We expected that cross-partisan conversation will be less effective at reducing affective polarization for partisans who experience partisan group threat from an election loss. We test our theory using a preregistered experiment in which Democrats and Republicans chatted via text online. Participants discussed the 2020 presidential election immediately following Biden's inauguration, a contentious context that we show differentially amplified feelings of group threat among Republicans. However, for both sides, cross-partisan conversations reduced out-party animosity for at least three days, reduced social polarization, but did not increase perceptions of election integrity. Our results suggest that cross-partisan conversation can effectively reduce affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats even in contentious contexts that amplify group threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Alternative Politics / Alternatif Politika is the property of Alternatif Politika and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study assesses whether the Democratic Party holds issue ownership over science in the United States. We analyze data from a national survey that asked 1041 adults questions specifically designed to measure perceptions of science ownership. While the results suggest that the Democratic Party does hold a significant advantage in ownership of science in an abstract sense, perceptions of ownership of specific types of science vary across the two parties. Those who identify as Independents drive much of the aggregate perceptions of ownership of science, whereas partisans' perceptions of issue ownership of science are mostly driven by in-party favoritism. Post hoc analyses suggest that news media use contributes to perceptions of science ownership and reinforces affinity-party preference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Life in society revolves around social norms. These norms play a crucial role in regulating and influencing individuals’ behavior, both at the societal and individual levels. They offer a psychological framework that reduces uncertainty, guides behavior, and aids people in adapting to their social surroundings. Moreover, by observing prevailing social norms, individuals gain insights into societal trends that preserve cherished values and traditions across generations, thus mapping the dynamics of social stability and change. Social change is closely tied to shifts in these norms, which can occur at varying speeds, influenced by factors at multiple levels of analysis, including societal, group, and individual levels. In this article, I analyze the various concepts of social norms found in the literature, with a particular focus on their role in psychology. I describe the main sources of normative influence and illustrate, with multiple examples, how they operate in different social contexts. In this way, I address how these norms guide and facilitate participation in collective actions, their intergenerational transmission, and their role in the emergence of radicalization in social protest contexts. Furthermore, I delve into how group norms are linked to intergroup contact experiences involving both advantaged and disadvantaged group members, as well as the expression of prejudice and affective polarization. I conclude by emphasizing the necessity of adopting a multilevel approach to comprehend the connection between norms and social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization is increasingly evident around the world. This has been attributed in part to residential segregation by partisanship. The ‘Big Sort’ has meant that neighbourhoods in the United States, and elsewhere, have become more homogenous in terms of vote. Yet there is little systematic evidence on the relationship between homogenous partisan neighbourhoods and affective polarization. Does living among fellow partisans make people more negative towards the other side? In this Research Note, we use unique data from Britain to show that while people accurately recognize that their local area is more or less politically homogenous, neighbourhood political homogeneity is not correlated with any measure of affective polarization. These findings are robust to the type of political divide (partisanship or Brexit identity), the level of geography, length of residence and controls for ideology and social characteristics. We therefore suggest that while geographical sorting is an important phenomenon, it is unlikely to be a major cause of affective polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democrats and Republicans have polarized in their attitudes (i.e., ideological polarization) and their feelings toward each other (i.e., affective polarization). Simultaneously, both groups also seem to diverge in their fatual beliefs about reality. The preregistered survey experiment among 2,253 American citizens examined how this factual belief polarization may or may not fuel ideological and affective polarization around four keys issues: income differences, immigration, climate change, and defense spending. On all issues except immigration, Democrats and Republicans were equally or more divided in their factual beliefs about the present than in their ideals for the future. Corrective information decreased partisan polarization over some ideals, but not directional policy attitudes. Priming respondent's factual beliefs conversely increased polarization around defense spending, but not other issues. Much remains unclear about the complex relation between factual beliefs and polarization, but measuring ideals and priming beliefs could be promising avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies addressing the normative questions of whether social media use positively or negatively affects citizens' levels of democratic engagement and satisfaction with democracy have produced mixed findings. This study tests the proposition that political polarization plays an important contingent role in explaining these relationships. Combining Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) and World Values Survey (WVS) data, this study examines how issue polarization and affective polarization at the country level shape the relationships between social media use for political information and democratic outcomes in 27 developed democracies. The findings show divergent consequences of social media use contingent on affective polarization. In the countries with high affective polarization, social media use increased democratic engagement (i.e. participation and voting) and decreased satisfaction with democracy (i.e. political satisfaction and perceived quality of democracy), which may have implications for democratic erosion and backsliding. In the countries with low affective polarization, social media use increased the perceived quality of democracy but had no effect on political satisfaction. Issue polarization had a limited contingent influence. The findings contribute to the literature by explicating the dynamics of country-level affective polarization that can shape and contextualize the relationship between social media use and democratic engagement in democracies across the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the partisan cheerleading view, numerous political disagreements that appear to be genuine are not authentic disputes, because partisans deliberately misreport their beliefs to show support for their parties. Recently, three arguments have been put forth to support this view. First, contemporary democracies are characterized by affective rather than ideological polarization. Second, financial incentives indicate that partisans often deliberately misreport their beliefs to express their attitudes. Third, partisans have inconsistent and unstable political beliefs, so we should not take these attitudes seriously. In this paper, I examine these arguments and present an alternative view, which I call the partisan conviction view. According to it, partisans are not necessarily insincere in their political judgments, and they are in genuine disagreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de 2011, 2015 ve 2018 genel seçimlerinden sonra yapılan seçim sonrası anketlerinden yararlanarak seçmenlerin duygusal kutuplaşma düzeylerini ve bu kutuplaşmanın oy kullanma yolu ile siyasi katılıma etkilerini incelemektedir. İki partili sistemlerde yaygın olarak gözlemlenen ve araştırılan duygusal kutuplaşma, son yıllarda çok partili sistemlerde de görülmeye başlanmıştır. Duygusal kutuplaşma, seçmenlerin yakın hissettiği siyasi kurum ve kişilerin yanında, uzak hissettiği hatta hiç hoşlanmadığı karşı grupların varlığında ortaya çıkan, birey seviyesinde bir kutuplaşmadır. Partizan duygular taşıyan seçmenler bir partiye, lidere veya parti destekçilerine yakınlık hissederken, karşıt gruplara uzaklık ve hoşnutsuzluk duyabilmektedir. Hem çok ülkeli çalışmalarda raporlanan yüksek duygusal kutuplaşma skorları hem de seçimlere katılımın yüksek oranları, Türkiye’de iki kavramın etkileşimine dair çeşitli soruları barındırmaktadır. Çalışmanın bulgularına göre, Türkiye’de duygusal kutuplaşma seviyesi ve oy kullanma arasında, pozitif ve istatistiki olarak anlamlı bir ilişki bulunmaktadır. Duygusal kutuplaşan seçmenler, politik etkililik konusunda kime oy verdiğini daha çok önemsemekte ve bu seçmenler için seçim günü oy kullanmak, demokrasiye katılmanın etkili bir yolu olarak kendini göstermektedir.

Affective polarization is defined as the tendency to dislike, distrust, and maintain hostile attitudes towards supporters of other political parties or ideologies. In its extreme form, affective polarization may pose a severe threat to these groups' cohesion, functionality, and existence. The current study explored the role of sadness, elicited by memorial days, in temporarily reducing affective polarization and protecting societies from its destructive outcomes. In a longitudinal study (517 participants), participants were surveyed prior to Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), during HMD, and after HMD. The findings suggest that affective polarization declined during HMD. This effect was partially mediated by an increase in sadness. It is argued that one main function of memorial days is to harness the power of sadness to maintain cohesion and integrity among national groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What emotions do affectively polarized individuals report, and how? While affect is a broad term, research suggests that different emotions predict distinct political behaviors. Therefore, it is vital to understand what emotions partisans report. However, as research on motivated reasoning suggests that people process information consistent with their partisan mind, I argue that they may not necessarily report the emotions they feel. Instead, they may ascribe normatively desirable emotions to their ingroup and normatively undesirable emotions to opposing outgroups. Doing so makes their ingroup distinct from and superior to outgroups. This article develops and showcases this argument. I analyze data in which affective polarization was likely high—interviews with radical‐right voters conducted before a major election—to illustrate what emotions partisans report and how. The discussion invites future research to test how affective polarization correlates with single emotions and whether partisans strengthen polarization by how they talk about emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much scholarly attention has focused on partisan affective polarization, a growing animosity between Democrats and Republicans in the mass public. Less notice has been given to affective polarization among the ideological teams, liberals, and conservatives. Yet, we suggest that given ideology's particular influence in U.S. politics, ideological affective polarization has important and distinct consequences. We begin by offering evidence that ideological affective polarization both exists and has increased sharply in recent years. We theorize that this shift alters the way individuals come to form attachments to ideological identities, as well as the structure and tenor of ideology in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What implications might rising animosity towards political out-partisans have for public health? Vaccination has a significant social aspect, protecting not only the vaccinated, but also those around them. While political ideology in the United States was an important driver of individuals' willingness to get vaccinated against COVID-19, with those on the political right displaying greater hesitancy, we examine the role that political diversity has on vaccine uptake across US states and commuting zones. Using data from the Cooperative Election Study fielded on over 20,000 respondents in November 2021, and controlling for individual partisanship, we find that those who are political outliers in their community are significantly less likely to get vaccinated. By contrast, we find no equivalent negative effect for ethnic diversity. In sum, the impact of affective polarization is not limited to encounters between non-partisans; it can lead to decreased pro-social behavior that harms political friends and foes alike. Yet these behavioral effects depend on how individuals relate to their community's predominant political ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While scholars have closely examined the intensification of negative affect across party lines during elections, less is known about the decline of partisan hostility in the aftermath of election campaigns. Synthesizing insights from research on electoral rules and political psychology, we theorize and empirically test two such mechanisms of post‐election negative affect decline. The first is that of winners' generosity: the expectation that self‐perceived election winners will express warmer feelings towards political opponents. The second is that of co‐governance, which predicts that shared coalition status leads to warmer affective evaluations among governing parties. We provide evidence that these mechanisms operate as pressure valves of negative partisan affect. We also show that while co‐governance reduces negative affect between parties who govern together, it fuels negative affect among supporters of opposition parties. The empirical analyses leverage a uniquely uncertain political period following the 2021 Israeli elections, around which we conducted an original panel study. Our findings advance the comparative polarization literature and connect psychological and institutional accounts of temporal fluctuations in partisan affect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization – that is, antipathy towards political opponents – sits high on the academic and political agenda. This is because it is thought to have a multitude of damaging consequences, both for how citizens view and approach each other and for how they relate to the political system. This study investigates some of the most mentioned and worrying potential consequences of affective polarization at the individual level. Zooming in on Europe, it sheds light on the substantive relationship between partisan antipathy and three kinds of norm‐breaking escalation in the form of avoidance, intolerance and support for violence against party supporters. Methodologically, it unpacks the affective component of polarization, testing to what extent the traditional feeling thermometer performs as a predictor of these three potential outcomes. It then tests alternative expectations of the antecedents of such escalation derived from the intergroup emotions' literature and the study of political radicalization. This is done using a broad range of both established and new survey items fielded in nationally representative panels between May and November 2020 in two contexts that score relatively low (Norway) and high (the United Kingdom) on affective polarization. They reveal that avoidance, intolerance and support for political violence can be validly measured, and are manifest, in these two European countries, but that they are only weakly correlated to mere dislike of the outgroup. Instead, more severe forms of norm‐breaking escalation depend on the specific nature of the discrete emotions induced beyond dislike (anger, fear or disgust) and are rooted in factors such as relative deprivation, Manicheanism, and dark personality traits (psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism). We discuss the implications for the way polarization is theorized and measured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization, a concept that originated in the USA, has increasingly been studied in Europe's multi-party systems. This form of polarization refers to the extent to which party supporters dislike one another – or, more technically, to the difference between the positive feelings towards the supporters of one's own political party and the negative feelings towards the supporters of other parties. Measuring this gap in Europe's multi-party systems requires researchers to make various important decisions relating to conceptualization and measurement. Often, our focus could instead lie on assessing partisan hostility or negative party affect, which is easier to measure. While recent research on affective polarization in Europe has already taught USA lot, both about affective polarization and about political conflict in Europe, I nevertheless suggest that research in this field faces four challenges, namely developing better measures, more sophisticated theories, clearer accounts of affective polarization's importance and successful ways of reducing negative party affect, if this is indeed desirable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research suggests that journalists can (unintentionally) exacerbate affective polarization when reporting on growing levels of polarization in society. However, is there a way for journalists to report on the realities of growing political polarization without dividing people further? In our research with five pre-registered experimental studies (N =  3,414), we develop the polarizing content warning which, based on inoculation theory, warns readers that scientific research suggests reading news content about political polarization may drive further affective polarization. Results indicate that the polarizing content warning can be used both with online news articles and on social media sites, and is able to indirectly reduce affective polarization of readers. Additionally, the polarizing content warning is beneficial both when presented alongside news content and beforehand, and reduces readers' perceptions of societal polarization, in turn reducing affective polarization. This warning allows journalists to report on societal polarization without further dividing people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A defining feature of democracies is an independent legal system, where elites and the public alike accept the broader legitimacy of its actions, even if they run counter to political preferences. Existing scholarship suggests that public support for rule of law institutions is rooted in perceptions of procedural fairness. However, amid increasing levels of affective polarization, we posit a partisan presidential heuristic wherein citizens' views of legal institutions are influenced by their partisanship and signals from the president. Through multiple experiments, we demonstrate that support for two key institutions—the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Justice—is substantially derived from the intersection of one's partisan identity and their partisan proximity to the president. These effects are strongest among respondents exhibiting high levels of affective partisanship. Our results suggest that in forming perceptions of the rule of law, partisan politics is increasingly competing with perceptions of procedural fairness, thereby subverting support for legal institutions in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political opponents are often divided not only in their attitudes (i.e., ideological polarization) and their feelings toward each other (i.e., affective polarization), but also in their factual perceptions of reality (i.e., factual belief polarization). This paper describes factual belief polarization in the Netherlands around three core issues. Furthermore, this paper examines who are most susceptible to this type of polarization. Analyses on the 2021 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study reveal that citizens hold different perceptions than their political opponents about income inequality, immigration, and climate change. This type of polarization is strongest among citizens who have hostile feelings toward their political opponents and, paradoxically, among those who are highly educated and interested in politics. Trust in epistemic authorities did not mitigate factual belief polarization, perhaps because this trust has itself become politicized. These findings underline that factual belief polarization constitutes a core pillar of political polarization, alongside ideological and affective polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While affective polarization has been shown to have serious social consequences, there is little evidence regarding its effects on political attitudes and behavior such as policy preferences, voting, or political information accrual. This paper provides evidence that affective polarization impacts misinformation belief, arguing that citizens with higher levels of affective polarization are more likely to believe in-party-congruent misinformation and less likely to believe out-party-congruent misinformation. The argument is supported by data from the ANES 2020 Social Media Study and the ANES 2020 Time Series Study, which speaks to the generalizability of the relationship. Additionally, a survey experiment provides evidence that the relationship is causal. The results hold among Democrats and Republicans and are independent of the effects of partisan strength and ideological extremity. Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it, implying that education will not solve the issue. The results speak to the need for work on reducing affective polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political disagreement with family members can have a deleterious impact on familial relationships, but the long‐term consequences are understudied. This study examined the relational outcomes of familial political incongruence two years after the 2019 social unrest in Hong Kong and the extent to which frequency and types of family contact explain their association. This two‐wave questionnaire study augmented with a 14‐day daily record of family contact recruited (1) young adults and (2) parents with children aged 18–30 (N = 559). Nearly half of the respondents reported significant political incongruence with their parents/children. We observed consistent findings in both adult children and parents. Greater parent–child political differences were associated with reduced likelihood of having positive family communication and family functioning. Increased political differences with family members were associated with greater odds of family dysfunctionality. Moreover, expression of love and care mediated the effect of political differences with family members on changes in family functioning. This study demonstrates familial political incongruence exerts an influence on families two years after the unrest. Parent–child political differences are associated with a decline in the quality of family communication and family environment. We discuss how parent–child political incongruence drives a family to worsened well‐being through dysfunctional family dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bakker and Lelkes (2024) point at a critical gap in research on affective polarisation: the limited understanding of its affective components, mainly due to the reliance on a unidimensional operationalisation of affect in affective polarisation. They advocate for a broader approach to study affect, integrating explicit and implicit measures, and call on emotion specialists to address this gap. Acknowledging the complexity of affect in the ideological divide, we argue that the lack of a thorough examination of the distinct role of discrete emotions constitutes the primary "affective gap". Drawing from studies on the relationship between ideological groups and utilising a discrete emotions approach, we contest the prevailing assumption that hatred predominantly underlies affective polarisation. Instead, we propose that disappointment, better captures the intricate dynamics between ideological groups. We argue that such nuanced approach, regarding the affective component of affective polarisation enhances our understanding of the phenomenon and shed light on its implications for societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we analyzed the factors that intensified affective polarization among voters during the 2022 South Korean presidential election. We also examined this polarization's effect on their political attitudes, including their satisfaction with democracy, perception of the fairness of elections, and trust in political institutions. We found that the greater the perceived ideological differences between the two parties the People Power Party (PPP) and the Democratic Party (DP) and the more ― ― extreme the voter's ideology, the more affective polarization increased. We also found that affective polarization intensified with increasing ideological extremity among all age cohorts except those in their forties. Finally, in contrast to DP supporters, PPP supporters' political attitudes became more negative as their affective polarization increased because the opposing party, the DP, was the governing party. This suggests that affective polarization may polarize support for democratic norms and trust in the political institutions that underpin democracy, depending on one's partisan allegiances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of research suggests that the contemporary media environment enables motivated reasoning, which intensifies affective polarization. This is especially the case in the U.S., where elections are capital-intensive and media are largely commercially owned. From a normative perspective, these commercial forces may interfere with authentic communication by hijacking the "lifeworld" and thus undermining the sincerity of our speech. From a psychological and empirical perspective, this means we are an affective public steeping in "hot cognitions" that unconsciously motivate us toward processing (mis)information in biased and distorted ways. This kind of cognitive limitation intensifies as current affairs heat up, but starts well before, as a function of media market boundaries aligning with human psychology. Through a synthetic literature review of theory and empirical research, this essay argues that "social identity complexity" may help to overcome some of the worst outcomes of motivated reasoning, pointing toward a developmental basis for more authentic communication in the public sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partisan affective polarization describes the extent to which different partisans like or dislike each other. In Europe, affective dislike is strongest towards the radical-right, as mainstream voters tend to hold particularly negative affect towards radical-right supporters. This is an important pattern given the recent high levels of support for radical-right parties, for example in the Netherlands, France, and Italy. However, the perspective of radical-right supporters themselves has been largely neglected in existing work. To remedy this, we examine how radical-right supporters feel towards supporters of mainstream parties. We develop a new concept, dislike differentiation, which refers to the extent to which radical-right supporters differentiate in the dislike they harbor towards mainstream parties. We use two new studies that sampled 2,628 radical-right supporters in nine European polities. We find that some supporters reject all mainstream parties, whereas others follow more typical patterns of political competition along ideological lines. Dislike differentiation among radical-right supporters is linked to key socio-political phenomena, including party attachment, ideological extremism, satisfaction with democracy, and political tolerance. By creating a novel typology combining out-party dislike and dislike differentiation, we show that anti-system radical-right supporters, characterized by high out-party dislike and low dislike differentiation, are the least supportive of democracy. By centering our analysis on those voters that receive and radiate the highest levels of negative affect, we advance knowledge on what fosters polarized attitudes and intolerance in Europe’s multiparty systems in times when the electoral popularity of the radical-right is surging.

What populism and polarization have in common is that their relationship with democracy is an ambiguous one. Studies have found that certain degrees of polarization can be helpful for citizens to make up their minds about their choices and because of that encourage them to democratic participation. Similarly, populism can help increase participation by, for example, presenting policies in a simpler language. Citizens with less political interest and political knowledge might be incited to participate in elections and democratic politics in general. However, high levels of polarization lead to the irreconcilability of factions and thereby to gridlock. Democracy can be regarded as incapable of solving citizens’ problems. Likewise, populism can be destructive to democracy when occurring in certain forms and degrees. While populism is not per se antidemocratic, populist parties and leaders, when in power, repeatedly challenge democratic elements. To disentangle how polarization and populism affect democracy, I focus on certain specifics of these three concepts (democracy, populism, and polarization). Namely, I analyze how affective polarization and individual-level populism affect the support for the direct democratic instrument of holding referendums. Drawing on survey data from Austria and Germany, I find that being affectively polarized has a positive effect on the support for holding referendums. However, this effect is moderated by citizens’ individual-level populism. Thus, this study provides insights into citizens’ preferences for democratic decision-making, dependent on their levels of affective polarization and populism.

Affective polarization has become a worldwide phenomenon that impacts the ability to engage in meaningful dialogue and reflective consideration of different available courses of action. Social media use has been linked to phenomena such as homophily and echo chambers, which contribute to the polarization of attitudes and beliefs. At the same time, social media use has been tied to collective action. This study seeks to analyze the relationship between the political use of social media, affective polarization, and collective action. It proposes two models: the first evaluates the mediating effect of the SIMCA variables in the relationship between the political use of social media and collective action; the second proposes a pathway whereby the political use of social media and its impact on collective action is mediated first by affective polarization and subsequently by the SIMCA model variables. Using a sample of 659 Peruvian social media users ranging from 18 to 39 years old, the authors found that participative efficacy alone mediates the relationship between the political use of social media and collective action. Affective polarization by itself did not mediate this relationship. However, when considering participative efficacy, the findings indicate a pathway from political use of social media to collective action mediated by both affective polarization and participative efficacy. This article reflects on how the production of affective polarization in virtual spaces among like-minded individuals can impact participative efficacy, and subsequently collective action.

We tested among Democratic and Republican perceivers the relative effects of social vs. economic ideology similarity information about individual members of the opposing party (i.e., information suggesting that a member of the opposing party has similar social or economic ideological views as the perceiver) on explicit and implicit affective polarization in evaluations of these target individuals and on perceived worldview conflict with these individuals. In Studies 1a and 1b, both types of ideology information reduced explicit affective polarization on some measures. Among both Democratic and Republican perceivers, the two types of similarity information were equally effective at reducing overall worldview conflict. Neither type of ideology information shifted implicit affective polarization (Studies 2a and 2b).

Affective polarization, the strong feeling of animosity toward the supporters of the opposite party is rising in Europe. Several studies have examined the impact of ideological extremity and partisanship as a social identity on the rise of affective polarization. However, the impact of policy preferences on affective polarization remains relatively unexplored. I am at filling this gap by examining how preferences towards measures taken at addressing both the economic and the health crises impact affective polarization. Using newly collected data from Greece, a country with historically high levels of affective polarization, the analysis reveals that both policies have an impact of affective polarization but there are asymmetries on how policy preferences influence it. For the supporters of the governing conservative party, affective polarization appears to be policy-driven, whereas for the supporters of the opposition, the populist left-wing party SYRIZA, it is predominantly ideology-driven. Interestingly, the supporters of the governing party continue to align with the pro-memorandum stance even in the absence of an actual memorandum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intellectual humility (IH) appears to offer one solution to political hostility. However, research on how IH associates with political orientation and the strength of their political belief is mixed, leaving open the possibility of two potential confounds in research on the benefits of intellectual humility: people who are high in intellectual humility might have different ideological beliefs or might be less polarized than those who are lower in intellectual humility. In the current research, we address this concern in a large, pre-registered, and systematic analysis of nine samples (N = 3,248). We find that IH is generally unassociated with the strength of people’s political belief but is reliably associated with a more liberal political orientation. We discuss implications of these findings for research in this domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accepting defeat in the aftermath of elections is crucial for the stability of democracies. But in times of intense polarization, the voluntary consent of electoral losers seems less obvious. In this paper, I study whether affective and perceived ideological polarization amplify the winner–loser gap in political support. Using multilevel growth curve modelling on pre and post-election panel data from the British Election Study Internet Panel collected during the 2015 and 2019 UK general elections, I show that the winner–loser gap is indeed more pronounced amongst voters with higher levels of affective and perceived ideological polarization. Moreover, the results illustrate that polarized voters experience a stark decrease in their support for the political system following their electoral loss. Given the high and, in some Western democracies, rising polarization levels, these findings have important implications for losers’ consent and the stability of democracies in election times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Notwithstanding the considerable scholarly and public attention that political polarization and corruption have attracted in recent years and the important mechanisms through which the former may influence the latter, research in this area remains limited and inconclusive. This article offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical synthesis of the current state of research in this domain. It finds that a large fraction of the apparent contradictions can be attributed to the conceptual inconsistencies and ambiguity surrounding political polarization. The types of polarization that have an inherently hostile and uncivil element (usually referred to as affective or pernicious polarization) undermine democratic accountability, which leads to more corruption. The role of ideological polarization among parties and the general population is more complex: it may boost accountability and decrease corruption but can also contribute to the aforementioned harmful forms of polarization and enhance the role of partisan bias in public opinion formation, thereby increasing corruption. The overall effect of ideological polarization on corruption may depend on the nature and the degree of the former, as well as on mitigating contextual factors. The two may create a vicious circle as corruption also increases political polarization via various channels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing expression of antagonism toward immigrants has turned immigration into one of the most polarizing issues in many countries, among them Finland, dividing people into those who favor and those who oppose immigration. But while affective polarization of the kind exemplified by widespread responses to immigration has recently received increasing attention from political psychologists, little attention has been paid to how affective polarization develops through the mutual reinforcement of opposing discourses. The application of critical discursive psychology to interviews with lay Finns reveals this mutual reinforcement in progress. In our interviews, Finns across the political spectrum construct five subject positions by attributing blame for immigration‐related challenges. Both sides blame some "other" for the challenges while exempting themselves from blame. Our study makes three contributions to political psychology: exploring how blame attribution helps to generate affective polarization, illustrating the ability of (critical) discursive psychology to illuminate processes of affective polarization in individuals, and bringing the concept of affective polarization drawn from survey research into dialogue with the concept of subject positions constructed by blame attribution drawn from discursive studies of populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization happens when groups develop mutual negative perceptions and feelings. This phenomenon has raised concern among journalists, opinion leaders, and academics, many of whom have related polarization to partisan politics. Previous research has relied mainly on quantitative data focused on the national-level political polarization of Western societies. In this article, we show that polarization and its negative consequences--the damage to relationships and the rise of violence--may arise after divergence with relevant issues unrelated to political positions or identities. We process trace two communities in Argentina with local environmental conflicts to show the interaction mechanisms that start with an issue difference, continue with affective polarization, and may end with escalation or depolarization. By showing the mechanisms of interaction that lead to polarization, we offer a precise and clear explanation of the process that can be tested in further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has put forward a new indicator based on the "ABC‐model" of attitudes designed to capture individual‐level Euroscepticism. We constructed a composite anti‐EU score based on affective, behavioural and cognitive sub‐indices. The study analyses data from a representative, countrywide Hungarian public opinion research. Looking for the drivers of anti‐EU attitudes, we took an integrative approach linking various theories of voting behaviour, Euroscepticism and populism studies. Our research showed that subjective well‐being significantly reduces anti‐EU attitudes. We found some empirical support for the "left behind thesis" in the Hungarian context, as severe economic grievances and fear of losing social status explained anti‐EU attitudes. Authoritarian traits turned out to be a major driver of Euroscepticism in Hungary. We proved that cosmopolitan values reduce affective and cognitive anti‐EU attitudes, but foreign experience and some international ties significantly correlated with anti‐EU stance. We confirmed that being a supporter of the governing Fidesz party and sharing culturally right‐wing political views significantly increase anti‐EU attitudes. We also revealed that partisanship's effect is strengthened by affective polarization and political interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between political attitudes, affective polarization, and fertility preferences among married couples in Hong Kong. Using dyadic data from a representative household survey (N = 1586 heterosexually married adults), we investigate how individuals’ attitudes toward democracy and levels of affective polarization are associated with their fertility preferences. We also explore the influence of spouses’ political attitudes and affective polarization on one's fertility preferences. We found that individuals with stronger support for democracy have lower fertility preferences. This negative association between political attitudes and fertility preferences is further amplified by one’s level of affective polarization. The findings of this study contribute to our understanding of how political factors shape fertility patterns in the context of dramatic political transitions. This study provides valuable insights into the complex dynamics between political attitudes, affective polarization, and family formation decisions in Hong Kong, which have both theoretical, policy and political implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In terms of party systems, Canada's system is an outlier. In our present work, we develop Richard Johnston's account of Canada's polarized pluralism in three ways. First, we link the literature on party systems to social identity theory. Second, we make an empirical contribution by directly testing Johnston's claim that intergroup affect plays a central role in shaping the dynamics of the party system. Using Canadian Election Study data from seven elections, we offer strong empirical support for the theory of polarized pluralism. Congruent with existing research, we find that the most important feature summarizing group-based affect in Canadian politics corresponds with the ideological left/right divide, but we also find that feelings toward groups on a second, uncorrelated axis (feelings toward Quebec and minority groups) shape vote choice. Yet our results show that fault lines in the polarized pluralist structure of the Canadian party system are emerging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

White Americans are more affectively polarized today than at any point since at least the 1870s—and the trend shows no sign of abating any time soon. Recent work using the Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM) suggests that appealing to a super-ordinate identity—in this case, American national identity—holds the potential of bridging the social distance between partisans (Levendusky, 2018). However, CIIM assumes that the normative content—i.e. the norms and stereotypes—that people associate with being an American are the same across subordinate groups. Using the 2016 and 2020 American National Election Studies cross-sectional surveys, as well as the 2016–2020 ANES panel survey, we demonstrate three key findings. First, White Democrats and White Republicans have systematically different ideas about what attributes are essential to being a member of the national community. Second, the association between partisanship and these competing conceptions of American identity among White Americans has gotten stronger during the Trump Era, largely because of Democrats adopting a more racially inclusive conception of American identity. Lastly, appeals to American identity only dampen out-partisan animosity when the demographic composition of the opposing party matches their racialized conception of American identity. When there is a mismatch between people's racialized conception of American identity and the composition of the opposition party, American identity is associated with higher levels of partisan hostility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on affective polarization is at its peak. Causes that intensify or mitigate the affective polarization environments in the contemporary democracies, as well as their consequences, remain the subject of debate. What is the relationship between the mass media and social media and affective polarization climates? Traditional and social media are inserted into a macro structure in which circulate the bulk of the political information that can be consumed, so it is necessary an examination of their role. This systematic literature review addresses all articles in the Web of Science database on the subject without restrictions (N=73). After reading the articles, the main evidence, trends, consensus, and disagreements on the subject, as well as recommendations for future researchers, are presented. The results point to minimal and heterogeneous media effects in researchs very focused on polarizing rather than depolarizing effects. It should be noted that there is greater heterogeneity and partisan moderation in information consumption than expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine if increased salience of partisan competition causes affective polarization in the United States during presidential elections. To do so, we leverage the random and quasi-random timing of survey interviews conducted during election campaigns. We conduct three separate studies. In Study 1, we utilize the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), in which random survey interview timing allows for a credible causal estimate of salience on affective polarization. In Study 2, we employ American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1980 to 2016, again leveraging survey timing to assess the effect of salience on affective polarization. In Study 3, we examine changes in affective polarization as a result of increasingly salient partisan competition using NAES and ANES panel data from 1980 to 2008. Across the three studies we identify a meaningful increase in affective polarization toward candidates, but not toward parties, as a result of heightened partisan competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]