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This paper advocates for considering disgust as a primary emotional system within Panksepp's Affective Neuroscience framework, which has the potential to improve the efficacy of psychotherapy with obsessive-compulsive disorder, hypochondriasis, and emetophobia. In 2007, Toronchuk and Ellis provided comprehensive evidence that DISGUST system, as they defined it, matched all Panksepp's criteria for a primary emotional system. A debate ensued and was not unambiguously resolved. This paper is an attempt to resume this discussion and supplement it with the data that accumulated since then on DISGUST's relationship with the immune system and the role of DISGUST dysregulation in psychopathology. We hope that renewed research interest in DISGUST has the potential to improve clinical efficacy with hard-to-treat conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Active inference describes (Bayes-optimal) behaviour as being motivated by the minimisation of surprise of one's sensory observations, through the optimisation of a generative model (of the hidden causes of one's sensory data) in the brain. One of active inference's key appeals is its conceptualisation of precision as biasing neuronal communication and, thus, inference within generative models. The importance of precision in perceptual inference is evident—many studies have demonstrated the importance of ensuring precision estimates are correct for normal (healthy) sensation and perception. Here, we highlight the many roles precision plays in action, i.e., the key processes that rely on adequate estimates of precision, from decision making and action planning to the initiation and control of muscle movement itself. Thereby, we focus on the recent development of hierarchical, "mixed" models—generative models spanning multiple levels of discrete and continuous inference. These kinds of models open up new perspectives on the unified description of hierarchical computation, and its implementation, in action. Here, we highlight how these models reflect the many roles of precision in action—from planning to execution—and the associated pathologies if precision estimation goes wrong. We also discuss the potential biological implementation of the associated message passing, focusing on the role of neuromodulatory systems in mediating different kinds of precision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The representation of intelligence is achieved by patterns of connections among neurons in brains and machines. Brains grow continuously, such that their patterns of connections develop through activity-dependent specification, with the continuing ontogenesis of individual experience. The theory of active inference proposes that the developmental organization of sentient systems reflects general processes of informatic self-evidencing, through the minimization of free energy. We interpret this theory to imply that the mind may be described in information terms that are not dependent on a specific physical substrate. At a certain level of complexity, self-evidencing of living (self-organizing) information systems becomes hierarchical and reentrant, such that effective consciousness emerges as the consequence of a good regulator. We propose that these principles imply that an adequate reconstruction of the computational dynamics of an individual human brain/mind is possible with sufficient neuromorphic computational emulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely believed that play and curiosity are key ingredients as children develop models of the world. There is also an emerging consensus that children are Bayesian learners who combine their structured prior beliefs with estimations of the likelihood of new evidence to infer the most probable model of the world. An influential school of thought within developmental psychology, rational constructivism, combines these two ideas to propose that children learn intuitive theories of how the world works in part by engaging in play activities that allow them to gather new information for testing their theories. There are still, however, at least two pieces missing from rational constructivist theories of development. First, rational constructivism has so far devoted little attention to explaining why children's preferred form of learning, play, feels so fun, enjoyable, and rewarding. Rational constructivism may suggest that children are curious and like to play because reducing uncertainty and learning better theories of the causal workings of the world is enjoyable. What remains unclear, however, is why reducing uncertainty in play is interesting, fun, and joyful, while doing so in other forms of learning can be frustrating or boring. Second, rational constructivism may have overlooked how children, during play, will take control of and manipulate their environment, sometimes in an effort to create ideal niches for surprise‐extraction, sometimes for developing strategies for making the world fit with their predictions. These missing elements from rational constructivism can be provided by understanding the contribution of play to development in terms of predictive processing, an influential framework in cognitive neuroscience that models many of the brain's cognitive functions as processes of model‐based, probabilistic prediction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tourette syndrome (TS) has been associated with a rich set of symptoms that are said to be uncomfortable, unwilled, and effortful to manage. Furthermore, tics, the canonical characteristic of TS, are multifaceted, and their onset and maintenance is complex. A formal account that integrates these features of TS symptomatology within a plausible theoretical framework is currently absent from the field. In this paper, we assess the explanatory power of hierarchical generative modelling in accounting for TS symptomatology from the perspective of active inference. We propose a fourfold analysis of sensory, motor, and cognitive phenomena associated with TS. In Section 1, we characterise tics as a form of action aimed at sensory attenuation. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of epistemic ticcing and describe such behaviour as the search for evidence that there is an agent (i.e., self) at the heart of the generative hierarchy. In Section 3, we characterise both epistemic (sensation-free) and nonepistemic (sensational) tics as habitual behaviour. Finally, in Section 4, we propose that ticcing behaviour involves an inevitable conflict between distinguishable aspects of selfhood; namely, between the minimal phenomenal sense of self—which is putatively underwritten by interoceptive inference—and the explicit preferences that constitute the individual's conceptual sense of self. In sum, we aim to provide an empirically informed analysis of TS symptomatology under active inference, revealing a continuity between covert and overt features of the condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to active inference, constantly running prediction engines in our brain play a large role in delivering all human experience. These predictions help deliver everything we see, hear, touch, and feel. In this paper, I pursue one apparent consequence of this increasingly well-supported view. Given the constant influence of hidden predictions on human experience, can we leverage the power of prediction in the service of human flourishing? Can we learn to hack our own predictive regimes in ways that better serve our needs and purposes? Asking this question rapidly reveals a landscape that is at once familiar and new. It is also challenging, suggesting important questions about scope and dangers while casting further doubt (as if any was needed) on old assumptions about a firm mind/body divide. I review a range of possible hacks, starting with the careful use of placebos, moving on to look at chronic pain and functional disorders, and ending with some speculations concerning the complex role of genetic influences on the predictive brain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops an outline for a hierarchically embedded architecture of an artificial agent that models human translation processes based on principles of active inference (AIF) and predictive processing (PP). AIF and PP posit that the mind constructs a model of the environment which guides behavior by continually generating and integrating predictions and sensory input. The proposed model of the translation agent consists of three processing strata: a sensorimotor layer, a cognitive layer, and a phenomenal layer. Each layer consists of a network of states and transitions that interact on different time scales. Following the AIF framework, states are conditioned on observations which may originate from the environment and/or the embedded processing layer, while transitions between states are conditioned on actions that implement plans to optimize goal-oriented behavior. The AIF agent aims at simulating the variation in translational behavior under various conditions and to facilitate investigating the underlying mental mechanisms. It provides a novel framework for generating and testing new hypotheses of the translating mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we assess the functionality and therapeutic potential of ambient smart environments. We argue that the language of affordances alone fails to do justice to the peculiar functionality of this ambient technology, and draw from theoretical approaches based on the free energy principle and active inference. We argue that ambient smart environments should be understood as playing an'upstream' role, shaping an agent's field of affordances in real time, in an adaptive way that supports an optimal grip on a field of affordances. We characterise this optimal grip using precision weighting, and in terms of allostatic control, drawing an analogy with the role of precision weighting in metacognitive processes. One key insight we present is that ambient smart environments may support allostatic control not only by simplifying an agent's problem space, but by increasing uncertainty, in order to destabilise calcified, sub-optimal, psychological and behavioural patterns. In short, we lay an empirically-grounded theoretical foundation for understanding ambient smart environments, and for answering related philosophical questions around agency, trust, and subjective wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concept normativity is a prominent subject of inquiry in the philosophical literature on the nature of concepts. Concepts are said to be normative, in that the use of concepts to categorise is associated with an evaluation of the appropriateness of such categorisation measured against some objective external standard. Two broad groups of views have emerged in accounting for the normativity of concepts: a weaker view traces such normativity to the social practice in which the agent using the concept is embedded, while a stronger view traces such normativity to a first-person capacity of reflection. However, both views have drawbacks: the weaker view seems not to do justice to the basic sense of normativity associated with an individual agent using a concept, while the stronger view ties such normativity with the first-person conscious evaluation, which appears to be too strong. Here, we propose a different view of concepts using principles from the Active Inference framework. We reconceive concepts, defining them as Bayesian beliefs—that is, conditional probability distributions—that represent causes and contingencies in the world, their form grounded in the exchange between the agent and its environment. This allows us to present a different view on the source of normativity, with an emphasis on the structure of the agent itself as well as its interaction with the environment. On the Active Inference view, concepts are normative in that they are intrinsically connected to the self-evidencing nature of an agent, whose very structure implies an evaluation of the concepts it employs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flowinducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I develop an account of linguistic content based on the active inference framework. While ecological and enactive theorists have rightly rejected the notion of content as a basis for cognitive processes, they must recognize the important role that it plays in the social regulation of linguistic interaction. According to an influential theory in philosophy of language, normative inferentialism, an utterance has the content that it has in virtue of its normative status, that is, in virtue of the set of commitments and entitlements that the speaker undertakes by producing this utterance. This normative status is determined by the normative attitudes shared by members of the utterer's linguistic community. I propose here an account of such normative attitudes based on the ecological interpretation of the active inference framework. I explain how social normativity can be understood in that framework as the way in which members of a group shape their social niche to make it more predictable. Finally, I apply this account of social normativity to basic communicative practices, thereby explaining how social normative expectations can emerge to regulate these communicative practices, eventually leading to the institution of the sort of normative statuses constitutive of linguistic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking inspiration from humans can help catalyse embodied AI solutions for important real-world applications. Current human-inspired tools include neuromorphic systems and the developmental approach to learning. However, this developmental neurorobotics approach is currently lacking important frameworks for human-like computation and learning. We propose that human-like computation is inherently embodied, with its interface to the world being neuromorphic, and its learning processes operating across different timescales. These constraints necessitate a unified framework: active inference, underpinned by the free energy principle (FEP). Herein, we describe theoretical and empirical support for leveraging this framework in embodied neuromorphic agents with autonomous mental development. We additionally outline current implementation approaches (including toolboxes) and challenges, and we provide suggestions for next steps to catalyse this important field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understandings of how visual hallucinations appear have been highly influenced by generative approaches, in particular Friston's Active Inference conceptualization. Their core proposition is that these phenomena occur when hallucinatory expectations outweigh actual sensory data. This imbalance occurs as the brain seeks to minimize informational free energy, a measure of the distance between predicted and actual sensory data in a stationary open system. We review this approach in the light of old and new information on the role of environmental factors in episodic hallucinations. In particular, we highlight the possible relationship of specific visual triggers to the onset and offset of some episodes. We use an analogy from phase transitions in physics to explore factors which might account for intermittent shifts between veridical and hallucinatory vision. In these triggered forms of hallucinations, we suggest that there is a transient disturbance in the normal one-to-one correspondence between a real object and the counterpart perception such that this correspondence becomes between the real object and a hallucination. Generative models propose that a lack of information transfer from the environment to the brain is one of the key features of hallucinations. In contrast, we submit that specific information transfer is required at onset and offset in these cases. We propose that this transient one-to-one correspondence between environment and hallucination is mediated more by aberrant discriminative than by generative inference. Discriminative inference can be conceptualized as a process for maximizing shared information between the environment and perception within a self-organizing nonstationary system. We suggest that generative inference plays the greater role in established hallucinations and in the persistence of individual hallucinatory episodes. We further explore whether thermodynamic free energy may be an additional factor in why hallucinations are temporary. Future empirical research could productively concentrate on three areas. Firstly, subjective perceptual changes and parallel variations in brain function during specific transitions between veridical and hallucinatory vision to inform models of how episodes occur. Secondly, systematic investigation of the links between environment and hallucination episodes to probe the role of information transfer in triggering transitions between veridical and hallucinatory vision. Finally, changes in hallucinatory episodes over time to elucidate the role of learning on phenomenology. These empirical data will allow the potential roles of different forms of inference in the stages of hallucinatory episodes to be elucidated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Active inference by the free energy principle, neglected by paleoanthropologists, led to behavioral evolution in early Homo. • Early Homo's hierarchically mechanistic mind was a biological inference machine with generative depth between apes' and ours. • Neurobiological aspects are outlined that likely were involved in the cerebral evolution of generative depth in Homo. • Tight bounding of cognitive surprise made early Homo unresponsive to unorthodox or novel behavior and unlikely to copy it. • Handaxes likely resulted often from novel manual behavior enacted spontaneously by early Homo for over a million years. A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo — namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' — from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a ' snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' — as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective — that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses — affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Equipping autonomous agents for dynamic interaction and navigation is a significant challenge in intelligent transportation systems. This study aims to address this by implementing a brain-inspired model for decision making in autonomous vehicles. We employ active inference, a Bayesian approach that models decision-making processes similar to the human brain, focusing on the agent's preferences and the principle of free energy. This approach is combined with imitation learning to enhance the vehicle's ability to adapt to new observations and make human-like decisions. The research involved developing a multi-modal self-awareness architecture for autonomous driving systems and testing this model in driving scenarios, including abnormal observations. The results demonstrated the model's effectiveness in enabling the vehicle to make safe decisions, particularly in unobserved or dynamic environments. The study concludes that the integration of active inference with imitation learning significantly improves the performance of autonomous vehicles, offering a promising direction for future developments in intelligent transportation systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the ubiquity and importance of narratives for human adaptation is widely recognized, there is no integrative framework for understanding the roles of narrative in human adaptation. Research has identified several cognitive and social functions of narratives that are conducive to well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the cognitive and social functions of narratives in terms of active inference, to support the claim that one of the main adaptive functions of narrative is to generate more useful (i.e., accurate, parsimonious) predictions for the individual, as well as to coordinate group action (over multiple timescales) through shared predictions about collective behavior. Active inference is a theory that depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by proactively inferring the causes of their sensations (including their own actions). We review narrative research on identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projections, storytelling practices, enculturation, and master narratives. We show how this research dovetails with the active inference framework and propose an account of the cognitive and social functions of narrative that emphasizes that narratives are for the future--even when they are focused on recollecting or recounting the past. Understanding narratives as cognitive and cultural tools for mutual prediction in social contexts can guide research on narrative in adaptive behavior and psychopathology, based on a parsimonious mechanistic model of some of the basic adaptive functions of narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Functional movement disorders are not uncommon in neurological consultations, hospitals and emergency departments. Although the disorder can usually be recognized clinically, the communication of the diagnosis is often unsatisfactory. Those affected are indirectly accused of a lack of insight or openness but it is often the doctors who fail to formulate a coherent and comprehensible explanation of the underlying disorder. In this review an integrative model for the development of functional movement disorders is presented, which places the motor (and nonmotor) symptoms in a neuroscientific light. In addition, explanations and metaphors are presented that have proven helpful in conveying an understanding of the disorder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Karl Friston's free-energy principle casts agents as self-evidencing through active inference. This implies that decision-making, planning and information-seeking are, in a generic sense, 'wishful'. We take an interdisciplinary perspective on this perplexing aspect of the free-energy principle and unpack the epistemological implications of wishful thinking under the free-energy principle. We use this epistemic framing to discuss the emergence of biases for self-evidencing agents. In particular, we argue that this elucidates an optimism bias as a foundational tenet of self-evidencing. We allude to a historical precursor to some of these themes, interestingly found in Machiavelli's oeuvre, to contextualise the universal optimism of the free-energy principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, understanding the foundations of intelligent behaviour is increasingly important. Active inference, regarded as a general theory of behaviour, offers a principled approach to probing the basis of sophistication in planning and decision-making. This paper examines two decision-making schemes in active inference based on "planning" and "learning from experience". Furthermore, we also introduce a mixed model that navigates the data complexity trade-off between these strategies, leveraging the strengths of both to facilitate balanced decision-making. We evaluate our proposed model in a challenging grid-world scenario that requires adaptability from the agent. Additionally, our model provides the opportunity to analyse the evolution of various parameters, offering valuable insights and contributing to an explainable framework for intelligent decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between societal structures shaped by traditions, norms, laws, and customs, and creative expressions in arts and media through the lens of the predictive coding framework in cognitive science. The article proposes that both dimensions of culture can be viewed as adaptations designed to enhance and train the brain's predictive abilities in the social domain. Traditions, norms, laws, and customs foster shared predictions and expectations among individuals, thereby reducing uncertainty in social environments. On the other hand, arts and media expose us to simulated experiences that explore alternative social realities, allowing the predictive machinery of the brain to hone its skills through exposure to a wider array of potentially relevant social circumstances and scenarios. We first review key principles of predictive coding and active inference, and then explore the rationale of cultural traditions and artistic culture in this perspective. Finally, we draw parallels between institutionalized normative habits that stabilize social worlds and creative and imaginative acts that temporarily subvert established conventions to inject variability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New insights into intractable industrial challenges can be revealed by framing them in terms of natural science. One intractable industrial challenge is that creative production can be much more financially expensive and time consuming than standardized production. Creative products include a wide range of goods that have one or more original characteristics. The scaling up of creative production is hindered by high financial production costs and long production durations. In this paper, creative production is framed in terms of interactions between entropy and complexity during progressions from emergent pragmatics to action semantics. An analysis of interactions between entropy and complexity is provided that relates established practice in creative production to organizational survival in changing environments. The analysis in this paper is related to assembly theory, which is a recent theoretical development in natural science that addresses how open-ended generation of complex physical objects can emerge from selection in biology. Parallels between assembly practice in industrial production and assembly theory in natural science are explained through constructs that are common to both, such as assembly index. Overall, analyses reported in the paper reveal that interactions between entropy and complexity underlie intractable challenges in creative production, from the production of individual products to the survival of companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore the known connection among sustainability, resilience, and well-being within the framework of active inference. Initially, we revisit how the notions of well-being and resilience intersect within active inference before defining sustainability. We adopt a holistic concept of sustainability denoting the enduring capacity to meet needs over time without depleting crucial resources. It extends beyond material wealth to encompass community networks, labor, and knowledge. Using the free energy principle, we can emphasize the role of fostering resource renewal, harmonious system–entity exchanges, and practices that encourage self-organization and resilience as pathways to achieving sustainability both as an agent and as a part of a collective. We start by connecting active inference with well-being, building on existing work. We then attempt to link resilience with sustainability, asserting that resilience alone is insufficient for sustainable outcomes. While crucial for absorbing shocks and stresses, resilience must be intrinsically linked with sustainability to ensure that adaptive capacities do not merely perpetuate existing vulnerabilities. Rather, it should facilitate transformative processes that address the root causes of unsustainability. Sustainability, therefore, must manifest across extended timescales and all system strata, from individual components to the broader system, to uphold ecological integrity, economic stability, and social well-being. We explain how sustainability manifests at the level of an agent and then at the level of collectives and systems. To model and quantify the interdependencies between resources and their impact on overall system sustainability, we introduce the application of network theory and dynamical systems theory. We emphasize the optimization of precision or learning rates through the active inference framework, advocating for an approach that fosters the elastic and plastic resilience necessary for long-term sustainability and abundance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natural language syntax yields an unbounded array of hierarchically structured expressions. We claim that these are used in the service of active inference in accord with the free-energy principle (FEP). While conceptual advances alongside modelling and simulation work have attempted to connect speech segmentation and linguistic communication with the FEP, we extend this program to the underlying computations responsible for generating syntactic objects. We argue that recently proposed principles of economy in language design—such as “minimal search” criteria from theoretical syntax—adhere to the FEP. This affords a greater degree of explanatory power to the FEP—with respect to higher language functions—and offers linguistics a grounding in first principles with respect to computability. While we mostly focus on building new principled conceptual relations between syntax and the FEP, we also show through a sample of preliminary examples how both tree-geometric depth and a Kolmogorov complexity estimate (recruiting a Lempel–Ziv compression algorithm) can be used to accurately predict legal operations on syntactic workspaces, directly in line with formulations of variational free energy minimization. This is used to motivate a general principle of language design that we term Turing–Chomsky Compression (TCC). We use TCC to align concerns of linguists with the normative account of self-organization furnished by the FEP, by marshalling evidence from theoretical linguistics and psycholinguistics to ground core principles of efficient syntactic computation within active inference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a novel perspective on Agentive Cognitive Construction Grammar (AgCCxG) by examining the intricate interplay between mind and language through the lens of both Active Inference and Peircean semiotics. AgCCxG emphasizes the impact of intention and purpose on linguistic choices as a cognitive imperative to balance the symbolic Self (Intelligent Agent) with the dynamics of the environment. Among other things, the paper posits that linguistic constructions, particularly Constructional Attachment Patterns (CAPs), like argument structure constructions, embody experienced interactions with the world through reenactment routines via the integration of multisensory channels. Unlike traditional usage-based approaches (e.g., construction grammars), AgCCxG embraces a robust theory of signs that reveals human representation as a continuous process of semiotic hybridization for the creative prediction of uncertain scenarios. Importantly, the paper challenges the notion of the mind as a unified, rational, uncertainty-reducing machine by asserting that physical processes governing open biological systems profoundly influence the linguistic sign system. Intelligent agents' adaptability in expressing incongruous realities thus highlights the role of semiotic hybridization in preserving an agent's autonomy and semiotic boundary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper advocates for considering disgust as a primary emotional system within Panksepp’s Affective Neuroscience framework, which has the potential to improve the efficacy of psychotherapy with obsessive-compulsive disorder, hypochondriasis, and emetophobia. In 2007, Toronchuk and Ellis provided comprehensive evidence that DISGUST system, as they defined it, matched all Panksepp’s criteria for a primary emotional system. A debate ensued and was not unambiguously resolved. This paper is an attempt to resume this discussion and supplement it with the data that accumulated since then on DISGUST’s relationship with the immune system and the role of DISGUST dysregulation in psychopathology. We hope that renewed research interest in DISGUST has the potential to improve clinical efficacy with hard-to-treat conditions.

Collective motion is ubiquitous in nature; groups of animals, such as fish, birds, and ungulates appear to move as a whole, exhibiting a rich behavioral repertoire that ranges from directed movement to milling to disordered swarming. Typically, such macroscopic patterns arise from decentralized, local interactions among constituent components (e.g., individual fish in a school). Preeminent models of this process describe individuals as self-propelled particles, subject to self-generated motion and "social forces" such as short-range repulsion and long-range attraction or alignment. However, organisms are not particles; they are probabilistic decision-makers. Here, we introduce an approach to modeling collective behavior based on active inference. This cognitive framework casts behavior as the consequence of a single imperative: to minimize surprise. We demonstrate that many empirically observed collective phenomena, including cohesion, milling, and directed motion, emerge naturally when considering behavior as driven by active Bayesian inference--without explicitly building behavioral rules or goals into individual agents. Furthermore, we show that active inference can recover and generalize the classical notion of social forces as agents attempt to suppress prediction errors that conflict with their expectations. By exploring the parameter space of the belief-based model, we reveal nontrivial relationships between the individual beliefs and group properties like polarization and the tendency to visit different collective states. We also explore how individual beliefs about uncertainty determine collective decision-making accuracy. Finally, we show how agents can update their generative model over time, resulting in groups that are collectively more sensitive to external fluctuations and encode information more robustly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to predictive processing, an increasingly influential paradigm in cognitive science, the function of the brain is to minimize the prediction error of its sensory input. Conceptual engineering is the practice of assessing and changing concepts or word meanings. We contribute to both strands of research by proposing the first cognitive account of conceptual engineering, using the predictive processing framework. Our model reveals a new kind of implementation problem as prediction errors are only minimized if enough agents embrace conceptual changes. This problem can be overcome by emphasizing the importance of social norms and conceptual pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent strand in the philosophical literature on addiction emphasizes problems with diachronic self-control. Hanna Pickard, for example, argues that an important aspect of addiction consists in inability to identify with a non-addicted future self. This literature sits alongside another that treats addiction as the product of neural changes that "hijack" mechanisms of reward prediction, habit formation decision making and cognitive control. This hijacking literature originates in accounts that treat the neural changes characteristic of addiction as a brain disease. This paper provides a framework based on predictive processing accounts of self-awareness that integrates the hijacking and diachronic accounts. I discuss a hijacking account proposed to explain disruption of addiction following lesion to the anterior insula cortex. I show how insula activity contributes to the type of identification implicated in diachronic accounts and how deactivation of the anterior insula can disrupt addiction by alienating the subject from her addictive tendencies. This is consistent with neural evidence but also incorporates the personal level features of addiction that are opaque to neural level explanation [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a method for an artificial agent to behave in a social manner. Although defining proper social behavior is difficult because it differs from situation to situation, the agent following the proposed method adaptively behaves appropriately in each situation by empathizing with the surrounding others. The proposed method is achieved by incorporating empathy into active inference. We evaluated the proposed method regarding control of autonomous mobile robots in diverse situations. From the evaluation results, an agent controlled by the proposed method could behave more adaptively socially than an agent controlled by the standard active inference in the diverse situations. In the case of two agents, the agent controlled with the proposed method behaved in a social way that reduced the other agent's travel distance by 13.7% and increased the margin between the agents by 25.8%, even though it increased the agent's travel distance by 8.2%. Also, the agent controlled with the proposed method behaved more socially when it was surrounded by altruistic others but less socially when it was surrounded by selfish others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers neural representation through the lens of active inference, a normative framework for understanding brain function. It delves into how living organisms employ generative models to minimize the discrepancy between predictions and observations (as scored with variational free energy). The ensuing analysis suggests that the brain learns generative models to navigate the world adaptively, not (or not solely) to understand it. Different living organisms may possess an array of generative models, spanning from those that support action‐perception cycles to those that underwrite planning and imagination; namely, from explicit models that entail variables for predicting concurrent sensations, like objects, faces, or people—to action‐oriented models that predict action outcomes. It then elucidates how generative models and belief dynamics might link to neural representation and the implications of different types of generative models for understanding an agent's cognitive capabilities in relation to its ecological niche. The paper concludes with open questions regarding the evolution of generative models and the development of advanced cognitive abilities—and the gradual transition from pragmatic to detached neural representations. The analysis on offer foregrounds the diverse roles that generative models play in cognitive processes and the evolution of neural representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we unite concepts from Husserlian phenomenology, the active inference framework in theoretical biology, and category theory in mathematics to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding social action premised on shared goals. We begin with an overview of Husserlian phenomenology, focusing on aspects of inner time-consciousness, namely, retention, primal impression, and protention. We then review active inference as a formal approach to modeling agent behavior based on variational (approximate Bayesian) inference. Expanding upon Husserl's model of time consciousness, we consider collective goal-directed behavior, emphasizing shared protentions among agents and their connection to the shared generative models of active inference. This integrated framework aims to formalize shared goals in terms of shared protentions, and thereby shed light on the emergence of group intentionality. Building on this foundation, we incorporate mathematical tools from category theory, in particular, sheaf and topos theory, to furnish a mathematical image of individual and group interactions within a stochastic environment. Specifically, we employ morphisms between polynomial representations of individual agent models, allowing predictions not only of their own behaviors but also those of other agents and environmental responses. Sheaf and topos theory facilitates the construction of coherent agent worldviews and provides a way of representing consensus or shared understanding. We explore the emergence of shared protentions, bridging the phenomenology of temporal structure, multi-agent active inference systems, and category theory. Shared protentions are highlighted as pivotal for coordination and achieving common objectives. We conclude by acknowledging the intricacies stemming from stochastic systems and uncertainties in realizing shared goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A theoretical account of development in mesocortical anatomy is derived from the free energy principle, operating in a neural field with both Hebbian and anti-Hebbian neural plasticity. An elementary structural unit is proposed, in which synaptic connections at mesoscale are arranged in paired patterns with mirror symmetry. Exchanges of synaptic flux in each pattern form coupled spatial eigenmodes, and the line of mirror reflection between the paired patterns operates as a Markov blanket, so that prediction errors in exchanges between the pairs are minimized. The theoretical analysis is then compared to the outcomes from a biological model of neocortical development, in which neuron precursors are selected by apoptosis for cell body and synaptic connections maximizing synchrony and also minimizing axonal length. It is shown that this model results in patterns of connection with the anticipated mirror symmetries, at micro-, meso- and inter-arial scales, among lateral connections, and in cortical depth. This explains the spatial organization and functional significance of neuron response preferences, and is compatible with the structural form of both columnar and noncolumnar cortex. Multi-way interactions of mirrored representations can provide a preliminary anatomically realistic model of cortical information processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding adaptive human driving behavior, in particular how drivers manage uncertainty, is of key importance for developing simulated human driver models that can be used in the evaluation and development of autonomous vehicles. However, existing traffic psychology models of adaptive driving behavior either lack computational rigor or only address specific scenarios and/or behavioral phenomena. While models developed in the fields of machine learning and robotics can effectively learn adaptive driving behavior from data, due to their black box nature, they offer little or no explanation of the mechanisms underlying the adaptive behavior. Thus, generalizable, interpretable, computational models of adaptive human driving behavior are still rare. This paper proposes such a model based on active inference, a behavioral modeling framework originating in computational neuroscience. The model offers a principled solution to how humans trade progress against caution through policy selection based on the single mandate to minimize expected free energy. This casts goal-seeking and information-seeking (uncertainty-resolving) behavior under a single objective function, allowing the model to seamlessly resolve uncertainty as a means to obtain its goals. We apply the model in two apparently disparate driving scenarios that require managing uncertainty, (1) driving pastan occluding object and (2) visual time-sharing between driving and a secondary task, and show how human-like adaptive driving behavior emerges from the single principle of expected free energy minimization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We formulated the sense of the presence of a remote participant in hybrid communication using a Bayesian framework. We also applied the knowledge gained from the simulation with the Bayesian model to the intervention behavior of an avatar robot and encouraged the local participants to speak by intervening in the behavior of a remote participant using an avatar robot. We formulated the sense of presence as model evidence for other's mental state. Based on the results of simulations with the model, we designed the gaze behavior of an avatar robot. In an experiment, the gaze behavior of the remote participant expressed more attention and interest in local participants, but local participants expressed fewer opinions in the meeting. The results suggest that gaze behavior increases the presence of the remote participant and discourages the local participant from speaking in the context of the experimental task. We updated the model and replicated the experimental results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the challenges posed by the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence specifically Large Language Models (LLMs). I show that traditional linguistic theories and corpus studies are being outpaced by LLMs' computational sophistication and low perplexity levels. In order to address these challenges, I suggest a focus on language as a cognitive tool shaped by embodied-environmental imperatives in the context of Agentive Cognitive Construction Grammar. To that end, I introduce an Embodied Human Language Model (EHLM), inspired by Active Inference research, as a promising alternative that integrates sensory input, embodied representations, and adaptive strategies for contextualized analysis and conceptual utility maximization. By incorporating Active Inference, which sees perception as inferring the world's state from sensory data, the findings reveal that the characterization of the English modal be able to, as a triadic construction encoding biological intelligent agency, introduces a more plausible theoretical basis for the positing of linguistic constructions. This emphasizes the crucial role of embodied human language models in the comprehension of how humans construct preferred futures through language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I discuss Clark's predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: Clark's hybrid suggests that, when we use them, we pay attention to mind-extending external resources. This clashes with a commonly accepted necessary condition of cognitive extension; namely, that mind-extending resources must be phenomenally transparent when used. I then propose a solution to this problem claiming that the phenomenal transparency condition should be rejected. To do so, I put forth a parity argument to the effect that phenomenal transparency cannot be a necessary condition on cognitive extension: roughly, since internal cognitive resources can fail to be transparent when used, by parity, external resources can fail to be phenomenally transparent too. Further, I argue that phenomenal transparency is not even a reliable indicator of cognitive extension; hence its absence should not be considered a problem for Clark's extended mind-predictive processing hybrid. Lastly, I consider and allay a number of worries my proposal might raise, and conclude the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the realm of law enforcement, the "police hunch" has long been a mysterious but crucial aspect of decision-making. Drawing on the developing framework of Active Inference from cognitive science, this theoretical article examines the genesis, mechanics, and implications of the police hunch. It argues that hunches -- often vital in high-stakes situations -- should not be described as mere intuitions, but as intricate products of our mind's generative models. These models, shaped by observations of the social world and assimilated and enacted through active inference, seek to reduce surprise and make hunches an indispensable tool for officers, in exactly the same way that hypotheses are indispensable for scientists. However, the predictive validity of hunches is influenced by a range of factors, including experience and bias, thus warranting critical examination of their reliability. This article not only explores the formation of police hunches but also provides practical insights for officers and researchers on how to harness the power of active inference to fully understand policing decisions and subsequently explore new avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]