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This research examines AI-driven price discrimination in digital marketplaces, comparing it to competition law. While AI can enhance efficiency and customer welfare, it can also lead to exclusion and exploitative consequences. The EU and China have implemented competition laws and regulations to address unfair price discrimination, demonstrating that a legal reaction based on competition laws is not always necessary. Competition authorities must balance various factors to effectively address AI-driven price discrimination in digital markets. It evaluates the potential for abuse of dominance and the negative impact on competition and consumers. The research uses legal research methodology to examine price discrimination laws and their evolution, comparing them with traditional forms of dominance. It also examines the economic arguments of market efficiency and fairness, consumer detriment, and regulatory action. The paper recommends increased regulation of AI pricing and improved consumer protection measures to prevent unfair market conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The General Court's annulment of the European Commission's finding that Intel's conditional rebate scheme was abusive underscores the Court's readiness to scrutinize in detail the economic analysis, including the as-efficient competitor (AEC) test. This paper critically reviews some of the key errors that the Commission, according to the Court, made in relation to the implementation of that test, focusing on some of its main ingredients, namely the contestable share of the market, the conditional portion of the rebates, and the relevant cost benchmark. We conclude that the Court's assessment provides useful lessons for how to perform thorough and robust economic analysis not only within the context of an AEC test but in competition cases more generally. At the same time, considering the test's intrinsic limitations, we find that, aside from the test's implementation, its informative value should also be explored, based on economic theory and the facts of the case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discriminatory transactions are contracts in which there is unjustified discrimination in one of them despite the fact that the circumstances are the same. In legal systems, special conditions for prohibition have been included. Some of these conditions are related to the contract itself; Such as the similarity of transactions and the condition of applying restrictions, which exist only in the United States. Some of these conditions are related to the parties to the contract, such as the exclusive power of the economic enterprise or the dominant economic situation. Some conditions are competitive legal conditions. Competitive conditions include disruption of competition, competitive damage and discrimination between competing buyers. The condition of entering damage to the interstate market in the United States and to the trade between the member countries, is foreseen in the European Union law; But it has not been relevant in Iran's legal system. Therefore, in all three legal systems, special conditions for prohibition have been stated. In America, these restrictions are more and most transactions are considered legal. The most important difference between the European Union and Iran is that, in the European Union, only those transactions which are stated by the economic enterprise in a dominant position are prohibited. This should be emphasized in Iranian law as well. Also, based on the appearance of Iranian law, the conditions for prohibiting unilateral discriminatory transactions are stricter than multilateral discriminatory transactions. Finally, based on the examination of the conditions of prohibition, legal articles have been proposed to amend the law.

During the previous years of the ECLIC conference series, the case of Facebook (Meta), which started at the German national competition authority Bundeskartellamt, was analysed by our (broader or narrower) author team, from different perspectives. At issue was primarily the question that links the areas of data protection and competition - and thus whether the use and linking of personal data from this social network and from third parties can be considered an abuse of a dominant position in light of the fact that the collection of this data is a condition for the use of the platform. The legal case was transferred from the administrative phase, to the German national court, which referred the case to the Court of the Justice of European union (hereafter also as "CJEU") for a preliminary ruling. Advocate General Athanasios Rantos also submitted his opinion in the case, and the CJEU in its judgment of 04 July 2023, answered the questions referred for a preliminary ruling. By answering the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in case C-252/21, CJEU drawed conclusions both in relation to the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU between the competent data protection and competition authorities, and in relation to the regulation of personal data and competition. From a methodological point of view, the analysis will focus in particular on the decision in the case (C-252/21), taking into account the findings presented in professional literature with emphasis on the abuse of dominant position. The aim of this paper is to select the most relevant generally applicable conclusions of the judgement of 04 July 2023 for the application of the abuse of dominance in the context of extensive data collection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Margin squeezing is an abuse of dominant position, which is not directly mentioned in Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European General Court that have recognised this practice as anti-competitive, initially treating it as anti-competitive refusal to supply. Given the many similarities between these practices, there are questions as to whether margin squeeze should be considered an separate manifestation of an abuse of dominant position. The aim of the article is to analyse the position of the European Commission in this regard and juxtapose it with the views contained in relevant judicial decisions, judgements, and rulings, as well as to compare it with the regulations adopted in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is dedicated to my esteemed colleague Richard S. Markovits. It deals with ownership of data and with alternative methods to regulate Internet platform providers. It rejects the view that the subjects of information should have ownership rights over their personal data, which extend beyond what is necessary for privacy protection. Also, data controllers should not have an exclusive ownership right but share anonymized data with competitors. Even though the wealth of data harvested and stored by Internet firms are only weakly protected by trade-secret law, this together with effective encryption technologies develops into an exploitative de facto property over information, if effective market opening rules do not exist. The paper shows that the rule of abuse of dominant position of traditional competition law could not sufficiently check unfair trade practices of platform providers. Its adjudication is information intensive and leads to overly lengthy and costly proceedings. The Digital Markets Act of the European Union drew a radical conclusion from these experiences and regulates the biggest Internet firms with simple per se rules, which are relatively easy to administer but less flexible. Still, the Digital Markets Act should be welcomed as an important step forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article summarises the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Towercast case, which clarifies the interaction between Article 102 TFEU and economic concentrations. The judgment validates the ex post review of concentrations of undertakings with a dominant position that initially escape merger control, through the prism of an abuse of dominant position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Annotation on the Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 12 January 2023 in Case C‑42/21 P Lietuvos geležinkeliai AB v Commission In Lithuanian Railways,1the Court of Justice of the EU (the CJEU) considered the question of whether the doctrine of essential facilities applied to a dominant undertaking that had destroyed its own infrastructure that was also used by competitors. Both the European Commission (EC)2 and the General Court (the GC)3 had previously answered that question in the negative. Adjudicating an appeal filed against the judgment of the GC, the CJEU embraced this strict position and narrowed down the application of the doctrine to 'access refusal' conducts. On its side, the CJEU clarified that the doctrine of essential facilities did not apply when assessing whether 'infrastructure destruction' conduct done by a dominant undertaking amounts to a violation of Article 102 TFEU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Doing Business in a World of Goliaths: Power Imbalances and Economic Dependency in Platform-to-Business Relations Digital platforms have emerged as crucial infrastructures in today's economy, facilitating digital transactions between buyers and sellers. However, propelled by network effects and other sources of market power, digital platforms are generally the stronger party in their relations with users, and this could lead them to abuse their market power through exclusionary and exploitative practices. While extensive consumer regulations shield consumers in business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions, scant protection is afforded to businesses in presumed peer-to-peer business-to-business (B2B) transactions. Although certain EU provisions, such as Article 102 TFEU, Regulation 1150/2019 and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), aim to safeguard business users in platform-to-business (P2B) contexts, their effectiveness is constrained. These regulations and provisions are often too narrow in scope, fail to consider the platform's unique features, prioritise public interests over those of individual businesses and lack effective remedies. Conversely, some Member States have adopted abuse of economic dependence regulations, potentially offering stronger protection, as such an approach provides more flexibility and emphasises contractual fairness for individual business users. The present article attempts to show that business users are in fact economically dependent on the platform, thereby suggesting that an EU level prohibition of abuse of economic dependence could more effectively address the existing gaps in protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(2), 627-639 | European Forum Insight of 17 October 2022 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Background. - II.1. The European Commission Decision. - II.2. The 2014 General Court judgment in Intel. - II.3. The Intel judgment of the Court of Justice. - III. The 2022 General Court decision in Intel. - IV. Critical analysis and further discussion. - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) The latest judgment of the General Court in the Intel case annulled the EU Commission's decision from 2009 imposing a €1.06 billion fine on Intel for abusing its dominant position by offering fidelity rebate schemes (case T‑286/09 Intel v Commission ECLI:EU:T:2022:19). The judgment reaffirms the application of an "effects-based" approach which requires careful economic analysis in order to establish the abusive nature of fidelity rebates. The judgment demonstrates that the presumption that fidelity rebates are restrictions of competition by object can be rebutted by the dominant company. It also clarifies that the as efficient competitor (AEC) test is not an indispensable part of the assessment in examining the foreclosure capability of all rebate systems but can be a relevant factor where the Commission has carried it out as part of its assessment of the anticompetitive effects of the rebate schemes. This Insight seeks to examine how this clarification can be translated into concrete lessons not only for future cases but also for other cases dealing with similar issues (i.e. the Qualcomm and Google Shopping cases) and, in particular, the significance of the AEC test as a specific tool to evaluate the anticompetitive effects of fidelity rebates. The Insight concludes that the recent judgment leaves more questions than answers regarding the application of the AEC test, and that it can be seen as signalling the demise of the application of this test for future cases.

This article summarises the recent decisions published by the Spanish Competition Authority regarding abuse of dominant position in the pharmaceutical sector. Even though these are rare infringements, they result from the special responsibility of a dominant pharmaceutical company in a key moment for competition law: when its exclusive right over the patent or the orphan drug is coming to a close. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following an international trend, Brazil's National Competition Authority (NCA), the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), has been devoting more attention to potential anticompetitive conducts in the digital economy. This article discusses a set of cases involving unilateral conducts in the digital economy, assessing CADE's decision-making practice, enforcement challenges, and tools used. Building from CADE's case law, we single out some relevant aspects of the Brazilian experience, including (1) the cautious approach taken by CADE when evaluating effects of unilateral conducts in final decisions, (2) the use of interim measures to intervene in early stages of investigations, and (3) the use of settlements to reach quick solutions with negotiated remedies. A brief conclusion discusses possible future trends given the experience discussed in the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article analyses the competition issues that arise from the legal gaps of the Slot Regulation (95/93/EC). Although the Slot Regulation targets a just allocation system, allowing market access for all airlines, the augmenting number of congested airports in the European Union makes it hard to attribute slots to newcomers. The gaps of the Slot Regulation have led to problematic conducts such as 'slot hoarding' as incumbent carriers are aware of the financial and operational importance of these slots, and of their scarcity. The gaps have also allowed dominant airlines to engage in secondary slot trading under secretive and potentially anti-competitive terms, which may have an impact on the competitiveness of the market. The article examines the applicability of Article 102 TFEU to airlines that may abuse their dominance created by the number of slots they have under the essential facilities doctrine and the margin squeeze theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Majunya perkembangan teknologi menghasilkan dunia usaha yang semakin terdigitalisasi. Oleh karena itu, berbagai proses usaha mulai menggunakan teknologi seperti algoritma dalam membuat keputusan bisnis. Dalam hal ini, algoritma digunakan untuk menentukan harga oleh pelaku usaha yang kemudian dikenal sebagai algoritma harga. Namun, terdapat beberapa permasalahan yang timbul jika algoritma harga digunakan oleh pelaku usaha dominan. Terdapat kekhawatiran bahwa penggunaan algoritma harga dapat mengakibatkan penyalahgunaan posisi dominan. Selanjutnya, terdapat tantangan mengenai upaya hukum apa yang dapat dilakukan oleh otoritas persaingan usaha untuk menghadapi fenomena ini. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis penggunaan algoritma harga dan penyalahgunaan posisi dominan, serta upaya hukum yang dapat ditempuh. Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum dengan pendekatan peraturan perundang undangan, pendekatan konseptual, dan pendekatan perbandingan. Dengan metode tersebut, penelitian ini menganalisis penggunaan algoritma harga oleh pelaku usaha dominan yang dapat memenuhi unsur penyalahgunaan posisi dominan menurut hukum Indonesia serta mentransformasi upaya hukum yang dapat dilakukan untuk menghadapi penggunaan algoritma harga. Dalam hal ini, penggunaan algoritma harga dapat mengakibatkan penyalahgunaan posisi dominan karena kemampuan algoritma untuk menciptakan syarat perdagangan dan membatasi pesaing dan mencegah konsumen mendapatkan harga yang bersaing. Adapun upaya hukum yang dapat ditempuh oleh otoritas persaingan usaha adalah meningkatkan pengetahuan mengenai algoritma, pembentukan regulasi yang mendukung transparansi dan akuntabilitas algoritma harga, melakukan pendekatan struktural, serta menitikberatkan pembuktian pada bukti digital, petunjuk, dan pendapat ahli.

For many years, exclusivity payments and its specific type – loyalty rebates – were treated by the European Commission (Commission) as restrictions by object. This approach has been gradually revised towards a more effect-based reasoning. In the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (Guidance), the Commission demonstrated its willingness to follow the so-called ‘economic approach’. In particular, the Commission announced that for price-based exclusionary conduct the so-called ‘as-efficient competitor’ test (AEC test) is going to be used. This article aims to verify whether the Commission followed the Guidance in its assessment of exclusionary practices in two cases, Qualcomm and Google (Android), considered by the Author as an opportunity to make a move from a form-based to an economic-based approach. In his considerations, the Author provides proposals on how the practice of the Commission should be changed to ensure dominant undertakings are provided with a sufficient level of legal certainty.

The Competition Appeals Tribunal agreed with the Competition Council's market definition. The Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court Deutz and Diesel Motor Nordic brought the decision from the Competition Appeals Tribunal before the Danish Maritime and Commercial High Court. Like the Competition Appeals Tribunal, the Maritime and Commercial High Court agreed with the Competition Council's definition of the relevant market. [Extracted from the article]

The shares were to be listed on Nasdaq's MTF,[7] First North Sweden MTF, a market not listed as an SME growth market. Nasdaq's Dominance There are three companies providing SME growth markets in Sweden: Nasdaq, NGM and Spotlight Group AB (Spotlight). Sweden • NASDAQ Abandons Plans to Trade Shares Listed on a Rival Market Place Following an Interim Injunction by the Swedish Competition Authority Nasdaq's SME growth market is by far the largest, with 54 exchange members, compared to those of NGM and Spotlight, listing 25 and 19 members respectively. [Extracted from the article]

The use of IoT products is increasingly becoming part of the everyday life of citizens in the EU. With the consumer IoT sector braced for rapid growth, the European Commission is concerned that it will be concentrated in a small number of companies. The Commission is particularly wary that Big Tech may leverage their large shares on the voice assistants market to harm developing competitors and consumers. The preliminary report of its inquiry into the consumer IoT sector published in June 2021 shows that many respondents share the Commission's competition concerns. If, after analyzing the results of the inquiry, the Commission turns up evidence of anti-competitive practices by tech giants, it could initiate investigations against those companies to ensure compliance with EU rules on abuse of dominant position. Nevertheless, some experts doubt whether a crackdown on Big Tech would lead to a more competitive and innovative IoT market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Studia Luridica Montenegrina is the property of University of Donja Gorica, Faculty of Legal Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Abstract The role of patents is complex when dealing with the problem of technological interoperability in cases where patented technology becomes standard. In such cases, a balance is needed between the protection of the interests of the inventor, i.e. the standard essential patent (SEP) holder, and of users who need the technology to enter the market. There is a susceptibility to restrictions on competition to create markets (competition for the market). Market dominance can be created by the adoption of SEP holder technology as a standard and hence, a key for other business actors to enter the market. With the potential for the formation of a dominant position in the relevant market, the competition law intervention is required when patent abuse occurs, as it appears typical in the pharmaceutical and information technology industries. The normative research examines how competition law in the European Union deals with SEP cases in comparison to Indonesian competition law. Abstrak Peran paten menjadi kompleks ketika berhadapan dengan persoalan interoperabilitas teknologi ketika teknologi yang dipatenkan menjadi standard. Dalam kasus-kasus demikian, diperlukan adanya perimbangan antara perlindungan atas kepentingan inventor yang mememegang standard essential patent (SEP) dengan kepentingan pengguna yang membutuhkan teknologi tersebut untuk masuk ke dalam pasar. Dalam hal ini, rentan terjadi pembatasan atas persaingan untuk membentuk pasar (competition for the market). Dominasi pasar dapat tercipta dengan diterimanya teknologi pemegang SEP sebagai standard dan kunci bagi pelaku usaha lain untuk masuk ke dalam pasar. Dengan potensi terbentuknya posisi dominan dalam pasar yang relevan bagi pemegang SEP tersebut, ruang analisis menjadi terbuka untuk hukum persaingan usaha ketika terjadi penyalahgunaan paten sebagaimana tampak khas dalam industri farmasi dan teknologi informasi. Penelitian yang menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normative ini menyajikan perkembangan yang terjadi di Uni Eropa. Permasalahan yang menjadi fokus dalam paper ini adalah analisis hukum persaingan usaha di Uni Eropa dalam kasus penyalahgunaan SEP dan perbandingannya dengan hukum persaingan Indonesia.

In the paper “Considerations on the Romanian competitive environment in the 2017-2020 period” we presented essential aspects of the activity carried out by the Competition Council in the analyzed period. In the 2017-2020 period, the Competition Council monitored the good unfolding of the competition in the market, thus opening and completing investigations annually, but also fining companies where it discovered activities likely to affect the competitive environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of smart electronic devices are enabling online businesses to collect any data related to the consumer's online activity. Such an extensive trove of consumer personal data can be used for "personalized pricing". We have evaluated the challenges this form of price discrimination creates for competition and found that in jurisdictions such as the EU which prosecute exploitative abuses, the probability that personalized pricing might be assessed as an abuse of dominant position is high. Another issue raised by the collection and the processing of data for personalized pricing purposes is the growing invasion of privacy. In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation foresees that personal data cannot be used without the consent of the consumer. As for online businesses processing personal data, they'd better stick to the provisions of the GDPR aiming to ensure greater transparency, if they are to avoid any risk of infringement of privacy law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the article is to analyse the recent judgments in which the CJEU found that the dominant entity's behaviour regarding access to its infrastructure constitutes an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. The article will focus on the analysis of why, in matters related to infrastructure, which is often considered an essential facility, the essential facilities doctrine, established in the jurisprudence of the CJEU was not applied. This will allow us to answer the question whether this doctrine is still needed. The article analyses the cases of Slovak Telekom, Lithuanian Railways and Google Shopping in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Margin squeeze occurs when vertically integrated undertaking, which is dominant on the upstream market, charges a price for the product on the upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the downstream market, does not allow even an equally efficient competitor to trade profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis. The subject of the analysis in the paper is the abuse of a dominant position by margin squeeze in the competition law of the European Union. The author will present and analyze relevant competition rules in the European Union, the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission, as well as views expressed in the doctrine, in order to answer whether margin squeeze is an independent type of abuse of dominant position and what conditions are relevant for legal analysis of margin squeeze.

The paper introduces the concept of excessive pricing within the framework of the competition policy. Charging high prices by an undertaking is a natural freedom in the context of a market economy. Still, a company that detains an important market power has a special economic and social responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not distort competition or negatively affect the consumers’ welfare on that market. A company in such a position is deemed to poses a dominant position on the market. Specifically, in regard with the notion of excessive pricing, a dominant undertaking should not make use of the opportunities arising out of its special market power in such a way as to gain trading profits which it would not have benefit if there had been sufficiently competition. The paper briefly analyzes the method used when establishing dominance, as well as various forms of abuse of a dominant position on the market, finally focusing on the evaluation of excessive prices. Relevant excessive pricing cases are presented, covering 45 years of European experience, since 1975 to the present day. In regard with the evolution of the methodology for analyzing potential excessive prices by the competition authorities, the cost/tariff comparison as part of the United Brands test is a cornerstone in the European jurisprudence. The notion of ‘economic value’ is for the first time used in 1978 and criteria set in the United Brands case provide for a 2 steps approach to the assessment of excessive prices. Other ways of assessing excessive pricing are dealt with, as the European Court of Justice observed that economic theorists have not failed to think up several methods to deal with the issue. Yardstick competition and the elimination of the excessive costs from the evaluation are examples of such alternative methodologies used when analyzing excessive prices. The paper concludes with the presentation of the recent European Commission investigation into excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical sector, and proposes the idea that monopoly companies’ tariffs might be easier to evaluate in the context of excessive pricing.

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Nowadays, personal data represent a strategic asset for companies as they can significantly influence their market position. Indeed, the issues arising from the management of large amounts of data (so-called big data) are not only relevant for data protection authorities, since this practice has also induced the intervention of competition and consumer protection authorities. The digital economy has enhanced new forms of abuses of dominant position and unfair practices, which can be performed via the handling of big data. This paper starts by analysing the German antitrust authority vs Facebook decision in which the big-tech platform was sanctioned for having performed an exploitative abuse of dominant position through its data management strategy. Then, it focuses on the Italian antitrust authority vs WhatsApp decision, where WhatsApp was deemed responsible for unfair and aggressive practices aimed at extracting users' consent for data-sharing purposes. These two remarkable cases will be compared and further discussed, outlining the need to rethink the strengthening interplay between data protection, competition and consumer law, as it will entail a closer contact of the respective authorities to ensure the sustainability of digital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The internet revolution profoundly altered economic relations, with the developing of new technologies and commercial practices. This article scrutinizes how markets involved in this reality can facilitate anti-competitive behavior. It posits that the structure of these markets can enable new manifestations of anti-competitive practices, challenging traditional premises of competition law. The methodology, regarding the procedure, consists of the literature review of competition and the Google Shopping case study, decided by the Brazilian Economic Defense Council (CADE), in 2019. While technically approaching the characteristics of these markets - such as zero price, multiple sides and attention -, one can visualize the way in which the abuse of a dominant position can be revealed in digital markets, through the handling of big data and the consequent consolidation of economic power. When exploring the different views of the case study, even with divergent views of the decision makers, it is pointed out the need to rethink concepts in the analysis of anti-competitive behavior in digital markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Margin squeeze occurs when vertically integrated undertaking, which is dominant on the upstream market, charges a price for the product on the upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the downstream market, does not allow even an equally efficient competitor to trade profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis. The subject of the analysis in the paper is the abuse of a dominant position by margin squeeze in the competition law of the European Union. The author will present and analyze relevant competition rules in the European Union, the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Commission, as well as views expressed in the doctrine, in order to answer whether margin squeeze is an independent type of abuse of dominant position and what conditions are relevant for legal analysis of margin squeeze. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Data aggregation, understood as the process of gathering and combining data in order to prepare datasets that might be useful for specific business or other purposes, is not per se forbidden. However, some forms of it can be considered anticompetitive. In the Decision B6-22/16 of the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) data aggregation, which included the collection of data from sources outside of Facebook’s social network (from Facebook-owned services such as WhatsApp and Instagram and from third party websites or mobile applications) and their combination with the information connected with a particular Facebook user account without that user’s consent, constituted an abuse of Facebook’s dominant position on the German market for social networks. The Bundeskartellamt found that the processing of user’s personal data by Facebook has, to some extent, been carried out in away which infringed GDPR provisions. In the same decision, the Bundeskartellamt also identified the exclusionary nature of Facebook’s anticompetitive behavior. According to the Bundeskartellamt, the illegal data aggregation formed a barrier to entry for Facebook’s competitors which, through compliance with data protection standards, found themselves in a worst position. Facebook, through its inappropriate data aggregation gained a competitive advantage. The Bundeskartellamt’s decision is, therefore, reflecting the anticompetitive dangers that data aggregation might pose. Nevertheless, it is debated whether the Bundeskartellamt, as a competition authority, is competent to determine the compliance or lack of compliance of business terms with the provisions of the GDPR. This paper analyzes the Bundeskartellamt’s decision as to where an anticompetitive nature of data processing has been identified, and tries to answer the question why it is problematic that it was the Bundeskartellamt and not a data protection supervisory authority that has issued such a decision

This article addresses aspects of competition in the European gas market and more precisely analyzes the abuse of Gazprom's dominant position by preventing the free flow of gas among the Member States of the European Union and by its unfair prices. In line with the European principle of freedom of movement for goods, services, persons and capital, the European Commission adopted three directives, approved in 1998, 2003 and 2009, by introducing competition on a market which had been closed down until then. From a macroeconomic perspective, there has been significant theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that the liberalization of the European gas market has positive effects on the energy industry in terms of lower prices and security of supply. But the competition law in the European energy sector is not always properly applied and consumers are discouraged in terms of implementing the legislative and regulatory framework. In accordance with art. 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), EU countries importing natural gas must benefit from transparent, fair pricing contracts. However, in some cases, abusive practices have been used for gas importers in central and Eastern Europe.

The paper “Essentialities concerning the competition policy in the European Union, the 2012-2016 period” presents the decisions adopted at European Union level in relation to the breech of the competition rules by the Member States. In the first part of the paper, I drew a parallel between the state aids granted at EU level for the banking system, deeply affected by the economic crisis, and the aids granted for supporting other sectors. Afterwards, I made a brief presentation of the main anti-competitive and of the decisions related to them in the analysed period.

Proving the excessiveness of the dominant firm's prices constitutes a challenging task for young competition authorities, due to the difficulties in confronting economic theories with facts and the lack of analytical tools to carry out robust investigations. To handle these issues, this paper proposes a statistical algorithm centred on the analysis of the prices and mark-up of the dominant firm. An empirical study involving the use of real industrial data is carried out to show the implementation of the proposed statistical algorithm. The results reveal that the excessiveness of the dominant firm's prices is due to the excessiveness of its mark-up over the total cost. Our findings also show that the pricing behaviour of the dominant firm remains unpredictable in the absence of a large amount of data for the analysis of demand patterns, a direct measurement of the marginal cost, and a good knowledge of market functioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Case C-372/19 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Weareone.World BVBA and Wecandance NV, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Fifth Chamber) of 25 November 2020 The most recent excessive pricing case considered by Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) revolved around fees imposed by a national royalty collective society (SABAM) on two Belgian festival organizers (Weareone.World BVBA and Wecandance NV). The Belgian national court submitted the case to CJEU for a preliminary ruling on whether the imposition of fees was to be considered an abuse of dominant position, and further, whether the fees levied were to be considered unfair and excessive in light of Article 102(a) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]