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Legal scholars and theorists have recently drawn a more sustained attention to the link between international human rights law (hereafter, IRHL) and international criminal law (hereafter, ICL). This concerns both positive and more normative accounts of the link. Whether positive or normative, however, the predominant approach to constructing the link is substantive. This approach identifies some human rights violations as constituting potential international crimes. This overlap is normatively justified in similar terms by reference to a sub-set of moral human rights. As such, the substantive approach concentrates on the right-holders and the harm committed to the victims of the violations to build the common core between IRHL and ICL.\ud In this paper, I offer an alternative to the substantive approach. After having identified two flaws in the substantive approach (the problem of threshold and the problem of ethical neutrality), I defend what I call a structural account by focusing on the duty-holders of IHRL and ICL. Instead of focusing on the limited overlap between ICL and IRHL provisions (as positive legal scholars tend to), and instead of using substantive moral reasoning to specify this overlap (as normative theorists tend to), I start by reconstructing two structural characteristics that are common to IRHL and ICL qua international legal regimes: who has the authority to address violations of IRHL and ICL, and who can be liable for those violations. I then infer that public authority (functionally construed) constitutes the common core of IRHL and ICL. I rely on the extra-territorial application of IRHL and on the collective dimension of ICL violations to further support the argument. I finally offer an argument explaining the normative point of those structural features. I hold that IRHL and ICL (their adjudicative and liability regimes) are both necessary (but clearly not sufficient) to render this exercise of public authority legitimate to its subjects.

This article offers an internal critique of the European Court of Human Rights’ deferential approach to the content and limits of the right to vote (under the right to free and fair elections, article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights). Rather than imposing an independent theory of democratic rights, the critique is internal as it relies on the Court’s own conception of democracy developed under article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression) and article 11 ECHR (freedom of reunion and assembly). It uses normative democratic theory to show that the Court’s conception under those rights reveals an utmost concern for political inclusion and that this conception is systematically used by the Court to balance alleged interferences with this article. It then argues that this concern has implications for the Court’s review of the right to vote. While the Court proclaims the complementarity between expression and vote at the level of principle, the Court refrains from engaging in the balancing exercise under P1-3. The article takes the notorious example of the right of convicted felons to vote. The article does not conclude, however, that the Court should systematically maintain its franchise on democratic grounds. It rather contends that the Court should apply proportionality with the same substantive democratic principles across democratic rights.

No abstract available.

In this contribution, we first argue that the ECtHR has come to develop a salient dualist reasoning under Articles 8-11. Although the ECtHR has held that all those articles serve the overarching ideal of ‘democratic society’, its right-based reasoning can be differentiated. On the one hand, the ECtHR has focused on the free circulation of ideas and opinions – in particular, those held on issues of public interest – in its treatment of the freedoms of expression (Article 10) and assembly and association (Article 11). The more those views are subject to prohibition, the more the margin of appreciation is reduced. On the other hand, the ECtHR has focused on the notion of ‘personal autonomy’ to adjust its margin of appreciation under Articles 8-9. The more personal autonomy is endangered, the more it reinforces the scrutiny in the assessment of reasons for an interference. Secondly, we argue that such dualist approach stands in need of clarification. Could individuals reasonably express and develop their views on issues of public interest without assuming their autonomy? Conversely, can the ECtHR assert that freedom of religion pertaining to the forum internum – typically, religious beliefs – has no relevance in the expression of personal views on issues of public interest? By contrast to most views in the literature, our argument does not rely on a prior normative theory of the virtues of a ‘legal system’ – such as legal certainty, coherence and harmony – that generally target the ambiguous use of the margin of appreciation doctrine, or on a prior normative theory of the values that ECtHR should protect. Rather, our argument relies on the conceptual vagueness that follows from the ECtHR’s differential reasoning. The current application of the margin of appreciation implies that there are not only different ‘localised system of values’ among State Parties, but that there are different ‘localised democratic societies’.Read more

Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License 4.0 Sociologically and normatively, the concept of legal pluralism presupposes a ‘legal system’ or a ‘law-like’ normative order displaying a distinctive structure (eg an institutionalised system of rules and sanctions) whose boundaries can be determined and distinguished from others (or from non-law). Legal pluralism thereby presupposes that the boundaries between those entities are cognisable (descriptively or normatively) and distinguish large-scale entities (‘system’, ‘order’, ‘layer’, etc). In this article, I argue that this overlapping concept of legal pluralism is inapplicable to human rights law either descriptively or normatively (with particular emphasis on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Normatively, recent philosophical literature suggests that human rights (law) may be endorsed by a variety of moralities (eg collectivistic) that make it safe from the critique of parochialism, legal or moral. Descriptively, European human rights law has never been legally depicted as an autonomous and complete legal order in the vein of EU law as held by the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos. This is explained by the structural principle of subsidiarity shaping the complementing roles of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in reviewing state practices and national courts in applying the ECHR. How shall we then understand the point (if any) of legal pluralism in the context of European human rights law? I argue that one first needs to uncover the link between legal and moral pluralism and therefore ‘pierce’ the large-scale boundaries premised in the conventional concept of legal pluralism. I show how pluralism is used in the reasoning of the ECtHR to justify its authority over national courts, so that the distinction between legal ‘orders’ or ‘systems’ is contingent upon the normative role that moral pluralism plays in justifying the duties correlative to human rights.

"Charakteristisch für den hier eingeschlagenen Weg ist nämlich eine spezifische Weise der Verknüpfung von Begründungsargumenten und historischer Reflexion , die sich so in den Geschichten der Menschenrechte oder in den philosophi-schen Ansätzen nicht findet und dort in der Regel auch gar nicht angestrebt wird. Die ehrgeizigen philosophischen Begründungsversuche kommen ohne Ge-schichte aus. Sie konstruieren ihre Argumente aus dem (angeblichen) Charakter der praktischen Vernunft und des moralischen Sollens, den Bedingungen eines Gedankenexperiments über die Einrichtung von Gemeinwesen oder den Grund-zügen eines idealisierten Diskurses heraus. Zur Geschichte stehen solche Kon-struktionen notwendig in einem merkwürdigen Spannungsverhältnis. Merk-würdig muss ja aus dieser Perspektive erscheinen, dass in der Geschichte der Menschheit zeitlos Gültiges nur so selten als solches erkannt wurde. [...] Die Geschichtsschreibung wiederum wird zwar häufig, bewusst oder unbe-wusst, von Vorstellungen über philosophische Begründung durchsetzt sein; [...]. Als Wissenschaft muss sie aber ihren Anspruch auf die empirische Ebene einer sachgemässen Rekonstruktion historischer Prozesse begrenzen. In ihrer Arbeits-teilung bekräftigen Geschichtswissenschaft und Philosophie damit die Unter-scheidung von Genesis und Geltung, die von vielen für eine Grundlage jeder rechtlichen Beschäftigung mit normativen Fragen gehalten wird. Entweder, so diese Denkweise, steht der Geltungsanspruch normativer Sätze zur Diskussion, oder wir interessieren uns für ihre geschichtliche Herkunft. Zur Entscheidung über den normativen Geltungsanspruch kann in dieser Perspektive geschichtli-ches Wissen nichts, jedenfalls nichts Ausschlaggebendes beitragen." Hans Joas, Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue Genealogie der Menschen-rechte [2011], 12-13 I. The prima facie opposition between human rights theory and history The burgeoning of recent publications on human rights shows how fashionable an object of study international human rights have become lately, and this especially among philosophers 1 and historians. 2 Curiously, however, given that joint development, human rights the-orists and human rights historians seem to be following separate paths, without much interaction between them besides historians "showcas[ing] the theoretical and philosophical debates about the meaning of human rights" 3 and theorists gesturing at some of the historical origins of the concept of human rights usually to then distance themselves from them. 4, The burgeoning of recent publications on human rights shows how fashionable an object of study international human rights have become lately, and this especially among philosophers and historians. Curiously, however, given that joint development, human rights theorists and human rights historians seem to be following separate paths, without much interaction between them besides historians \textquoteleftshowcas[ing] the theoretical and philosophical debates about the meaning of human rights and theorists gesturing at some of the historical origins of the concept of human rights usually to then distance themselves from them. The specific question that arises for human rights theorists in this context is not only whether human rights history should matter for their normative endeavour, but also how it could be integrated methodologically in the latter, if at all. Is human rights history more than a source of information for the philosopher of human rights? Should it be used, for instance, to identify the object of human rights theorizing and then maybe to interpret it? And may it provide a critical tool for non-ideal human rights theories?

"Charakteristisch für den hier eingeschlagenen Weg ist nämlich eine spezifische Weise der Verknüpfung von Begründungsargumenten und historischer Reflexion , die sich so in den Geschichten der Menschenrechte oder in den philosophi-schen Ansätzen nicht findet und dort in der Regel auch gar nicht angestrebt wird. Die ehrgeizigen philosophischen Begründungsversuche kommen ohne Ge-schichte aus. Sie konstruieren ihre Argumente aus dem (angeblichen) Charakter der praktischen Vernunft und des moralischen Sollens, den Bedingungen eines Gedankenexperiments über die Einrichtung von Gemeinwesen oder den Grund-zügen eines idealisierten Diskurses heraus. Zur Geschichte stehen solche Kon-struktionen notwendig in einem merkwürdigen Spannungsverhältnis. Merk-würdig muss ja aus dieser Perspektive erscheinen, dass in der Geschichte der Menschheit zeitlos Gültiges nur so selten als solches erkannt wurde. [...] Die Geschichtsschreibung wiederum wird zwar häufig, bewusst oder unbe-wusst, von Vorstellungen über philosophische Begründung durchsetzt sein; [...]. Als Wissenschaft muss sie aber ihren Anspruch auf die empirische Ebene einer sachgemässen Rekonstruktion historischer Prozesse begrenzen. In ihrer Arbeits-teilung bekräftigen Geschichtswissenschaft und Philosophie damit die Unter-scheidung von Genesis und Geltung, die von vielen für eine Grundlage jeder rechtlichen Beschäftigung mit normativen Fragen gehalten wird. Entweder, so diese Denkweise, steht der Geltungsanspruch normativer Sätze zur Diskussion, oder wir interessieren uns für ihre geschichtliche Herkunft. Zur Entscheidung über den normativen Geltungsanspruch kann in dieser Perspektive geschichtli-ches Wissen nichts, jedenfalls nichts Ausschlaggebendes beitragen." Hans Joas, Die Sakralität der Person. Eine neue Genealogie der Menschen-rechte [2011], 12-13 I. The prima facie opposition between human rights theory and history The burgeoning of recent publications on human rights shows how fashionable an object of study international human rights have become lately, and this especially among philosophers 1 and historians. 2 Curiously, however, given that joint development, human rights the-orists and human rights historians seem to be following separate paths, without much interaction between them besides historians "showcas[ing] the theoretical and philosophical debates about the meaning of human rights" 3 and theorists gesturing at some of the historical origins of the concept of human rights usually to then distance themselves from them. 4, The burgeoning of recent publications on human rights shows how fashionable an object of study international human rights have become lately, and this especially among philosophers and historians. Curiously, however, given that joint development, human rights theorists and human rights historians seem to be following separate paths, without much interaction between them besides historians \textquoteleftshowcas[ing] the theoretical and philosophical debates about the meaning of human rights and theorists gesturing at some of the historical origins of the concept of human rights usually to then distance themselves from them. The specific question that arises for human rights theorists in this context is not only whether human rights history should matter for their normative endeavour, but also how it could be integrated methodologically in the latter, if at all. Is human rights history more than a source of information for the philosopher of human rights? Should it be used, for instance, to identify the object of human rights theorizing and then maybe to interpret it? And may it provide a critical tool for non-ideal human rights theories?