1. Cartel Stability and Economic Integration
- Author
-
Schröder, Philipp J. H.
- Subjects
L12 ,L13 ,trade liberalisation ,F15 ,market access cost ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ,Collusive behavior ,Kartell ,Aussenhandelsliberalisierung ,Zolltheorie ,Kosten ,Wirtschaftsintegration ,ddc:330 ,F12 ,specific tariffs ,Theorie - Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other?s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened.
- Published
- 2004