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372 results on '"Zizzo, Daniel"'

1. Preliminary Experimental Results on the Similarity Function in 2x2 and 3x3 Games

Author

Zizzo, Daniel John

Subjects
Psychology: Cognitive Psychology, Psychology: Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
Abstract

This paper employs two experimental datasets to assess along what dimensions agents evaluate whether two 2x2 or 3x3 games are similar. The Euclidean distance between the payoffs, the absolute difference in game harmony and the difference in mean and standard deviation between the games are all significant components of the estimated similarity function, and so is whether the two games have zero, unique or multiple pure Nash equilibria. However, our explanatory power is limited: substantial extra information can be gathered by collecting similarity evaluation data rather than relying just on our observable proxies.

Published
2003

2. Game Harmony: A Short Note

Author

Zizzo, Daniel John

Subjects
Psychology: Cognitive Psychology, Psychology: Social Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Social Psychology
Abstract

Strategic uncertainty in game theory may have two different general sources, either alone or in combination: uncertainty because of the existence of a coordination problem, and uncertainty because of a conflict between one own and the other n players' interests. Game harmony is conceived as a generic game property that describes how harmonious (non-conflictual) or disharmonious (conflictual) the interests of the n players are, as embodied in the game payoffs. Pure coordination games are examples of games with maximal game harmony; zero sum games are examples of games with very low game harmony. This note briefly describes attempts to measure game harmony simply as a real-valued number.

Published
2000

8. Switching Cost Models as Hypothesis Tests

Author

Cohen, Samuel N., Henckel, Timo, Menzies, Gordon D., Muhle-Karbe, Johannes, and Zizzo, Daniel J.

Subjects
Economics - General Economics, Mathematics - Optimization and Control
Abstract

We relate models based on costs of switching beliefs (e.g. due to inattention) to hypothesis tests. Specifically, for an inference problem with a penalty for mistakes and for switching the inferred value, a band of inaction is optimal. We show this band is equivalent to a confidence interval, and therefore to a two-sided hypothesis test.

Published
2018

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