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The blockchain-empowered mobile-edge computing (MEC) is a promising solution for enhancing the computation capabilities of mobile equipments (MEs) to process computation-intensive tasks such as the real-time data processing tasks and mining tasks. However, because of the “cold start” and “long return” problems, efficient computation offloading cannot be achieved in blockchain-empowered MEC because the MEs do not always have enough coins to afford the offloading service cost. In this article, we study the joint computation-offloading and coin-loaning problem for blockchain-empowered MEC to minimize the total cost of all MEs. We introduce the banks that can provide loan services to the MEs to address the above two issues. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game to model the competitions between the myopic MEs. By using a potential game method, we prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and design a distributed algorithm to achieve the NE point with low computational complexity. We also provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy of the game by theoretical proof. Besides, two smart contracts are designed to automatically perform the computing resource trading and coin loaning processes. Lastly, our simulation results show that our proposed algorithm can significantly reduce the total cost of all MEs, has better performance compared with other solutions, and scales well as the number of MEs increases. Moreover, the financial cost for executing the two smart contracts on the Ethereum network is low.

Offloading computation-intensive blockchain mining tasks to the edge servers (ESs) is a promising solution for blockchain-empowered Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) because the computing capabilities in IIoT are usually limited, whereas the blockchain mining tasks are computationally intensive. However, the computation offloading solutions for data processing tasks and for blockchain mining tasks have been studied separately. Moreover, most of the existing solutions for offloading assume that all IIoT devices can directly connect to the ESs or cloud data centers. To address these issues, in this paper, we propose a multihop cooperative and distributed computation offloading algorithm that considers the data processing tasks and the mining tasks together for blockchain-empowered IIoT. First, we study the multihop computation offloading problem for both the data processing tasks and the mining tasks to minimize the economic cost of IIoT devices. Second, we formulate the offloading problem as a potential game in which the IIoT devices can make their decisions autonomously and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for the game. Third, we design an efficient distributed algorithm based on exchanging messages between IIoT devices to achieve the NE with low computational complexity. Lastly, our experimental results demonstrate that our distributed algorithm scales well as the number of IIoT devices increases and has the minimum system cost compared with other approaches.

Computation offloading is a promising solution to extend the capacity of robot swarms for computation-intensive applications because it allows robot swarms to benefit from the powerful computing resources of modern data centers. However, the existing computation-offloading approaches still face challenges: 1) multi-hop cooperative computation offloading, 2) joint computation offloading and routing, and 3) task slicing. In this paper, we propose a quality of service (QoS)-aware cooperative computation-offloading scheme for robot swarms using game theory. We analyze the multi-hop cooperative communication model in robot swarms and investigate the computation offloading and routing decision-making problems with the goals of both latency minimization and energy efficiency. We formulate the joint optimization problem as a multi-hop cooperative computation-offloading game and show the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game for both unsliceable and sliceable tasks. We further propose a QoS-aware distributed algorithm to attain an NE and provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy in the game. Finally, our simulated results show that our algorithm scales well as the swarm size increases and it has a stable performance gain in various parameter settings.

Edge Learning is an emerging distributed machine learning in mobile edge network. Limited works have designed mechanisms to incentivize edge nodes to participate in edge learning. However, their mechanisms only consider myopia optimization on resource consumption, which results in the lack of learning algorithm performance guarantee and longterm sustainability. In this paper, we propose Chiron, an incentive-driven long-term mechanism for edge learning based on hierarchical deep reinforcement learning. First, our optimization goal combines learning-algorithms metric (i.e., model accuracy) with system metric (i.e., learning time, and resource consumption), which can improve edge learning quality under a fixed training budget. Second, we present a two-layer H-DRL design with exterior and inner agents to achieve both long-term and short-term optimization for edge learning, respectively. Finally, experiments on three different real-world datasets are conducted to demonstrate the superiority of our proposed approach. In particular, compared with the state-of-the-art methods under the same budget constraint, the final global model accuracy and time efficiency can be increased by 6.5 % and 39 %, respectively. Our implementation is available at https://github.com/Joey61Liuyi/Chiron.

Nonorthogonal multiple access (NOMA) and content caching have been introduced to effectively utilize and save bandwidth resources, thus relieving network transmission pressure. Therefore, we develop a computation offloading framework blending NOMA and content caching to further improve the computational performance. We formulate the joint computation offloading decision, resources allocation, and caching decision as an utility maximization problem under the constrains of bandwidth, computing and storage resources. We convert the original non-convex problem to a convex problem via variable relaxation and substitution. We then decompose it and introduce an alternative direction method of multipliers based distributed algorithm to solve it. Finally, simulation results show that our algorithm can quickly converge and reach up to 95% of the optimal value. It also performs well over various parameter settings.

Edge computing is a promising paradigm to expand the capability of Internet of Things (IoT) devices by computation offloading. To establish a distributed ledger to provide a secure and trusted environment for the resource allocation between edge servers and IoT devices, the emerging blockchain technology has attracted a lot of attention recently. However, in practice, edge resource allocation in IoT devices often involves multi-layer structures, which poses a challenge due to information incompleteness among different layers. Moreover, how to design a suitable and efficient blockchain framework for hierarchical resource allocation markets is a critical issue. In this paper, we apply blockchain to propose a secure and efficient hierarchical resource allocation framework for edge computing. First, we study the edge computing resource allocation problem in the hierarchical market of IoT devices, in which the IoT devices beyond the coverage of Access Points can participate in the resource allocation through middlemen. To solve the problem, a smart contract-based hierarchical auction mechanism is developed. The edge computing resources allocated in the top market can be continually reallocated to the sub-markets based on the mechanism, which then leads an efficient solution that maximizes the social welfare of the whole participants. Moreover, the mechanism is implemented as a smart contract in the blockchain, which enforces the rule of the hierarchical auction in a non-deniable and automated manner. Finally, the extensive simulations demonstrate the correctness and performance of the proposed mechanism.

Federated learning is promising in enabling large-scale machine learning by massive clients without exposing their raw data. It can not only enable the clients to preserve the privacy information, but also achieve high learning performance. Existing works of federated learning mainly focus on improving learning performance in terms of model accuracy and learning task completion time. However, in practice, clients are reluctant to participate in the learning process without receiving compensation. Therefore, how to effectively motivate the clients to actively and reliably participate in federated learning is paramount. As compared to the current incentive mechanism design in other fields, such as crowdsourcing, cloud computing, smart grid, etc., the incentive mechanism for federated learning is more challenging. First, it is hard to evaluate the training data value of each client. Second, it is difficult to model the learning performance of different federated learning algorithms. In this paper, we survey the incentive mechanism design for federated learning. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for federated learning, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, some future directions of how to incentivize clients in federated learning have been discussed.