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Using an online experiment with two distinct dishonesty games, we analyze how dishonesty in men and women is influenced by either thinking or learning about the dishonesty of others in a related, but different situation. Thinking is induced by eliciting a belief about others' dishonesty in a different game. We find that such belief elicitation (1) increases males' (but not females') dishonesty and (2) has no influence on participants' beliefs about the dishonesty of others in the game that they themselves play. Learning is induced by receiving a signal about the actual honest or dishonest choices of others in a different game. We find that the level of unethical behavior provided in such a signal (1) increases females' (but not males') dishonesty and (2) is positively correlated with participants' beliefs about the dishonesty of others in the game that they themselves play. We conclude that gender matters when examining how unethical behavior spreads. Both genders update their beliefs about others' dishonesty in the same way when presented with information about others' choices, but dishonesty in men is triggered by merely thinking about others' dishonesty, while women only respond to actual information on others' dishonesty.

Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. Such situations may evoke psychological costs from being dishonest and dismissing higher monetary benefits for others. In a within-subjects experiment, we analyze such a dilemma. We first measure individual dishonest behavior when subjects report the outcome of a die roll, which determines their payoffs. Subsequently, they act as leaders and report payoffs for a group including themselves. In our main treatment, subjects can apply for leadership, whereas in the control treatment, we assign leadership randomly. Results reveal that women behave more dishonestly as leaders while men behave similarly in both the individual and the group decision. For female leaders, we find that sorting into leadership is not related to individual honesty preferences. In the control we find that female leaders do not increase dishonesty. A follow-up study reveals that female leaders become more dishonest after assuming leadership, as they align dishonest behavior with their belief on group members’ honesty preferences.

Das erweiterte Abstract beinhaltet die Abschnitte 'Leaders and their incentives to behave non-compliantly', 'the relevance of gender for leader's compliance', die dazu durchgeführte Studie sowie deren Auswertung. The extended abstract consists of two clauses 'leaders and their incentives to behave non-compliantly', 'the relevance of gender for leader's compliance', as well as the related experimental study and it's conclusion.

The thesis answers several questions concerning how people behave in an economic context if behavioral norms and rules are not obvious. In particular, it is investigated how subjects behave if other people in the role of third parties are involved or if the subjects themselves have the role of third parties. The main findings are that people value fair and efficient processes and, if they have the chance to be responsible for the outcomes of the process, they are happy to contribute to it. People are willing to forego own earnings for “saving”, “rewarding”, or “punishing” strangers even if this does not lead to potential future monetary gains for themselves. This behavior is correctly anticipated by others and prompts them to behave according to the desired norms. Whether in the role of impartial authorities or in the shoes of subordinates, people are happy to use communication to share their normative views with others even if they do not expect to meet again. And, apparently, this communication can influence the behavior of others in an efficient way.

The paper investigates the introduction of an institution, in form of an impartial authority (third party), into a two-person situation. The impartial authority can reward a stranger for acting according to a desired behavioral norm. The reward is costly for the authority and her behavior cannot be strategic, i.e., it cannot lead to higher earnings for her in a later stage. A trust game followed by a helping game is implemented. The trustee in the trust game becomes the recipient in the helping game. This paper demonstrates that positive strong indirect reciprocity can exist in one-shot settings (helpers transfer more money to their recipients the more these are trustworthy) and that positive strong indirect reciprocity is not diminishing if the reward can be anticipated. Furthermore, the positive strong indirect reciprocity is correctly anticipated and leads to higher trustworthiness in the treatment.

Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner's dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations about cooperativeness in the population in question, the degree of risk and loss aversion, and the degree by which a participant is tempted to inflict harm on another participant if this gives her a chance for an even higher payoff. Information about these motivational forces stems from additional within subjects tests. All five factors are significant only if one controls for all the other motives, which suggests that a prisoner's dilemma is a game jointly characterised by these five motives. The need to control for the remaining explanations seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner's dilemma with personality have not been successful.

Punishees regularly ask for justification. But is justification also effective? To answer this question under controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral - she does not benefit from contributions to the public good. Punishment is costly. Along with the punishment decisions the authority writes justifications for her decisions. In the Baseline, authorities are requested to justify punishment decisions, but the reasons are kept confidential. In the Private treatment, the addressee is only informed about the justification of the authority´s decision affecting herself, not affecting others. In the Public treatment, all reasons are made public. Whenever reasons are communicated, there is less monetary punishment. Authorities partly substitute words for action. Contributions decay in later periods if the justification is only communicated to the addressee. In the remaining two treatments, contributions stabilize at a high level.

If two players of a simultaneous symmetric one-shot prisoner's dilemma hold standard prefer-ences, the fact that choosing the cooperative move imposes harm on a passive outsider is imma-terial. Yet if participants hold social preferences, one might think that they are reticent to impose harm on the outsider. This is not what we find, however severe the externality. A within-subjects measure of reticence to impose harm does not explain cooperation. But the externality makes participants more pessimistic. However conditional on their beliefs participants are more, not less cooperative if cooperation entails harm on an outsider, again however severe the externality.

This cumulative dissertation combines four papers that aim to provide insights into how the economic outcomes of companies and the accompanying social wellbeing can be protected or enhanced. More specifically, this dissertation offers three investigations into how companies can be more successful when starting a change project by using nudging, can avoid managerial risk or uncertainty aversion by implementing a default rule, and can avoid managerial risk aversion by introducing a recommendation nudge at different stages of the decision-making process. All of these are primarily aimed at supporting business efforts but also aid social wellbeing by guiding employee behavior towards supporting change and managerial decision-making towards more neutrality. The lack of supportive behavior for change by employees and neutral managerial decisions can put economic growth in jeopardy. All three projects feature intervention rooted in the concept of libertarian paternalism. Nudge interventions can be described as changing parts of the choice architecture to increase the likelihood of people altering their behavior while not forbidding any options or changing the economic incentives significantly. In addition, the fourth project in this dissertation offers an experimental study that aims to understand the gender-specific spread of unethicality. This project sheds light on a very important issue: enabling further research to try to find practical solutions for resisting unethicality and, therefore, avoiding the economic, social, and ecological damages caused by its spread. All the papers feature experimental work settled in the discipline of behavioral economics and were conducted either online or in a laboratory. Dissertation, Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2022