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This paper proposes a service-oriented manufacturing strategy in a two-echelon supply chain with random demand. When there is no inventory for the retailer to meet demand, customers can choose to order products through the retailer and products will be delivered to them by the manufacturer directly in the promised time, and we call this delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing. We employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to analyse the procurement quantity and delivery time decisions by the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. Using the performance of the pure-manufacturing strategy as a benchmark, our main results follow. First, the equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained. Clear decision rules are also given. Second, delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing can be an effective way to reduce the holding cost of the retailer. Third, we describe the customer loss caused by waiting and find how the manufacturer influences procurement quantity of the retailer through the decision of delivery time. Finally, delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing cannot always improve the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer. We give guidance for managers to provide it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the impact of demand uncertainty on online retailers' store branding partnerships with manufacturers. The study examines whether such partnerships, involving service effort to boost demand, are effective under uncertain conditions. The supply chain comprises an intermediary and a manufacturer, with the manufacturer facing a service cost disadvantage. The benchmark case is the manufacturer's sale through the agency (AG) contract with the intermediary. Using a two‐period game‐theoretic model, the study analyzes equilibrium prices, service efforts, and profits for the AG contract and two store branding contracts: original design manufacturer (ODM) and acquisition (AC). Findings show that the intermediary adopts store branding when its service cost advantage is significant. The intermediary exhibits a preference for the ODM contract when the commission fee falls within a moderate range. Conversely, when it deviates from this middle ground, the AC contract becomes more favorable. Within the AC contract framework, with low commission fees, specifically when the service cost advantage is not particularly pronounced and demand variability is high, the intermediary opts to trigger the acquisition option exclusively when the actual demand turns out to be substantial. With high commission fees, the intermediary avoids the acquisition option. These outcomes arise from balancing the double marginalization effect caused by factors like service cost advantage, service decentralization, and wholesale price. Implementing store branding through ODM or AC contracts enhances supply chain profit when it is optimal for the intermediary. We provide insights into online retailers' decision‐making regarding store branding partnerships with manufacturers under demand uncertainty. It highlights the importance of considering factors like service cost advantage, service decentralization, and wholesale prices to determine the optimal store branding strategy. The research contributes to understanding supply chain dynamics and suggests ways to enhance supply chain profit in online retail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, gray markets have become a significant phenomenon in the business practice. This paper investigates the gray markets issues in differentiated duopoly case by considering quantity competition among firms. We develop a game-theoretic model and provide equilibrium results for three scenarios, i.e. the benchmark scenario ‘no gray market’, the scenario ‘parallel imports act as a buffer against a follower’s product’ and the scenario ‘gray markets stimulate the competition’. By the analysis of the equilibrium results, some important managerial insights are obtained. Finally, by comparison of the equilibrium results among different scenarios, we study the impact of gray markets on manufacturers’ optimal strategies and profits in differentiated duopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we combine two aspects of remanufacturing, namely product acquisition management and marketing (pricing) of the remanufactured products. We consider an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who decides on the acquisition prices offered for returns from different quality types and on selling prices of new and remanufactured products, in a single period setting. We develop a procedure for determining the optimal prices and corresponding profit of the OEM, and conduct a sensitivity analysis to understand the effect of different model parameters on the optimal strategies and profit. An important managerial insight is that the optimal solution is not to have the same profit per remanufactured item for all return types, but to if the minimum cost for acquisition and remanufacturing of some core type is lower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many firms offer consumers the opportunity to place advance orders at a discount when introducing a new product to the market. Doing so has two main advantages. First, it can increase total expected sales by exploiting valuation uncertainty of the consumers at the advance ordering stage. Second, total sales can be estimated more accurately based on the observed advance orders, reducing the need for safety stock and thereby obsolescence cost. In this research, we derive new insights into trading off these benefits against the loss in revenue from selling at a discount at the advance stage. In particular, we are the first to explore whether firms should advertise the advance ordering opportunity. We obtain several structural insights into the optimal policy, which we show is driven by two dimensions: the fraction of consumers who potentially buy in advance (i.e., strategic consumers) and the size of the discount needed to make them buy in advance. If the discount is below some threshold, then firms should sell in advance and they should advertise that option if the fraction of strategic consumers is sufficiently large. If the discount is above the threshold, then firms should not advertise and only sell in advance if the fraction of strategic consumers is sufficiently small. Graphical displays based on the two dimensions provide further insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]