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Many ride-hailing service platforms have launched a surcharge policy to schedule long-distance drivers to meet demand during regionally peak demand periods. When someone is unwilling to wait in line until there exists an idle local driver to match, he/she would choose the surcharge policy to quickly match long-distance drivers and get fast service through paying a surcharge. With heterogeneous congestion-sensitive customers and reservation rates of local and long-distance drivers, this paper explores the role of the surcharge policy for a ride-hailing service platform's profit, consumer surplus and driver surplus. We find that when the potential demand increases, the platform sets a lower surcharge to shift the demand to those customers with the surcharge policy. Influenced by network externalities, increasing the number of long-distance drivers causes the platform to initially increase and then decrease the surcharge. There exists a threshold of the number of local drivers, below which the platform under the surcharge policy can gain a higher profit than the situation without the surcharge. However, only the surplus of customers who choose to wait for local drivers is beneficial, while other customers and drivers suffer losses, indicating that the proposed policy cannot result in an all-win outcome for all parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the framework of the newsvendor model, both single- and multi-period models are proposed to investigate the ordering strategy of a risk-averse retailer under buyback guarantee financing (BGF) and stochastic demand. In the single-period model, the classical newsvendor is extended by introducing risk aversion and capital constraints simultaneously. It is found that the optimal ordering quantity is a monotonic function in some parameters, such as increasing in the retailer's risk aversion and salvage value, while decreasing in the initial capital and wholesale price. The multi-period model is a dynamical model described by the bounded rationality decision adjustment rules. We then investigate the complex dynamics they admit, such as period-doubling bifurcation and chaotic phenomena, and have found that the dynamical models experience more complex behaviour than their static counterpart. Furthermore, in the dynamical case, we could see periodic, bifurcating or chaotic changes in ordering quantity. We also investigate the influence of BGF on ordering quantity, which may lead to a risk-averse retailer to order aggressively. Finally, some numerical simulations are given to illustrate the theoretical results and some suggestions are also provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In practice, manufacturers sell products through online intermediaries (e.g., JD) that sell them to customers (reselling) or direct access to customers via intermediaries by paying a proportional fee (agency selling). Additionally, manufacturers can simultaneously employ reselling and agency selling, which we call hybrid selling. Motivated by practical examples in which these intermediaries possess superior demand information and choose whether to share it with their manufacturers, we develop a game-theoretic model to study the interplay between an intermediary's information-sharing and a manufacturer's selling format selection. When the information-sharing strategy is established before the selling format decision, it is always detrimental for the manufacturer to adopt the agency selling model. Specifically, the manufacturer should adopt the reselling (hybrid selling) model if the proportional fee is relatively large (small). Moreover, the intermediary should voluntarily share the information with the manufacturer if the fee is intermediate. When the information-sharing strategy is established after the selling format decision, the intermediary should not (should) disclose information, as the fee is relatively small (large) under the hybrid selling format. Additionally, the manufacturer could employ the agency selling (hybrid selling) model if the fee is sufficiently small and the competition intensity is relatively large (small). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]