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With the surge in cloud storage popularity, more individuals are choosing to store large amounts of data on remote cloud service providers (CSPs) to save local storage resources. However, users' primary worries revolve around maintaining data integrity and authenticity. Consequently, several cloud auditing methods have emerged to address these concerns. Many of these approaches rely on traditional public-key cryptography systems or are grounded in identity-based cryptography systems or certificateless cryptography systems. However, they are vulnerable to the increased costs linked with certificate management, key escrow, or the significant expenses of establishing a secure channel, respectively. To counter these limitations, Li et al. introduced a certificate-based cloud auditing protocol (LZ22), notable for its minimal tag generation overhead. Nonetheless, this protocol exhibits certain security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we devise a counterfeiting technique that allows the CSP to produce a counterfeit data block with an identical tag to the original one. Our counterfeiting method boasts a 100% success rate ∀ data block and operates with exceptional efficiency. The counterfeiting process for a single block of 10 kB, 50 kB, and 100 kB takes a maximum of 0.08 s, 0.51 s, and 1.04 s, respectively. By substituting the exponential component of homomorphic verifiable tags (HVTs) with non-public random elements, we formulate a secure certificate-based cloud auditing protocol. In comparison to the LZ22 protocol, the average tag generation overhead of our proposed protocol is reduced by 6.80%, 13.78%, and 8.66% for data sizes of 10 kB, 50 kB, and 100 kB, respectively. However, the auditing overhead of our proposed protocol shows an increase. The average overhead rises by 3.05%, 0.17%, and 0.45% over the LZ22 protocol's overhead for data sizes of 10 kB, 50 kB, and 100 kB, correspondingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE) supports arbitrary meaningful computations on encrypted data under different public keys even without access to the secret key, which is well tailored for the secure multiparty computation scenarios. Based on the Gentry–Sahai–Waters scheme (a single-key FHE in Crypto 2013) with the underlying learning with errors problem, MW16 scheme (Eurocrypt 2016) utilizes the method of 'linear combination procedure' (LCP) as a subroutine to construct the auxiliary information for the expanded ciphertexts of MFHE scheme. However, every party shares a common random string (CRS) to be distributed by a trusted setup, which is unpractical. Meanwhile, the noise in the auxiliary information is too much compared with the one in fresh ciphertexts. In this paper, we propose a modified MFHE scheme in the plain model, i.e. without CRS, to enhance the practicability of MFHE. Specifically, every involved party generates his own public key independent on a CRS. Then a potential improvement on the LCP is developed to provide auxiliary information, which largely reduces the noise and leads to a smaller modulus for our MFHE. Furthermore, the feasibility of our proposal is also proved by theoretical performance comparisons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]